













*THE "CHANDOS CLASSICS"*

HISTORY  
OF THE  
WAR IN THE PENINSULA  
AND IN THE  
SOUTH OF FRANCE

*FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814*

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. F. P. NAPIER, K.C.B.

COLONEL 27TH REGIMENT

*WITH FIFTY-FIVE MAPS AND PLANS*

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# HISTORY

OF THE

## PENINSULA WAR.

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### BOOK THE ELEVENTH.

#### CHAPTER V.

DURING the siege of Rodrigo, an expedition sailing from Coruña under Porlier seized and dismantled Santona and other points on the coast. Mahi, coming down from the Gallician mountains, also menaced Astorga; and part of his army, under Toboado Gil, occupied Puebla de Senabria to act in concert with Silveira. Mahi's movements were unopposed by Kellerman and Serras during the siege of Rodrigo, because the first being at Baños was too distant, and the latter's troops were too widely spread; but when the fortress fell, the eighth corps repassed the Tormes to gather provisions, which enabled Serras to concentrate and drive Mahi back to the hills. Toboado Gil then removed his stores from Puebla de Senabria, and drew closer to Silveira in expectation of an attack; but Serras put a Swiss battalion and sixty dragoons into Puebla and fell back to Zamora, the eighth corps returned to the Agueda, and these were the only Spanish efforts to draw off any of the besiegers from Rodrigo, and give the English general an opportunity of succouring it.

Meanwhile Bonnet having defeated the Asturians at Sales, entered Castropol on the frontier of Galicia, but returned to Oviedo on hearing of the expedition to Santona; the Spaniards then re-embarked for Coruña and the project of a



larger armament, to be directed against Santander itself, was adopted; for the success of this small enterprise had elated the allies, and Mahi boasted, that if arms and ammunition were supplied by England he would clear the plains of Leon as far as the Esla river: his proposals were acceded to, and sir Home Popham was appointed to superintend a great naval expedition against the Asturian and Biscay coasts.

Reynier now passed the Tagus. He had collected boats at Barca de Alconete in June, expecting to be joined by the French column from Andalusia; but hearing it was attacked by Mendizabel at Los Santos the 23rd of that month marched to its succour. Lacy's expedition to the Ronda had just then drawn Mortier from Seville; the French on the Odiel had fallen back to the Tinto, and Copons was foraging about the former river. Reynier thought the crisis formidable, and instead of returning to the Tagus sought to surprise Imas; failing in that he pushed across the Morena against Ballesteros, who was at Campo Frio and only saved himself by a hasty flight into Portugal. Lacy, as before said, was soon beaten from the Ronda, Mortier returned to Seville, Huelva and Moguer were re-occupied, and Reynier resumed his project for passing the Tagus at Alconete, where his boats remained, the Spaniards having neglected the opportunity for destroying them.

To cover his movement ~~from Hill~~, then at Campo Mayor, Reynier placed a rear-guard on the Salor, and Kellerman came from Baños to Coria to awe the Portuguese on the Elga. On the 10th the passage was effected by the main body; on the 16th by the rear-guard, which thus escaped Hill and Romana, who being united and advancing to gather the harvest for victualling Badajos and the other fortresses, had designed to fight. Reynier's movement forced Hill to make a parallel march by Vilha Velha, which only required thirty-six hours, and meanwhile Wellington had assembled at Thomar, under general Leith, a reserve of eight thousand Portuguese, and two thousand British troops just arrived from England. When Reynier reached Coria he detached troops by Perales upon Sabugal, but recalled them on finding Hill was close at hand, and the two generals then

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faced each other. Hill, reinforced by the Portuguese cavalry under general Fane, encamped sixteen thousand men with eighteen guns at Sarzedas, having the Sobreira Formosa close behind; his advanced guard was in Castello Branco, his horsemen on the Ponçul; and a Portuguese brigade of infantry was detached to Fundao to cover the Estrada Nova and communicate with Guarda: general Leith immediately adopted the line of the Zezere, in support of Hill, and thus twenty-six thousand regulars, aided by the militia, were between Reynier and Lisbon. That general made a demonstration on the side of Salvatierra but was repulsed by some Portuguese cavalry, and then dividing his forces between Penamacor and Zarza Mayor, established a small post on the left bank of the Tagus near the mouth of the Rio del Monte, and by continual movement rendered it doubtful whether he meant to repass the Tagus, to advance upon Sarzedas, or to join Massena. Meanwhile Ballesteros returned to Aracena, and Romana sent Inas to Xeres de los Cavalleros, O'Donnell to Truxillo, and Carlos d'España to surprise Reynier's post on the Rio del Monte; yet he soon recalled these detachments because Mortier was preparing to re-enter Estremadura. Such was the state of affairs in August, when Massena, assured of Reynier's aid, invested Almeida, which produced Craufurd's action on the Coa, during which Loison, thinking the governor a native, pressed him to desert the English, 'that vile people whose object was to enslave Portugal.'

Wellington's situation was embarrassing. Ciudad Rodrigo furnished the French with a place of arms, they might disregard Almeida, and their tardy investment, viewed in conjunction with the great magazines collecting at Ciudad Rodrigo, indicated an intention of so doing. Ney's corps and the reserve cavalry were indeed around Almeida, but by telegraphic intercourse with the place, it was known the investment was not real, and that the heads of the columns pointed towards Celorico. Loison's advanced guard entered Pinhel the day after Craufurd's action, Reynier's troops were divided between Zarza Mayor and Penamacor, and having boats near Alcantara on the Tagus, menaced equally the line of that river and the line of the Zezere: it was as likely Massena would join

Reynier, as that Reynier would join Massena. A letter containing Napoleon's orders for Reynier to invade by the line of Abrantes, while Mortier entered the Alemtejo and Massena acted by the valley of the Mondego, was intercepted; but Reynier was by the same letter placed under Massena's command, Mortier was not in a condition to move against the Alemtejo, and no certain notion of the enemy's intention could be formed. Junot, Serras and Kellerman were between the Tormes and the Esula, and might break into the northern provinces of Portugal, while Ney and Reynier held the allies in check; and this was the surest course, because the taking of Oporto would have furnished many resources, stricken the natives with terror, dispersed the northern militia, opened the great coast-road to Lisbon, and enabled Massena to avoid all the difficult country about the Mondego. The English general must then have retired before the second and sixth corps, unless he attacked Ney; an unpromising measure, because of the enemy's strength in horse; in fine, Massena, though dilatory, had one hundred and sixteen thousand men and the initial power: the English general was forced to await his movements.

The actual position of the allies was too extended and too forward, yet to retire at once would have seemed timid; hence Wellington remained quiet during the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, although the enemy's posts were thickening on the Pinhel river. The 28th, the British cavalry advanced to Freixadas, the infantry withdrew behind the Mondego, Cole only remaining at Guarda. Craufurd occupied Celorico, the other divisions were at Penhancos, Carapichina, and Fornos, the Portuguese a day's march behind. The sick were sent daily to the rear, the line of retreat kept free from encumbrance, the army ready for action. In this state the enemy made a demonstration towards St. Joa de Pesquera and defeated some militia at Fosboa on the Douro, after which he retired across the Coa, and the communication with Almeida was again open. A detachment of Reynier's horse, encountered at Atalaya near Fundao, was beaten by the Portuguese cavalry and ordenança, with a loss of fifty killed or taken, and the French withdrew from Penamacor.

On the side of Galicia, Kellerman entered Castro Contrijo, and part of Serras' troops, advancing towards Monterey, ordered provisions for ten thousand men on the road to Braganza. Silveira immediately marched against Puebla de Senabria, drove off the French cavalry and invested the Swiss on the 7th. They capitulated on the 10th at the moment when Serras, who had so carelessly left them there, was coming to their relief: five hundred men and an eagle were thus captured. Silveira in his foolish pride would then have given battle to the French, and when Beresford, dreading mischief, sent him imperative orders to retreat, he obeyed in so slovenly a manner as to abandon his rear-guard under J. Wilson, who nevertheless saved it in circumstances of such trying difficulty that he received the public thanks of the marshal. This advantage in the north was balanced by a disaster in Estremadura. The Spanish generals, never much disposed to respect Wellington's counsels, were now discontented by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. He had pressed upon Romana the policy of avoiding battles, had obtained Campo Mayor for him as a place of arms, with leave to retire there when over-matched by the enemy, and he had shown him that Hill's departure greatly augmented the necessity of caution. Romana, despising this counsel, joined Ballesteros, and their united forces amounted to eighteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, besides partidas. Wellington foreseeing then they would offer battle, be defeated, and thus lay open the Alemtejo, ordered Hill to send Madden's Portuguese cavalry in all haste to their succour, and that officer reached Campo Mayor the 14th, but he was too late; Romana's van-guard, under Mendizabel, had been defeated at Benvenida by Mortier on the 11th, with a loss of six hundred men, and was going to surrender when Carrera coming up with the Spanish cavalry disengaged it. The whole then retreated across the Morena to Monte Molin and Fregenal, pursued by the French, who slew or took four hundred: the next day Mortier entered Zafra and Romana retired to Almodralejos. This check shook the defence of Portugal to its centre. There was nothing to prevent Mortier penetrating to the lower Tagus, and thus drawing Wellington from Beira, before the measures for laying waste the country were ripe for

execution. But a counter-check of a like nature arrested Mortier. Lacy, sailing from Cadiz under the convoy of captain Cockburn of the British navy, landed three thousand men near Moguer, and drove the duke of Aremberg towards Seville while Copons drove general Remond upon Zalamea; the French indeed rallied and forced Lacy to re-embark, but on the first alarm Mortier was recalled to the Morena, and Romana once more occupied Zafra. This affair at Moguer was contemptible in itself, yet the check it gave to Mortier's progress, and a very timid despatch from captain Cockburn gave it a momentary celebrity.

Massena had been waiting for Mortier's co-operation, and on the day the latter entered Zafra the sixth corps formally invested Almeida. Wellington immediately brought up the Portuguese army to Celorico, Gouvea, Melho, and Trancoso, while the British troops occupied Pinhel, Freixadas, and Guarda. In these positions, expecting a vigorous defence from Almeida, he hoped to delay the enemy for two months, when the rainy season would give him farther advantages in defence of the country. His original intention had been to keep the light division always on the Cabeça Negro, a rugged hill overhanging the bridge of the Coa, expecting thus to keep open his communication with the fortress, or to make the French invest the place with their whole army. Craufurd's rashness marred this plan; and his despondency after the action on the 24th, rendered it imprudent to renew the project. Yet Massena's tardiness and the small force with which he finally invested the place, led Wellington again to think of assembling secretly a large and chosen body of men behind the Cabeça Negro, with the view of suddenly forcing the bridge and the fords and taking the French battering train; but while revolving this great stroke in his mind a terrible disaster broke his measures.

#### SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.

This fortress was garrisoned by four thousand Portuguese regulars and militia under the English colonel Cox. Although regularly constructed with six bastions, ravelins, an excellent

ditch and covered way, it was extremely defective. The ramparts were too high for the glacis, and from some near ground the bottom of the ditch might be seen. An old square castle, built on a mound in the centre of the town, contained three bomb proofs, the doors of which were not secure, and with the exception of some damp casemates in one bastion, there was no other magazine for the powder.

On the 18th, ground was broke under cover of a false attack, and in the morning of the 26th, sixty-five pieces of artillery, opening at once, set many houses in flames, which the garrison was unable to extinguish. The counter-fire was however briskly maintained and very little military damage was sustained. Towards evening the cannonade slackened, but just after dark the ground suddenly trembled, the castle bursting into a thousand pieces gave vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a prodigious noise the whole town sunk into a shapeless ruin! Treason or accident had caused the magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible. The ramparts were breached, the guns thrown into the ditch, five hundred people were struck dead on the instant, and only six houses were left standing: the stones thrown out hurt forty of the besiegers in the trenches, and the surviving garrison, aghast at the horrid commotion, disregarded all exhortations to rally. Cox fearing the enemy would take the opportunity to storm the ramparts, beat to arms, and running to the walls, with the help of an artillery officer, fired off the few guns that remained. No attack was made, but the French shells fell thickly all the night, and in the morning of the 27th, two officers appeared at the gates, bearing a letter from Massena with an offer of terms. Further resistance was impossible, but the governor, thinking if he could impose on the enemy for two days the army might succour him, was in the act of rejecting the offer, when a mutiny, openly fomented by the lieutenant-governor Bernardo da Costa, privately by Josef Barciros the chief of the artillery, who had corresponded secretly with the French, broke out. The other native officers, disturbed by fear or swayed by the influence of those two, were more willing to follow than to oppose their dishonourable proceedings, and Costa expressed his resolution to hoist the

white flag. Cox, unsupported except by the British captain Hewit, and seeing no remedy of force, endeavoured to procrastinate; he was ignorant of Bareiros' proceedings, and sent him with counter-proposals to the French camp, but the traitor immediately informed Massena of the true state of the garrison and never returned; the place then capitulated; the militia to return to their homes, the regulars to remain prisoners of war.

While the treaty was pending, and even after the signature of the articles, in the night of the 27th, the French bombarded the place. This act equally unjustifiable and strange, because Massena's aide-de-camp, colonel Pelet, was actually within the walls when the firing commenced, was excused on

Justification  
of colonel  
W. Cox.

Note by general Pelet,  
appended to  
Vol. XII.  
*Victoires et  
Conquêtes  
des Français.*

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspondence,  
MSS.

the ground of an error in the transmission of orders; yet it lasted during the whole night, and Cox asserts that the terms of the capitulation with respect to the militia were also violated. Pelet indignantly denies this charge. He says the garrison seeing the marquis of Alorna, their countryman, amongst the French generals, offered for the most part to serve, and this version is corroborated by two facts. The 24th Portuguese regiment certainly took service with the French in a body, and Massena released the Arganil regiment of

militia who refused to do so. Yet, so easily are men's minds moved by present circumstances, that the greater number deserted again when they saw the allied armies. Bareiros joined the enemy and escaped punishment; Da Costa was, long afterwards, shot by order of marshal Beresford, and his cowardice and mutiny merited death; yet the only evidence produced against him was an explanatory letter, written to lord Liverpool by Cox while a prisoner at Verdun. The explosion, the disappearance of the steeple and cessation of fire, proclaimed the fall of Almeida in the allied camp; but the surrender was first ascertained by Wellington on the 29th, when, with a telescope, he observed many French officers on the glacis of the place. Then he withdrew to his former position behind the Mondego; and while this happened on the Coa, the powder magazine in Albuquerque,

struck with lightning, also exploded and killed four hundred men.

Reynier now made demonstrations towards Castello Branco, in one of which he lost a squadron of horse; but the 1st of September he suddenly entered Sabugal, and the British piquets on the Pinhel river were driven in the following day by Ney. Massena's plans then seemed ripe for execution, and Wellington, transferring head-quarters to Govea, withdrew his infantry behind Celorico, leaving the cavalry in front of that place with posts of observation on the flanks, at Guarda and Trancoso: but Reynier returned to Zarza Mayor, and throwing a bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara again involved the French projects in obscurity.

Massena, chilled by age and honours, was wasting time. He found it difficult to feed his troops, was disinclined to invade so late in the year, and undecided as to the mode, for his knowledge of the country was derived entirely from Alorna and Pamplona. It was two months since Ciudad Rodrigo fell, Almeida had only resisted ten days, yet the French army was still behind the Coa; and a second intercepted letter, dictated by Napoleon in September, indicated his fear of further inaction: 'Lord Wellington,' he observed to Massena, 'has only eighteen thousand men, Hill has only six thousand; it would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty-five thousand English can balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall boldly on after having *well observed where the blow may be given*. You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times as much artillery as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, and with the rest commence operations. The emperor is too distant, and the positions of the enemy change too often to direct how you should attack; but it is certain the utmost force the English can muster, including the troops at Cadiz, will be twenty-eight thousand men.' This letter was accurate as to the numbers of the English army, but Napoleon was ignorant how strongly Wellington had secured Portugal in the rear; and before his letter arrived, Massena had commenced the invasion. A remarkable event in the world's history it



proved, and it is essential to a clear understanding of the operations which followed to describe the country in which they were conducted.

It has been shown that the advanced positions of the allies extended from Almeida across the Sierra de Estrella, by Guarda, to Fundao, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco, thus guarding at each side of the Estrella the two great entrances to Portugal by the Beira frontier. A serious attack at either side was to be the signal for a gradual concentric retreat of the army towards Lisbon. Guarda, the connecting point, was however to be held to the last moment; because from thence the enemy could, while menacing Celorico, move secretly by Belmonte and Covilhao between Hill and Wellington, whose distance from each other was double that of such a march. It was to balance this disadvantage, the Covilhao road had been broken up, and a brigade from Hill's corps stationed at Fundao. Two entrenched positions also were formed, between which Leith's reserve was placed. The first behind the Zezere extending from its confluence with the Tagus to the Barca de Codices. The second behind the Alva, a stream descending from the Estrella, and falling into the Mondego a few miles above Coimbra. Both positions were strong, the covering rivers deep, swift, and difficult of access, and the Alva was hugged on the left bank by the rugged Sierra de Murcella. During the spring and summer the militia destined to reinforce Leith on the Zezere had been kept in winter quarters, because money could not be obtained from the English ministers to bring them into the field until the last moment: they were now however placed in second line to support Hill, who could fall back on the Zezere from Sarzedas, and gain the Alva by the military road of Espinal. •


It has been shown that from Celorico to the Alva, sixty miles, the road is a long defile between the Sierra Estrella and the Mondego; the ridge upon which Celorico stands, being a shoot from the Estrella, closes this defile at one end and is covered by the Mondego; the Sierra Murcella covered by the Alva closes it at the other end. The principal road leading through this defile had been repaired and joined to

the military road of Espinal, having a branch also carried across the Mondego to Coimbra, and thus an internal communication was established for the junction of all the corps. Between Celorico and the Alva, the country was not permanently tenable, because from Guarda and Covilhao roads led over the Estrella to Gouvea, Cea, and Gallices, in rear of Celorico; and the enemy could also turn the whole tract by moving through Trancoso and Viseu, and so down the right bank of the Mondego to Coimbra. But while the head of the army was one march behind Celorico, in observation of the flanking routes over the Estrella, and the rear close to the Alva, the line was safe; and as the Mondego was fordable in summer, and bridged at several places, it could be passed in a few hours to meet the enemy on the right bank, where the road, the worst in Portugal, was crossed by several deep streams, as the Criz and Dao, and was a long defile between the Mondego and the Sierra de Alcoba or Caramula: there also a transverse ridge, called the Sierra de Busaco, seemingly a prolongation of the Murella, barred the way to Coimbra. The Caramula extending from the Douro to Coimbra separated the Mondego valley from the coast line; but it had breaks, and one near Viseu by which the French could gain the royal road from Oporto, and so reaching Coimbra, turn Busaco: in this system the weakest point was Guarda, and the mass of the allied force was kept on that side with a cavalry post in the town.


Massena, ill-acquainted with the military features of Portugal, was absolutely ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras. So circumspectly had those works been carried on, that only vague rumours of their existence reached the bulk of the English army; neither the Portuguese government, nor the British envoy, although aware great defensive works were constructing, knew their nature: they imagined the entrenchments immediately round Lisbon were the lines! Many British officers laughed at the notion of remaining in Portugal; the major part supposed the campaign on the frontier to be only a decent cloak to cover the shame of an embarkation. In England the opposition asserted that Wellington would embark; the Portuguese dreaded it, the French army

universally believed it; and the English ministers entertained the same opinion; for at this time an officer of engineers arrived at Lisbon, whose instructions, received personally from lord Liverpool, were unknown to Wellington, and commenced thus ;—‘ As it is probable the army will embark in September.’





OPERATIONS  
on the  
MONDEGO  
1810.



BATTLE OF  
BUSACO.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

MASSENA's command extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos. His troops under arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men; but thirteen thousand were in the Asturias and the province of Santander; four thousand in the government of Valladolid; eight thousand under Serras, at Zamora and Benevente; nineteen thousand under Drouet at Bayonne. This last named body entered Spain in August as the ninth corps, but though replaced at Bayonne by another reserve under Caffarelli, it did not join Massena until long afterwards; his efficient troops were not more than seventy thousand, and as every man, combatant or non-combatant, is borne on the strength of a French army, only fifty-five thousand bayonets and eight thousand sabre-men were with the eagles. The ninth corps had however orders to follow his march, and the void thus made at Burgos and Valladolid was filled by sixteen thousand of the young guard. This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon has been called a rash warrior, never thinking of retreat; no man ever made bolder marches, yet no man secured his base with more care. Here, he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests until his line of communication had been strengthened with three additional fortresses,—namely, Astorga, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida; and while he employed sixty-five thousand men in the invasion of Portugal, he kept more than eighty thousand in reserve. The total loss of the army destined to make what is technically termed 'a point' upon Lisbon, would, as a mere military disaster, have scarcely shaken his hold of Spain.

Massena's instructions were, to convert Ciudad Rodrigo

and Almeida into places of arms, and move on both sides of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of September. But thinking his force too weak to act upon two lines at the same time, or trusting to the co-operation of Soult, he relinquished the Alentejo, and looked only to the northern bank of the Tagus; and as Junot's march in 1807 warned him off the Sobreira mountains, his views were confined to the three roads of Belmonte, Celorico, and Viseu. The strength of the position behind the Alva river was known to him, as were also the impediments to his descent from Covilhao upon Espinhal; but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese in the French camp asserted with singular ignorance, that the road by Viseu to Coimbra along the right bank of the Mondego was easy, and no important position covered the latter town. The French general thus deceived, resolved suddenly to assemble all his forces, distribute thirteen days' bread, and rush in one mass down the right of the Mondego, not doubting to reach Coimbra before Hill could join lord Wellington. In this view, the three corps were directed to concentrate on the 16th of September; Reynier's at Guarda, Ney's and the heavy cavalry at Maçã de Chão, Junot's at Pinhel. By this disposition all three roads were menaced, and the allies kept in suspense as to the ultimate object; Massena thus hoped to gain one march, a great thing, seeing that from Coimbra he was not more than a hundred miles, whereas Hill's distance from that town was greater. To cover his real project and to keep Hill as long as possible at Sarzedas, he caused the town of Guarda to be seized on the 12th, by a detachment, which however withdrew again as if it were only a continuation of former feints: meanwhile Reynier, having ascertained that Mortier was at Monasterio, menacing Estremadura, destroyed his boat-bridge at Alcantara, and marched rapidly towards Sabugal.

On the 13th the allies re-established their post at Guarda. On the 15th, it was again driven away by a considerable mass of the enemy and retired up the side of the Estrella; the cavalry in front of Celorico was also forced back in the centre, and the post at Trancoso chased towards Mongualde on the left. Wellington then felt assured the invasion was in serious

progress, and having ascertained that the troops in Guarda were of Reynier's corps, despatched his final orders for Hill and Leith to concentrate on the Alva. On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda to the low parts bordering the Mondego, where he was joined by Ney's corps and Montbrun's cavalry, and the whole passed the river. Pushing through Celorico their horsemen drove back the cavalry posts of the allies to the village of Cortiço, but the first German hussars turned there and charged the leading squadrons making some prisoners. The road divaricated to Fornos on the right, to Gouvea on the left, and a French brigade advanced along the latter to cover the march of the main body towards Fornos, but this feint was soon discovered; for there is a custom, peculiar to the British army, of sending mounted officers, good riders, singly to observe the enemy's motions; they will penetrate through the midst of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement, and hover almost within musket-shot on the skirts of his columns to learn his numbers and the true direction of his march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring officers, being on the left of Reynier's troops this day, soon noticed the movement on Fornos and following with some German cavalry, made several prisoners and took the baggage of a general. The French operations being thus opened, Wellington made the first, third, and fourth divisions march towards the Alva, withdrew the heavy cavalry from the front, and placed the light division at St. Romao in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, which were transferred that night to Cea.

The 17th, the second and sixth corps passed the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard approached Mongualde. The eighth corps kept on the road leading towards Oporto, to observe ten thousand of the northern militia who under the command of Trant, J. Wilson, and Miller, were collected to harass Massena's right flank and rear. Trant was already at Moimenta de Beira in the defiles leading through the hills to Lamego, the ordenança were all in arms, the country on both sides of the Mondego laid waste, the mills destroyed, and the helpless part of the population hidden amongst the highest mountains. •

On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached the



deserted city of Viseu, and Pack's Portuguese brigade was sent across the Mondego at Fosdao to the Criz, while general Pakenham entered Coimbra with a brigade of the first division. On the 19th, captain Somers Cocks, a gallant and zealous officer, who commanded the cavalry post driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, and following the enemy through Celorico ascertained that neither sick men nor stores were left behind: hence it was evident that Massena, relinquishing his communications, had thrown his cavalry, infantry, artillery, parcels, baggage and hospital waggons, in one mass upon the worst road in Portugal!

Wellington was in motion to cross the Mondego, when a false report that the enemy was again on the left bank arrested the movement. The next day the truth became known, and the third, fourth, and light divisions, and the British cavalry, passed the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, and other places. The light division marched to Mortagao in support of Pack, the third and fourth entered the villages between the Sierra de Busaco and Mortagao, the horsemen occupied a plain between the light division and Pack's brigade. But now the eighth corps pointed towards the valley of the Vouga, and thus rendered it doubtful whether Massena would not that way gain the main road from Oporto to Coimbra. Spencer moved therefore with the first division upon Milheada, and Trant was directed to join him by a march through San Pedro de Sul and Sardao. Meanwhile Leith arrived on the Alva, and Hill was only one march behind; for having discovered Reynier's movements on the 12th, and hearing that the French boats on the Tagus had been destroyed, he with ready decision, anticipating orders, sent his artillery by Thomar, and marching rapidly with his troops by the military way reached Espinal the evening of the 20th: there he was joined by general Lecor, who with equal vigour and judgment had brought the Portuguese brigade by long marches from Fundao. The 21st, Hill reached the Alva and pushed his cavalry in observation beyond that river; thus the whole of the allied army was united on the very day the main body of the enemy entered Viseu: the French horsemen were indeed on the Criz, but the bridges had been destroyed by Pack, and the project of surprising Coimbra was baffled.

Nor had Massena escaped other evil consequences from his false movement. Forced to repair the road from day to day for his artillery it was twenty miles from Viseu on the 19th, and Trant formed the hardy project of destroying it. Quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night with a squadron of cavalry, two thousand militia and five guns, he passed between the convoy and the army, and on the 20th surprised a patrol of ten men, from whom he learned that the guns were close at hand and Montbrun's cavalry in their rear. The enterprise was serious, but the defiles were narrow, and charging the head of the escorting troops he took a hundred prisoners with some baggage. The convoy fell back, Trant followed, and such was the ruggedness of the defile that Montbrun's cavalry could never get to the front. The French were in disorder, and a resolute attack would have ruined them, when the militia became alarmed and unmanageable; the enemy then repulsed the Portuguese horsemen with a loss of twelve troopers, and Trant seeing nothing more could be effected returned to Moimenta de Beira and from thence marched to Lamego with his prisoners. Montbrun, ignorant of the number and quality of the assailants, fell back, and the artillery did not reach Viseu until the 23rd, whereby Massena lost two most important days.

While these events were passing in the valley of the Mondego, a small expedition from Cadiz again landed at Moguer to aid Copons in collecting provisions on the Tinto; it was however quickly obliged to reembark, and Copons was defeated by general Remond with the loss of three hundred men on the 15th. Meanwhile Romana attacked the French posts near Monasterio and pushed his cavalry towards Seville, whereupon Soult sent Mortier against him, and he was beaten at Fuente de Cantos on the same day that Copons had been defeated on the Tinto. The pursuit was continued to Fuente del Maestre, and the whole army was like to disperse in flight, when Madden's Portuguese cavalry coming up charged the pursuers with signal gallantry, overthrew the leading squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the French entered Zafra, and Romana retreated by Almendralejo and Merida to Mon-

tijo on the 18th, throwing us he passed a garrison into Olivenza and three battalions into Badajoz, which was however so little able to resist that he sent the junta to Valencia de Alcantara and took refuge himself under the guns of Elvas. Wellington's anticipations were thus realized and the Alemtejo laid open. Fortunately Sebastiani was at this moment near Carthagena in pursuit of the Murcian army, and a fresh insurrection had broken out in the Grenada mountains, where the French posts of Motril and Almunecar were taken. Copons also advanced to the Tinto, and these events falling at one time prevented Soult from sending more than twelve thousand men to Estremadura; a force inadequate to the invasion of the Alentejo, because several British regiments withdrawn from Cadiz, and others coming from England, reached Lisbon about this period, and formed a reserve of more than five thousand good troops. Wherefore the French, who were suffering from sickness, returned to Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to Xeres de los Cavalleros and Aracena, and this dangerous crisis glided gently away. But to understand its importance, it is necessary to show how increasing political embarrassments had thwarted the original plan of the English general.

Although the first vexatious interference of the Souza faction had been checked, the loss of Almeida furnished a favourable opportunity to renew their clamorous hostility to the military proceedings. Falsely asserting that the

Mr. Stuart's  
papers, MSS.

provisions of that fortress had been carried away by the English commissaries, and as falsely pretending that Wellington had promised to raise the siege, this party hypocritically assumed, that his expressions of sorrow for its fall were assurances of an intention to remove by a splendid victory the public despondency. They insisted therefore that the frontier

Appendix 21,  
§ 2. Vol. II

Mr. Stuart's  
Papers, MSS.

should be defended, inveighed against the destruction of the mills, endeavoured to force their own fidalgo faction on to the staff of Beresford, to embarrass the operations, and even proposed to have the fleet and transports sent away from the Tagus! But, neglecting or delaying the measures agreed upon for laying waste the

country, they protected the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained from punishing delinquents, and took every occasion to mislead the public mind when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor was there wanting either accident or indiscretion to increase the growing confusion.

When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards, writing to a friend at Oporto, indiscreetly declared that Massena was advancing in front with a hundred thousand men, and eighty thousand more were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. This letter was made public, and created such a panic amongst the English merchants at Oporto that one and all applied for ships to carry their families and property away; and such a tumult ensued, that Trant, who was still governor, had to quit the field to suppress the commotion. To dry up this spring of mischief Wellington announced in general orders that he would not even seek for the authors of that and similar letters, being assured their sense and feeling would prevent a continuance of such pernicious correspondence. This appeal had a good effect.

To the regency he addressed a more peremptory rebuke. Reproving them for the false colouring given to his communications, he declared, 'he would never permit public clamour and panic to induce him to change in the smallest degree a system and plan of operation which he had adopted after mature consideration, and which daily experience proved to be the only one likely to produce a good end.' This only increased the virulence of his opponents, and before he reached Busaco, he was forced to tell them, 'their miserable intrigues must cease or he would advise his own government to withdraw the British army.' These factious proceedings had however been so mischievously successful, that the country between the Mondego the Tagus and the Lines, still contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing winter; and between fighting the invaders on the Mondego, or wasting the country by force as he retreated, the English general had then to choose. But what an act the last! Final success depended on the moral strength he could call forth, and he would have had to retire with a mixed force, his rear-guard engaged daily with a powerful army, his advanced guard driving unhappy multitudes

before it to the capital, where no preparation was made to save them from famine; but where a violent powerful faction was ready to misrepresent every proceeding and inflame the people's minds. And this when the court of Rio Janeiro was discontented, and the English ministers were panic-stricken by the desponding letters of general officers immediately about the head-quarters of the commander-in-chief! It was necessary therefore to fight, although the French marshal had sixty-five thousand veterans, and only fifty thousand troops, half of them untried, could be opposed to him. It was necessary to fight, though the battle was not to be estimated by the result of the fighting. Massena might by victory gain everything; a defeat would scarcely hurt him; a serious check might send him from Coimbra to Oporto, where he would be more formidable,—where he could feed and be strongly reinforced. But the English general's resources could not be much improved; and he could scarcely expect that England or Portugal would endure a war without any palpable advantage to balance the misery and expense.

While Massena remained at Viseu, Spencer held Milheada with the first division, observing the great road from Oporto; the light division was at Mortagao, watching the road from Viseu; the remainder of the army was in reserve ready to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard repaired the bridges over the Criz and passed that river, the first division was recalled, and the Sierra de Busaco chosen for the position of battle. This mountain, eight miles in length, abuts with its right on the Mondego, while its left is connected with the Sierra de Caramula by a rugged country impervious to the march of an army. A road along the crest afforded an easy communication from right to left; and behind the ridge on the right, the ford of Pena Cova furnished a passage over the Mondego to the Alva. The face of Busaco was steep, rough, and fit for defence; the artillery of the allies, placed on certain salient points could play along the front, and there was some ground on the summit suitable for a small body of cavalry. But neither guns nor horsemen on the French side had a field, and their infantry were to contend with every difficulty of approach and attack.

After passing the Criz, a table-land permitted Massena to march with a wide order of battle to Mortagao; but from thence, a succession of ridges led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated from the last by a chasm, so profound the naked eye could hardly distinguish the movement of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so narrow that twelve-pounders could range across. From Mortagao four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first, unfrequented and narrow, crossed the Caramula to Boyalva, a village situated on the western slope of that sierra, and from thence led to Sardao and Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through the rough ground in front, passed over the Sierra de Busaco; one by a large convent, fronting the enemy's right, and on the highest point; another on his left, by a village called St. Antonio de Cantara; the third, a branch from the second, being still more to his left, followed the Mondego to Pena Cova. When this formidable position was chosen, some officers expressed their fears that Massena would not assail it. 'But if he does, I shall beat him,' was the reply of the English general. He was however well assured the prince, whose advanced guard was already over the Criz, would attack. The second and sixth corps were massed behind that stream, and Massena was not likely, merely at the sight of a strong position, to make a retrograde movement and adopt a new line of operations by the Vouga, which would be exposed to Baccellar's militia: he was indeed anxious for a battle, but being still misled by Alorna and Pamplona as to the topography, was convinced Wellington would retreat and embark.

## CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL PACK having destroyed the bridges on the Criz fell back on the light division, but the French restored them the 23rd and drove the British cavalry into the hills behind Mortagao. Six or seven squadrons were retained there, the rest went to the low country about Milheada, from whence Spencer was recalled to Busaco; Picton and Cole also took post on that position, the former at St. Antonio de Cantara, the latter at the convent. The light division encamped in a pine wood, where happened one of those extraordinary panics attributed in ancient times to the influence of a god. No enemy was near, no alarm given, yet suddenly the troops, as if seized with a frenzy, started from sleep and dispersed in every direction; nor was there any possibility of allaying this strange terror until some persons called out that the enemy's cavalry were amongst them, when the soldiers mechanically run together, and the illusion was dissipated. On the 24th the French skirmished with the piquets, the division retired leisurely to some strong ground four miles in the rear, and towards evening some French cavalry, venturing too close, were charged by a squadron of the 14th and lost thirty men.

Next morning Craufurd moved to the low ground in front and seemed disposed to renew the fault of the Coa. The French cavalry were gathering thickly, and three columns of infantry were descried on the table-land above Mortagao coming on all abreast with an impetuous pace, while behind them clouds of dust loading the atmosphere for miles, showed that the whole army had passed the Criz and was in march to attack. The horsemen were actually exchanging pistol-shots, when Wellington arrived and taking the command in person made the division retire, covered by the 52nd, the rifles, and Ross's battery. It was a timely interference, for the French brought

up guns and infantry so quickly, that all the skill of the general and the readiness of the troops could scarcely evade a disaster. Howbeit a series of rapid evolutions under a sharp cannonade placed the division in an hour safely on the Busaco Sierra, and the opposite ridge was immediately crowned by the masses of the sixth corps, the French batteries opening while the English troops were yet ascending the position. Reynier, pursuing a Portuguese battalion, arrived about the same time at Antonio de Cantara in front of Picton, and before three o'clock forty thousand French infantry were embattled on the two points, their guns trying the range above, while the skirmishing clatter of musketry arose from the dark-wooded chasms beneath. Ney, whose military glance was sure, instantly perceived that the mountain, a crested not a table one, could hide no great reserves, that it was only half-occupied, and that the allies were moving with the disorder usual on the taking unknown ground. He wished therefore to attack, but Massena was ten miles in rear, the officer sent to him waited two hours for an audience, and then returned with an order to attend the prince's arrival. Thus a great opportunity was lost, for Spencer was not up, Leith's troops, now called the 5th division, were only passing the Mondego, and Hill was still behind the Alva. Scarcely twenty-five thousand men were in the line, and with great intervals.

Next day Reynier and Ney wrote in concert to Massena to urge an immediate attack; but he did not come up from Mortagao until twelve o'clock, bringing Appendix 2, § 3. with him Junot's corps and the cavalry, which he formed as a reserve to connect Ney's and Reynier's troops; then throwing out skirmishers along the whole front he carefully examined the allies' position. It was no longer denuded. Hill, having crossed the Mondego, was athwart the road leading over the sierra to the Pena Cova ford;—on his left Leith prolonged the line of defence, having the Lusitanian legion in reserve;—Picton, supported by Champlemond's Portuguese brigade, was next to Leith;—Spencer occupied the highest part of the ridge, between Picton and the convent. Cole was on the extreme left, covering a path leading to the flat country about Milheada. A regiment of heavy dragoons was in re-



serve on the summit of the sierra, and Pack's brigade and some other Portuguese troops were in front of Spencer half way down the mountain. On their left, the light division, supported by a German brigade and the nineteenth Portuguese regiment of the line, occupied a spur, jutting out nearly half a mile in front of but lower than the convent, the space between being scooped like the hollow of a wave before it breaks: the whole mountain side was covered with skirmishers, and fifty pieces of artillery were disposed upon the most salient points.

Ney was now averse to attack, but Massena resolved to storm the ridge. Reynier thinking he had only to deal with a rear-guard encouraged the prince; and the latter, too confident in the valour of his army and his own fortune, directed the second and sixth corps to fall on the next day, each to its own front, while the eighth corps the cavalry and the artillery remained in reserve. Towards dusk the light troops, dropping by twos and threes into the lowest parts of the valley, endeavoured to steal up the wooded dells and hollows, and establish themselves unseen close to the piquets of the light division; the riflemen and cazadores drove them back, but renewed attempts seemed to menace a night attack and excited all the vigilance of the troops. Yet only veterans tired of war could have slept while that serene sky glittered above, and the dark mountains were crowned with the innumerable bivouac fires of more than a hundred thousand warriors.

#### BATTLE OF BUSACO.

See Plan, page 13.

Before daybreak on the 29th, Ney planted three columns of attack opposite the convent, and Reynier planted two at Antonio de Cantara, those points being about three miles apart. Reynier's men, having easier ground to assail, were in the midst of the piquets and skirmishers of Picton's division almost as soon as they could be perceived in movement; and though the allies fought well, and six guns played along the ascent with grape, in less than half an hour the French were close upon the summit: so swiftly and with such astonishing power and resolution did they scale the mountain, overthrow-

ing everything that opposed their progress. The right centre of the third division was forced back, the eighth Portuguese regiment broken, the hostile masses gained the highest part of the crest, just between the third and the fifth divisions, and the leading battalions established themselves amongst the crowning rocks, while a confused mass in rear wheeled to the right, intending to sweep the summit of the sierra. At that moment Wellington caused two guns to open with grape upon their flank, a heavy musketry was poured into their front, and in a little time, the eighty-eighth regiment and a wing of the forty-fifth charged so furiously that even fresh men could not have withstood the shock; the French, spent with their previous efforts, gave way, and both parties went mingled together down the mountain side with a mighty clamour and confusion, their track being marked with dead and dying even to the bottom of the valley.

Meanwhile those French battalions which had first gained the crest, were formed across the ridge with their right resting upon a precipice overhanging the reverse side, and the position was in fact gained if any reserve had been at hand; for the greatest part of the third division, British and Portuguese, were fully engaged; some of the French skirmishers were descending the back of the position, and a misty cloud capped the summit, so that the hostile mass, ensconced amongst the rocks, could only be seen by general Leith. That officer, noticing the first impression made on Picton's division, had moved with a brigade to his aid; he had two miles of rugged ground to traverse on a narrow formation, but he was now coming on rapidly, and directed the thirty-eighth regiment to turn the French right flank while colonel Cameron with the ninth assailed their front. A precipice stopped the thirty-eighth, but Cameron, hearing from a staff-officer the critical state of affairs, formed line under a violent fire, and without returning a shot run in upon and drove the French grenadiers from the rocks with irresistible bravery; plying them with a destructive musketry as long as they could be reached, and yet with excellent discipline refraining from pursuit lest the crest of the position should be again lost: for the mountain was so rugged no general view could be taken. This secured the

victory, for Hill's corps had now edged in towards the scene of action, Leith's second brigade had joined the first, and a great mass of fresh troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had neither reserves nor guns to restore the fight.

Ney's attack had as little success. From the abutment of the mountain upon which the light division was stationed, the lowest parts of the valley could be discerned, the ascent was steeper than where Reynier had attacked, and Craufurd in a happy mood of command made masterly dispositions. The table land between him and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal the forty-third and fifty-second regiments drawn up in line; and a quarter of a mile behind them, on higher ground and close to the convent, the German infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance on this part of the position. In front of the British regiments, some rocks, overhanging the descent, furnished natural embrasures in which Ross's guns were placed, and beyond them the riflemen and caçadores were planted as skirmishers, covering the slope of the mountain.

While it was still dark a straggling musketry was heard in the deep valley, and when the light broke, three heavy masses, detached from the sixth corps, were seen to enter the woods below and throw forward a profusion of skirmishers. One of these, under general Marchand, emerging from the dark chasm and following the main road seemed intent to turn the right of the light division; a second under Loison made straight up the face of the mountain against the front, the third remained in reserve. Simon's brigade, leading Loison's attack, ascended with a wonderful alacrity, and though the light troops plied it unceasingly with musketry, and the artillery bullets swept through it from the first to the last section, its order was never disturbed nor its speed in the least abated. Ross's guns were worked with incredible quickness, yet their range was palpably contracted every round, the enemy's shot came singing up in a sharper key, the English skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge of the ascent, the artillery drew back, and the victorious cries of the French were heard within a few yards of the summit.

Craufurd, standing alone on one of the rocks, had been

intently watching the progress of this attack, and now with a shrill tone ordered the two regiments in reserve to charge! the next moment a horrid shout startled the French column and eighteen hundred British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. Yet so brave so hardy were the leading French, that each man of the first section raised his musket and two officers and ten soldiers fell before them. Not a Frenchman had missed his mark! They could do no more. The head of their column was violently thrown back upon the rear, both flanks were overlapped at the same moment by the English wings, three terrible discharges at five yards' distance shattered the wavering mass, and a long trail of broken arms and bleeding carcasses marked the line of flight. The main body of the British now stood fast, but some companies pursued down the mountain, whereupon Ney threw forward his reserve division, and opening his guns from the opposite heights killed some of the pursuers: thus warned they recovered their own ground, and the Germans were brought forward to the skirmish. During this fight a small flanking detachment, having passed round the right, rose near the convent and was gallantly charged and defeated by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment under colonel M'Bean.

Loison did not renew the action, but Marchand having formed several small bodies, gained a pine-wood half-way up the mountain on the right of the light division, and sent a cloud of skirmishers against the highest part; on that steep ascent however, Pack's men sufficed to hold them in check, and half a mile higher up Spencer showed a line of the foot-guards which forbid any hope of success. Craufurd's artillery also smote Marchand's people in the pine-wood, and Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining this murderous cannonade for an hour relinquished that attack also. The desultory fighting of the light troops then ceased, and at two o'clock parties from both armies were, under a momentary truce, mixed together carrying off wounded men. Towards evening a French company, with signal audacity, seized a village only half-musket shot from the light division, and refused to retire, whereupon Craufurd turned twelve guns on the intruders and overwhelmed them with bullets for half an hour; but after paying the French

for days in company with contending armies: fortunately for this unhappy multitude, the weather was fine and the roads firm or the greatest number must have perished in the most deplorable manner. And all this misery was of no avail, the object was not gained; the people fled, the provisions were left, and the mills were only partially and imperfectly ruined.

On the 1st of October, the allied outposts were driven from the hills north of Coimbra, but the French horsemen, entering the plain, suffered some loss from a cannonade. The British cavalry were in line on open ground, the disparity of numbers was not great, the opportunity fair; yet the English were withdrawn across the Mondego, and so unskilfully, that the French cut down some troopers in the middle of the river, and thus forced a combat in which fifty or sixty men fell. This scrambling affair caused the light division to march hastily through the city to gain the defiles of Condeixa, which commence at the end of the bridge, and then all the inhabitants who had not quitted the place rushed out, driving before them a number of animals loaded with sick people and children. At the entrance to the bridge the press was great and the troops halted a few moments under the prison; the jailer had fled with the keys, the prisoners, crowding to the windows endeavoured to tear down the bars with their hands, and even with their teeth, bellowing in the most frantic manner, while the bitter lamentations of the multitude on the bridge increased, and the pistol shots of the cavalry engaged at the ford below were distinctly heard. William Campbell, a staff officer, breaking the prison doors, soon freed the wretched inmates, and the troops forced a passage over the bridge; but at the other end, the defile, cut through high rocks, was so crowded no effort could make way. A troop of French dragoons which had passed the ford now came close upon the flank, and a single regiment of infantry would have destroyed the division, wedged as it was in a hollow way, and unable to retreat, to advance, or break out on either side. At last a passage was opened to the right, and the road was cleared for the guns, yet it was dark before the troops reached Condeixa, although the distance was less than eight miles.

That night the head-quarters were at Redinha, the next day at Leiria; the marches were therefore easy, and provisions were abundant, yet the usual disorders of a retreat had already commenced. In Coimbra a quantity of harness and entrenching tools were scattered in the streets; at Leiria, the magazines were plundered by the troops and camp-followers; at Condeixa, a magazine of tents, shoes, spirits, and salt meat was destroyed or abandoned to the enemy. And while the town was flowing with rum, the light division and Pack's Portuguese brigade, only a quarter of a mile distant, had to slaughter their own bullocks, and received but half rations of liquor! Wellington however arrested these growing disorders with a strong hand. Three men taken in the fact were hanged at Leiria for plundering, and some regiments more tainted than others, were forbidden to enter a village. This vigorous exercise of command, aided by the fine weather and the enemy's inactivity, restored regularity amongst the allies, while Massena's conduct, the reverse of the English general's, introduced the confusion of a retreat in the pursuing army. At Coimbra, he permitted such waste, that resources were dissipated in a few days which would have supplied his troops for two months under good arrangements; and during this licentious delay the advantage gained by his dangerous flank march to Boyalva was lost.

## OBSERVATIONS.

1°. *'Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to strike.'* This simple but profound expression in Napoleon's letter to Massena furnishes a test for the latter's operations, which were not conformable to it. His design to turn the defiles behind Celorico by the way of Viseu required rapid movements, yet he did not quit Viseu to march on Coimbra until the tenth day after passing the Pinhel river: that was not a 'vigorous attack.' Again, a battle might have been forced on Wellington when Almeida fell, or even before that event. The mules required for transport being then incomplete, the commissary-general Kennedy was dependent on the country carts, and when the first retrograde movement from Alverca commenced, the drivers fled with their bullocks and

produced infinite confusion. Kennedy in a few days procured indeed fifteen hundred additional mules, but immediately a vigorous advance of the French would have forced a battle or a retreat more hasty than suited the English general's political position. There also the French marshal failed to strike vigorously.

2°. If Massena had not been entirely misled by Alorna and Pamplona, and the more readily because the latter's estates were about Coimbra, he would have judged, that the direct line from Celorico, so jealously guarded by his enemy after eight months' study of the country, was more likely to offer advantages than the circuitous and comparatively neglected route by Viseu. Ignorant of the topography, but having the stronger and more moveable army, he should have pressed his adversary closely; a rapid pursuit through Celorico would have brought him to the Alva before Hill or even Leith could have come into line, and Wellington must then have fought with only half his force or gone back to the lines. If he accepted battle, his position being only half manned could be turned on his right by the slopes of the Estrella, on his left by crossing the Mondego. Hence it is clear that the great object of forcing a battle before Hill could enter the line was more attainable on the left bank of the Mondego than by the road to Viseu. Here then the 'where to strike' was not well observed!

3°. When the rocks of Busaco, glittering with bayonets, first rose on the prince of Essling's view, two questions were to be solved. Should he attack or turn that formidable post? Should he keep the allies in check, seize Oporto, and neglect Lisbon until better combinations could be made? The last question has been already solved, but, contrary to the general opinion, the attack upon Busaco appears faulty in the execution rather than in the conception; and the march by which that position was turned, was a violation of the soundest principles of war: in a purely military view, the English general may be censured for not punishing his adversary's rashness. With respect to the attack, sixty-five thousand French veterans had no reason to believe, that fifty thousand inexperienced troops, spread along a mountain crest more than

eight miles long, were impreguably posted; and it is an error to suppose, as some persons have, that guns could not have been used; the light division was constantly within long range, and thirty pieces of artillery employed on that point would have greatly aided the attack by the sixth corps. But when a general in chief remains ten miles from a field of battle, gives his adversary two days to settle in a position, makes his attacks without connexion and without artillery, and brings forward no reserves, success is impossible even with such valiant soldiers as Massena commanded.

4°. ‘An army should always be in a condition to fight.’

‘A general should never abandon one line of communication without establishing another.’

‘Flank marches within reach of an enemy are rash and injudicious.’

These maxims of Napoleon have been illustrated by many examples. Senef, Kollin, Rosbach, the valley of the Brenta, Salamanca, attest their value. Massena violated all three by his march to Boyalva, when no desperate crisis of affairs warranted such a departure from general principles. Sir Joshua Reynolds, treating of another art says, ‘genius begins where rules end.’ Here genius was dormant and rules disregarded. Massena was not driven to a desperate game, the conquest of Oporto was open to him, so was a march to the Vouga by Viseu; yet he threw his whole army into a single narrow defile within ten miles of an enemy in position. And, as I have been told by an officer of Ney’s staff, with such disorder, that the baggage, the commissariat, the wounded and the sick, were mixed with the artillery, cavalry, and infantry, each striving who should first make way;—that discord raged amongst the generals, confusion amongst the soldiers,—and all this in a night march!

‘Massena’s army was not then in a condition to fight—he made a flank march within reach of an enemy in position, and he abandoned his line of communication without having established another.’

5°. Wellington was within four hours’ march of either end of the defile through which the French army was moving. He might with the first division and the cavalry, the Portuguese



regular troops and Trant's militia have presented twelve or fourteen thousand men at Sardao, to head the French in the defile, while the second, third, fourth, fifth, and light divisions advancing by Mortagao, assailed their rear. That he did not do so is to be attributed to his political position; his mixed and inexperienced army was not easily handled, war is full of mischances, and the loss of a single brigade might have caused the English government to abandon the contest altogether. Nevertheless, his retreat was as dangerous as such an attack would have been, and in a military view the battle of Busaco should not have been fought; it was extraneous to his original plan and forced upon him by events; it was in fine a political battle and he afterwards called it a mistake.

6°. Massena's march was successful, and the allied army could not cope with him in the open country, between Busaco and the sea, where his cavalry would have had a fair field. Wellington therefore, reverting to his original plan, retreated by the Coimbra and Espinal roads; but the French were at Avelans de Cima and Milheada on the 30th, the allied cavalry and the light division being then on the right bank of the Mondego, which was fordable in many places below Coimbra. Had Massena, marching by Tentugal, crossed at the lower fords, and pushed on to Leiria, the retreat would have been intercepted, terror and confusion would have raged at Lisbon, the patriarch's faction would have triumphed, and a dangerous battle must have been fought to reach the lines.

7°. When the allies had secured their retreat, the fate of Portugal was still in Massena's hands. He could have established a fresh basis at Coimbra, employed the ninth corps to seize Oporto, and secured lines of communication with that city and with Alameda by fortified posts. Then attacking Abrantes he could have connected his operations with Soult's troops in Estremadura, and would have effectually frustrated both the political and military defence of Portugal. Wellington dreaded this danger, and to him the renewed advance of the French was as the rising of a heavy cloud showing a clear horizon.

8°. Even at Coimbra Massena knew nothing of the lines of

Appendix 2,  
§ 2.

Torres Vedras, and believed the country beyond the Mondego to be fit for the usage of all arms. Yet Junot, Loison, Foy, and many other officers

who had served in Portugal were with him and able to correct Alorna and Pamplona's erroneous information! But this campaign was a strange one and illustrated Massena's character as drawn by Napoleon. 'Dull in conversation, decided and intrepid in action, danger gave his thoughts clearness and force. Ambitious and selfish, he was neglectful of discipline, regardless of good administration, and consequently disliked by his troops; his dispositions for a battle were always bad, but his temper was pertinacious to the last degree: he was never discouraged.'

9°. The French reached Coimbra just as fourteen days bread carried by the soldiers was exhausted. French soldiers only are accustomed to carry so much bread. Other nations, and notably the English, would not husband it; yet it was a practice of the ancient Romans and it ought to be the practice of all armies. It requires previous discipline and well-confirmed military habits, and it is a vital element of success. The secret of making perfect soldiers is however only to be found in national customs and institutions; men should come to the ranks fitted by previous habits for military service, instead of being stretched as it were upon the bed of Procrustes by a discipline which has no resource but fear.

## CHAPTER VIII.

From the 1st until the 3rd, the French army was in disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, leaving his sick and wounded with a slender guard at Coimbra. His hospital was established at the convent of Santa Clara on the left bank of the river, and all the inhabitants who were averse or unable to enter the lines, immediately came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. But scarcely had the prince left the city when Trant, Miller, and Wilson closing upon his rear with ten thousand militia, occupied the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cut off all communication with Almeida.

On the evening of the 4th the French drove the English piquets from Pombal, and next morning pushed so suddenly upon Leiria as to create general confusion. The road was however crossed by a succession of parallel ravines, and captain Somers Cocks, defending one with a single squadron, charged the head of the enemy's column vigorously and checked its march until Anson's brigade of horsemen and Bull's artillery came up. The French then formed three columns, and endeavoured to bear down the British with the centre one, while the others turned the flanks; but the ravines were difficult, Bull's artillery played well into the principal body, and Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great number. The British lost three officers and fifty men, the French lost more, and in five hours did not gain as many miles of ground, although they had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten. During this delay Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated, the right by Thomar and Santarem, the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor, the left by Alcobaça and Obidos; at the same time a native force, under colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena followed in one column by the way of Rio Mayor, but meanwhile

the most daring and hardy enterprise executed by any partisan during the whole war, convicted him of bad generalship and shook his plan of invasion to its base.

#### SURPRISE OF COIMBRA.


Trant had returned from the Vouga to Milheada after the French passed, designing to unite with Miller and J. Wilson; but those officers were still distant, and his own arrival being unknown at Coimbra, he resolved to attack the French in that city without waiting for assistance. Surprising a post at Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry at a gallop through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass the bridge and cut off all communication with the French army, of whose progress he was ignorant. His infantry then penetrated at different points into the principal parts of the town, the astounded enemy made little or no resistance, and the convent of Santa Clara surrendered at discretion. Thus on the third day after Massena quitted the Mondego, his depôts and hospitals, and nearly five thousand prisoners, wounded and unwounded, amongst them a marine company of the imperial guards, fell into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and Wilson came, and spreading their men on all sides picked up three hundred more prisoners, while Trant conducted his to Oporto. During the first confusion the militia ill-used some prisoners, and the Abbé du Pradt and other French writers have in consequence accused Trant of disgracing his uniform by encouraging such ferocity. But it was he who repressed the ferocity: only Appendix 3. ten lives were lost, and the falsehood is rendered conspicuous by a letter of thanks addressed to him by the French officers who fell into his hands.

This disaster did not stop Massena's march. The 8th his advanced guard drove Slade's cavalry piquets out of Rio Mayor, and pushing on to Alcoentre were like to have captured the field battery there. The royals and the sixteenth dragoons forced the French back and sabred many, but the combat was renewed next morning and the British cavalry, ill-handled by Slade, retired. Meanwhile the lines were being occupied.

Cole and Leith took the centre at Sobral, Picton occupied Torres Vedras on the left, Hill entered Alhandra on the right. Craufurd and Pack should have gone to Aruda, but the former, who reached Alemquer on the 9th, was still there at three o'clock P.M. on the 10th. The weather was stormy, and he put the men under cover and let them cook; he knew the cavalry had filed into the lines, yet he posted no guards, sent no patrols forward, took no precaution against a surprise, although the town, situated in a deep ravine, was peculiarly liable to such a disaster. Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched the height in front, and about four o'clock observed French dragoons on the summit, within cannon shot. The alarm was instantly given, but the assembly post had been marked on an open space exposed to an enemy's fire, and from thence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of a mountain behind. The French, increasing every moment, feigned to be pointing guns, and the general hastily desired the regiments to break and re-form on the other side of the archway out of range. In a moment all was disorder. The streets were crowded with the camp followers and baggage animals, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven headlong to the archway; several were crushed, and with worse troops a general panic must have ensued, but most of the officers and soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm until the first confusion had abated.

Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy's infantry, descending the heights, endeavoured to turn the town on the left, while some pushed directly through the streets in pursuit; thus with his front in disorder, his rear skirmishing, and the night falling, Craufurd commenced a retreat, but the weather being boisterous the fire soon ceased: some wounds and the loss of baggage was all the hurt sustained, yet, so uncertain is everything in war, this affair had like to have produced the most terrible results in another quarter. For the division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafes, followed the route of Sobral, and thus made in the dark a flank march of several miles along the foot of the lines to gain Aruda, which was meanwhile left open to the





enemy. In this state, the cavalry patrols from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers near Caregada, were by them told the light division was cut off; a report confirmed in some measure by the unguarded state of Aruda and by the presence of the enemy's scouts on that side. This information alarmed Hill for the safety of the second line, and the more so that the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda; he therefore made a retrograde movement towards Alverca, with a view to watch the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas, according to circumstances: hence, while the enemy was in march against the lines, the latter, from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance of eight or nine miles, were disgarnished of troops. The true state of affairs was however quickly ascertained, and Hill regained Alhandra before daylight on the 11th. During this time Reynier and Junot passed Alemquer. The first marched upon Villa Franca, the second upon Sobral; but Reynier's operations were languid, he did not discover the unguarded state of Alhandra, and his piquets only entered Villa Franca the next day. It was different on Junot's side. Clausel, one of the ablest generals of the French army, leading the head of the eighth corps, came upon Sobral in the dusk, dislodged the first division, occupied the ridge upon which that town is built, and before morning had thrown up works close in the centre of those justly-celebrated entrenchments.

#### THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.

They consisted of three distinct ranges of defence.

The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the Zizandre on the seacoast, was, following the inflections of the hills, twenty-nine miles long.

The second, traced at a distance, varying from six to ten miles, in rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length.

The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended

Colonel J. T. Jones, Royal Engineers, of the lines. Printed for private circulation only



from Passo d'Arcos on the Tagus, to the tower of Junquera on the coast. Here an outward line, constructed on an opening of three thousand yards, enclosed an entrenched camp, the latter being designed to cover an embarkation with fewer troops if such an operation should be delayed by bad weather. This second camp enclosed Fort St. Julian, whose high ramparts and deep ditches defied an escalade, and were armed to enable a rear-guard to resist any force. From Passo d'Arcos to the nearest part of the second line was twenty-four miles; from the first line it was two marches, but the principal routes led through Lisbon, where means to retard the enemy were prepared.

Of these stupendous lines, the second, whether for strength or importance, was the principal; the others were appendages, the third a mere place of refuge. The first line was originally designed as an advanced work, to stem the primary violence of the enemy and enable the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or pressure; but while Massena remained inactive on the frontier, it acquired strength, which was now so much augmented by the rain that Wellington resolved to abide the attack there permanently.

It offered five distinct positions, which shall be described from right to left.

1°. *From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix.* This portion, five miles long, was a continuous and lofty ridge defended by thirteen redoubts, and for two miles rendered inaccessible by a scarp fifteen to twenty feet high. It was guarded by Hill's corps, and flanked from the Tagus by a flotilla of gun-boats manned with British seamen.

2°. *From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pé de Monte.* This portion, also of five miles, presented two salient mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, incapable of stopping an enemy, were constructed here, and the defence was entrusted to the light division.

3°. *The Monte Agraça.* This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent country, and from its summit the whole of the first line could be seen. The right was separated from the Aruda position by a deep ravine which led to nothing; the

left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira; the centre overhung the town of Sobral. The summit was crowned by an immense redoubt armed with twenty-five guns, round which three smaller works, containing nineteen guns, were clustered. The garrisons, amounting to two thousand men, were supplied by Pack's brigade; and on the reverse slope, which might be about four miles in length, Leith was posted in reserve.

4°. *From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras.* This portion, seven miles long, was at first without works, because it was only when the rains had set in the resolution to defend the first line permanently was adopted. But the ground, rough and well defined, having a valley in front, deep and watered by the Zizandre, now a considerable river, presented a fine field of battle. Here Spencer and Cole, reinforced with a sixth division, formed of troops recently come from England and Cadiz, were stationed under the immediate command of Wellington, whose quarters were fixed at Pero Negro, just under the lofty Secora rock, on which a telegraph was erected to communicate with every part of the line.

5°. *From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre.* The right flank of this portion and a pass in front of the town of Torres Vedras were secured by a great redoubt, mounting forty guns, and by smaller forts judiciously planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the sea a range of moderate heights was crowned with minor redoubts; but the chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was to be found in the Zizandre, unfordable and overflowing so as to form an impassable marsh. Such were the defences of the first line, strong, but at several points defective; and there was a paved road, running parallel to the foot of the hills through Torres Vedras, Ruña, Sobral and Aruda to Alhandra, which gave the enemy an advantage.

The second and most formidable line shall now be described from left to right.

1°. *From the mouth of the St. Lourença to Mafra.* In this distance of seven miles, there was a range of hills, naturally steep, artificially scarped, covered by a deep and in many parts impracticable ravine. The salient points were secured by forts which flanked and commanded the few accessible points; but

as the line was extensive, a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear, to secure a road leading from Ereceira to Cintra.

2°. *The Tapada or royal park of Mafra.* Here there was some open but strong ground which, with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of fourteen redoubts, constructed with great labour and care, well considered with respect to the natural features, and in some degree connected with the secondary post spoken of above: the Sierra de Chypre, covered with redoubts, was in front and obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself.

3°. *From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas.* In this space of ten or twelve miles, forming the middle of the second line, the country is choked by the Monte Chique, the head of which is in the centre of and overtops all the other mountain masses. A road conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient though less bold than any other part of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeça, and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was extremely difficult, and behind was a parallel and stronger ridge which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting road in front; but to reach that, the Sierra de Chypre on the left, or the defile of the Cabeça on the right, must have been carried. Now the latter was covered by a cluster of redoubts constructed on some inferior rocky heads in advance; they commanded all the approaches, and from their artificial and natural strength were nearly impregnable. The Cabeça itself and its immediate flanks were secure in their natural precipitous strength; so likewise were the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of Bucellas, wherefore, save the blocking of one mule path, they were untouched.

3°. *From Bucellas to the low ground about the Tagus.* The defile of Bucellas, narrow and rugged, was defended by redoubts on each side, and a ridge, or rather collection of impassable rocks, called the Sierra de Serves, stretched to the right of it for two miles without a break, and then died away by a succession of ridges into the low ground on the bank of the Tagus. These declivities and the flat banks of the river offered an accessible opening, two miles and a half

wide. It was laboriously defended indeed by redoubts, water-cuts, retrenchments, and carefully connected with the heights of Alhandra; yet it was the weakest part of the line, and dangerous from its proximity to the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda.

Five roads practicable for guns pierced the first line of defence; two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça, there were only four points of passage through the second line, that is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, and Quintella in the flat ground. Hence the aim and scope of all the works were to bar those roads and strengthen the favourable fighting positions between them, without impeding the movements of the army; the loss of the first line therefore would not have been injurious, save in reputation, because the retreat was secure upon the second and stronger line: moreover the guns of the first line were all of inferior calibre, mounted on common truck carriages, immoveable, and useless to the enemy. The allies' movements were quite unfettered by the works, but those of the French army were impeded and cramped by the Monte Junta, which, rising opposite to the centre of the first line, sent out a spur called the Sierra de Baragueda in a slanting direction towards the Torres Vedras mountain, and only separated from it by the pass of Ruña, which was commanded by heavy redoubts. Massena was therefore to dispose his army on one or the other side of the Baragueda, which could not be easily passed; nor could a movement over it be hidden from the allies on the Monte Agraça, who from thence could pour down simultaneously on the head and tail of the passing columns with the utmost rapidity, because convenient roads had been previously prepared, and telegraphs established for the transmission of orders.

These celebrated lines were great in conception and execution, more in keeping with ancient than modern military labours; and it is clear that the defence was not dependent, as some French writers suppose, upon the first line. If that had been stormed the standard of Portuguese independence would still have floated securely amidst the rocks of the second line. But to occupy fifty miles of fortification, to man

one hundred and fifty forts, and work six hundred guns required many men, and numbers were not wanting. A great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of marines sent out from England, the civic guards of Lisbon, the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, the militia and ordenança of Estremadura, furnished a powerful reserve to the regular army. The native gunners and the militia supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second, and most of those on the first line; the British marines occupied the third line; the navy manned the gun-boats on the river, and aided in various ways the operation in the field. The recruits from the depôts, and the calling in of all the men on furlough rendered the Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been, while the British troops, reinforced from Cadiz and England, and remarkably healthy, presented such a front as a general would desire to see in a dangerous crisis.

It was however necessary to have the appearance of even greater strength, and Wellington therefore so dealt with Romana, that without much attention to the wishes of his own government he joined the allies with six thousand men. The English general did not however ask this until assured Massena's force was insufficient to drive the British from Lisbon, as it would have been dishonest to draw the Spaniards to a corner, where they could not from want of shipping have escaped in the event of failure. Romana crossed the Tagus at Aldea Galega the 19th, and took post the 24th at Enxara de los Cavalleros, just behind the Monte Agrã. The remainder of the Spanish army, reinforced with Madden's Portuguese dragoons, advanced towards Zafra, and Ballesteros moved on Aracena. Mortier ignorant of Romana's absence had retreated over the Morena on the 8th, desirous to be nearer to Soult who was then seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune aided the English general's efforts to increase the distance between Massena and Soult, and to diversify their objects at the moment he had concentrated the greatest force on the most important point; for before September more than one hundred and twenty thousand fighting men were rationed within the lines, seventy thousand being regular troops.

Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of works

which he had only heard of ~~five~~ days before he came upon them, employed several days to examine their nature. The heights of Alhandra were inexpugnable; but the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda attracted his attention. By the former he could turn Alhandra and reach the weakest part of the second line; but the abattis and redoubts, hourly strengthening, gave little encouragement to attack there. The ground about Aruda did not give him a view of the troops, although he frequently skirmished to make Craufurd show his force; but that general, by occupying Aruda as an advanced post, had rendered it impossible to discover his true situation without a serious affair, and, in an incredibly short space of time, he secured his position in a manner worthy of admiration. Across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall sixteen feet thick and forty feet high was raised; across the great valley of Aruda a double line of abattis was drawn; not, as usual, of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and chesnuts, digged up with all their roots and branches, dragged by main force for several hundred yards, and then reset and crossed so that no human strength could break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances to defend this line of trees, were also cast up; and along the summits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including the salient points, other stone walls, six feet high by four in thickness, with banquettes, were piled up! Romans never raised greater works in the time!

Monte Agraça and the upper Zizandre vale had no out-works; neither the Zilreira valley, nor the hills above Ruña had been fortified, and battle could be joined there on more equal terms; but the position was by nature strong, the rear supported by great forts, a powerful body of troops occupied the ground, and six battalions drawn from Hill's corps formed a reserve at Bucellas. Beyond Ruña, Massena could not take a view; the Baragueda ridge and the forts of Torres Vedras stopped him. Convinced by this survey that the lines were not to be forced, he disposed his troops in permanent positions between Villa Franca and Sobral. Reynier holding the heights opposite Alhandra with his left, extended his right along open ground as far as Aruda where it was covered by cavalry; Junot held the ridge near Sobral seized by Clausel,

and also occupied the lower shoots from the Baragueda, and lined the Zizandre to Duas Portas on the road to Ruña, the outposts of both armies being there in contact. Ney remained at Otta. These dispositions were not made without fighting. Clausel's men, attempting to dislodge the 71st regiment from a work near Sobral, were repulsed and driven also from their own retrenchment, which was held until the whole of Junot's corps advanced to re-establish the position. The allies in this and other petty combats lost a hundred and fifty men, most of whom fell at Sobral, and the Portuguese general Harvey was wounded. On the other hand the French general St. Croix, a young man of signal ability and promise, was killed by the gun-boats at Villa Franca.

The war was now reduced to a blockade. Massena only sought to feed his army until reinforcements reached it; Wellington endeavoured to starve the French before succour could arrive. The former spread his moveable columns in the rear to seek for provisions, and established magazines at Santarem. The latter drew down all the militia and ordenança of the north on the French rear, putting them in communication with the garrison of Peniché on one side, and on the other with the militia of Lower Beira: Carlos d'Espania also, crossing the Tagus, acted between Castello Branco and Abrantes. Thus the French were completely enclosed without any weakening of the regular army.

Obidos, having an old wall, had been armed as a post of communication between the northern militia and Peniché; the regency left it without provisions, and it was evacuated when Massena first arrived; the concentration of his troops now permitted major Fenwick to re-occupy it with three hundred northern militia-men, and he was supported by a Spanish battalion and some British cavalry sent from the lines west of the Baragueda. At the same time colonel Waters, issuing forth with a moveable column against the French marauding parties, made several prisoners and captured a convoy passing the Baragueda. Massena was thus harassed, but his detachments continued to scour the country as far as Leiria, and obtained abundance of food. During this partisan warfare Wellington remained quiet, to the surprise of many

persons; for Massena's right was much exposed, and four British divisions and Romana's troops, forming a mass of twenty-five thousand men, were around Sobral. If then, the six battalions at Bucellas and the cavalry had joined the light division, ten thousand men would have been at Aruda, and, in conjunction with Hill's force, would have held Reynier in check, while the twenty-five thousand pouring at daylight from Monte Agraça, the valley of Zibreira, and Ruña, enveloped and crushed the head of Junot's corps before the reserves could come from Otta. War is a curious and complicated web! The Portuguese government was a direr enemy to the English general than Massena. Scarcely could the former maintain his defensive attitude against the follies and intrigues of men, who have, nevertheless, been praised by a recent writer for their earnest and manly co-operation! with what justice and knowledge of facts shall be shown in the next chapter.

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War.



## CHAPTER IX.

MASSENA's invasion seriously affected the Portuguese finances, and the regency applied for an additional subsidy. Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, directed the house of Sampaio to furnish provisions to the troops on the credit of the first subsidy; and he also made great exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of whom arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in, destitute and starving. Corn at any price was sought for in Ireland, America, and Egypt; and one thousand tons of government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain from Algiers. One commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the obtaining cattle and corn from the northern province; another to regulate the transport of provisions to the army, and to push a trade with Spain through the Alemtejo. Small craft were sent up the Tagus to carry off the inhabitants and their stock from the islands and the left bank, and post-vessels were established along the coast to Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the men of war, a proclamation was issued, calling upon the people to be tranquil, and a strong police was established to enforce this object. Finally, to supply the deficiency of tonnage occasioned by sending transports in search of corn, an embargo was laid upon the port of Lisbon: this was protested against by the Americans, but an imperious necessity ruled.

All these measures were vehemently opposed by the Patriarch and his faction; and that nothing might be wanting to show how entirely the fate of the Peninsula depended in that hour upon Wellington's firmness, the fears of the British cabinet, which had been increasing as the crisis approached, were now plainly disclosed. Their private letters contained hints at variance with their public despatches; they wished the general

to abandon the country, yet threw the responsibility entirely upon him. They thought him rash, because they were unequal to the crisis; and having neither the modesty to resign, nor the manliness to continue the contest with vigour, cast their base policy with a view only to their own interests in case of failure. During the retreat from Beira, some officers of rank let their correspondence bear evidence of their own despondency; Spencer and Charles Stewart especially wrote so hopelessly to lord Liverpool, that he transmitted their letters to Wellington, and by earnestly demanding his opinion of their contents showed how deeply they had disturbed his own mind. Thus beset, the English general rose like a giant. Without noticing the arguments or forebodings in these letters, he took a calm historical review of the circumstances which had induced him to defend Portugal, and which he had before explained to the very minister he was addressing. He showed how, up to that period, his opinions had been justified by the results, and therefore he claimed confidence for the future, then tracing the probable course of coming events, he discussed his own and the enemy's designs with such sagacity that the subsequent course of the war never belied his anticipations. This remarkable letter, were all other records lost, would suffice to vindicate his great reputation to posterity. Having with conscious superiority replied to his own government, he, with a fierceness rendered necessary by the crisis, turned upon the patriarch and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic, foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told them they were unfaithful servants of their country and their prince; and he threatened to withdraw the British army altogether if the practices of which he complained were not amended. 'The king of England and the prince regent of Portugal had entrusted him with the military operations, and he would not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what to do, and would not alter his plans to meet the senseless suggestions of the regency. Let the latter look to their own duties! Let them provide food for the army and the people and keep the capital tranquil.'—'With principal Souza it was impossible to act, of that person continued in power the country would be lost.

Appendix 21,  
§§ 4, 8. Vol. II.

Either the principal or himself must quit their employment. If it was to be himself, he would take care the world should know the reasons: meanwhile he would address the prince upon the conduct of the regency.' 'He had hoped,' he resumed in another letter, 'the Portuguese government was satisfied with his acts, and instead of seeking to render all defence useless by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, would have adopted measures to secure tranquillity in the capital. But like other weak individuals they added duplicity to weakness, and their past expressions of approbation and gratitude he supposed were intended to convey censure. All he asked from them was to preserve tranquillity, to provide food for their own troops while employed in the lines, and be prepared, in case of disaster, to save those persons and their families who were obnoxious to the enemy.' '*I have,*' he said, '*little doubt of final success, but I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know, that the result of any is not certain even with the best arrangements.*'

These reproaches were neither too severe nor ill-timed, for the war had been hanging in even balance, and the weight of interested folly thus thrown in by the regency was beginning to sink the scale. Instead of performing its own duties, the government assumed that the war could be maintained on the frontier, and when it should have removed the people and food, urged impracticable military operations. When convicted of error by facts, it threw the task of driving the country upon the general; although he was necessarily ignorant of the names and places of abode of the officers and magistrates who were to execute it, and there was but one Portuguese agent at headquarters to give assistance in translating the necessary orders. When this was pointed out, they issued the orders, but made the execution referable to the general without his knowledge, well knowing he had no means of communicating with the provincial folks: the stopping of Massena at Busaco alone enabled the orders even to reach the country authorities. But the great object of the regency was to soothe and nourish the national indolence and throw the odium of rigorous measures on the British, and though Wellington reproached them for so doing, he never shrunk from that odium. Avowing himself

the author of the wasting plan, he permitted the regency to shelter themselves under his name, but he would not tamely let them deprive him of the fruits; nor would he suffer them, shrinking as they did in the trial, to seek popularity at the expense of their country's safety.

After the disputes which followed the fall of Almeida, the English government, influenced by Wellington, and convinced that a more secure and powerful grasp must be taken of Portugal, insisted that the subsidy should be placed under the control of the British instead of the native authorities. Lord Wellesley, ashamed of his colleagues, also gave assurance, that if the army was forced to quit Lisbon, the Portuguese troops should be carried to Oporto and the war re-commenced in that quarter; but Mr. Stuart prudently reserved this information until the necessity should arrive, well knowing that the patriarch and Souza, who had already proposed to go there themselves, would eagerly seize the occasion to urge the evacuation of Lisbon. The 2nd of October Mr. Stuart took his seat as a regent, and proceeded to control the intrigues and violence of the patriarch and the principal. It was full time. For both were formally protesting against the destruction of the mills in Beira, and vigorously opposing every measure proposed by Wellington.

Deeply offended by the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about this time was incorporated with the regular forces, they had openly declared the Portuguese troops should not retreat from the frontiers; and if the enemy forced the British to embark, not a native, whether soldier or citizen, should, they said, go with it. When the allies, notwithstanding this, fell back to the lines, principal Souza proposed that the regency should fly to the Algarves; and when this was indignantly opposed by Mr. Stuart, he threatened to quit the government. This dispute being referred to Wellington, drew from him those severe expressions of which an abstract has been given above. But when the army approached the lines, Souza proposed that the Portuguese troops should remain outside while the British took shelter within! a notion so preposterous as to justify Beresford's observation, that he knew not whether the proposer were more fool, rogue, or madman.

Unchecked by this, the restless principal pursued his scheme with the greatest activity, and in conjunction with his brothers and the patriarch, established a regular and systematic opposition to the plan of defence. Factionous in council, they were clamorous out of doors, where many echoed their sentiments from anger at some wanton ravages which had marked the retreat; they also courted the mob of Lisbon servilely; and the principal, getting the superintendence of the succours for the fugitive population, became the avowed patron of all persons preferring complaints. He stimulated and exasperated the public griefs, and frequently hinted that the Portuguese people, not the British army, had formerly driven out the French. All these calumnies were echoed by the numerous friends and partisans of the caballers, and by the fidalgos, who endeavoured to spread discontent as widely as possible; they were so successful that the slightest encouragement from the Brazils would have formed a national party openly opposed to the conduct of the war. To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old tool of the party in the Oporto murders, was sent to the court of Rio Janeiro to excite the prince; and the patriarch wrote to the prince of Wales and to the duke of Sussex, thinking to incense them also against the English general. But the extent and nature of the intrigues may be estimated from revelations, made at the time by baron Eben, and by the editor of a Lisbon newspaper called the *Brazilicnse*.

Those persons, abandoning their faction, asserted that the patriarch, the Souzas, and, while he remained in Portugal, the ex-plenipotentiary Mr. Villiers, being personally inimical to Wellington, Forjas, and Beresford, were seeking to remove them and get the duke of Brunswick appointed generalissimo. This part of the project was naturally aided by the princess of Wales; and the caballers in London had also sounded the duke of Sussex, but he repulsed them. Part of their plan was to engage a newspaper as their organ in London, the *Brazilicnse* being so in Lisbon. In their correspondence they called Wellington *Alberoni*, lord Wellesley *Lama*, Beresford *Ferugem*, Mr. Stuart *Labre*, the patriarch *Saxe*, Antonio Souza *Lamberti*, colonel Bunbury and Mr. Peel, the under-secretaries

of state, *Thin* and *By-thin*, sir Robert Wilson *De Camp*, lord Liverpool *Husband*, Mr. Villiers *Fatut*, Mr. Casamajor *Par-vénu*, and so on of many others. After Mr. Villiers' departure the intrigue was continued by the patriarch and the Souzas, but upon a different plan. Overborne by Mr. Stuart's vigour in the council they agreed to refrain from openly opposing him or Forjas, but resolved to write down what either might utter, and transmit that which suited their purpose to the comde de Linhares and the chevalier Souza, who undertook to present, after their own fashion, the information so received to the cabinets of St. James' and Rio Janeiro.

Mr. Stuart having obtained their secret was resolute to suppress their intrigues. Yet he first endeavoured to put them from their mischievous designs, by the humorous expedient of writing a letter to Domingo Souza in his own cipher, warning him and his coadjutors not to proceed because their party was insecure, and Mr. Stuart, Wellington, Beresford, and Forjas, united and resolved to crush all opposition, might be made friends but would prove dangerous enemies! This had some effect, yet principal Souza would not take any hint, and the violent temper of the patriarch soon broke out again. He avowed hostility to the English general; and while thwarting every measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction exercised odious cruelty against persons denominated by them well-wishers to the French, provided they were not of the fidalgo party. A decree of the prince regent's, dated 20th of March, 1809, permitted private denunciations in cases of disaffection, the informer's name to be kept secret, and in September, 1810, this infamous system, although strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, was acted upon; many persons were suddenly sent to the islands and others thrown into dungeons. Some might have been guilty, and the government pretended a traitorous correspondence with the enemy was carried on through a London mercantile house, which they indicated; yet it does not appear that direct crime was brought home to any, and it is certain that many innocent persons were oppressed.

At last lord Wellesley, to prevent the ruin of the general cause, dealt so with the Brazilian court, that intrigue there

ceased for a time, Wellington's power in Portugal was confirmed, and his proceedings approved of. Authority was also given him to dismiss or to retain Antonio Souza, and even to remove lord Strangford, the British envoy at Rio Janeiro, who had contrived the change in the members of the regency, and whose proceedings, generally in unison with the malcontents, were mischievously opposed to the English policy in Portugal. The subsidies were placed under Wellington's and Mr. Stuart's control, admiral Berkeley became a regent, and Portugal was thus reduced to the condition of a vassal state, which could never have been attempted, however necessary, if the people at large had not been willing to acquiesce. But firm in their attachment to independence, they submitted cheerfully to this temporary assumption of command, and fully justified the sagacity of the man, who thus dared to grasp at the whole power of Portugal with one hand, while he kept the power of France at bay with the other. This strong remedy was however not perfected for a long time, nor until after a most alarming crisis of affairs had been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal, of which notice shall be taken hereafter: while the army was in the lincs the evils were in full activity.

The strength of the works, defying attack, rendered it likely Massena would finally operate by the left bank of the Tagus. This was to be dreaded. He could in the Alemtejo more easily subsist, more effectually operate to the injury of Lisbon, more securely retreat upon his own resources. Wellington had therefore repeatedly urged the regency to make the inhabitants carry off their herds and grain from that side, and from the numerous islands in the river, and above all things to destroy or remove every boat. To effect these objects a commission had been appointed, but so many delays and obstacles were interposed by the patriarch and his coadjutors, that the commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the enemy was close upon the river, both banks being then stocked with cattle and corn, and forty large boats lying on the right side. The French therefore entered the alluvial islands called the Lizirias, where they obtained abundance of provisions; and while the regency thus provided for the enemy, they left the fortresses

of Palmella, St. Felipe de Setuval, and Abrantes, with empty magazines. Wellington, thinking the *ordenança* on the left bank, of whom five hundred were, contrary to his wishes, armed with English muskets and furnished with two pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel any plundering parties attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the lines. He wanted numbers there, and thought the *ordenança* would if assisted by a regular force leave the war to their allies. But Antonio Souza was continually urging the planting of ambuscades and other like frivolities upon the left bank of the Tagus; his opinions spread abroad, and the governor of Setuval, adopting the idea, suddenly advanced with his garrison to Salvatierra on the river side. This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy's attention, and Wellington, fearing a detachment would cross to disperse the Portuguese troops and seize Setuval before it could be succoured, ordered the governor to return to that fortress. This retrograde movement, however, caused the dispersion of the *ordenança* and consternation pervaded the Alentejo; the supply of grain coming from Spain was stopped, the chain of communication was broken, the alarm spread to Lisbon, and there was no remedy but to send general Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, which could be ill spared from the lines, to that side.

Fane destroyed all the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, and kept a strict watch upon the enemy's movements as high as the mouth of the Zezere. But other embarrassments were continually arising. The prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious inconvenience; for the English Admiralty, pretending alarm at a fever generated by the infamous treatment of the prisoners, refused to let them be transported to England in vessels of war, and no other ships could be had; thus the rights of humanity and the good of the service, were alike disregarded; for had there been real danger Wellington would not have continually urged the measure. About this time also, admiral Berkeley admitted that his elaborate report, made the year before, stating that the enemy even though he should seize the heights of Almada could not injure the fleet in the river,



was erroneous: hence the engineers were directed to construct lines on that side also, but it was in the eleventh hour. And

now also the native army showed the effects of  
 Appendix 21, the regency's folly. The troops were so ill  
 § 7. Vol II. supplied that more than once they would have  
 disbanded, had they not been succoured from the British  
 magazines. Ten thousand soldiers of the line deserted be-  
 tween April and December, and of the militia two-thirds were  
 absent from their colours; for as no remonstrance could  
 induce the government to put the laws in force against delin-  
 quents, that which was at first the effect of want became a  
 habit: even when regularly fed from the British stores within  
 the lines the desertion was alarmingly great.

Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up,  
 neither the patriarch nor the principal ceased their opposition.  
 The order to fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent  
 altercation. Wellington complained of this opposition to the  
 Portuguese prince regent, which produced such a paroxysm of  
 rage in the patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart,  
 and vented his passion in the most indecent language. Soon  
 after this, the state of the finances compelled the government  
 to resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind  
 for the feeding of the troops; and in that critical moment the  
 patriarch, whose influence was from various causes very great,

took occasion to declare that 'he would not suffer  
 Appendix 21, burthens to be laid upon the people which were  
 § 10. Vol. II. evidently for no other purpose than to nourish the  
 war in the heart of the kingdom.' But it was his and his  
 condjutors' criminal conduct that really nourished the war, for  
 there were ample means to have carried off in time ten times  
 the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena could  
 not then have remained a week before the lines, and his retreat  
 would have been attended with famine and disaster, if the  
 measures previously agreed to by the regency had been duly  
 executed. The country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Collegao,  
 and Santarem was absolutely untouched, the inhabitants re-  
 mained, the mills were little injured and quickly repaired; and  
 Wellington had the deep mortification to find his grand  
 project frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a

right to expect the most zealous support; there seemed nothing to prevent the prince of Esling holding his positions until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain. It is heart-breaking, exclaimed the British general—‘It is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly.’

## CHAPTER X.

MASSENA was convinced by the increasing strength of the works, and the report of British deserters, unhappily very numerous at this period, that to force the lines he must have great reinforcements; his army also suffered from sickness, from the irregular forces in his rear, and from the vengeance of individuals driven to despair by the excesses which the licentious French soldiers too often committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with a pertinacity only to be appreciated by those who have long made war, the French general maintained his position until the country for many leagues behind him was a desert; then reluctantly yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp, in which to make head against the allies while his foragers searched more distant countries for food. Early in October, he had collected boats for crossing both the Tagus and the Zezere, and Montbrun's cavalry, scouring the right bank of the former, gathered provisions and stored them at Santarem. There and also at Barquina, a creek in the Tagus below the mouth of the Zezere, rafts were formed and boats constructed with wheels to move from one place to another; but the extreme paucity of materials and tools made the progress slow, and Fane, reinforced with some infantry, closely watched the movements from the left bank. Carlos d'España likewise came down from Castello Branco to Abrantes, Trant acted sharply on the side of Ourem, and Wilson's Portuguese militia so infested the country from Espinal to the Zezere, that Loison was detached towards Thomar to hold him in check.

Towards the end of October, all Massena's hospitals, stores, and other incumbrances were removed to Santarem, and on the 31st, two thousand men forded the Zezere above Punhete to cover the construction of a bridge. From this body four hundred infantry and two hundred dragoons were led by Foy

against Abrantes, and after skirmishing with the garrison made towards Sobreira Formosa, whereupon the allies' bridge at Villa Velha was foolishly burnt. Foy however pushed for Pena Macor with a smaller escort, and the 8th gained Ciudad Rodrigo on his way to France, having undertaken to carry information of the state of affairs to Napoleon, a task which he performed with singular rapidity courage and address: the remainder of his escort returned down the Zezere, and being attacked by Wilson suffered some loss.

Massena's bridge on the Zezere was destroyed by floods the 6th of November, but having now entrenched the height over Punhete he easily restored it, and cast a second at Martinchel higher up the river. Then he commenced a retrograde march with great circumspection, because his position was overlooked from the Monte Agraça, and the defile of Alemquer behind the eighth corps rendered it a delicate operation. To blind the partisans on his rear Montbrun's cavalry marched upon Leiria, and his detachments scoured the roads to Pombal on the one side, and towards the Zezere on the other. Ney marched from Otta and Alemquer to Thomar, and Loison, removing to Golegao, was reinforced with a brigade of dragoons. Clausel then withdrew from Sobral during the night of the 14th, and Junot's corps passed the defile in the morning of the 15th, his march being protected by some cavalry left in front of Aruda, and by a strong rear-guard on the height covering Alemquer. Reynier also fell back towards Santarem by the royal causeway, while Junot continued his march by Alcoentre upon Alcanhede and Torres Novas. These movements were not interrupted. The morning of the 15th proved foggy, and it was some hours after daybreak ere the void space in front disclosed the ability of the French general. Fane had reported on the 14th that boats were collecting at Santarem, and information arrived at the same time that reinforcements for Massena were on the march from Ciudad Rodrigo; but the enemy's intention was not clearly developed; it might be a retreat to Spain; it might be to pass round the Monte Junta, and so push the head of his army on Torres Vedras while the allies were following the rear. The principal part of the army therefore

remained stationary; only Hill and Craufurd followed the enemy, the former along the causeway to Villa Franca, the latter by Alemquer: at the same time the cavalry were brought forward and all the boats of the fleet went up the Tagus, to enable the allies to pass rapidly to the other bank if necessary.

Early on the 16th, the French were tracked on the roads of Rio Mayor and Santarem. Having passed Alcoentre, it was clear they had no views on Torres Vedras; but whether to cross the Zezere by the bridges at Punhete and Martinchel in retreat or to make for the Mondego, was still uncertain. In either case, it was important to strike at the rear before reinforcements and a convoy, said to be on the road from Ciudad Rodrigo, could join. The first division was therefore brought up to Alemquer, the fifth entered Sobral, the light division and cavalry continued the pursuit. Four hundred prisoners, principally marauders, were soon picked up, and a remarkable exploit was performed by one Baxter, a serjeant

Captain of the sixteenth dragoons. With only five troopers  
SomersCocks he came suddenly upon a piquet of fifty men who  
MSS. were cooking; they ran to their arms, fired, and

killed one of the dragoons, yet Baxter broke in amongst them and with the assistance of some countrymen made forty-two captives. The 17th, Junot marched upon Alcan-

See Plan I. hete and Pernes, and Reynier reached Santarem;  
p. 111.

Fane, deceived by some false movements, reported that the whole army was in full retreat, and the troops at Santarem a rear-guard; and this information seemed to be confirmed by the state of the immense plains skirting the Tagus, which were left covered with straw-ricks: it was concluded therefore that Massena intended to pass the Zezere, over which it was known he had cast a second bridge. Hill immediately passed the Tagus with the second division and thirteenth dragoons, to succour Abrantes, or to head the march of the French according to circumstances. The fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions were directed upon Alemquer, the first division and Pack's brigades upon Cartaxo, the light division upon the village of El Valle on the Rio Mayor; here a considerable rear-guard was left by the French, and Crau-

furd, forgetting the lesson on the Coa, would have provoked an unequal engagement; but again the opportune arrival of the commander-in-chief stopped him and in the evening the French moved to Santarem.

Hitherto Wellington, looking to his lines with a jealous eye, was cautious. On the 15th and 16th, while the French were still hampered by the defiles, his pursuit was even slack, although it would in no degree have risked the safety of the lines or of the pursuing troops, to have pushed three divisions and Pack's brigade vigorously against the enemy's rear. But on the 18th, when Hill had passed the Tagus at Villada, and Fane was opposite to Abrantes, whether deceived by false reports, or elated at a retrograde movement evincing his own superior sagacity, he prepared to assail at Santarem what he thought the rear-guard of an army in full retreat. Massena however had no intention of falling back farther, his great qualities were roused by the difficulty of his situation, he had carried off his army with good skill, and his new position was chosen with equal sagacity and resolution. Santarem was on a mountain, rising almost precipitously from the Tagus and extending about three miles inland; a secondary range of hills in front were covered by the Rio Mayor, which is composed of two streams, flowing side by side until within a mile of the Tagus, and then uniting to run in a direction parallel with that river for many miles through an immense alluvial flat, called the plain of Santarem. Advancing from the lines, the allies had ascended the right of the Rio Mayor as far as the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway eight hundred yards long, which bridged the river and led directly to the position. On the allies' right a sedgy marsh, not impassable though difficult from water-cuts, covered the French line down to the Tagus. On the left hand, the double stream of the Rio Mayor had overflowed into a vast impassable swamp covering the enemy's right. The causeway was therefore the only practicable line of approach, but it was narrow and barred at the French end by an abattis and a gentle eminence, from the summit of which a battery looked down the whole length. To force this dangerous passage was however only a preliminary step. The secondary range of hills was then to be carried before the

great height of Santarem could be reached: finally, that town with its old walls offered a fourth point of resistance.

In this formidable post, Reynier's corps covered the rich plain of Golegao, which was occupied by Loison, who was placed there to watch the Tagus and keep the communication with Punhete. On Reynier's right, in a rugged country separating Santarem from the Monte Junta and the Sierra de Alcoberte, Junot was posted; not in a continuous line with Reynier, but having his right pushed forward to Alcanhete, his centre at Pernes, and his left thrown back to Torres Novas, where Massena's head-quarters were fixed. On the right of Alcanhete the cavalry were disposed, as far as Leiria, and the sixth corps was at Thomar in reserve, having previously forced Wilson's militia to retire from the Zezere upon Espinal. Massena thus enclosed an immense tract of fertile country. The plain of Golegao supplied him with maize and vegetables, the Sierra de Alcoberte with cattle; presenting a formidable head to the allies at Santarem, he commanded the road through Leiria to Coimbra with the eighth corps and the cavalry; that through Thomar and Ourem to Coimbra with the sixth corps; and by help of his bridges over the Zezere, he had opened two new lines of retreat towards the Spanish frontier, one through Castello Branco, the other by the Estrada Nova to Belmonte. He also preserved the power of resuming offensive operations, whether by a passage of the Tagus on his left, or by turning the Monte Junta on his right, and thus paralysing the allied army he appeared, even in retreating, to act on the offensive. His first dispositions were however faulty in detail. From Santarem to the nearest division of Junot's corps was ten or twelve miles, and the British general might thus turn Reynier's right, and cut him off from the rest of the army; and indeed Reynier, fearing such an attempt, had hastened off his baggage and hospitals to Golegao, despatched a regiment up the Rio Mayor to watch two bridges on his right, and called for succour. It was the hurried march of his baggage that misled Fane to think Massena was retreating to the Zezere; and at the time it was supposed also to have caused the dispositions for attacking Santarem; but from the despatches it would appear

it was only designed to ascertain the strength of the French position. However, on the 19th Craufurd was sent into the plain beyond the Rio Mayor to menace the Santarem heights by the sedgy marsh, while Spencer moved against the causeway, and Pack's Portuguese and the cavalry, crossing the upper river at the bridges of Saliero and Subajeiro, menaced Reynier's right: the skirmishers of the light division were actually engaged when it became known that Pack's guns had not reached him, and the troops regained their former ground.

Massena's resolution to hold his ground was evident. Every advantageous point was occupied, the sentinels returned the fire of the skirmishers, strong reserves, some in arms, some cooking were descried, the strokes of the hatchet and the fall of trees resounded in the woods clothing the Santarem hills, and the commencement of a triple line of abattis with the fresh earth of entrenchments were discernible. The demonstrations were renewed next day, yet soon ceased, and Hill was ordered to halt at Chamusca, on the left bank of the Tagus. Craufurd, however, still thought a rear-guard only was at Santarem; his spirit was chafed, he seized a musket, and, followed by a serjeant, advanced in the night along the causeway to commence a personal skirmish with the French piquet: he escaped from its fire miraculously and came back convinced that Massena was not in flight.

Wellington was preparing forcibly to examine the French right on the 22nd, when Massena, having ordered Reynier's baggage to return, directed Clausel to drive back the allies' posts near the town of Rio Mayor. This counter-stroke caused Spencer and Pack to be withdrawn to Cartaxo, and the light division also was held in readiness to retreat. In truth, Massena was only to be assailed by holding Reynier in check at the Ponte Seca, while a powerful mass penetrated by Tremes and Pernes; but heavy rains rendered those roads impracticable, and the position of Santarem was maintained in quiet for several months. For this both generals have been censured, but it may be shown that they acted wisely and like great captains.\* Massena, without any extreme dissemination,



menaced several points and commanded two distinct lines of retreat; but he had other objects also in view; he expected detachments and convoys from Castille, and the ninth corps, which had lately been placed under his orders; his position, touching upon Leiria and the Zezere, enabled him to give his hand to these reinforcements and convoys, either by the line of the Mondego or that of Belmonte and the Estrada Nova; and at the same time he could communicate with troops coming from Andalusia. He was undoubtedly open to a dangerous attack between Santarem and Alcanhete; but he thought himself safe from such a decisive operation by an army composed of three different nations and unpractised in great evolutions. Guided by a long experience, he calculated upon moral causes with confidence, and he who cannot do so is but half a general. Like a great commander he counted likewise upon the political effect his menacing attitude would produce. While he maintained Santarem, he appeared to besiege Lisbon, and encouraged the disaffected, who were expected to rise; and he prolonged the sufferings of the capital: forty thousand persons are said to have died from privations within the lines during the winter of 1810. He thus shook the English influence in Portugal, and so obscured the future, that few men had sagacity to judge rightly. At this period also, the illness of George the Third, reviving the question of a regency in England, had strengthened the opposition in parliament, and Massena's position supported their arguments against the war. Wherefore he did right to hold his ground: and if he committed errors early in the campaign, he now proved himself a daring, able, and pertinacious commander.

On the English general's side the difficulties were so great that a battle was equally to be desired and dreaded. Desired because victory would silence opponents in England and Portugal, and enable him to dictate to the ministers instead of struggling incessantly against their fears. It would relieve the misery of the Portuguese people from their horrible sufferings; and was also to be desired, lest a second and a third army, now gathering in Castille and in Andalusia, should reach Massena and again shut up the allies in their works. Dreaded, because a defeat or even a repulse would have ruined

the cause; for it was at this period the disputes relative to the lines at Almada were most violent, and the slightest disaster would have placed the patriarch at the head of a national party. Dreaded, because of the regency discussion in England, as a serious check would have caused the Whigs to triumph, and the troops would have been withdrawn from Portugal. So powerful indeed was the opposition, and so much did the ministers dread its cry for economy, that, forgetting the army in their keen love of place, they actually issued orders to discharge all the transport ships to save expense! In fine, the prime minister Perceval, with that narrow cunning and selfish spirit which marked his whole public career, was, to use an expression of his own, starving the war in the Peninsula, despite of lord Wellesley's indignant resistance in the cabinet, and lord Wellington's energetic remonstrances from the field.

In this balanced state, it was essential that the battle should not be fought except on terms of advantage, and those terms were not to be had. Wellington, reinforced from Halifax and England, had indeed more than seventy thousand men under arms, and the enemy not more than fifty thousand; nevertheless, the latter could from the advantage of position bring more soldiers into the fight. The Portuguese army had in six months lost four thousand men by death, four thousand by discharges, and ten thousand by desertion. Thirty thousand recruits had come in, therefore the numbers were increased, but efficiency for great operations was diminished; and every department was neglected by a government which neither paid nor fed its soldiers. The Spanish auxiliaries, ill-governed and turbulent, quarrelled with the Portuguese, and their generals were not able in war nor amenable to better officers. The heights of Almada being naked, twelve thousand men were required on the left bank of the Tagus, and two British divisions were necessarily kept in the lines, because the French at Alcanhete were nearer to Torres Vedras than the allies were at Cartaxo. Reynier also might break out from Santarem during an attack on Pernes, wherefore ten thousand men were wanting to hold him in check; and thus the disposable troops, comprehending soldiers of three nations and many recruits,

would have fallen short of forty-five thousand: but Massena could bring nearly all his men to one point, because a few would have sufficed to watch the British division on the left of the Tagus and at Santarem.

Wellington's experience was not at this period equal to his adversary's; and the attack was to be made in a heavy difficult country, where the Alviella, the Almonda, and other rivers, greatly swelled by incessant rain, furnished a succession of defensive lines to Massena, and in case of defeat the means of carrying off two-thirds of his army. Victory might crown the attempt, but the stakes were unequal. If Massena lost a third of his force, the ninth corps could have replaced it. If the allies failed, the lines were gone and with them the whole Peninsula. Wellington thought the relief of the northern provinces, perhaps of Andalusia, would reward a victory; but those objects might be obtained without fighting, and a battle would bring the greatest part of the French troops in Spain upon him without bringing the Spaniards to his side. 'I cannot forget,' he wrote to lord Liverpool, 'that last year I brought upon myself and general Cuesta not less than five corps d'armée, and the king's guards and reserve, more than equal to a sixth corps; and when Castille and the north of Spain was cleared of the enemy, not a man was put in the field by those provinces, nor even one raised!' These things considered, it was judged better to remain on the defensive, to strengthen the lines, to forward the works at Almada, to perfect the discipline of the Portuguese troops, to improve the organization of the militia in rear of the enemy, and to remedy the evils occasioned by the patriarch's faction. Amongst those evils, the destitution of the fortresses was so prominent, that at one moment the drawing off the garrison from Abrantes to prevent the men from starving, seemed inevitable.

In this defensive view of affairs the light division, supported by a brigade of cavalry, occupied El Valle and the heights overlooking the marsh and inundation. The bridge at the English end of the causeway was mined, and a sugar-loaf hill, looking straight down the approach, was crowned with embrasures for artillery, and laced in front with a zig-zag covered way capable of containing five hundred infantry; the cause-

way being thus blocked, the French could not while the waters were out make any sudden irruption from Santarem. On the left of the light division, posts were extended along the inundation to Malhorquija, and thence by a range of heights to Rio Mayor. Behind the latter place, Anson's cavalry watched the roads leading from Pernes and Alcanhede; and in rear of Anson, an entrenched position at Alcoentre was occupied by a division of infantry. Thus all the roads leading upon the lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta, were secured by what are technically called heads of cantonments, under cover of which the troops took winter quarters. The first division and head-quarters were at Cartaxo, a few miles behind El Valle; some troops were kept at Alemquer and Sobral, and Torres Vedras was occupied in force, lest the enemy should make a sudden march round the Monte Junta. Massena was building boats, he had fortified a post at Tancos on the Tagus, and expected with impatience a convoy, escorted by five thousand men, which Gardanne was conducting from Ciudad Rodrigo. This force, consisting of detachments and convalescents left in Castille when the army entered Portugal, had marched by Belmonte and the Estrada Nova, and was at Cardijos the 27th, within a few leagues of the French brigades on the Zezere. A cavalry patrol on either side would have opened the communication and secured the junction. But Gardanne, harassed by the ordenança, and deceived by a rumour that Hill was in Abrantes to move against him, suddenly retreated upon Sabugal with such haste and blindness that he sacrificed a part of his convoy, and lost many men. Hill was not at Abrantes, yet it is remarkable that Wellington had contemplated sending him there to make an attack upon the French posts beyond the Zezere, and the advance of Gardanne's column, the strength of which he could not clearly ascertain, deterred him!

Notwithstanding this event, Massena continued to strengthen his position at Santarem, which enabled him to draw the bulk of his forces to his right, and push his marauding excursions in a daring manner. General Frey, crossing the Zezere with a strong detachment of the sixth corps, foraged as far as Castello Branco without difficulty, and returned without loss. Junot occupied Leiria and Ourem with detachments, and en-

deavoured to surprise Coimbra, but Trant baffled that project. Drouet made movements avowedly to invade the *Tras os Montes*, but on the 22nd he occupied the line of the *Coa* with the ninth corps, and Massena's patrols appeared again on the *Mondego* above Coimbra, making inquiries about the fords. At the same time the spies reported that a great re-union of forces from the south was to take place near Madrid, which gave reason to fear that Massena intended to file behind the *Mondego* and seize *Oporto*; or that the expected reinforcements would enable him to throw bridges over the *Mondego* and occupy the northern country without quitting his present position. A tenth corps was forming at *Burgos*, the head of the fifth corps was again in *Estremadura*, the French boats at *Punhete* and *Barquiña* were numerous and large, and in all parts there was evidence of great forces assembling for a mighty effort on both sides of the *Tagus*. Wellington calculated that more than forty thousand fresh troops would co-operate with Massena, and had made preparation accordingly. An outward line of defence from *Aldea Gallega* to *Setuval* was in a forward state, and a chain of forts parallel to the *Tagus* was being constructed; *Abrantes*, *Palmella*, and *St. Felipe de Setuval* were at last provisioned, and the works of *Alhandra*, *Aruda* and *Monte Agraga* were strengthened, so as to defy any force. Lord Liverpool was urged to send reinforcements, and five thousand men from England and three regiments from Sicily were embarked for Lisbon. Soult was now collecting a force behind the *Morena*, the troops on the left of the *Tagus* were therefore augmented, and as general Hill was sick, Beresford took the command. He had eighteen guns two divisions of infantry and five regiments of cavalry, in all fourteen thousand men, exclusive of Carlos d'Espana's brigade, which being at *Abrantes* was also under his orders, yet so troublesome and so ill-behaved, that lord Wellington, who had not asked for their assistance, threatened to send them out of Portugal.

To prevent Massena passing the *Tagus*, and to intercept communication between him and Soult, to join the main body of the army by *Vellada* if in retreat, by *Abrantes* if in advance, were the instructions given to Beresford; whose head-

quarters were at Chamusca, his troops being disposed along the Tagus from Almeyrim, by Chamusca, to the mouth of the Zezere. Signals for communication were then established, the roads leading to Spanish Estremadura were scoured, a sure intercourse was opened with Elvas and other frontier fortresses, and good sources of intelligence were organized at Golegao, Santarem, and Thomar. Batteries opposite the mouth of the Zezere were also constructed, but, against the advice of the engineers, at too great distance from the river, and in other respects unsuitably: French craft dropped down towards Santarem without hindrance, until colonel Colborne, of the sixty-sixth regiment, moored of his own accord a guard-boat close to the mouth of the Zezere, and disposed fires in such a manner on the banks of the Tagus that nothing could pass without being observed.

Appendix 5,  
§ 1.

On the right of the Tagus, the country between Alcanhete and the Ponte Seca continued impracticable from the rain, and both armies were of necessity tranquil. Anson's cavalry, however, acting in concert with major Fenwick, who came down from Obidos towards Rio Mayor, harassed the enemy's foraging parties; and in the Upper Beira several actions took place with the militia, which must be noticed as essential parts of the combinations. Drouet had been so delayed scouring Biscay and Upper Castille, in his progress towards Massena, that he lost all connexion with the army, and this enabled the partidas of Leon so to molest Serras that the Tras os Montes was unmenaced; wherefore, Silveira, falling down on the lower Douro, invested Almeida the 29th of October, and made an unsuccessful attempt to surprise a French post at San Felices. However, in November, Drouet reached Ciudad Rodrigo with a large convoy for Massena, which Wellington was anxious to intercept, and with that view directed Silveira to waylay it, ordering Miller to be at Viseu in support on the 16th. But on the 13th general Gardanne, who had charge of the convoy with four thousand infantry and some squadrons, raised the blockade of Almeida, and being supported by Drouet with the ninth corps proceeded towards Penamacor. Silveira fell upon him while in march and took many

prisoners, but finding Gardanne too strong retired on the 17th to Trancoso where he found Miller. Gardanne then pursued his march and, as before related, after reaching Cardigos retreated in a panic. At that time Drouet had no order to place his corps under Massena's command, but, being urged by Foy, moved forwards, first spreading the report before noticed that his design was to invade the *Tras os Montes*. On the 17th of December he passed the Coa, and the 22nd reached Gouvea with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand horsemen; from thence he detached Claparede's division and the cavalry to drive Silveira from Trancoso, and with the rest of his troops marched on the *Ponte Murcella*.

Hitherto lord Wellington's communications with general Baccellar had been through Trant on the side of Coimbra, and through Wilson on that of Espinal and Abrantes; this advance of the ninth corps forced Wilson to cross the *Mondego*, and Drouet having effected his junction with Massena by Espinal, then occupied Leiria, and spreading towards the sea cut off all communication between the allies and the northern provinces. On the 2nd of January, Trant intercepted a letter from him to Claparede, giving an account of his own arrival and the state of Massena's army; he spoke also of a great operation being in contemplation, said the fifth corps was expected in the *Alemtejo*, and directed Claparede to seize Guarda, forage the neighbouring villages, watch the road of Belmonte, and if Silveira was troublesome to crush him. That vain insufficient man had already attacked Claparede near Trancoso, was defeated with loss, and as Oporto was thus laid open, Baccellar called Trant and Miller to its succour. The last had re-crossed the *Mondego* and taken a hundred of Drouet's stragglers, but both hurried towards Oporto, now in serious danger; for Silveira having again provoked Claparede was driven over the Douro, and the French general seized Lamego: Baccellar however brought up his reserve to the Pavia, Miller and Trant reached Castro d'Airo, and then Claparede returned to Moimenta de Beira followed by Wilson.

Meanwhile Drouet's momentary presence in Leon had enabled Serras to menace the *Tras os Montes*, which drew

Silveira back to Bragança, and Miller died at Viseu. Trant and Wilson continued in Beira, but Claparede entering Guarda seized Covilhao, and Foy with three thousand convalescents, gathered from Massena's hospitals in Castille, was again in Portugal on his return from Paris. He had encountered many perils, and at Pancorbo only escaped from the partidas with the loss of half his escort and his despatches; and now at Enxabarda, notwithstanding Claparede's vicinity, he was so harassed by colonel Grant with a corps of ordenança from the Lower Beira, that three hundred of his men died on the mountain from cold, yet he finally reached Santarem, where affairs were coming to a crisis.

During December and January, the country being more or less flooded, the armies remained quiet, and Wellington, hearing that a serious attack on Cadiz was at hand, prepared to send some British regiments to the assistance of that place. Massena had meanwhile strengthened his works, reinforced his outposts, and extended his marauders in proportion to his increasing necessities. Both generals watched Rio Mayor with jealousy as the season advanced and the roads became firmer, and when some reinforcements landed at Lisbon, Massena thinking the allies were concentrating at Alcoentre, sent Junot to drive their outposts back from Rio Mayor and probe the state of affairs: a general attack was expected, but after a skirmish, Junot returned with a wound which disabled him for the rest of the campaign. Soon afterwards six thousand French scoured all the country beyond the Zézere, and found considerable stores concealed near Pedragoa; thence they marched to the Mondego and carried off from below Coimbra four hundred oxen and two thousand sheep intended for the allies. These excursions gave rise to horrible excesses, which broke down the discipline of the French army, and were not always executed with impunity; the British cavalry at various times redeemed many cattle, and brought in a considerable number of prisoners, amongst them Clausel's aid-de-camp.

Massena also organized a secret communication with Lisbon, through the Portuguese general Pamplona, who effected it by the help of the fidalgos in that capital; their agents, under



pretence of selling sugar at Thomar and Torres Novas, passed by the road of Caldas, and through the mountains of Pedragoa; and it was suspected this treason extended to the provisioning of the enemy on so large a scale as to be one of the resources which enabled Massena so long to brave the difficulties of his position. Certain it is that herds of cattle were often placed in his way under circumstances raising doubts if it could be done without design. On the other hand, lord Wellington had secret intelligence with a French officer of high rank, and thus both generals had excellent information. In this manner hostilities were carried on, each commander impatiently waiting for reinforcements which should enable him to act offensively: how both were disappointed, and how other events, hitherto unnoticed, bore upon the plans of each, must be the subject of another book.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1°. 'War is not a conjectural art.' Massena conjectured the allies would not stand in front of Lisbon, that the militia would not attack Coimbra; but the battle of Busaco and the capture of his hospitals evinced the soundness of the maxim. Again, he conjectured the English would re-embark if pressed, and the lines put an end to that dream. Then he awoke and made war like a great man, more formidable with reduced means and in difficulties, than he had been when opportunity was rife and his numbers untouched. His stay at Santarem showed what thirty thousand additional troops acting on the left bank of the Tagus would have done. Had they reached the heights of Almada before admiral Berkeley's error was discovered, the supply of provisions from Alemtejo and from Spain, would have been transferred from Lisbon to the French armies; the fleet would have been driven from the Tagus, and then the misery of the inhabitants, the fears of the British cabinet, the machinations of the patriarch, and the little chance of final success, would probably have forced the British general to abandon the country.

2°. It has been said Massena might in the first week have passed the Tagus, secured the resources of the Alemtejo, and driven the British fleet out of the port. This was not so

practicable as supposed; the rains were heavy, the fords impassable, and the French had not boats sufficient for a bridge; to detach a small force would have been useless, to detach largely dangerous; to collect boats, cast a bridge, and raise the entrenchments necessary to defend it in the face of the allied forces, would have been neither safe nor sure: moreover, Massena would thus have relinquished the certain aid of the ninth for the uncertain assistance of the fifth corps.

3°. It has been said lord Wellington might have straitened the enemy's quarters more effectually at Santarem; that Hill's corps, passing through Abrantes, could have destroyed the bridges at Punhete; lined the Zezere, cut off Massena's reinforcements, and forced him to abandon his positions, or even to capitulate. This argument held at the time by colonel Squire, an engineer of ability, well acquainted with the localities, merits examination. A partial attack of this nature was contemplated by lord Wellington, but a successful result on the larger design of colonel Squire was not certain. While the lines of Almada were unfinished, to leave the Tagus unguarded before an enemy who possessed eighty large boats, exclusive of those forming the bridges on the Zezere, would have been rash. Hill's corps must therefore have been replaced, and then the force before Santarem would have been so weak as to invite attack, to the danger of the lines. Nor was the forcing of the French works at Punhete a sure matter; the ground was strong, there were two French bridges on the Zezere, and Ney might have passed at Martinchel and taken Hill in flank.

4°. Colonel Squire, at a later period, miscalculating the enemy's numbers at thirty thousand men, and the allies at more than seventy thousand, proposed that Beresford should cross the Tagus at Azingha behind the Almonda river, and march upon Golegao, while Wellington, concentrating at Rio Mayor, pushed upon Torres Novas. Seventy thousand men would thus, in a single march, have been placed in the midst of the enemy's extended quarters; but the hand of Napoleon could scarcely have launched such a thunderbolt. Massena had fifty thousand fighting-men, the boats from Abrantes must have come down to pass the Tagus, and the concentra-

tion of troops at Rio Mayor could scarcely have escaped the enemy's notice. Exact concert, in point of time, was essential, but Junot could have held the allies in check on the Alviella, while Reynier from Santarem, and Ney from Thomar, crushed Beresford between the Almonda and the Tagus; moreover the roads about Tremes were impassable from rain during December, and in January, Soult, whose operations are now to be related, was menacing the Alemtejo. A disaster would at this time have relieved the enemy's difficulties, when nothing else could. Wellington, convinced of this, earnestly wished Massena to retire; and was so far from desiring to hem him in and force a battle, that he doubted if he had not already rendered his line of retreat too difficult by the operations of the northern militia. A campaign is like other works of art, accessories however splendid must be rejected when not conducive to the main object. That judgment which duly classes the value of every feasible operation is the best quality of a general. Lord Wellington possessed it in a remarkable degree and to it his genius and his courage were made subservient: without that mental balance, he might have performed many brilliant exploits in the Peninsula, but he could never have conducted the war to a successful end.

## BOOK THE TWELFTH.

## CHAPTER I.

SPANISH affairs so deeply affected the operations in Portugal that some account of them is absolutely necessary. The general defensive line of the allies presented a great crescent, extending from Coruña to Cadiz, in the concave of which the French armies were operating. Their main body menaced Lisbon, the most important point; if checked there they could reinforce it from the wings, unless the allies at the horns of the crescent acted vigorously upon a system which the harbours and fortresses at each extremity indicated as suitable for those who possessed the absolute command of the sea. A British army and fleet were therefore established at Cadiz, a squadron of frigates at Coruña, and how far this warfare relieved the pressure on lord Wellington shall now be shown.

Mahi's Gallicians, usually hanging on the borders of Leon, were always reported above twenty thousand men when arms or stores were demanded from England; but there were never more than ten or twelve thousand in line. They suffered Serras' division, only eight thousand strong, to spread over the plains of Leon, from Benevente to the Agueda during Massena's advance; and the arrival of the ninth corps, in October, quite paralysed them, while the partidas often surprised both posts and convoys.

Behind Mahi was a second army, about six thousand strong, embodied to defend the coast line towards the Asturias; and in the latter province, eight thousand men, including the irregular bands of Perlier and other chiefs, constantly watched the movements of Bonnet's division. This general frequently

mastered but could never hold the Asturias, because the country is a long defile lying between the great mountains and the sea, and being crossed by a succession of parallel ridges and rivers, is admirably calculated for partisan warfare in connexion with a fleet. If he penetrated towards Galicia, British and Spanish frigates from Coruña, landing troops at the ports of Gihon, Santander, or Santona, could form a junction with the great bands of Longa, Mina, and Amor, and excite insurrections on his rear. In this manner, when he had defeated Ponte, at Sales, just before Massena's invasion of Portugal, Porlier forced him to withdraw from Castropol; and the advantage of such operations being thus shown, sir Home Popham and general Walker were sent to direct the naval and military affairs at Coruña. Preparations were then made to embark a large force under Renovales, for an attack on Santona and Santander, the partidas of the interior being to co-operate; a battalion of marines from England was to form the garrison of Santona when taken, and Mahi promised to co-operate by an incursion along the coast. But Serras threatened the frontier of Galicia, Mahi remained in suspense, and this with the usual procrastination of the Spaniards, and the late arrival of Popham, delayed the expedition until October, although Porlier, Escadron, and other chiefs had commenced an isolated attack in the beginning of September. Finally, Serras returned to Zamora, Mahi sent a division into Leon, and Bonnet, aware of the preparations at Coruña, fell back towards Santander, leaving only a post at Gihon.

On the 16th of October Renovales sailed with thirteen hundred men. He was accompanied by Walker, who carried ten thousand stand of arms and ammunition, and on the 19th, they captured in Gihon some French vessels, while Porlier on the land side, took some treasure and eighty prisoners. Renovales then proceeded to Santona, but tempests impeded his landing, and the 2nd of November he returned to Coruña with only eight hundred and fifty men; a frigate and brig containing the remainder of his men had foundered in a dreadful gale, which destroyed all the Spanish naval force along the coast, and wrecked twelve vessels even in the harbour of Coruña. Mahi, then leaving Toboado Gil's division to

watch Serras, entered the Asturias, and being joined by the troops of that province, and by Renovales, was very superior to the French: yet he effected nothing, and Bonnet re-established his line from Gihon, through Oviedo, to the borders of Leon. During these actions the junta of the Asturias remained distinguished by venality and indifference to the public good. Their province was in a miserable state, the powers of the British naval officers on the coast were not defined, disputes arose between them and general Walker, and the junta was thus enabled to interfere improperly with the distribution of the English stores. Galicia was comparatively rich, but its junta, culpably inactive in the discharge of duties and oppressive, disgusted the whole province. During the winter the clergy combined to oppose both the provincial junta and the general Cortes; and they assumed such a menacing attitude, that Mahi, then in the Asturias, dreaded personal violence, and applied for an English vessel to take him to Coruña. One Acuna was soon after arrested at Ponferrada, but the discontent spread, and the army was more employed to overawe this faction than to oppose the enemy. Finally Walker, despairing to effect anything useful, desired either that a British force should be placed at his disposal, or that he might join the army in Portugal.

General  
Walker's  
Reports,  
MSS.

These expeditions from Coruña naturally increased the audacity of the inland partidas, who became really dangerous only when they had a sea-port where they could receive supplies and reinforcements, or by embarking save themselves in extremity and change their theatre of operations. To prevent this, the emperor employed many men in the military governments touching on the Bay of Biscay, and directed all the reinforcements, in their progress towards Portugal, to scour the disturbed countries to the right and left. The ninth corps had been thus employed during the months of August and September, but when it passed onwards the partidas resumed their activity. Mina, Longa, Campillo, and Amor, frequently united about Villar Caya and Espinosa, in numbers sufficient to attack large French detachments with success, and to aid them, Walker repeatedly recommended that Santona should

be occupied with British troops: it had the best winter harbour along the coast, was built on a mountain promontory joined to the main by a narrow sandy neck, and could have been made very strong. It would have cut Bonnet's communication with France by sea, given the British squadron a secure post from whence to vex the French coasts, and furnished a point of connexion with the partidas of the Rioja, Biscay, and Navarre.

Lord Liverpool, swayed by these considerations, desired to employ four thousand men to secure it; but lord Wellington earnestly dissuaded him from such maritime operations. 'For,'

Letter to lord  
Liverpool, 7th  
May, 1811,  
MSS. said he, 'unless a very large force be sent, it will scarcely be able to effect a landing and maintain the situation of which it might take possession.

Then that large force will be unable to move or effect any object at all adequate to the expense, or to the expectations which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships must be deficient. It is vain to hope for any assistance, even in this way, much less military assistance from the Spaniards; the first thing they will require uniformly will be money; then arms, ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, means of transport, and everything which the expedition would have a right to require from them; and after all, this extraordinary and perverse people will scarcely allow the commander of the expedition to have a voice in the plan of operations to be followed when the whole shall be ready to undertake any, if indeed they ever should be ready.'

The question was soon set at rest, Caffarelli's reserve and other forces entered Spain, Santona was seized and fortified by the French, and Bessières took the command of a new organization called the army of the north, which included the young guard, the third and fourth governments, and Bonnet's division, and in February, 1811, it was seventy thousand strong, nearly fifty-nine thousand men and nine thousand horses being present under arms.

Bessières was invested with unusual powers and had orders to support Massena's operations. The king's army also was

augmented to twenty-seven thousand, exclusive of his French and Spanish guards, and of juramentados, native troops who had taken the oath of allegiance. With this force he watched the Valencians, protected his capital and chased the partidas, who continually hovered in the vicinity of Madrid, cutting off small detachments and intercepting all despatches not protected by large escorts. To obviate this vexation small but strongly fortified posts protected the lines of correspondence, running by Guadarama and Segovia to the provinces of Valladolid and Salamanca,—through Buitrago and the Somosierra to the army of the north—through Guadalajara and Calatayud to the army of Aragon—through La Mancha to the army of the south. A line also went by the bridge of Arzobispo to Truxillo, where a brigade of cavalry was generally stationed to communicate with the fifth corps during its incursions into Estremadura.

This partida warfare being only a succession of surprises and massacres, need not be detailed; but during the summer and autumn, not less than twelve considerable, and an infinite number of trifling affairs, took place between the moveable columns and the bands. The latter were generally beaten; the Empecinado, Duran, Sanchez, Longa, Campillo, Porlier, and Mina only retained reputation, and the country people were so harassed, that many counter partidas assisted the French. Joseph might therefore have aided Massena by an advance to the Elga, or by reinforcing and supporting Mortier in Estremadura; but troubled by the partidas and having many convoys to protect, he would not stir. He was averse to join the marshals, with all of whom, except Massena, he was on ill terms; nor would his feelings towards Napoleon let him take an interest in any military operations, save those which affected the immediate security of the court. His poverty was extreme; he was surrounded by intriguers; his plan for organizing a national party was thwarted by his brother's regulations; plots were formed, or supposed to be formed, against his person; and in this state, feeling he could only act a secondary part, and being from natural gentleness averse to the terrible scenes around him, he resolved to resign the throne.



At the southern horn of the crescent the allies were most favourably situated for resisting the invasion. Sebastiani having Grenada and other cities of the interior to hold, as well as the coast towns which were separated from him by very rugged mountains, was peculiarly exposed to a harassing warfare. The narrow stripe of country bordering the Mediterranean required a large controlling force, which was continually menaced from Gibraltar and the Spanish camp of San Roque on one flank, and on the other by the Murcian army; he had to fear descents from the sea, against which it could never concentrate in time, because of the long shallow line he occupied; the Murcian army, based on the cities of Murcia and Carthage, menaced alike his coast line and Grenada, and any movement by Baza and Guadix was sure to draw him to that side, and give opportunity for troops coming from Cadiz and Gibraltar to strike at the coast line. His mode of warfare was to keep a reserve near Grenada in an entrenched camp, from whence he made sudden incursions sometimes against the Murcians, sometimes on the side of Gibraltar; but that fortress afforded a refuge to the Spaniards on one flank, and Carthage, surrounded by arid lands where for two marches no water is to be found, offered a sure retreat on the other. His principal object was however, to win the castles on the coast, and of these Estipona and Marbella were so stiffly defended, that the latter was only reduced in December, when the garrison of one hundred men took refuge on board the *Topaze* frigate. But to keep these towns, and support his troops on the coast, it was essential to preserve communications across the mountains with Grenada, Chiclana, and Seville; a difficult task, for general Campbell sent British officers into the *Ronda* to lead the wild mountaineers of that district, and they were successful until Lacy's misconduct disgusted the people.

In October general Campbell and admiral Penrose had concerted with the governor of Ceuta to surprise Malaga, where French privateers and gun-boats supposed to be destined against the islands near Ceuta were collected. The siege of Marbella was then in progress, the French depôt for it was at Fuengirola, thirty miles from Malaga, and any attack there

would draw the troops from that city to its succour. General Valdemoro, commanding at San Roque, promised to aid, and an armament was prepared.

## EXPEDITION OF FUENGIROLA.

Captain Hope sailed from Ceuta with the *Topaze*, a division of gun-boats, and a convoy containing a brigade of twelve-pounders, sixty-five gunners, a battalion of the eighty-ninth regiment, a detachment of foreign deserters, and the Spanish imperial regiment of Toledo, in all fifteen hundred men, under lord Blayney. He was to make a false attack on Fuengirola, and if the enemy came from Malaga, he was to sail against that place. A landing was effected, and Sebastiani instantly marched, leaving only three hundred men in Malaga; lord Blayney was as instantly apprized of this, yet he remained two days cannonading the castle with twelve-pounders, after the heavier metal of the gun-boats and frigate had failed to make any impression. His dispositions betrayed the utmost contempt of military rules, and on the second day, he being in a gun-boat, the garrison, about two hundred men, having descried Sebastiani's column approaching, made a sally, took the battery, and drove the British investing force headlong towards the boats. Lord Blayney landed, rallied his men and retook the artillery, but two squadrons of French cavalry coming up, he mistook them for Spaniards, advanced alone, and was immediately made a prisoner; then his troops again fled, and would have been all sabred but for the opportune arrival of the *Rodney* with the eighty-second regiment, the flank companies of which were immediately disembarked and first checked the enemy. The Spaniards, untouched by the panic, regained the ships without loss, but of the British, two officers and thirty men were killed or wounded, a general, seven inferior officers and two hundred serjeants and privates taken, and this expedition, well-contrived and adequate to its object, was ruined by misconduct and terminated in disaster and disgrace.

General C.  
Campbell's  
Correspondence, MSS.

Scarcely was the affair finished, when Valdemoro and the

marquis of Portasgo appeared in the Ronda, an insurrection commenced at Velez Malaga and the neighbouring villages, and Blake, who had returned from Cadiz to the army in Murcia, advanced with eight thousand men towards Cullar on the side of Baza. Campbell furnished money to Portasgo, embarked a thousand stand of arms for the people of Velez Malaga, and Penrose sent a frigate to cruize along the coast; but Sebastiani, relieved from the coast descent, soon quelled this insurrection and then turned against Blake. That general had been held in check by Rey with a small force, and when Milhaud arrived with Sebastiani's cavalry, he retired behind the Almanzora river, where he was defeated the 4th of November: his army then dispersed, and as a contagious fever broke out at Carthagena and spread along the coast to Gibraltar and Cadiz, operations on the side of Murcia ceased.

In the kingdom of Seville, the war turned chiefly upon the blockade of the Isla and the movements of the Spanish armies in Estremadura. Provisions for Cadiz were principally drawn from the Condado de Neibla; and it has been seen that Copons, aided by descents from the ocean, endeavoured to secure this important resource. But neither would have availed, if Ballesteros had not constantly menaced Seville from Araceña and the Aroche mountains. Nor could Ballesteros have warred there without the support of Badajos and Olivenza, from whence Romana supported his line of operation, and sent him at times military supplies: on the possession of Badajos therefore the supply of Cadiz chiefly depended. Seville was the head of the French system in Andalusia. Cadiz, Estremadura and the Condado de Neibla were objects for their offensive operations. To obtain provisions, to cut off Spanish convoys, or to meet expeditions from Cadiz against their posts at Moguer and Huelva, they were forced to act on the coast side; the enterprises of Ballesteros threw them towards Araceña; Romana's operations brought them to Estremadura; where the country was so wasted that Soult could only send Mortier there for sudden momentary strokes, and to prevent the Spaniards establishing a formidable military base on that frontier of Andalusia.

This occasioned many irregular movements without a definite object which can only be slightly treated. Thus, when Romana entered the lines, Mendizabel, who remained with two divisions in Estremadura, finding that Mortier, unconscious of Romana's absence, had retired across the Morena, occupied Merida in the view of feeding on the yet unwasted district of Llerena, but a roving column from the king's army in La Mancha sent him back to Badajos, from whence he marched to join Ballesteros. Soult then fortified Gibrleon and other posts in the Condado de Neibla; and Girard's division, recrossing the Morena, joined the column from La Mancha, and foraged the Llerena district, while Mendizabel occupied Zafra with nine thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, including Madden's Portuguese brigade. Meanwhile Copons was defeated in the Condado.

At Cadiz, no military event occurred after the affair of Matagorda, save the expeditions against Moguer, already noticed, and a slight attempt of the Spaniards against the Chiclana works in September. But, after two years of intrigues and delay the national Cortes had assembled, and the long suppressed voice of the people was to be heard. Yet only partially, for deputies could not be legally chosen in the provinces possessed by the enemy, and some members were captured on their journey to Cadiz: hence many unknown even by name to their supposed constituents were chosen. A new principle of election was also adopted. Every man twenty-five years old, not holding office or pension under the government, and not incapacitated by crime by debts to the state or bodily infirmity, was eligible to sit if chosen, which had never before been the rule. A supplement of sixty-eight members was likewise provided to supply accidental vacancies; and it was agreed that twenty-six persons then in Spain, natives of the colonies, should represent those dependencies. The assembly met the end of September, and took the title of majesty. It declared the press free in respect of political, not of religious matters; it abolished some provincial juntas, re-appointed captains-general, and proceeded to form a constitution worded in the very spirit of democracy. These things, aided by a vehement eloquence,

drew much attention to the proceedings, and a fresh impulse seemed given to the war: but men brought up under despotism do not readily attain the fashions of liberty. The provincial junta, the central junta, the junta of Cadiz, the regency, had all been in succession violent and oppressive while claiming only to be popular leaders; and this spirit did not desert the Cortes. Abstract principles of liberty were freely promulgated, yet tyrannical and partial proceedings were of common occurrence; and the reformatory, outstripping the feeling and understanding of the nation, weakened the springs of its resistance to the French. It was not for freedom, but from national pride and religious influence the people struck. Liberty had no attractions for the nobles, nor for the monastics, nor even for the merchants; and the Cortes, by suppressing old establishments and violating ancient customs, shocked those very prejudices which had produced resistance to Napoleon. Nothing beneficial was given in return. In the conduct of the war, the execution of the laws, the treatment of the colonies, there was as much of vanity and intrigue, of procrastination negligence folly and violence as before. The people became discontented, and when the Cortes proposed to abolish the inquisition, the clergy turned bitter opponents. The principle of feudal privilege being once given up, the natural tendency of the Cortes was towards the enemy; and a broad line of distinction was thus drawn between the objects of the Spanish and English governments in the prosecution of the war. Ere the contest finished, such distemperature was between them as would have given the Peninsula to Napoleon, if fortune had not betrayed him amidst the snows of Russia.

Jalous of the Cortes and dissatisfied with the inferior title of highness, the regency partook not of the republican spirit. Anxious to check innovation, it had early in the year invited the duke of Orleans to command the provinces bordering on France, permitted him to issue proclamations, and received him at Cadiz with the honours of a royal prince, designing to oppose his authority to that of the local juntas at the moment, and finally to that of the Cortes. He had been well received at Taragona, but at Cadiz he was regarded with indifference.

Mr. Wellesley opposed his stay; lord Wellington judged his presence in Spain would render the Spanish war popular in the south of France; the English ministers sent him a verbal invitation to reside in England, which he did not accept, and the Cortes, aware of the cause of his arrival, compelled him to quit Spain. Soon after this, the regency of five was effaced, and one of three members, namely, Blake, Cisgar, and Agar, were appointed. The two first were absent, and substitutes were provided, one of whom, Palacios, hesitated to take the oath, whereupon he was declared to have forfeited the confidence of the nation. The new regents were as little pleased with the democratic spirit as their predecessors, but wishing to retain power, refused to listen to Carlotta's claim to be sole regent, and thus factions sprung up on every side. For the republicans were not at first paramount in the Cortes, and the majority were so subtly dealt with by Pedro Souza, that they privately admitted Carlotta's pretensions both to the succession and the immediate control of the whole Peninsula.

Manuel Lapeña was declared captain-general of Andalusia, and commander of the forces in the Isla, and he was subservient to the Cortes. The new regency, jealous of Romana's power, adopted the complaints of his enemies in Badajos, removed him from his command, and ordered his divisions to abandon the English army and come to Cadiz.

The conduct of his troops had been very unsatisfactory, yet numbers were so essential to keep Massena in check, that Wellington sent colonel O'Neal to remonstrate; and as he clearly showed the regents that the loss of Estremadura and of all communication with the interior of Spain would ensue, a momentary respite was obtained.

Mr. Stuart,  
MSS.

In matters touching the war or the administration no Spanish party acted cordially or wisely; but towards the colonies all agreed to push violence, injustice, cruelty, and impolicy to their utmost bounds. The British government had obtained from the first regency a decree, permitting South America to export its own products under certain conditions. This legalizing of a trade, which could not be suppressed, and which was but a decent return to Eng-

land for her assistance, gave offence to the municipal junta of Cadiz; and its resentment was so much dreaded, that in June the regency disowned their own decree of the previous month, and even punished the printers of it for having given birth to a forged instrument! The colonists had resisted all the intrigues of the French with an independence and singleness of purpose very displeasing to the government in Old Spain, for the latter wished to have them follow in its wake. When, exasperated by this arrogance, they expressed their discontent, the authorities in the mother-country, throwing off the mask of liberality and patriotism, exposed their own secret views. 'It is not enough that Americans should be Spanish subjects now, but that in all cases they should belong to Spain,' was the proclamation of the regency, in answer to a declaration from the Caraccas avowing attachment to Ferdinand: meaning, that if Spain should pass to the usurper, America must follow, as having no right to decide in any case for herself.

When the Cortes met, the Americans expected justice. They had contributed ninety millions of dollars for the support of the war, and many had served zealously in person; America had also been declared an integral part of the empire by the central junta, and her deputies were to sit in the great national assembly. She was however soon made to understand, that the first meant eternal slavery, and the second was a mere form. 'The Americans complain of having been tyrannized over for three hundred years! they shall now suffer for three thousand years;' and 'We know not to what class of beasts the Americans belong:' such were the expressions heard and applauded in the Cortes, when the rights of the colonists were agitated in that assembly. Better give Spain to Joseph if America be retained, than save Spain if America be separated from her, was a feeling rooted in every Spanish heart, covertly expressed in many public documents, and openly acted upon. For when repeated insults, treachery, and violence, had driven the colonists to defend their rights in arms, the money and stores, supplied by England for the support of the war against the French, were applied to the fitting out of expeditions against America. Thus the

convocation of the national Cortes, far from improving the posture of affairs, dried up the chief sources of revenue, weakened the army in the field, offended many powerful bodies in the state, involved the nation in a colonial war, and struck at the root of the alliance with England.



## CHAPTER II.

WHILE the Spaniards were entirely occupied with the debates in congress, the French works were finished; their chain of forts was completed, each fort having a ditch and palisades with a week's provisions. Soult came to San Lucar, and his flotillas there and at Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and Chiclauna being all ready for action, he proceeded to concentrate them. In the last night of October, thirty pinnaces and gun-boats, slipping out of the Guadalquivir, eluded the allied fleet, passed along the coast to Rota, and from thence, aided by shore batteries, fought their way to Santa Maria and the San Pedro river. But to avoid the danger of doubling Matagorda, the vessels were transported overland on rollers, and one hundred and thirty armed vessels and transports were thus safely assembled in the Trocadero canal: the success was however alloyed by the death of general Senarmont, a man of great reputation. At the Trocadero point there were immense batteries, and some notable pieces of ordnance invented by colonel Villantroys, called cannon-mortars. These huge engines, one of which now stands in St. James's Park, were cast at Seville, and being placed in slings, threw projectiles over Cadiz, a distance of more than five thousand yards. To obtain this flight the shells were partly filled with lead, and their charge of powder was too small for an effective explosion, yet they alarmed the city, and were troublesome to the shipping.

Soult's design was to ruin by superior fire the fort of the Puntales, then to pass the straits with his flotilla, and establish his army between the Isla and the city; nor was this plan chimerical, for on the side of the besieged there was neither concert nor industry. New drafts, made by Wellington,

had reduced Graham's force to five thousand men, and in October the fever broke out; but as Soult's preparations became formidable, reinforcements were drawn from Gibraltar and Sicily, and at the end of the year, seven thousand British, Germans, and Portuguese were still behind the Santi Petri. Graham was confident that, with due preparation, he could maintain the Puntales even though its fire should be silenced,—that Soult must establish a stronger flotilla than the allies, or his communication with Matagorda could not be maintained,—and that the intercourse between the Isla and the garrison of Cadiz could not be interrupted, unless the great redoubt of the Cortadura was lost. To insure naval superiority, admiral Keats drew all the armed craft from Gibraltar.

To secure the land defence, Graham urged the regency to adopt certain plans, and he was warmly seconded by sir Henry Wellesley; but neither their entreaties nor the imminence of the danger could overcome the apathy of the Spaniards; their troops were wanting in discipline, clothing, and equipments, and only sixteen thousand men of all arms were effective on a muster-roll of twenty-three thousand. The labour of the British troops, far from being assisted, was vexatiously impeded, and December ended before Graham, after many altercations, could even obtain leave to put the interior line of the Cortadura in a state of defence, although Soult was ready for an attack there, which would have been executed and probably fatal, if events in Portugal had not suddenly arrested his operations.

Graham's  
Despatches,  
MSS.

Appendix 19,  
§§ 1, 2, 3, 4.  
Vol. II.

When Massena entered that kingdom, his communications with France became so uncertain that the emperor's principal information came through the English newspapers: Foy brought the first exact intelligence. It was then Bessières was directed to support the army of Portugal, and the ninth corps was made a component part of the latter. Massena was enjoined to hold fast between Santarem and the Zezere, to besiege Abrantes, and if forced to retreat momentarily, was to keep his bridges and protecting works on the Zezere with a view to a renewed invasion from Castello Branco. He was to expect Soult who had been several times com-

Joseph's Cor-  
respondence,  
MSS.

manded to move through the Alemtejo to his assistance, and that marshal was censured for suffering Romana to join Wellington unmolested, when he ought to have been closely followed by the fifth corps. The emperor seemingly contemplated the evacuation of Andalusia and the concentration of the whole army of the south on the Tagus, because it was more important to crush the regular warfare in Portugal, than to hold any particular province. Massena's instructions reached him in due time, Soult's were intercepted by the guerillas, and the duplicates did not arrive before the end of December. When they did reach him his ripe design against Cadiz was rendered a nullity. Drawing off Latour Maubourg's cavalry and five thousand of Victor's infantry he repaired to Seville; but his instructions pointed out no fixed line of movement nor a specific operation, —Massena was to communicate his plan and Soult was to conform to it. No certain intelligence even of Massena's early operations had reached Seville, and such was Wellington's vigilance, and the activity of the bands, that the French marshals were now forced to operate without communication, and entirely ignorant of each other's plans and situation.

Soult did not know of Romana's being in the lines, but showed he could not have followed him, for Mendizabel had covered the movement with considerable forces, and five fortresses were on the frontiers of Portugal which he dared not neglect. Nor could he now co-operate directly with Massena. Sebastiani's hands were full, the blockade of Cadiz was to be maintained, and Seville protected from the Spanish forces at Aracena and in the Neibla: hence only twenty thousand men were disposable. With that force he dared not enter the Alemtejo leaving Olivenza and Badajoz in his rear, because Ballesteros would join Mendizabel to vex his communications, and Romana, without counting Hill's force, could oppose him with ten thousand men in front. Wherefore he demanded and obtained Napoleon's leave to reduce those fortresses before he co-operated directly with Massena. While awaiting the answer he prepared for the sieges and the protection of Andalusia. Dessolles' division had rejoined the king's army, and Godinot's now replaced it at

Soult's Cor-  
respondence,  
MSS.

Cordoba; a corps of observation under general Digeon was posted at Ecija; Seville, being entrenched on the Neibla side, was given in charge to general Daricau, and Remond occupied Gibraleon. The expeditionary force of sixteen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty-four guns, was assembled the 2nd of January. A siege equipage, a light pontoon train, and seventeen hundred carts for stores and provisions attended the troops; and so efficient was the civil administration, that Soult ordered a levy of five thousand young Spaniards, called escopeteros, (fuzileers), to maintain the police of Andalusia.

Joseph's  
Correspondence, MSS.

Mortier, moving from Guadalcanal, entered Zafra the 5th, whereupon Mendizabel retired to Merida and Ballesteros passed over the mountain to Frejenal. The French convoy was detained at the foot of the hills by the winter tempests which then raged, and to protect it and drive Ballesteros from Frejenal Gazan's division moved from Zafra. The Spanish leaders in Estremadura and at Cadiz judged lightly of Soult's object; some said he was to pass the Tagus, others that he only aimed at Ballesteros; Wellington alone divined his intentions, and first gave Mendizabel notice that the French were assembling their army at Seville: hence when they broke into Estremadura terror and confusion prevailed. Badajos was ill-provisioned, Albuquerque though garrisoned was in ruins, Olivenza nearly dismantled; and in the midst of all this disorder, Ballesteros was suddenly drawn off towards the Condada de Neibla by the regency, who thus deprived Estremadura of half its defenders at the moment of invasion. Wellington had advised a concentration of the troops, the destruction of the accessible bridges over the Guadiana, and a disputed passage of that river to gain time; these things were neglected and an advanced guard of cavalry carried the bridge of Merida on the 6th. Soult then turned upon Olivenza with the infantry; and while his dragoons held Mendizabel in check on the side of Badajos, his light horsemen collected cattle on the side of Estremadura. Gazan's division protected the march of the artillery and convoy, and La Houssaye's brigade, belonging to the army of the centre, marched from Truxillo against the par-

Appendix 18,  
§§ 5, 6. Vol. II.

tidas, and scoured the banks of the Tagus from Arzobispo to Alcantara.

#### FIRST SIEGE OF OLIVENZA.

This place fortified with nine bastions a covered way and some unfinished ravelins, was incapable of a good defence. With an old breach slightly repaired, very few guns mounted, and commanding no passage, it was of little importance; but it contained four thousand troops. Wellington had pressed Romana to destroy the defences entirely or furnish good means of resistance; the marquis decided on the former, but Mendizabel, slighting his orders, had thrown his best division into the place. It was invested on the 11th. An abandoned outwork, three hundred and forty yards south of the town, was taken possession of the first night, and breaching and counter-batteries for eight and six guns were marked out. The trenches were opened on the west, and approaches by the flying sap were made against the old breach; yet heavy rain and a scarcity of entrenching tools retarded the siege until the head of the great French convoy had passed the mountains. However, the covered way was crowned and on the 20th the breaching batteries opened their fire; two mortars threw shells into the town and a globe of compression was prepared to blow in the counter-scarp. In the evening, Mendizabel skirmished unsuccessfully with Latour Maubourg's horsemen covering the siege, and on the 21st the mine was completed and preparations made for the passage of the ditch. Mendizabel, weakened by the absence of Ballesteros, demanded succour from Romana, who was sick but sent Carlos d'España with two thousand men from Abrantes the 18th, and Virues, with his own divisions from Cartaxo the 20th. The 21st, the governor of Olivenza was informed of this, and replied that he would maintain the place to the last moment; yet he capitulated the next day, having still provisions, ammunition, eighteen guns, and four thousand one hundred effective soldiers. The prisoners were immediately sent to Cordoba, escorted by a regiment, and on the 26th Soult marched against Bajados.

French  
Journal of  
Operations,  
MSS.

During the siege Ballesteros advanced upon Neibla, but being followed by Gazan, was beaten at Castillejos the 28th,

and driven over the Guadiana into Portugal with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners besides killed and wounded: his artillery escaped to the castle of Paymigo, the infantry took refuge at Alcoutin and Mertola. His force was thus reduced by three thousand men and the regency recalled Copons to Cadiz! In this manner a fortress was taken, and twelve thousand men, who well employed might have frustrated the French designs against Badajos, were dispersed, withdrawn, or made prisoners in twenty days after the commencement of Soult's expedition. Wellington had striven hard to teach the Spanish commanders there was but one safe mode of proceeding in Estremadura, and Romana had just yielded to his counsels, when the sudden arrival of the French threw everything into confusion, and the defence of the Guadiana, the dismantling of Olivenza, the concentration of the armies were neglected. Romana's own divisions reached Montemor the 22nd, but the 23rd they received Mendizabel's orders to halt, because Olivenza had surrendered. The 24th Romana died of an aneurism in the heart. A worthy man and of quick parts, although deficient in military talent, his death was a great loss; yet his influence was on the wane, and he had many enemies; his authority was only sustained by the attachment of his troops, and by his riches; for his estates being in the Balearic Isles his revenues did not suffer by the war.

Mendizabel, now commanding in Estremadura, had received Romana's orders to follow Wellington's counsels. These were, to concentrate his ten or eleven thousand men, and before Soult appeared on the Guadiana to occupy a position of great natural strength close to Badajos. The right was to touch the fort of St. Christoval, the front to be covered by the Gebora river and the Guadiana. The fortress of Campo Mayor was to be immediately in rear of the left, Elvas behind the centre. Entrenched in that position with a strong garrison in Badajos, the English general thought Mendizabel might defy Soult to invest or even straiten the communications of the town; yet he prophetically observed, 'with soldiers of any other nation success is cer-  
tain, but no calculation can be made of any operation in which Spanish troops are engaged.' When Olivenza

fell, Mendizabel had a small garrison in Albuquerque, another in Valencia de Alcantara; Romana's divisions were at Montemor under Virues, and Carlos d'España was at Campo Mayor. Instead of concentrating all this force at once on the Gebora, he waited until Soult drove back his outposts and then shut himself up with six thousand men in Badajos. That place was still unprovisioned, though a siege had been constantly expected for a year, and on the 27th Latour Maubourg's dragoons having crossed the Guadiana at Merida, forded the Gebora, and cut off all communication with Campo Mayor and Elvas.

#### FRENCH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

This city stands at the confluence of the Guadiana with the Rivillas; the first a noble river five hundred yards broad; the second a trifling stream. A rock, one hundred feet high, crowned by an old castle, overhangs the meeting of the waters. The town, spreading like a fan as the land opens between the rivers, was protected by eight regular curtains and bastions, from twenty-three to thirty feet in height, with good counter-scarps, covered way and glacis. On the left bank of the Guadiana the outworks were, 1°, the Lunette of San Roque, covering a dam and sluice on the Rivillas by which an inundation could be made; 2°, an isolated redoubt, called the Picurina, situated beyond the Rivillas, and four hundred yards from the town; 3°, the Pardaleras, a defective crown-work, central between the lower Guadiana and the Rivillas, two hundred yards from the ramparts. On the right bank of the Guadiana a hill crowned by the San Christoval fort, three hundred feet square, overlooked the interior of the castle; and a quarter of a mile farther down the stream, the bridge, six hundred yards in length, was protected by a bridge-head, slightly connected with San Christoval but commanded on every side.

Soult constructed a ferry on the Guadiana, above the confluence of the Gebora, and opened three attacks the 28th, two against the Picurina, one against the Pardaleras. The 29th and 30th slight sallies were repulsed, but tempestuous weather ruined the French works; Gazan's division was distant, the

infantry before the place were few, and on the 31st, a sally from the Pardaleras, killed or wounded sixty men and cleared the trenches; some of the Spanish cavalry also, gliding round the left of the French parallel, sabred several engineers and sappers. Two nights afterwards the Rivillas, flooded by a tempest, carried away the French bridges, drowned men and horses, damaged the depôts, and reduced the besiegers to the greatest distress; and next morning another sally from the Pardaleras killed or wounded eighty men and ruined part of the parallel. The cavalry employed in the investment could not forage, the convoys only came in by detachments, scarcity was felt in the camp, and the rigour of the winter bivouacs caused sickness. Gazan arrived the 3rd, but the French cavalry was withdrawn from the right bank of the Guadiana in consequence of the severe weather, the Spanish communication with Elvas was re-established, and Mendizabel called all the divisions from Portugal to his assistance: Virues marched upon Elvas, Carlos d'España and Madden united at Campo Mayor, and Julian Sanchez brought down his partida from Upper Estremadura to the Tagus.

Conquête de  
l'Andalousie,  
par Edouard  
Lapène.

Siège de  
Badajos.  
Lamare.

Wellington's  
Correspond-  
ence, MSS.

Mr. Stuart,  
MSS.

In the night of the 5th, Mendizabel repaired to Elvas and took the command of Virues' divisions. He passed the Caya the next morning, and being joined on his march by Carlos d'España, pushed the few French cavalry posts still on the right bank of the Guadiana over the Gebora: Madden's Portuguese even crossed that river and captured some baggage beyond. The French soon returned, forced Madden to recross the stream, and killed many of his rear-guard; the Spanish cavalry then fled shamefully, and the infantry entered Badajos. Mendizabel, instead of taking the strong position behind the Gebora recommended by Wellington, resolved to raise the siege by a sally, yet he delayed the execution until next morning, at the risk of being shut up in Badajos with his whole army; and this would inevitably have happened if a greater body of the French cavalry had passed the Gebora in pursuit of the beaten horsemen.



Badajos now contained sixteen thousand fighting men, and the projected sally was made with great vigour by Carrera and Carlos d'España. Breaking out on the Picurina side with five thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry they carried all the trenches and batteries, for the soldiers fought with surprising ardour, but the generals had forgotten even to provide the means of spiking the guns when taken. Mortier then fell with his reserves upon the front and flank of the column and drove it back in disorder with a loss of six hundred killed and wounded. It was a hard struggle, and the French lost several engineers and four hundred men; but while the action was being fought, Latour Maubourg's cavalry occupied the ground between the Gebora and the Caya, and again cut the communication with Elvas and Campo Mayor. He was however too weak to maintain himself there, and Madden forced him to repass the Gebora on the 9th: Mendizabel then gave over Badajos to the governor Rafael Menacho, and pitched his own camp round San Christoval. Some days previous to these events the French had bombarded the place; a proceeding only mischievous to themselves, for the inhabitants fled in great numbers to avoid the danger, leaving behind them provisions which enabled Menacho to feed his garrison.

Soult now seeing that the Spaniards had great resources if their generals knew how to use them, feared a change of commanders or of system, and resolved to bring the siege to a crisis rapidly; in this view he stormed the Pardaleras on the 11th, sent fifteen hundred cavalry across the Guadiana to Montijo on the 12th, and the 14th threw shells into the camp about San Christoval. His efforts were well timed, for Romana's soldiers, who had long considered themselves independent of the central government, were now enraged to hear that Castaños was made captain-general of Estremadura, and became so unruly that when the position behind the Gebora was assumed, no one dared meddle with them and military discipline ceased. The Spaniards had been expressly counselled to entrench their camp by Wellington, whose design was to have them on an impregnable post, from whence they could aid the garrison, and preserve free communication

Appendix 5,  
§ 2.

Wellington  
to Lord Liver-  
pool, MSS.

with the Alemtejo until the reinforcements from England enabled him to raise the siege. Mendizabel hung for twelve days on the Christoval heights, torpid, and when driven from thence by the French shells, he merely destroyed a small bridge on the Gebora, cast up no entrenchment, and kept no guard in front : wherefore, Soult, seeing this negligence, suddenly leaped upon him.

#### BATTLE OF THE GEBORA.

Although the Guadiana and the Gebora covered the Spanish camp, Soult hoped to pass both and surprise the careless general ; but first, to mislead and deprive Mendizabel of the support of the fort, he threw shells again on the 17th, and the swell of the rivers delayed the great operation until the 18th. In the evening of that day the cavalry drew down the right bank of the Guadiana from Montijo, while the artillery and infantry crossed the ferry four miles above the confluence of the Gebora ; this combination was exactly timed, and precisely at daybreak the 19th, five thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry were on the right bank ; but the Gebora was still to be passed in face of ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and many armed camp followers, in all not less than fifteen thousand fighting men. A thick mist hid the French, no Spanish post or patrol was in advance, and Soult after riding through the ranks and exhorting his soldiers to fight strongly, commenced the passage of the Gebora ; the cavalry forded five miles up the stream, the infantry on the right and left of the broken bridge ; then some random shots from the French guns awakened Mendizabel, and though the mist still hid all things, a loud clamour, following the cannon shot, showed that the surprise was complete. Mortier, acting under Soult, soon formed his line of battle, the mist cleared up, and at eight o'clock the first beams of the sun and of victory flashed together on the French soldiers ; for their horsemen were around Mendizabel's left, and his infantry cavalry and guns were heaped together in the centre waving to and fro in disorder. His right having fallen away from San Christoval the 17th to avoid the shells, had no position, and in a few moments Girard placed three battalions between the Spanish

centre and that fort; the artillery then opened and the French bore onward as one man to the attack. Six battalions pressed the Spanish front, Girard struck their right flank, the cavalry charged their left, and instinctively the multitude crowded on the centre; but the French infantry closed with a destroying musketry, the horsemen spurred in with loose

bridles and the huge quivering mass was broken: the cavalry fled outright, and even Madden's Portuguese, regardless of his example and reproaches, shamefully turned their backs.

At ten o'clock the fight was over. Virues was taken, Mendizabel and Carrera escaped with difficulty, España alone made an orderly retreat to Campo Mayor with two thousand men. A few reached Elvas, three thousand got into Badajos by the bridge, nine hundred bodies strewed the field. Eight thousand, including armed followers, were made prisoners, together with all the guns, colours, muskets, ammunition, and baggage. It was a shameful defeat. Soult, with a small force, had passed two difficult rivers, carried a strong position, and annihilated an army which had been two years in constant service. Mendizabel, instead of destroying the bridge over the Gebora should have cast others, that he might freely pass to attack the French while crossing the Guadiana; he should have opposed them again in passing the Gebora; or he might have gone through Badajos, and fallen on the troops in the trenches with his whole army, while Soult was still entangled between the rivers.


After the action the French cast up entrenchments and posted three battalions and the heavy cavalry on the position gained. Next day the siege was renewed, but the difficulty was rendered apparent by the victory. Continual rains interrupted the convoys, and men were detached a great distance to gather provisions; nearly two thousand had been killed or wounded in the two sieges and this battle, many were sick, and Badajos was still powerful. The garrison was nine thousand strong, and by the flight of the inhabitants well provided with food, there was no want of other stores, the governor was resolute, the season rigorous for the besiegers: no communication had been opened with Massena,





## BATTLE of BAROSA

5<sup>th</sup> March, 1811



and Wellington, momentarily expecting his reinforcements, was eager to succour the place. Andalusia was meanwhile seriously menaced.

#### CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

When Graham knew that Soult had gone to Estremadura he undertook to drive Victor from his lines. Troops sailing from Cadiz were to disembark in rear of the French and be joined by the garrison of Tarifa under major Brown, and by three thousand Spaniards from San Roque under general Beguines. Contrary winds delayed the expedition, and the despatch vessels carrying counter orders to Brown and Beguines being likewise retarded, those officers advanced, the first to Medina, the second to Casa Vieja. Victor got notice of the design and kept close in his works until he heard of this failure in the combinations, when he sent troops to retake Medina and the Casa. At the same time twelve thousand men from the northern governments reached him, and, his whole force being twenty thousand, he had fifteen thousand in the lines: the remainder were at San Lucar, Medina, and other posts. This was known at Cadiz, but ten thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry were again embarked, being this time to land at Tarifa and march straight on Chiclana. General Zayas was left in command of the Isla with orders to throw a bridge over the Santi Petri near the sea mouth. Ballesteros with the remnant of his broken force was to menace Seville, the partidas were to hold Sebastiani in check, and insurrections were expected in all quarters.

Official  
Abstract  
of Military  
Reports,  
MSS.

Appendix 17,  
§ 6. Vol. II.

On the 22nd the British troops passed their port in a gale, but landed at Algeiras, marched to Tarifa the next day, and were joined by the twenty-eighth regiment and the flank companies of the ninth and eighty-second regiments. Thus more than four thousand effective troops, including two companies of the twentieth Portuguese and one hundred and eighty German hussars, were assembled under Graham; all good and hardy troops,

Appendix 4,  
§ 2.

and himself a daring old man and of a ready temper for battle. The captain general La Peña landed the 27th with seven thousand Spaniards, and Graham to preserve unanimity ceded the command although it was contrary to his instructions. Next day a march of twelve miles carried them over the ridges which separate the plains of San Roque from those of Medina and Chiclana, and being then within four leagues of the enemy's posts, the troops were re-organized. The vanguard was given to Lardizabal, the centre to the prince of Anglona, the reserve, composed of two Spanish regiments and the British troops, was confided to Graham: the cavalry of both nations, formed in one body, was under colonel Whittingham, then in the Spanish service.

Before this Beguines and the partidas had driven the French from Casa Vieja and Medina; but general Cassagne, being reinforced from Arcos, had retaken both places and entrenched Medina, acting as a covering force to the lines. Meanwhile the generals in the higher districts of Andalusia, seeing the people ripe for commotion, gathered their scattered troops, and, following Soult's orders, concentrated at Seville, Ecija, and Cordoba. In Grenada the insurgents were especially active, and Sebastiani, doubtful if the storm would not break on his side, concentrated troops at Estipona as a covering point for the coast line, whence he could easily gain

General  
Werlé to  
Sebastiani,  
Alhama,  
March 12.  
Intercepted.

Ronda. Victor manned his works at Rota, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and the Trocadero, with a mixed force of juramentados and regular troops; but he assembled eleven thousand good soldiers near Chiclana, between the roads of Conil and Medina, to await the unfolding of the allies' project, which was not long delayed. At first La Peña's march pointed to Medina Sidonia, his vanguard stormed Casa Vieja on the 2nd of March, and he was joined by Beguines with sixteen hundred infantry and several hundred irregular cavalry. Having then twelve thousand infantry, eight hundred horsemen, and twenty-four guns, he turned towards the coast and drove the French from Vejer de la Frontera. The following evening he continued his movement, and at nine o'clock in

Appendix 17.  
§ 7.

the morning of the 5th, after a skirmish, in which his advanced guard of cavalry was routed by a French squadron, he reached the Cerro de Puerco, called by the English the heights of Barosa, being then four miles from the sea mouth of the Santi Petri.

Barosa is a low ridge, creeping in from the coast about one mile and a half; it overlooked a high broken plain of small extent, bounded on the left by the coast cliffs, on the right by the forest of Chiclana, in front by a pine-wood. Beyond this wood a long narrow height, called the Bermeja, filled the space between the Almanza creek and the sea, and could be reached by moving through the pine-wood in front, or by the beach under the cliffs. Graham, foreseeing that Victor would come out of his lines to fight, had previously obtained La Peña's promise to make short marches, to keep the troops fresh for battle, and not to approach the enemy except in a mass; but in violation Appendix 4,  
§ 1. of this promise, the march from Casa Vieja, made on bad roads with ignorant guides, had occupied fifteen hours, and the night march to Barosa had been still more fatiguing. The troops therefore came up in a straggling manner; and ere they had all arrived, La Peña, without disclosing his own plans, or communicating by signal or otherwise with Zayas, sent Lardizabal, reinforced by a squadron and three guns, straight to the mouth of the Santi Petri. Zayas had cast his bridge on the 2nd, and commenced an entrenchment, but in the night he had been surprised by the French and driven again into the Isla; Lardizabal's movement was therefore dangerous, yet, after a sharp fight in which three hundred Spaniards fell, he forced the French posts and effected a junction with Zayas.

La Peña desired the British troops to follow, but Graham was desirous to hold the Barosa height in strength. He argued that Victor could not attack Lardizabal and Zayas, as he would thus lend his flank to the allies on Barosa; Lasey, chief of the Spanish staff, controverted this reasoning, and La Peña peremptorily commanded Graham to march the British troops through the wood to Bermeja. With great temper he obeyed the uncourteous order, but left the flank



companies of the ninth and eighty-second regiments under major Brown to guard his baggage: he moved also thinking La Peña would remain at Barosa with Anglona's division and the cavalry, and the more certainly that a Spanish detachment was still on the side of Medina. Yet the British had scarcely entered the wood in front, when La Peña, without notice, carried off the corps of battle, and directing the cavalry to follow, repaired himself by the sea-road to Santi Petri, leaving Barosa crowded with baggage and protected only by a rear-guard of four guns and five battalions.

Victor had hitherto kept so close to the forest of Chiclana that the allies' patrols could find no enemy, and Graham's march of only two miles seemed safe, but the French marshal was keenly watching his opportunity. He had recalled Cassagne's infantry from Medina Sidonia when La Peña reached Barosa, and, momentarily expecting its arrival, felt so sure of success, that the great body of French cavalry, then at Medina and Arcos, was directed upon Vejer and other points to cut off the fugitives after the battle. He had fourteen

pieces of artillery and nine thousand excellent soldiers in hand commanded by Laval, Ruffin, and

Appendix 17.  
§ 7. Vol. II.

Villatte. From these he drafted three grenadier battalions to form reserves, attaching two of them and three squadrons of cavalry to Ruffin's brigade which formed his left wing: the other waited on Laval's brigade which formed his centre. Villatte's brigade, two thousand five hundred strong, originally on the Bermeja, had retired from thence before Lardizabal, and was now posted close to a bridge on the Almanza creek, to cover the works of the camp and to watch the Spanish forces at Santi Petri and the Bermeja.

#### BATTLE OF BAROSA.

Cassagne had not yet arrived, but Victor seeing Graham's corps in the wood, Zayas and Lardizabal on the Bermeja, a third body and all the baggage on the Barosa height, a fourth in movement by the coast, and a fifth still on the march from Vejer, poured at once into the plain and begun the battle. Laval was directed against the British in the wood. Victor.

leading Ruffin's troops in person, ascended the rear of the Barosa height, and thus intercepted the Spanish detachment coming from Medina. He drove the rear-guard off the hill towards the sea, dispersed the baggage and followers in all directions, and took three Spanish guns; but major Brown kept his companies in good order, and though unable to stem the torrent slowly retired into the plain and sent to Graham for orders. That general was near Bermeja, and simply answered, fight! then facing about himself regained the plain with great celerity, expecting to find La Peña with the corps of battle and the cavalry on the Barosa hill. When the view opened he beheld Ruffin's brigade, flanked by the two grenadier battalions, near the summit on the one side, the Spanish rear-guard and the baggage flying toward the sea on the other, the French cavalry following the fugitives in good order, Laval close upon his own left flank, and La Peña nowhere!

In this desperate situation, feeling that a retreat to Bermeja would bring the enemy pell-mell with the allies on to that narrow ridge, and must be disastrous, Graham resolved to attack, although the key of the field of battle was in the enemy's possession. Ten guns, under major Duncan, instantly opened a terrific fire against Laval's column, and colonel Andrew Barnard running vehemently out with his riflemen and some Portuguese companies, commenced the fight while the rest of the British troops, without any attention to regiments or brigades, so sudden was the affair, formed two masses, with one of which general Dilkes marched against Ruffin, while colonel Wheatley led the other against Laval. Duncan's guns ravaged the French ranks, Laval's artillery replied vigorously, Ruffin's batteries took Wheatley's column in flank, and the infantry on both sides pressed forward eagerly and with a pealing musketry. But when the masses drew near, a fierce rapid prolonged charge of the 87th regiment overthrew the first line of the French, and though the latter fought roughly, they were dashed violently upon the second line and both being broken by the shock went off, the reserve battalion of grenadiers, hitherto posted on the right, alone remaining to cover the retreat. Meanwhile Brown having received Graham's laconic order, fell headlong

upon Ruffin; and though nearly half of his detachment went down under the enemy's first fire, he maintained the fight, until Dilkes' column, which had crossed a deep hollow and never stopt even to reform the regiments, arrived, with little order indeed but in a fighting mood, and then the whole run up towards the summit: there was no slackness on either side, for at the very edge of the ascent their gallant opponents met them, when a dreadful and for some time a doubtful combat raged. Finally Ruffin, and Chaudron Rousseau, who commanded the chosen grenadiers, fell, both mortally wounded, the English bore strongly onward, and their slaughtering fire forced the French from the hill with the loss of three guns and many brave soldiers. The discomfited divisions, retiring concentrically from the different points of battle, soon met, and with infinite spirit endeavoured to reform and renew the action, but the play of Duncan's guns, rapid and murderous, rendered the attempt vain: Victor then quitted the field of battle, and the British having been twenty-four hours under arms without food, were too exhausted to pursue.

While these terrible combats of infantry were fighting, La Peña looked idly on, neither sending his cavalry, nor his horse-artillery, nor any part of his army to the assistance of his ally, nor yet menacing Villatte who was close to him and comparatively weak. The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some guerilla cavalry, turned indeed without orders and came up just as the action ceased; and it was expected that Whittingham, an Englishman, commanding a powerful body of Spanish horse, would have done as much—but no stroke in aid was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed two hundred and fifty men, and it is evident the eight hundred under Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin's division, have rendered the defeat ruinous. So certain indeed was this, that Frederick Ponsonby, drawing off the hundred and eighty German hussars belonging to the English army, reached the field of battle, charged the French squadrons in their retreat, overthrew them, took two guns, and even attempted though vainly to sabre Rousseau's chosen battalions. This was the fight of Barosa. Short, for it lasted only one

hour and a half, violent and bloody, for fifty officers, sixty sergeants, eleven hundred British soldiers, and more than two thousand French were killed and wounded: six guns, an eagle, two generals, both mortally wounded, together with four hundred other prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors.

Graham remained some hours on the height, still hoping La Peña would awake to the prospect of success and glory which the extreme valour of the British had opened. Four thousand men and a powerful artillery had come over the Santi Petri, and the Spanish general was therefore at the head of twelve thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry, all fresh troops; before him were the remains of the French line of battle retreating in the greatest disorder upon Chiclana; but military feeling was extinct in him, and Graham no longer able to endure this scene, left the dastard on the Bermeja and filed the British troops over the bridge into the Isla.

Appendix 4,  
§ 1.

On the French side, Cassagne's reserve came up from Medina and a council of war was held in the night of the 5th. Victor, although naturally of a desponding temper, proposed another attack, but the suggestion was ill-received, and the 6th, admiral Keats landed his seamen and marines and dismantled, with exception of Catalina, every fort from Rota to Santa Maria, and even obtained momentary possession of the latter place. This caused such alarm in the French camp, that Victor, leaving garrisons at the great points of his lines and a rear-guard at Chiclana, retreated behind the San Pedro, where he expected to be immediately attacked; and if La Peña had even then pushed to Chiclana, Graham and Keats were willing to make a simultaneous attack upon the Trocadero; but two days passed without even a Spanish patrol following the French. On the 8th Victor returned to Chiclana, whereupon La Peña recrossed the Santi Petri and destroyed the bridge; his detachment on the side of Medina was thus cut off from the Isla, and soon afterwards retired to Algeiras.

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All the passages in this extraordinary battle were broadly marked, and La Peña's contemptible weakness was surprisingly contrasted with the heroic vigour of Graham, whose attack was

an inspiration rather than a resolution, so wise so sudden was the decision, so swift so conclusive the execution. The original plan of the enterprise has however been censured. Sebastiani, it is said, might, by moving on the rear of the allies, have crushed them, and they had no right to calculate upon his inactivity. This is shallow criticism. Graham, weighing the natural dislike of one general to serve under another, judged that Sebastiani would not hastily abandon his own district, menaced as it was by insurrection, to succour Victor before it was clear where the blow was to be struck. The distance from Tarifa to Chiclana was fifty miles, Sebastiani's nearest post to Chiclana was above a hundred, and the object of the allies could not be known until they passed the mountains separating Tarifa from Medina. Combining these moral and physical considerations, Graham expected several days of free action, and thus it happened; with a worthy colleague he would have raised the blockade, and more than that could not have been hoped, as the French would have concentrated before Cadiz or about Seville or Ecija, and they had still fifty thousand men in Andalusia. The real error of the French has been pointed out by Napoleon. Soult disseminated his forces too widely, and made unskilful combinations. Seville and the lines at Cadiz were the important points to guard during his absence; he should therefore have collected his hospitals in Seville, leaving his scattered posts free to move to any point. Sebastiani and Godinot should have been under Victor's orders, who could then have drawn them to his succour in time, and crushed the allies. In this manner Sebastiani might certainly have prevented the expedition altogether; but Graham knew Sebastiani was not under Victor's command, and it was a proof of genius to rely as he did on the effect of the insurrections in Grenada. The error was with Sebastiani, who suffered his sixteen thousand excellent troops to be paralysed by some insurgents. Victor's attack was well-timed, and vigorous; with a few thousand more troops he would have destroyed the allies. The unconquerable English spirit prevented this disaster; but if Graham had given way, or even hesitated the army must have been driven like sheep into an enclosure, having the Almanza creek on one side, the

sea on the other, the Santi Petri to bar their flight, and the enemy hanging on their rear in all the fierceness of victory. Indeed, such was La Peña's misconduct that the French, although defeated, gained their main point; the blockade was renewed; and during the action a French detachment, passing the Santi Petri near the bridge of Zuazo without difficulty, brought back prisoners: with a few more troops Victor might have seized the Isla. Ballesteros menaced Seville during the operations, but was driven back in a miserable condition to the Aroche hills by Daricau.

Violent disputes arose in Cadiz. La Peña, in an address to the Cortes, claimed the victory for himself: he said that the arrangements previous to the battle were made with the knowledge and approbation of the English general, and the latter's retreat to the Isla was the real cause of failure. Lasey and Cruz-Murgeon, also published inaccurate accounts of the action, and had deceptive plans engraved to uphold their statements. Graham, incensed at these unworthy proceedings, wrote a letter to the British envoy in which he exposed La Peña's misconduct; he refused with disdain the title of grandee of the first class voted to him by the Cortes, and when Lasey used expressions relative to the action personally offensive, he enforced an apology with his sword. Having thus shown himself superior to his opponents at all points, the gallant old man relinquished his command to general Cooke, and joined lord Wellington's army.

## CHAPTER III.

ANDALUSIA continued to be disturbed by insurrection, but Soult's resolution to take Badajos remained unshaken, and early in March, the approaches being carried by sap to the covered way, mines were prepared to blow in the counter-scarp. Rafael Menacho the governor was however a resolute man: his courage and activity gained the confidence of his troops, his sallies were frequent and vigorous, his fire was superior to that of the French, and he had entrenched the streets behind the breach; but on the 2nd March, in a successful sally, he was killed, and the command fell to Imas, a man so base that a worse could nowhere be found. Then the spirit of the garrison sunk, the French passed the ditch, a lodgment was made on one of the ravelins, the rampart was breached, and the place was summoned previous to the assault.

At this time the great crisis of the campaign in Portugal having passed, a strong body of British and Portuguese troops was in march to raise the siege. In three different ways, by telegraph, by letter, by a confidential messenger, Imas was told that Massena was in retreat, and an army actually in march to succour the place. The breach was still impracticable, provisions were plentiful, the garrison was above eight thousand strong, and the French army reduced to less than fourteen thousand men: Imas read the letter, received the messages and instantly surrendered, handing over at the same moment the intelligence thus obtained to the enemy. He only demanded that his grenadiers should march out of the breach, and it was granted, but he was forced to enlarge the opening himself ere they could do so! Yet this man who had secured his own liberty while consigning his fellow-soldiers to a prison, was never punished by the Spanish rulers; for though Wellington's indignant remonstrances procured a trial, the

process lasted during the whole war. When the place fell, Mortier marched against Campo Mayor, and Latour Maubourg seized Albuquerque, and Valencia d'Alcantara making six hundred prisoners, but Soult, alarmed by the effects of the battle of Barosa, returned to Andalusia. He had in fifty days mastered four fortresses and invested a fifth; he had killed or dispersed ten thousand men, and made twenty thousand prisoners with a force at no time exceeding the number of his captives. Great daring and successful his operations had been, yet the principal object was frustrated, Massena was in full retreat—Wellington's combinations had palsied the hand of the conqueror!


While the siege was proceeding, no change took place in the main positions of either army at Santarem. Massena was encouraged by the destitute state of the Portuguese army, which he hoped would break up the alliance; for the native troops were starving in their own country while the British were well fed, and the deserters from the former, without knowing the cause, had a story, as true as it was pitiable, to tell of their miseries. The English general, certain that the French, reduced by sickness, must soon quit their ground if he could relieve Badajos, only waited for his reinforcements to send Beresford with fourteen thousand men against Soult. The defeat on the Gebora ruined this project, the expected reinforcements would not suffice for the execution, Massena could not be starved out in time, and there only remained the resource of a general battle,—the prince of Esling had therefore reason for saying that so far from being aided by Soult he had covered that marshal's operations. Wellington's design was to post ten thousand men before Santarem to hold Reynier in check; to make Beresford cross the Tagus at Abrantes and fall on Massena's rear; and with the rest of the army, moving by Rio Mayor and Tremes, to drive back the enemy's centre and right, cut off the left at Santarem, and drive it into the Tagus. But day after day he looked in vain for his reinforcements. They had been embarked in January and would have reached Lisbon before the end of that month, if the admiral, sir Joseph Yorke, had taken advantage of a favourable wind, blowing when the troops were first put on board; but the



opportunity was neglected, contrary gales followed, and the ordinary voyage of ten days was prolonged for six weeks.

Massena's situation however was becoming very perilous. He could not besiege Abrantes, and that place, although a strategic point for the allies who had a moveable bridge, was not so for him, as it did not give a passage over the river. Three courses remained for choice. To force a passage of the Tagus alone, to await Soult's co-operation, or to retreat. He seemed inclined towards the first, showing great jealousy of the entrenchments opposite the mouth of the Zézere, and moving his boats on wheel carriages down the bank of the Tagus, as if to alarm Beresford and make him concentrate to his left. His demonstrations produced no effect, Beresford held his ground, and was so vigilant that neither spy nor officer could pass his line, Massena only knew that Soult was before Badajoz, nothing more. Meanwhile sickness wasted the French, famine menaced them, discipline was loosened, the leading generals were at open discord, and the conspiracy to place St. Cyr at the head of all the armies in opposition to the emperor was still smouldering. These accumulating difficulties overcame Massena's obduracy, he promised to retreat when he had no more provisions left than would supply him for the march; and this tardy assent was given when by holding his position ten days longer he would have insured the co-operation of Soult! It was however wrung from him by necessity, and general Pelet, speaking Massena's sentiments, says that Soult's sieges when he should have come down to the Tagus at once were the great cause of failure;—it would be juster to say that Wellington's combinations, which barred the road to Soult, effected their object. Before the sieges of Olivenza and Badajoz, Mendizabel could have assembled twenty thousand men on Soult's rear if he moved towards the Tagus; there was a large body of militia on the Ponçul and the Elga who could by Abrantes have joined Beresford, and that marshal had fourteen thousand regular troops besides *ordenança*. Wellington also had so many boats that he could have thrown troops over the river with a celerity forerunning any effort of Massena to join Soult, who would thus have to pass thirty-five thousand men and several fortresses to fight a superior army.





The difficulty of communication was always a stumbling-block for the French combinations in Spain. At this time Napoleon had remodelled the organization of his troops in a manner to give Massena great relief. The king's force was to be diminished, Soult's was to be augmented; Drouet was to join Mortier with eleven thousand of the 9th corps, the remainder of which was to be incorporated in the divisions of the army of Portugal under Clausel and Foy. Marmont was to supersede Ney with the sixth corps, Loison was removed to the second corps, and Bessières was to send six thousand men to Ciudad Rodrigo in support of general Claparede. Seven thousand of the young guards were to occupy Zamora in observation of the Gallicians, and the remainder were to be at Valladolid with strong cavalry posts between to insure frequent intelligence of what was passing in Portugal. These dispositions, at an earlier period would have enabled Massena to adopt any line of operations without regard to his original base, and made his command easier by removing captious subordinates; but they did not reach the armies until a late period, and in the end of February the French forces about Santarem being reduced to fifty thousand fighting men, exclusive of Drouet's troops about Leiria, could no longer defend their extended positions against Wellington's projected attack. Hence when the prince of Esling knew from the fidalgos that the long-expected reinforcements from England had landed at Lisbon on the 2nd of March, he commenced his retreat, and on the 6th all his positions were void.

#### MASSENA'S RETREAT.

Several projects were considered. 1°. Attempt to pass the Tagus between Punhete and Santarem by boats, or possibly by fords, which were often practicable after a week of dry weather. 2°. Fall back by Sobreira Formosa upon Castello Branco, and communicate by Plascencia with the king, and with Soult by Alcantara. 3°. Retreat by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte, to Sabugal, and afterwards act according to circumstances. 4°. Gain the Mondego, and ascend the left bank of that river towards Guarda and Almeida, or, crossing it, march

upon Oporto through an untouched country. Of these four plans the first was thought perilous, because the weather was too unsettled to be sure of the fords. The second and third were difficult from the ruggedness of the Sobrecira, and dangerous, because the allies could break out by Abrantes upon the flank of the army while in retreat. Massena decided to gain the Mondego, but with intent to halt behind it and reduce Oporto with a detachment. For he calculated that the junction of the ninth corps and other troops from Leon, would raise his force to seventy thousand men, and enable him to remain there until greater means were prepared for a renewed advance against Lisbon by both banks of the Tagus, with an intermediate corps on the Zezere, after the emperor's original scheme. This design involved, as a preliminary step, a flank march, with more than ten thousand sick men and all the army stores, under the beard of an able adversary: yet this he effected like a great commander.

Commencing by the destruction of ammunition, and all guns not horsed, he passed his sick and baggage by degrees upon Thomar, keeping only his fighting men in front, and strongly indicating an intention to pass the Zezere. But when the impediments had gained two marches, Ney suddenly assembled the sixth corps and the cavalry on the Lys near Leiria, as if to advance against Torres Vedras; thus holding Wellington in suspense, while the second and eighth corps, quitting Santarem Tremes and Alcanhete in the night of the 5th, fell back by Pernes upon Torres Novas and Thomar, and destroyed the bridges on the Alviella behind them. Next morning the boats were burnt at Punhete, and Loison retreated by the road of Espinal to cover the flank of the main line of retreat; he was followed by Reynier; but the rest of the army made rapid concentric marches towards a position in front of Ponibal. The line of movement to the Mondego was thus secured, and four days gained; for Wellington, although knowing a retreat was in progress, could take no decided step, lest he should open the lines to his adversary. Nevertheless he had made Beresford close towards Abrantes the 5th, and on the 6th finding at daylight that the Santarem camp was abandoned, he followed Reynier with his own force.

Thomar seemed the French point of concentration, but as their boats were supposed to be still at Punhete, general Stewart was directed to cross the Tagus at Abrantes with the greatest part of Beresford's troops; the light division moved to Pernes where the broken bridge was rapidly restored, and the first, fourth, and sixth divisions with two brigades of cavalry marched on Golegao. When it was found that Massena had burned his boats, the Abrantes bridge was floated down the Tagus for Stewart to cross and move by the shortest line upon Thomar, and on that point also the divisions at Golegao were directed. The line of retreat being then clearly pronounced for the Mondego, the main body halted at Thomar, but the light division the German hussars and the royal dragoons followed the 8th corps and took two hundred prisoners. During this march, in an obscure place among the hills, a large house was discovered filled with starving persons. Above thirty women and children were already dead, and sitting by the bodies were fifteen or sixteen living beings, of whom only one was a man, and all so enfeebled as to be unable to swallow the little food that could be offered to them. The youngest had fallen first, all the children were dead, none were emaciated, but the muscles of their faces were invariably drawn transversely, giving a laughing appearance unimaginably ghastly. The man seemed most eager for life, the women patient and resigned, and they had carefully covered and arranged the bodies of the dead!

While part of the army thus tracked the French, the third and fifth divisions moved from Torres Vedras upon Leiria, and the Abrantes' boats dropped down the river to Tancos to form a new bridge; that effected, the second and fourth divisions and some cavalry coming back from Thomar, recrossed the Tagus to succour Badajos; and in that view also Beresford, who had remained at Barca, sent a brigade of cavalry to Portalegre.

Wellington, misled by a letter from Trant, by information obtained in Santarem, and by Massena's first movements, thought on the 7th the retreat would be by Puente Murcella; on the 8th he trembled for Coimbra; but the 9th the prince, instead of continuing his retrograde movement, concentrated

the fourth and eighth corps and Montbrun's cavalry on a high table-land in front of Pombal, where the light division skirmished with the advanced posts, and in a cavalry fight the Germans took some prisoners. This was perplexing. To fight with advantage it would be necessary to bring up the troops destined to relieve Badajos. To decline battle would be giving up Coimbra and the untouched country behind the Mondego to Oporto, and Massena would retire as a conqueror. While thus embarrassed, Wellington received letters from Badajos saying the place could hold out for a month, which decided the question; the fourth division and the heavy cavalry, then at Tancos on march for the Alentejo, were recalled, general Nightingale was sent with a brigade of the first division and some horse by Espinal to follow Reynier, and the rest of the army closed concentrically upon Pombal. How dangerous a captain Massena could be was here proved. He had maintained an army for nearly six months in a country supposed to be incapable of sustaining it for fifteen days, and carried it off with consummate skill. Moving the 4th, it was the 11th before sufficient troops could be assembled to fight him at Pombal; in these seven days he executed a very difficult operation, gained four marches, and organized his retreat; had rain fallen the first day, the allies could not have brought artillery by those bad roads; but he had before sent off or destroyed all his guns, except a few light pieces.

#### COMBAT AT POMBAL.

Prick's brigade and the cavalry; the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and light divisions; and the Portuguese troops, attached to each division like the Latin auxiliaries to the Roman legions, were assembling to fight on the 10th, when Massena, who had sent his baggage over the Soure river in the night by the bridge of Pombal, suddenly retired through that town. Being followed closely by the light division, Ney, who had charge of the rear-guard drew up on a height behind and threw a detachment into the castle. He had waited too long, the streets were still encumbered, and the French army was moving with some confusion by a long defile between the

mountains and the Soure river which was fordable, while the British main body was moving along the opposite bank to cross lower down and cut the line of retreat. The fall of night marred this operation, but a sharp action happened at Pombal, where the riflemen and caçadores of the light division drove the French from the castle and town with such vigour, they could not destroy the bridge although it was mined: forty of the allies were hurt, and the loss of the enemy was somewhat greater. In the night Massena continued his retreat. His baggage and sick marched first, protected by the reserve cavalry; they were followed by the eighth corps, while the sixth, reinforced with some light cavalry and the best horsed of the artillery, were destined to stem the pursuit. Ney had been directed to detach Marcognet's brigade from the Lys river on the 10th to seize Coimbra, but he neglected the order, and Massena now sent Montbrun on that service; a very important one, for Wellington's object was to hurry Massena past Coimbra, and force him out of Portugal. This he hoped to effect by operating on his flanks rather than by battles, for he judged the moral effect would suffice for the general cause; yet he still retained the fourth division and the cavalry from the succour of Badajos, being willing enough if occasion offered to strike. The country was however full of strong positions, every village was a defile, the weather was moderate, and Ney, with a happy mixture of courage and skill, illustrated every league of ground by some signal combination.

Daybreak, on the 12th, saw both armies in movement, and eight miles of march, with some slight skirmishing, brought the head of the British into a hollow way, leading to some table-land, on which Ney had disposed five thousand infantry a few squadrons of cavalry and some guns. His centre was opposite the hollow road, his wings covered by wooded heights which he occupied with light troops, his right rested on the ravine of the Soure, his left on the Redinha stream, which circling round his rear fell into the Soure. Behind him the village of Redinha, situated in a hollow, covered a narrow bridge and a long defile. Beyond the stream, some rugged heights, commanding a view of the position in front of the village, were occupied by a division of infantry, a regi-



ment of cavalry, and a battery of heavy guns, so well disposed as to appear a considerable force.

#### COMBAT OF REDINHA.

The light division, now under sir William Erskine, was directed to attack the wooded slopes covering Ney's right, which were immediately carried, and the skirmishers even advanced on the open plain; but the French line, supported with four guns, opened a rolling fire, and a squadron of their hussars led by colonel La Ferriere charged and took some prisoners. Erskine then formed his line, consisting of five battalions and six guns, in such a manner as to outflank the French right and tend towards the ford of the Redinha. He was immediately reinforced with two regiments of dragoons, and at the same time Picton seized the wooded heights covering the French left. Ney's position was thus laid bare, but he perceived that Wellington, deceived as to his numbers, meant to use his whole force in attack, and with great coolness held his ground and even charged Picton's skirmishers, although that general was nearer to the village and bridge than the French right was, and there were already troops and guns enough on the plain to overwhelm him. In this state an hour passed away, but then three cannon shots were fired from the British centre as a signal, and a splendid spectacle was presented. The woods on the flanks seemed alive with troops, and thirty thousand infantry were stretched in three gorgeous lines of battle across the plain bending in a gentle curve, and moving onwards while the horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously from two points, charged under a general volley from the French, who were instantly shrouded in smoke: when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen. For marshal Ney, while keenly watching the progress of this magnificent formation, had opposed general Picton's foremost skirmishers with his left, and covered by their fire, had withdrawn the rest of his people, and with such rapidity as to gain the village before even the cavalry could touch them: the utmost efforts of Picton's light troops and the horse-artillery only enabled them to gall the hindmost with

their fire. One howitzer was dismounted, but the village of Redinha was in flames between it and the pursuers, and Ney to confirm the courage of his soldiers ordered the French officer Brüe to stand fast with some infantry, while in person he carried off the howitzer. This was effected with the loss of fifteen or twenty of Brüe's men, and with great danger to the marshal, for the British guns were smiting his rear, and the light troops of the third division, chasing like heated blood-hounds, passed the river almost at the same time with the French, whose reserves cannonaded the bridge, yet were soon compelled to fall back ten miles to Condeixa. Twelve officers and two hundred men of the allies were killed and wounded: Ney lost as many, but he should have been destroyed. Nevertheless the facility with which the English masses were handled made him more cautious though it did not entirely check his over daring.

On the 13th the allies, about ten o'clock, found the French army in order of battle, Reynier's corps, which was at Espinal, excepted. The crisis of the retreat had arrived. The defiles of Condeixa leading upon Coimbra were behind the French; those of Miranda de Corvo leading to the Puente de Murcella were on their left; between them Ney was in position, on a strong range of heights covered by a marsh, and only to be approached by the high road which led through a hollow against his right. Trees were felled to obstruct this passage, the hollow way was palisaded and breast-works thrown up at each side. Here Massena resolved to stop the allies until Montbrun seized Coimbra; then assuming a permanent position behind the Mondego he designed to wait until Soult's operations should draw off Wellington, or the advance of Bessières should enable himself to resume the offensive; for he judged justly that the devastated country between the lines and the Mondego would secure him from serious operations on that river. Hitherto he had appeared the abler tactician, but now his adversary, being no longer compelled to await the development of the French projects, assumed the superiority. When at Thomar, thinking the Mondego could not be defended, he had directed Baccellar to look to the security of Oporto intending himself to follow Massena closely. In that view he

ordered Trant and Wilson to abandon the Mondego and the Vouga when the fords should become passable, to take the line of the Douro, and to break up the roads as they retreated and remove all boats and means of transport. Wilson was then near the Puente de Murcella road, but hearing the enemy were menacing Coimbra, he crossed the Mondego, passed between the French scouting parties and effected a junction with Trant, when both fell back. The latter however soon returned, for he had previously destroyed an arch of the Coimbra bridge, the river was flooding very fast, and the sound of guns told him the allies were close at Massena's heels. Orders from Baccellar indeed compelled him to send the greatest part of his force back again towards the Vouga the 11th, yet with the remainder he resolved to dispute the passage of the Mondego, though some French dragoons had actually forded that river at Pereiras.

On the 12th French officers were seen to examine the bridge, a skirmish took place along the banks of the river, and a party which attempted to creep on to the bridge was dispersed with grape. The fords were however practicable for cavalry, and not more than three hundred militia were in opposition; hence, if Marcognet's brigade had marched as originally ordered by Massena, Coimbra must have fallen, but now the French, thinking the reinforcements from England had come by sea to the Mondego, feared to attack, and thus Coimbra was saved by Trant and a few militiamen. Montbrun sent an exaggerated report of its resistance to Massena the 13th, and the latter then credulously relinquished his plan for the river: to the emperor he assigned an additional cause, namely, that Hill was said to be in march from the Zezere to the Mondego by the mountains in his rear; but Hill was in England. There remained only the line of retreat by the Puente de Murcella, and to cover that, and preserve the communication with Reynier on the side of Espinal, Massena had placed Loison at Fonte Coberta, a village five miles on his left, where the Anciao road joined the Murcella road; he now reinforced him with Clausel's division; and being thus pivotted on the Anciao Sierra, having Reynier beyond that mountain and Ney at Condeixa, he offered as confident a front as it

Coimbra had been gained. His baggage had however been observed filing off by the Murcella route, and Wellington, comprehending the matter, detached the third division to turn his left by a difficult path over the sierra. The prince was at Fonte Coberta, and Ney had orders to fire Condeixa at a certain hour, when all the divisions were to concentrate at Casal Nova on another position, perpendicular to the first and covering the road to the Murcella; but towards three o'clock Picton was descried winding round a bluff end of the Anciao Sierra, eight miles distant, and as he was already beyond the French left confusion pervaded their camp; a thick smoke then arose from Condeixa, columns were seen hurrying towards Casal Nova, and the British troops pushed forward; but the felled trees and obstacles impeded pursuit, and many fires, kindled at once, covered the retreating troops with smoke, while the flames of Condeixa stopped the artillery. Hence only the skirmishers and some cavalry could close with the enemy, and they did so, cutting off the French in Fonte Coberta so rapidly, that Massena only escaped by taking the feathers out of his hat and riding through the light troops.

When Condeixa was thus opened the British cavalry pushed towards Coimbra, opened the communication with Trant, and captured some of Montbrun's cavalry. The army kindled its fires, and the light division piquets, being pushed close up to the enemy heard in the night the march of the French division coming from Fonte Coberta to regain the main body. Its isolation was unknown to the British and it reached Miranda de Corvo without difficulty: but the noise of the march was mistaken for the movement of baggage, and so reported to general Erskine at daylight, whereupon that officer, rashly concluding the French were in full retreat, put the division in march.

#### COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA.

A thick mist hid everything, yet there was the dull sound of a moving multitude in front, and several officers objected to an advance without superior orders in such a fog; but Erskine, disregarding these remonstrances, with astounding indifference

sent the fifty-second regiment forward in a simple column of sections, without an advanced guard and even before the piquets had come in. The road dipped suddenly into a valley, and the regiment vanished in the mist, which was so thick that the French out-posts were unwittingly passed, and Ney who had remained all night near the piquets was nearly captured. The riflemen followed, and the rest of the division was about to plunge into the same gulf when the rattling of musketry and the booming of round shot were heard; then the vapour rose slowly, and the fifty-second was descried on the slopes of the opposite mountain, closely engaged without support in the midst of Ney's corps. At that moment Wellington arrived. His design had been to turn the left of the French, for their front was strong, and they occupied mountain ridges in succession to the Deuca or Deixa river, and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. There was a road leading from Condeixa to Espinal, by which Cole was moving with the fourth division on Panella, having orders to communicate with Nightingale, attack Reynier, and gain the sources of the Deuca and Ceira rivers; between Cole and Ney, Picton was also turning the French left flank in a more direct line; and the main body, coming up in one long column required time to form: all this fine combination was marred by Erskine's folly which had forced on the action prematurely, and the whole of the light division was necessarily pushed forward to succour the fifty-second regiment. Ney's ground was so extensive, and his skirmishers so thickly spread, so easily supported, that the division was soon stretched in one thin thread and closely engaged at every point without a reserve; nor could it even thus present an equal front until Picton sent the sixtieth riflemen to prolong the line. Fighting strongly, amidst the stone enclosures on the mountain side, it partially turned the French right, but their position was not shaken until Picton near, and Cole further off, turned the left; then also came up on the centre the first fifth and sixth divisions, the heavy cavalry and the guns; whereupon Ney, covering his rear with light troops and artillery, retired, disputing ridge after ridge with admirable skill. Long he did this with little loss, but towards noon the guns and

skirmishers disordered his masses and hurried his movements towards the strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, where Massena was in position with the main body; and there Montbrun came in, having from Coimbra made way through the hills for the Deuca by a very difficult road.

In this combat the light division lost eleven officers and one hundred and fifty men, but took a hundred prisoners. During the fight, Reynier abandoned Panella, and Nightingale who had constantly followed him united with Cole, when both passed the Deuca. Massena, fearing to find them next day on his rear, burned Miranda, and crossed the Ceira in the night, and his whole army was thus crowded in the narrow way between the Sierras and the Mondego. To ease his movement he destroyed baggage and ammunition, yet his army was still so encumbered and disordered, that he directed Ney to cover the passage with a few battalions, charging him not to risk an action. Ney however, in contempt, retained ten or twelve battalions a brigade of cavalry and some guns, and thus wilfully provoked a fight.

#### COMBAT OF FOZ D'ARONCE.

The French right rested on wooded and rugged ground, their left upon the village of Foz d'Aronce. The weather was obscure and rainy, the allies reached the Ceira at four o'clock on the 15th, and expecting no action kindled fires; but Wellington, having rapidly scanned Ney's position, directed the light division and Pack's brigade to hold the right in play, and sent Picton against the left, while the horse-artillery, galloping forward to a rising ground, opened with a great and sudden effect. Ney's left, overthrown by the first charge, fled in confusion towards the river, and some, missing the fords, rushed into the deeps and were drowned, others, crowding to the bridge were crushed to death. On the right, the ground being rugged and close, the action resolved itself into a skirmish and Ney was enabled to use some battalions to check the pursuit of his left, but darkness came on and the defeated troops in their disorder fired on each other. Four officers and sixty men fell on the side of the

British; the French lost five hundred, one half being drowned, and an eagle was afterwards found in the river. Massena had gone behind the Alva, yet Ney, notwithstanding this disastrous combat, kept his post on the left bank of the Ceira until every encumbrance had passed, and then blowing up seventy feet of the bridge sent his corps on, remaining himself with the rear-guard.

This terminated the first part of the retreat from Santarem, in which, if the great error of relinquishing Coimbra be excepted, Massena displayed infinite ability, but withal a harsh and ruthless spirit. The burning of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda de Corvo, and many villages on the route, covered his movements, and something may be attributed to the disorder of a forced retreat; but the town of Leiria and convent of Alcobaca, though out of the line, were given to the flames by express orders. The laws of war, rigorously interpreted, authorize such examples when the inhabitants take arms, yet it can only be justly done to overawe and not to revenge defeat: but every horror making war hideous, attended this dreadful retreat! Distress, conflagration, death, in all modes! from wounds, from fatigue, from water, from the flames, from starvation: on every side unlimited ferocity! I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog to devour the dead and dying, and the spirit of cruelty once unchained smote even the brute creation; for on the 15th Massena, to diminish the encumbrances, ordered the destruction of some beasts of burthen, and the inhuman fellow charged with the execution, ham-stringed five hundred asses and left them to starve. Being thus found by the British army, the mute yet deep expression of pain and grief visible in their looks, wonderfully aroused the fury of the soldiers: and so little weight has reason with the multitude when opposed by a momentary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any prisoner at that moment, and a humane feeling would have led to direct cruelty. The French have however been accused of crimes which they did not and could not commit; such as the driving of all women above ten years of age into their camp at Redinha, near which there were neither men nor women to be driven!

The country was a desert! They have been also charged by the same writer with the mutilating of John the First's body in the convent of Batalhá, during Massena's retreat; whereas the body of that monarch had been wantonly pulled to pieces, and carried off by British officers during the retreat to the lines!



## CHAPTER IV.

ON the 16th the allies halted, partly because the Ceira was swollen and unfordable, partly that the troops, who had suffered far greater privations than the enemy, were exhausted. The French, following their custom, carried fifteen days' bread; the allies depended upon a commissariat which broke down under the difficulties; not from deficiency in the chief, for he was distinguished alike for zeal, probity, and talent, but from the ill-conduct of the Portuguese government. Deaf to the representations of Wellington and Beresford, it would neither feed the Portuguese troops regularly at Santarem, nor fill the magazines, nor collect the means of transporting food during the march. Hence, after passing Pombal, few of the native forces had been able to continue the pursuit, and the brigades under Pack and Ashworth, which did keep up and engaged daily with the enemy, were actually four days without food of any sort: numbers died of inanition on the roads, and to save the whole from destruction, the British supplies were shared with them. The commissariat was thus overlaid, the whole army suffered, and was forced to halt. And there were also indications of treachery; for, during the pursuit, at Coimbra and on the Alva, Trant discovered large supplies placed by Portuguese government agents within reach of the French at critical moments.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, Coimbra had been saved, and Massena, turned out of every strong position, had been forced into a narrow intricate and ravaged country, by a series of masterly operations; for Wellington had constantly menaced the passes in his rear and thus compelled him to abandon positions which could scarcely have been forced. To turn the strength of a country to profit in this manner is the secret of mountain warfare; he who receives battle in the hills

has an advantage; and hence, if a general seriously menaces a pass or position behind his adversary, the latter must retreat or become the assailant. Wellington had thus constantly dislodged Massena, and with inferior numbers after Redinha, seeing that when Coimbra was saved, a brigade of cavalry, some guns, and a division of Portuguese infantry had been detached to the Alemtejo. And when the fall of Badajos, which uncovered Lisbon, was known, Cole's division also marched to enable Beresford to retake it before the breaches could be closed: the pursuit then became more circumspect. The loss of the fortress was indeed known the 13th, but Wellington, erroneously thinking the ninth corps was with Massena, made Cole's division available for that day, using it however on the side of Panella, because the road of Espinal being the shortest to the bridge on the Tagus, it attained two objects at once.

These dispositions were finely combined and successful, yet the military horizon was still clouded. Intelligence from the north spoke of the imperial guards at Zamora being designed to invade Galicia, and though Mahi had sixteen thousand men Wellington anticipated no resistance. In the south affairs were more gloomy.

Appendix 18,  
§ 9. Vol. II.

The battle of Barosa, the disputes which followed, and the misconduct of Imas and Mendizabel, proved that from Spain no useful co-operation was ever to be expected. Mortier had invested Campo Mayor and it was not expected to hold out until Beresford could succour it. The Spaniards, to whom it had been delivered under an engagement of honour, contracted by Romana, to keep it against the enemy, had disloyally abandoned it when Badajos fell, and two hundred Portuguese militia, thrown in at the moment, had to defend a fortress which required a garrison of five thousand regulars. Nor was the enemy immediately in the British front the last to be considered. Ney had withdrawn from the Ceira late on the 16th, and next day the light division forded it with great difficulty, while the main body used a trestle bridge thrown in the night. But Massena having repaired the Puente Murcella and occupied the Sierra de Moita behind the Alva, resolved to halt for some days. In this view he again destroyed the Mur-

cella bridge, and another near Pombeira, sent Reynier to guard the higher parts of the river, and spread his foragers abroad. He was soon disturbed. Three British divisions marched the 18th by the Sierra de Guiteria, made way over that rugged mountain with persevering strength, and menaced Reynier while two other divisions cannonaded Ney. The upper Alva thus threatened, ran parallel to the French line of retreat, and Massena, seeing the extreme ruggedness of the mountains had not protected his left, recalled Reynier, abandoned the lower Alva and concentrated on the Sierra de Moita for battle. The allies had then to concentrate also in advance, lest their disseminated columns should be crushed in detail. This was difficult. The lower Alva was wide and rapid, but the staff-corps contrived an ingenious raft, by which the light division passed above Murcella; the right of the army then closed to Arganil on the upper river, and Trant and Wilson closed on the right bank of the Mondego; for those officers had orders to move on that side parallel to the French line, to prevent their foragers passing the Mondego, and to interfere between them and Oporto. Thus pressed, Massena re-commenced his retreat, and being desirous to gain Celorico and the defiles leading upon Guarda betimes, again destroyed baggage and ammunition. He even abandoned his more distant foraging parties, who were taken to the number of eight hundred; for Wellington, seeing the success of his combinations, had concentrated all his columns upon Moita, the 19th. The 20th the pursuit was renewed through Penhancos by the light division and the cavalry; and a communication was opened with Wilson and Trant, who had reached the bridge of Fornos, and with Silveira who was about Trancoso. The third and sixth divisions followed in reserve, but the remainder of the army halted at Moita, until provisions, coming by sea from Lisbon to the Mondego, arrived.

Massena having reached Celorico the 21st with two corps and the cavalry, opened a communication with Almeida, and posted detachments of horse on the Pinhel, while Reynier, who had retired through Govea, occupied Guarda. He had now regained his original base of operations, and his retreat may be said to have terminated; yet he was far from wishing

to re-enter Spain. There he could only appear as a baffled general, and shorn of half his authority, because Bessières now commanded the northern provinces which had been under himself. Hence, to make his previous retreat appear only a change of position, he formed the design of throwing all his sick men and other encumbrances into Almeida, and then, passing the Estrella at Guarda, countermarch through Sabugal and Pena Macor to the Elga, and establish new communications across the Tagus with Soult, and by the valley of the Tagus with the king. But the factions in his army had risen to such a height he could no longer command the obedience of his lieutenants. Drouet, Montbrun, Junot, Reynier and Ney, were all at variance with each other and with him. The first had been desired to secure Coimbra early, instead of which he quitted Portugal, and carried with him Claparede's division. Marcognet was then ordered, but did not move, and Montbrun failed in default of vigour. Junot was disabled by his wound, yet his faction did not the less show their discontent. Reynier's dislike to the prince was so strong, the officers carrying flags of truce from his corps never failed to speak of it to the British, and Ney, more fierce than all of them, defied Massena's authority. To him the dangerous delay at Pombal, Marcognet's neglect and the too sudden evacuation of Condeixa, have been attributed; and it is alleged that far from being ordered to set fire to that town on the 13th, as the signal for a preconcerted retreat, he had promised Massena to maintain the position for twenty-four hours. The personal risk of the latter, in consequence of the hasty change of position, would seem to confirm this; but when Picton was observed passing the Sierra de Anciao by a road before unknown to the French, and by which Reynier could be separated and the pass of Miranda de Corvo seized, Ney would have been insane to have delayed.

At Miranda the long gathering anger between the prince and the marshal broke out in a violent altercation, and at Celorico Ney absolutely refused to concur in the march to Coria; he even moved his troops in another direction; but Massena, a man not to be crossed with impunity, then deprived

him of command. Both marshals sent confidential officers to Paris to justify their conduct to the emperor, and from both of those officers I have derived information; but as each thought the conduct of his general was approved by Napoleon, their opinions are irreconcilable upon many points, and the leading sentiments of each are therefore given, without drawing other conclusions than those deducible from the acknowledged principles of art and unquestioned facts. Thus judging, it appears Massena's general views were as superior to Ney's, as the latter's genius for handling troops in action were superior to the prince's. Yet the duke of Elchingen often played too near the flame, whereas nothing could be grander than the conceptions of Massena: nor was the project now meditated by him the least important.

From Guarda to Coria was only two marches longer than to Ciudad Rodrigo; but going to the last the army of Portugal would appear a beaten force seeking the shelter of its fortresses; going to Coria it made a great movement wiping out the notion of a forced retreat. A close and concentric direction would thus have been given to the armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal; and a powerful demonstration against Lisbon would have brought Wellington back to the Tagus. The conquests of the campaign, namely, Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida, Badajos, and Olivenza, would have been preserved, and Bessières could have protected Castille and menaced the frontier of Portugal. Massena, having maturely considered this plan, gave orders on the 22nd for the execution; but then Ney thwarted him; and as the English cavalry and the militia were hourly skirmishing with success, the French horsemen withdrew from the Pinhel. Loison, now in Ney's command, occupied Guarda, Reynier took post at Belmonte; the cavalry and the eighth corps entered the eastern valleys of the Estrella, and from those positions Massena still hoped to communicate with the king and Soult: his foragers had gathered provisions in the western valleys, and he calculated upon holding Guarda for eight days, which it was essential to do, because Drouet had suffered Julian Sanchez to cut off a convoy destined for Ciudad Rodrigo, and had left Almeida with only ten days' provisions.

In this state Wellington's ready boldness again baffled the prince's calculations. All the British forces had come up the 28th, and with them the reinforcements from England, forming a seventh division; whereupon the light division and the cavalry passed the Mondego at Celorico, drove the French from Frexadas, and occupied the villages beyond that place. Then the militia took post on the Pinhel river, cutting the communication with Almeida, and the third division was established at Porca de Misarella, half way up the Estrella, to secure the bridges over the higher Mondego. This done, three divisions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry were disposed in five columns of attack, on a half circle round the foot of the Guarda mountain, and on the 29th ascended by as many paths, leading concentrically upon the town and overlapping the French flanks. Supported on one wing by the militia, on the other by the fifth division, in the centre by the first and seventh divisions, they advanced expecting a great battle; but the absence of Ney was felt by both armies; the appearance of the allied columns threw the French for the first time into the greatest confusion, and without firing a shot this nearly impregnable position was abandoned. At daylight on the 30th, the horse artillery and cavalry were launched against Reynier, who was at Belmonte, and his corps would have been cut off if general Slade had led those troops with the celerity required by the occasion, but he was too slow, and Reynier escaped in the night with a loss of only three hundred men.

On the 1st of April, the allied army, descending the mountains, reached the Coa, where the French general, who had now recovered the ninth corps, and was anxious to hold on to Portugal and preserve the power of operating on the side of Coria, or Almeida, was again in position on the right bank. The sixth corps held Rovina, with detachments guarding the bridge of Sequiras and the ford of Atalayan; the communication with Almeida was maintained by a brigade of the ninth corps, posted near the ford of Junça; the second corps occupied the hills behind Sabugal, stretching towards Alfayates, with strong detachments at the bridge of Sabugal and the ford of Rapoulha de Coa; the eighth corps was at Alfayates, and a

post was established at Rendo to maintain the communication between the second and the sixth corps. The French army was thus disposed on two sides of a triangle, the apex at Sabugal, and both fronts covered by the Coa, because Sabugal was situated in a sharp bend of the stream. Massena was even inclined to retake the offensive, for a notion prevailed in his camp, that the allied divisions were very much scattered and might be beaten in detail. The disputes amongst the superior officers prevented this enterprise, which was founded on false information; but the strength of the position again lulled the French into a false security, from which they were roughly awakened.

Wellington occupied a line parallel to the enemy's right, which could not be attacked, because the Coa, a considerable river, runs in a rugged channel, deepening as the stream flows. Trant and Wilson were therefore directed to turn Massena, by passing below Almeida and penetrating between that fortress and Ciudad Rodrigo; the 6th division was then placed in opposition to Loison at Rovina, and a battalion of the seventh division was posted at the bridge of Sequiras to cover the left flank from incursions. This disposition seemed to menace the French right, but the real attack was designed against their left, which was to be enveloped and crushed by the main body. To effect this, Slade's cavalry was to cross the upper Coa, where the bed was less rugged, at daybreak on the 3rd, the light division was to ford that river a little below the cavalry, and the third division still lower. The fifth division and the artillery were to force the bridge of Sabugal, but the first and seventh divisions were held in reserve. Thus ten thousand men, pivoted upon the fifth division at Sabugal, were destined to turn Reynier's left, to separate him from the eighth corps, and to surround and crush him before the sixth corps could come from Rovina to his succour: one of those accidents which are frequent in war marred this well-concerted plan.

#### BATTLE OF SABUGAL.

A foggy morning prevented the troops from gaining their respective posts with the simultaneous regularity essential to

success; Erskine took no pains to put the light division in a right direction, his columns were not held together, and he carried off the cavalry without communicating with Beckwith, who commanded his first brigade. That officer remained therefore at a ford waiting for orders, when one of the staff rode up hastily and asked why he did not attack? The thing appeared rash as the combinations were not developed, but with an enemy in front he could make no reply; wherefore passing the river which was deep and rapid, he ascended a steep wooded hill in front. Four rifle companies led, and were closely followed by the forty-third; but the direction was wrongly given, and the *caçadores* of the brigade were, at this time, passing higher up, along with the other brigade of the division, and moving on the true point of attack, which was distant. Heavy rain made it impossible to distinguish friends or foes, and the obscurity had also retarded the arrival of the other divisions. This attack was therefore untimely, partial, dangerous, and on the wrong point; for Reynier's whole corps was in front, and Beckwith having only one bayonet battalion and four companies of riflemen, was assailing twelve thousand infantry supported by cavalry and artillery!

Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the hill, when a strong body of French drove them back upon the forty-third, the weather cleared at the instant, and Beckwith saw and felt all the danger, but his heart was too big to quail; with a fierce charge he beat back the assailants, and kept the top of the hill, although two French howitzers poured showers of grape into his ranks, and fresh forces assailed him in front and menaced both flanks. Reynier, little expecting to be attacked, had for the convenience of water placed his main body in low ground, behind the height on which the action commenced, and his renewed attack was therefore up hill; yet his musketry, heavy from the beginning, soon increased to a storm, and his men sprung up the acclivity with such violence and clamour, that the most desperate fighting only could save the British. Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company of the forty-third, running out to the right, with admirable presence of mind seized a small eminence, close to the French guns and commanding the ascent up which their



troops, turning the right flank, were approaching. His first fire threw the assailants into confusion; they rallied but were again disordered by his volleys; a third time they endeavoured to form a head of attack, but Hopkins with a sudden charge increased their disorder, and at the same moment the two battalions of the fifty-second regiment, attracted by the fire, entered the line. The centre and left of the forty-third were also furiously engaged, and there Beckwith, blood streaming from a wound in the head, rode amongst the skirmishers, praising and exhorting the soldiers in the loud cheerful tones of a man sure to win his battle. The bullets flew however thicker and closer every moment, and the fight became very perilous, yet the French fell fast, a second charge again cleared the hill, one of the howitzers was taken, and the English skirmishers were closely following the retiring mass to the low ground, when small bodies of cavalry came galloping in from all parts and drove them back on the main body, which instantly re-formed its line behind a low stone wall.

In this state of affairs, a French squadron of dragoons, having surmounted the ascent, rode with incredible daring up to the wall, and fired over it with pistols, but a rolling volley laid nearly the whole lifeless on the ground. Then a strong column of infantry rushed up the face of the hill, and endeavoured to retake the howitzer, which was on the edge of the descent and only fifty yards from the wall; a vain attempt, no man could reach it and live, so deadly was the forty-third's fire. Meanwhile two English guns came into action, and the fifty-second, charging violently upon the flank of this infantry column, again vindicated the possession of the height. Nevertheless fresh squadrons of cavalry, following the infantry in the last attack, seeing the fifty-second men scattered by this charge, flew upon them with great briskness, and caused some disorder amongst the foremost skirmishers before they were repulsed. Reynier now put his reserve of six thousand infantry with cavalry and artillery in motion, outflanking the British left and seeming resolute to storm the position; but the fifth division had then passed the bridge of Sabugal, the British cavalry crowned the hills beyond the French left, and general Colville's brigade of the third division, emerging from

the woods on their right, opened a fire which decided the action: Reynier hastily retreated to Rendo, where he met the sixth corps, and both fell back to Alfayates, pursued by the cavalry. The allies lost in this fight, which did not last an hour, two hundred men, the French loss was enormous. Three hundred dead bodies were heaped together on the hill, the greatest part around the captured howitzer; and more than twelve hundred were wounded, so unskilfully had Reynier handled his masses, and so deadly was the British fire. This disproportion was chiefly caused by the heavy rain which gave the French only a partial view, while the thick wood, ending at the hill top, covered the British, and left an open space for the French attack: it was however no exaggeration for lord Wellington to say, 'This was one of the most glorious actions British troops were ever engaged in.' Next day the light division took the route of Valdespina, to feel for the enemy on the side of the passes leading to Coria; Massena was however in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo. The 5th he crossed the frontier of Portugal, and then the vigour of French discipline was surprisingly manifested; those men who had for months been living by rapine, whose retreat had been one continued course of violence and devastation, having passed an imaginary line of frontier became the most orderly of soldiers; not the slightest rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and everything demanded was scrupulously paid for, although bread was sold at two shillings a pound! Massena himself also, fierce and terrible as he was in Portugal, always treated the Spaniards with gentleness and moderation.

Whilst these events were passing, Trant who had crossed the lower Coa with four thousand militia, two miles from Almeida, was in great peril; for the river suddenly flooded behind him, all the bridges had been broken by Massena, and near fort Conception was a brigade of the ninth corps, employed to cover the march of the battering train from Almeida to Ciudad Rodrigo. Trant hastily constructed a temporary bridge with great difficulty, and would have retired the 6th but for a letter, coming from head-quarters, which warned him to be vigilant and fearless, because the next morning a British force would be up to his assistance. Marching then to Val de Mula, he

boldly interposed between Almeida and the French brigade; but the proposed succour did not appear, and the French advanced within half a mile of his position! Suddenly two cannon shots were heard to the southward, the enemy hastily formed squares in retreat, and in ten minutes six squadrons of British cavalry and a troop of horse artillery came sweeping over the plain in the rear. Military order and coolness marked the French retreat across the Turones, and though the cannon shots ploughed with a fearful effect through their masses, and the horsemen continually flanked their march, they gained the rough ground, and finally escaped over the Agueda by Barba del Puerco, with the loss of three hundred men killed wounded and prisoners. Trant was thus saved as it were by a miracle; for accident had stopped the English infantry marching in the morning according to Wellington's promise, and he instantly pushed on this cavalry. The prince of Esling had reached Ciudad Rodrigo two days before, and Wellington now stood victorious on the confines of Portugal, having effected what to others appeared incredibly rash and useless to attempt.

## CHAPTER V.

MASSENA entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand men, and his reinforcements while at Santarem were about ten thousand, he repassed the frontier with forty-five thousand; the invasion therefore cost him thirty thousand men, of which fourteen thousand might have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand were lost during the retreat; but had Wellington, unrestrained by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha, Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Miranda de Corvo, half the French army would have been destroyed, though with great loss to the assailants: a retreating army should fight as little as possible.

When the French reached the Agueda, their cavalry detachments, heavy artillery, and convalescents, again augmented the army to more than fifty thousand men, but the fatigues of the retreat and the want of provisions would not suffer them to show a front to the allies; wherefore, drawing two hundred thousand rations from Rodrigo, they fell back to Salamanca, and Wellington invested Almeida. The light division then occupied Gallegos and Espeja, the rest of the army was disposed in villages on both sides of the Coa, and the headquarters were transferred to Villa Formosa, where Colonel Waters, who had been taken near Belmonte during the retreat, rejoined the army. He had refused his parole, and when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly consulted the Spaniard in whose house he was lodged about escaping; the man betrayed counsel, but his servant detesting the treachery secretly offered his own aid,—Waters told him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened, nothing more, for his design was one of open daring. He was placed under the guard of four *gens d'armes*, and when near Salamanca, the chief, who rode the only good horse of the party, alighted for a moment, whereupon Waters

gave the spur to his own mare, a celebrated animal, and galloped off! It was an act of incredible resolution and hardihood, for he was on a wide plain, and before him and for miles behind him the road was covered with the French columns; his hat fell off, and thus marked he rode along the flank of the troops, some encouraged, others fired at him, and the *gens-d'armes* sword in hand were always close at his heels. Suddenly he broke at full speed between two of the columns, gained a wooded hollow, and having thus baffled his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy's army, and the third day reached head-quarters, where lord Wellington, knowing his resolute subtle character, had caused his baggage to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent!

Massena having now occupied Salamanca and communicated with Bessières, sent a convoy to Rodrigo, which Appendix 2. could not be interrupted; for Wellington could scarcely maintain his forward position. He had been compelled, in default of money, to disband all his militia at the moment when they were acquiring solidity in the field, and his operations were reduced to a precarious blockade of Almeida. He even laid two temporary bridges over the Coa to secure a retreat if pressed, which might easily happen: for the Portuguese army was in a dreadful state, and the continued misconduct of the regency, and the absolute want of money, gave little hope of amelioration. The great dépôts were re-established at Lamego and Raiva, on the Douro and the Mondego, and magazines of consumption at Celorico, from whence the mule-brigades supplied the troops by Castello Bom. Commissariat stations were also commenced at Guarda, Pena Macor and Castello Branco, to be supplied from Abrantes, and the three great rivers were thus rendered subservient to the wants of the army up to the nearest navigable points; but from thence the land transport was very difficult, and that, coupled with the capricious nature of the Agueda and the Coa, rendered it dangerous to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida together. The covering army would have had bad ground, and those rivers behind it; indeed Almeida was only blockaded because it was supposed to have but a fortnight's provisions, and Wellington was prepared to relinquish it if

pressed, because the reduction of it formed no part of his general plan.

His success having given stability to the Tory cabinet, the ministers now wished to restrict the war to Portugal, and recalled many battalions to England; but offensive operations in Spain occupied the general's thoughts, and two projects presented themselves. 1°. Judging it would be long ere Massena could resume the invasion of Portugal, he thought to leave part of his force in Beira and with the remainder raise the siege of Cadiz. 2°. If Almeida surrendered to his blockade, to besiege Rodrigo; or if Almeida did not yield, he might in time besiege and take both together, and then marching into the heart of Spain, open a communication with Valencia and the English army in Sicily. This would deliver Andalusia as certainly as a direct operation, because Madrid, the principal French depôt, would be taken, the northern and southern French armies separated; and a new base on the Mediterranean being obtained, the whole of the allied forces would be united, when a few general battles would decide the fate of the Peninsula. With this great design in view, which successfully executed would have surpassed Marlborough's march to Blenheim, he resisted the recal of his battalions, demanded reinforcements from England, and required leave to act; yet his secret aspirations were checked by reflecting on the arrogance broken promises and folly of the Spaniards, upon the foul practices of the Portuguese regency, and upon the timid temper of the English cabinet. Wherefore revolving the leading points in secret he waited on circumstances; and both projects were necessarily conditional; for if Napoleon reinforced his armies new combinations would arise, and it was essential first to recapture Badajos, the loss of which affected the safety of Cadiz, and menaced Portugal by placing Elvas in danger. Thinking now that Massena could not easily interrupt the blockade of Almeida, he departed to join Beresford in the Alemtejo, leaving Spencer to direct the northern operations; and as this was a critical period of the war, it is essential to review the state of affairs in the south.

Wellington  
to lord Liver-  
pool, May 7th,  
1810, MSS.

Soult had returned to Andalusia when Badajos fell, leaving Mortier to besiege Campo Mayor. His presence and the fame of his successes restored tranquillity to the province, and his troops then recovered from the despondency caused by the battle of Barosa, which was so great that the works of Arcos, Lucar, Medina de Sidonia, and Alcala de Gazules, had been stopped, and fear was prevalent. But gloom and discontent were also paramount in Cadiz. The fall of Badajos menaced the city with famine: and though the regency pretended at first to menace Victor with a new attack, Zayas was finally despatched with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry to gather provisions in the Condada de Neibla, where Ballesteros had surprised and dispersed Remond's troops. The French were however reinforced, Zayas made no progress, many of his men deserted to Ballesteros, and he withdrew; Blake then assumed command in the Condada, and Ballesteros and Copons were placed under his orders. Their united corps amounting to eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry were called the 'fourth army,' and the fugitives from the Gebora having rallied under Mendizabel at Villa Viciosa were called the 'fifth army.'

Mortier had meanwhile taken possession of Albuquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, and besieged Campo Mayor, which would have fallen at once but for the courage of major Tallaia, a Portuguese engineer. With only two hundred men and five mounted guns, he compelled Mortier to open regular trenches, to batter in breach, to bombard the place, and to push his sap to the crest of the glacis. When a breach was made, Tallaia, though ill-seconded by his garrison, repulsed one assault and obtained a truce of twenty-four hours to wait for succour: none arrived and this brave man surrendered the 21st of March. Mortier then returned to Badajos, leaving Latour Maubourg to remove the siege artillery and stores. It was in this state of affairs that Beresford, who had quitted Wellington's army after the combat of Foz d'Aronce, arrived at Portalegre with twenty thousand infantry, more than two thousand cavalry, and eighteen guns. His instructions were to relieve Campo Mayor, and retake Olivenza and Badajos: the first had

Chief of  
Engineers,  
Garbe,  
March 25th.  
Intercepted.

Abstract  
of Military  
Reports from  
Cadiz, 1811,  
MSS.

already surrendered, but the marshal being only two marches distant, thought he might surprise the besieging corps, and with this view put his troops in motion.

#### COMBAT OF CAMPO MAYOR.

In the morning of the 25th the advanced guard, consisting of all the cavalry, supported by a detachment of infantry under colonel Colborne, came suddenly upon Campo Mayor. Latour Maubourg was then marching out with nine hundred dragoons, three battalions of infantry, some horse artillery and the battering train of sixteen guns; but his troops were in disorder, and the English cavalry under general Long immediately turned the town by the left, whereupon the French retreated on the Badajos road, and the allies followed along some gentle slopes, gradually forming a half circle round the retiring troops in the plain. Colborne was still at a considerable distance, yet coming up at a running pace, and followed by the second division; the French infantry halted and formed a square, placing their horsemen before and behind it, while their baggage and guns hurried towards Badajos; then Long, keeping the heavy cavalry back, ordered the thirteenth dragoons under colonel Head, and some Portuguese squadrons under Loftus Otway to attack. The thirteenth, charging at a gallop received the infantry fire, and the French hussars met them with loose reins; both came strongly to the shock and many were dismounted, yet those who kept the saddle passed fiercely through on both sides, re formed, and again charged in the same fearful manner! Desperately they fought, but Head's troopers riding more closely together than their adversaries, overthrew horse and man and finally the French dispersed. Then, galloping onwards, these gallant swordsmen passed the convoy, hewed down the gunners of the battering train, and being joined by some of the Portuguese, the French hussars still fighting here and there, rode forward. They naturally thought the English heavy dragoons, the artillery and the infantry, some of which was close up, would dispose of the enemy they were passing; but Beresford would not let the dragoons charge, and when



six guns might have opened he would not suffer more than two to play, and those only for a few rounds; hence the French recovered their battering train and retreated in safety! Meanwhile the thirteenth and the Portuguese having reached the bridge of Badajos took some guns close to the fortress, but were repulsed by its fire, and being followed by Mortier in person, and met by the retreating infantry and the remains of the beaten cavalry, lost some men. Altogether one hundred of the allies were killed or hurt, and seventy were taken. The French lost three hundred men and a howitzer, and their hussar colonel, Chamorin, was slain in single combat by a powerful swordsman of the thirteenth.

*To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly with the advanced guard in an offensive movement.* When this combat commenced, Beresford was not in front, and baron Trip, a staff-officer, told him the thirteenth had been cut off. The marshal therefore, anxious to spare his cavalry which could not be replaced, refused to follow up the blow, saying the loss of one regiment was enough; but the regiment was not lost, the country was open, the enemy's force and the posture of affairs easy to be discerned without trusting baron Trip. The errors of the day were all Beresford's; yet when the falseness of Trip's report was discovered, the thirteenth dragoons were severely reprimanded for pursuing so eagerly! But the unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them!

Campo Mayor was recovered so suddenly, that the French left eight thousand rations of bread in the magazines; and they also evacuated Albuquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, being infinitely dismayed by the appearance of so powerful an army in the south: indeed so secretly and promptly had it been assembled, that its existence was first made known by the blow at Campo Mayor. But to profit from this surprise it was essential to be rapid, for the breaches in Badajos were not closed, nor the trenches obliterated, nor the exhausted magazines replenished. Soult had carried away six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, four hundred men had been thrown into Olivenza, three thousand into Badajos; thus Mortier, deducting the losses sustained during the operations,

had less than ten thousand men, and he could not hold the line of the Guadiana and collect provisions also. Beresford should have instantly marched upon Merida, driven back the fifth corps, and opened a communication by Jerumenha with Elvas; the fall of Badajos would then have been inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the surprise, and the moral impression produced by the charge of the thirteenth, guaranteed the success of this march; he might even have passed at Merida before Mortier could ascertain his object. Neglecting this opportunity he put his troops in quarters round Elvas, for the soldiers, especially those of the fourth division, who had been marching incessantly since the 6th of the month, were bare-footed and exhausted.

Wellington's instructions were to throw a bridge over the Guadiana at Jerumenha, push back Mortier, and invest Olivenza and Badajos. The Portuguese government were to provide some of the means, and had reported that provisions, shoes, battering-guns, ammunition and transport, were actually collected; that the Guadiana abounded in serviceable craft; that twenty large boats, formerly belonging to Cuesta, were at Elvas, and all other things would be sent from Lisbon. Yet no magazines had been prepared, and very little transport provided; only five of Cuesta's boats were in Elvas; there was no serviceable craft on the river, and some small pontoons, sent from Lisbon, were unfit to bear the force of the current or to sustain the passage of guns: the country furnished no food and the garrison stores of Elvas were taken to feed the army. All these things pointed out Merida as the true line of operations. Food was to be had on the left of the Guadiana, and to remedy the evils enumerated did not require the presence of an army on the right bank. The want of shoes in the fourth division was indeed an obstacle, yet those excellent troops could have made an effort, and might without much risk have been left behind. Beresford preferred halting for the means to cross at Jerumenha, and thus commenced in error those bloody operations which marred Wellington's great conceptions for carrying the war into Spain, and detained the army more than a year on the frontiers of Portugal. General Phillipon, one of the ablest

governors that ever defended a fortress, employed the time thus given to level the trenches of Badajos, restore the glacis, and close the breach; and Latour Maubourg who had succeeded Mortier in command covered the country with foragers and filled the magazines.

After some days, a squadron of cavalry having passed over the Guadiana by a deep ford to protect the workmen, a bridge was cast at Jerumenha, by fixing trestles in the shallows and connecting them with Cuesta's boats. It was finished the 3rd, and the army assembled at night in the neighbouring woods with intent to cross at daylight, but the river rose suddenly, swept away the trestles, and rendered the ford impassable. No more materials for a solid passage could be immediately procured, and the Spanish boats were therefore converted into flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, while the engineer Squire constructed, with pontoons and casks, a slight bridge for the infantry. To cover this operation a battalion was added to the squadron on the left bank, yet it was late in the night of the 6th ere the army crossed and took position on a range of hills covered by a swampy rivulet. Latour Maubourg was so occupied with the provisions of Badajos, that his foragers were extended fifty miles in the rear, and he took no notice of Beresford, a neglect savouring more of Spanish than French warfare; for five thousand infantry, with guns and cavalry, could, notwithstanding the guns of Jerumenha, have easily cut off the small detachment of the British on the left bank, and completely frustrated the operations. Beresford should have passed over and entrenched a strong force to protect his workmen, instead of a battalion and some cavalry; but he tempted, and Latour Maubourg neglected fortune with equal pertinacity. When the allies had secured the left bank, the French general, awaking, collected three thousand infantry five hundred cavalry and four guns at Olivenza, and marched at daylight on the 7th to oppose a passage which had been completed the day before; he however surprised a squadron of the thirteenth dragoons, and advanced so close to the position as to exchange shots, yet he was suffered to retire unmolested!

Mendizabel now re-occupied Valencia d'Alcantara and

Albuquerque with the fifth army, and pushed cavalry posts to La Rocca and Montijo, Ballesteros re-entered Fregenal, and Castaños, made captain-general of Estremadura as well as of Galicia, arrived at Elvas. He was friendly towards Beresford, but had a grudge against Blake, and pretended to chief authority as the elder captain-general; Blake then claimed on the same ground a superiority over Beresford, which he was not disposed to admit of. Castaños, who disliked a disputed authority, and was fearful that Blake's pretensions would prevent Beresford crossing the Guadiana, finally agreed that he who brought the greatest force into the field should be generalissimo. Blake was thus put aside, and Beresford, the younger officer, commanded in chief. To protect his bridges which he had now re-constructed in a substantial manner, he employed the Elvas militia to raise entrenchments, and having placed a strong detachment in them advanced. Latour Maubourg retired upon Albuera, and the allies being joined by Madden's cavalry summoned Olivenza; this was on the 9th, and it is certain that no defence was expected, for it was not until the summons was rejected that major Dickson was sent to Elvas to prepare a battering train. The Anglo-Portuguese British troops then encamped round the place, and opened a communication with Ballesteros, while Castaños entered Merida and pushed cavalry to Almendralejos; but the French fell back to Llerena, whereupon Beresford left Cole to besiege Olivenza with the fourth division and Madden's cavalry, and took post himself on the 11th at Albuera. There, being in connexion with Castaños by his left, he spread his horsemen to cut off all communication with Badajoz, and sent a brigade to collect supplies at Talavera Real.

On the 14th, six twenty-four pounders being placed in battery, at Olivenza, opened a practicable breach, and the garrison surrendered. Cole then marched on Zafra, and Beresford having recalled the brigade from Talavera also marched on that place. His object was to drive Latour Maubourg over the Morena, and to cut off general Maransin, who had, when Zayas quitted the Condada, pursued Ballesteros to Fregenal, had defeated him there on the 12th, and was now following up his victory; an alcalde gave him timely notice of

Beresford's vicinity and he escaped, but two French regiments of cavalry, having advanced from Llerena to collect contributions, were encountered beyond Usagre by the thirteenth dragoons, and so vigorously pressed for six miles that one hundred and fifty were killed or taken.

On the 16th Cole arrived, and the army being thus concentrated about Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired on the 18th to Guadalcanal; the Spanish cavalry then occupied Llerena, and the resources of Estremadura were secured to the allies. General Charles Alten, coming from Lisbon with a brigade of German light infantry, now reached Olivenza, and Wellington came to Elvas, whither Beresford, after drawing his infantry nearer to Badajos, went to meet him. The presence of the general-in-chief was agreeable to the troops; they had seen great masses put in motion without any adequate results, and thought the operations had been slow without being prudent. The army had passed the Guadiana the 7th, and, including the Spaniards from Montijo, numbered twenty-five thousand men; Latour Maubourg never had more than ten thousand, many of them dispersed foraging, yet without displaying much skill, he had maintained himself in Estremadura for ten days; during which no corps being employed to constrain the garrison of Badajos, the governor brought in timber and other materials for the defence. Wellington arrived the 21st, forded the Guadiana on the 22nd, and pushing close up to Badajos with Madden's Portuguese cavalry and Alten's Germans, endeavoured to cut off a convoy going to the place, but the alert governor sallied, and the allies lost a hundred men without stopping the convoy.

Beresford had despised his enemy; but Wellington thought he would certainly disturb the siege with a considerable force, and demanded the Spanish generals' assent to the following operations before he would commence even the investment of Badajos. 1°. Blake, marching up from Ayamonte, was to take post at Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Ballesteros to occupy Burquillo on his left. 2°. Mendizabel's cavalry, stationed at Llerena, was to observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra with Ballesteros: these dispositions were made to watch the passes of the

Morena. 3°. Castaños was to furnish three battalions for the siege, and keep the rest of his corps at Merida, to support the Spanish cavalry. The British army was to be in second line, and Albuera, centrally situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos, was to be the point of concentration for all the allied forces in the event of a battle.

To attack Badajos the battering train and stores were taken from the ramparts and magazines of Elvas; it was therefore necessary to ensure the safety of the guns, lest that fortress should in the end be exposed half dismantled to a siege. But the Guadiana, rising ten feet on the 24th, had again carried away the bridges at Jerumenha; wherefore Wellington changed the line of communication, making it run by Merida until settled weather should admit of fresh arrangements, and ere that was effected political difficulties forced him to delay the siege. Mendizabel's troops had committed excesses in Portugal, their disputes with the inhabitants were constant, the Spanish general pillaged the town of Fernando, and the Portuguese government in reprisal, resolved to seize Olivenza, which had formerly belonged to Portugal. The Spanish regency publicly disavowed Mendizabel's conduct, and Mr. Stuart's strenuous representations deterred the Portuguese from plunging the two countries into a war; but this affair, joined to the natural slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented Castaños and Blake from immediately assenting to the English general's demands. Now also came unexpected intelligence that Massena was again on the Agueda, and in force, wherefore, postponing the siege until the Spanish generals could act in concert, or until the fall of Almeida should permit a British force to come down, Wellington repaired with the utmost speed to the Coa, and gave orders for the northern militia again to take the field.

Appendix 18,  
§ 10. Vol. II.

#### OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.


Almeida had indeed been closely pressed, and the army so disposed as to cut off all communication; but the allies were themselves so distressed for provisions that great part of their corn came from the side of Ledesma, being smuggled by the

peasants through the French posts, and passed over the Agueda by ropes, which were hidden amongst the deep chasms of that river near its confluence with the Douro. Massena had twice supplied Ciudad Rodrigo, and though Spencer, crossing the Agueda with eight thousand men, overtook and surrounded the rear-guard of the last convoy with his cavalry on a plain, it reached the place. Having thus succoured one fortress he became intent to relieve the other, and he was strong enough to do so by force. His retreat to Salamanca was merely to restore the organization and equipments of his army, which he could not do at Rodrigo without exhausting the resources of that place, but his cantonments were extended from Ledesma and Toro on the Douro to San Felices on the Agueda, by which he still lent his hand to Almeida. His cavalry was indeed in bad condition, and his guns nearly unhorsed by the retreat from Santarem, yet he only waited for aid from Bessières to retake the offensive. This he did not readily obtain, Bessières had neglected and continued to neglect the army of Portugal, contrary to the emperor's instructions, and now proffered remonstrances and counsel instead of men and guns. He disliked the war in Spain, condemned the mode of conducting it, and having his thoughts fixed more upon Russian than Peninsula politics, gave his opinion that a northern war must occur so openly, that it reached the English camp.

Towards the end of April the new organization, decreed while Massena was at Santarem, was making progress. Two divisions of the ninth corps joined Massena, and Drouet with the remaining eleven thousand infantry and cavalry was going to reinforce and take command of the fifth corps, when he was prevailed upon by Massena, who had at last received a promise of assistance from Bessières, to aid in an effort to relieve Almeida. With this view the French army advanced in the latter part of April. The light division immediately resumed its old positions at Gallegos and Espeja, and the cavalry was dispersed, part in observation towards the sources of the Azava, part behind Gallegos in support of the infantry. In this state of affairs colonel O'Meara and eighty men of the Irish brigade were captured by Julian Sanchez, the affair







BATTLE OF  
FUENTES ONORO  
5<sup>th</sup> May, 1811.

being, it was said, preconcerted to enable the former to quit the French service. Soon afterwards two thousand infantry and a squadron of cavalry, coming from Rodrigo, endeavoured to seize the bridge of Marialva in front of Gallegos, but it was bravely maintained by captain Dobbs of the fifty-second, with one bayonet company and some riflemen.

On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo, and the 27th, his advanced guards felt the light division from Espeja to Marialva. Wellington arrived the 28th, and immediately concentrated the main body of the allies behind the Duas Casas river. The Azava was swollen and difficult to ford, and the enemy continued to feel the line of outposts until the 2nd of May, when, the waters having subsided, the French army came out of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the light division, after a slight skirmish of horse at Gallegos, commenced a retrograde movement, from that place and from Espeja, upon Fuentes Onoro. The country immediately in rear of those villages was wooded as far as the Duas Casas, but an open plain, separating the two lines of march, offered the enemy's powerful cavalry an opening to cut off the retreat; they neglected the opportunity, and the separated brigades remained unmolested in the woods bordering the plain until midnight, when they resumed their march and crossed the Duas Casas at Fuentes Onoro. That village had escaped injury during the previous warfare, although occupied alternately by French and English during a whole year. Every family was well known to the light division, and it was with deep regret and anger they found that the British troops preceding them had pillaged it, leaving only shells of houses, where three days before a friendly population had been living in comfort. This wanton and disgraceful act was felt so deeply throughout the army, that eight thousand dollars were afterwards collected for the poor despoiled people, yet the injury sunk deeper than the atonement.

Lord Wellington had resolved not to risk much for his blockade. Massena he knew could bring down superior numbers; because the Portuguese troops continued to be so neglected by their government, that they were starving under arms; the infantry abandoned their colours or dropped from

exhaustion by thousands, the cavalry was entirely ruined, and a general dispersion was feared. Nevertheless, when the trial came, his warlike spirit would not let him go back; he could not indeed with only thirty-two thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition and forty-two guns face Massena on the plains beyond the Duas Casas; but he occupied a table-land between the Turones and Duas Casas, the left at Fort Conception, the centre opposite the village of Alameda, the right behind Fuentes Onoro. This line was five miles long, yet the Duas Casas, flowing in a deep ravine, covered his front; and the French dared not march by their right on Almeida because he would then have crossed the ravine at Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, and have fallen on their flank; hence to cover the blockade, it sufficed to have the fifth division near Fort Conception, and the sixth opposite Alameda: the first and third divisions were concentrated in mass about cannon-shot behind Fuentes Onoro, where the table-land turned back on the Turones, becoming rocky and harsh as it approached that river.

#### FIRST COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO.

Massena came up three columns abreast. The cavalry, the sixth corps, and Drouot's division, threatened Fuentes Onoro; the eighth and second corps moved against Alameda and Fort Conception, menacing the allies' left; the light division, therefore, after passing the Duas Casas, reinforced the sixth division. Loison, without waiting for Massena's orders, fell upon Fuentes Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions picked from the first and third divisions. Most of the houses were in the bottom of the ravine, but an old chapel, and some buildings on a craggy eminence overhanging one end gave a prominent point for rallying. The low parts were vigorously defended, yet the violence of the attack, and the cannonade, made the British abandon the streets, and they could scarcely maintain the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, the commanding officer, fell badly wounded, and the fight was critical, when the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and the seventy-ninth regiments, marching down from the

main position, charged roughly, and drove the French quite over the Duas Casas. During the night the detachments were withdrawn, and the three succouring regiments were left in the village, where two hundred and sixty of the allies and somewhat more of the French had fallen.

On the 4th Massena, accompanied by Bessières, who had brought up fifteen hundred cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard, examined all the line and made dispositions for the next day. His design was to hold the left of the allies in check with the second corps, and turn their right with the remainder of the army. Forty thousand French infantry, and five thousand horse, with thirty-six pieces of artillery, were under arms; they had shown in the action of the 3rd that their courage was not abated, and it was a very audacious resolution to receive their battle. The position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was indeed strong, free for the use of all arms, and covered the communication by the bridge of Castello Bom; but on the right, the plain was continued in a second steppe to Nava d'Aver, where a considerable hill, overlooking all the country, commanded the roads leading to the bridges of Sequiras and Sabugal. Massena could therefore, by a direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo seize that hill, place his army in line of battle upon the right flank of the allies, and attack them while entangled between the Duas Casas, the Turones, the Coa, and the fortress of Almeida: the bridge of Castello Bom alone would have been open for retreat. To prevent this, and to cover his communications with Sabugal and Sequiras, Wellington, yielding to Spencer's earnest suggestions, extended his right to Nava d'Aver, caused Julian Sanchez to occupy the hill, and supported him with the seventh division under general Houstoun:—thus the line of battle was made seven miles in length, besides the circuit of blockade. The Duas Casas still covered the front, but, above Fuentes Onoro, the ravine was gradually obliterated, resolving itself into a swampy wood, which extended to Poço Velho, a village half way between Fuentes and Nava d'Aver.

Appendix 17,  
§ 2. Vol. 11.

## BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO.

It was Massena's intention to commence the attack at day-break on the 5th, but a delay of two hours occurred and all his movements were descried. The eighth corps, withdrawn from Alameda, and supported by all the French cavalry, was seen marching above the village of Poço Velho, which with its swampy wood, was occupied by Houstoun's left, his right being thrown back in the plain towards Nava d'Aver. The sixth corps and Drouet's division took ground to their own left, still keeping a division in front of Fuentes Onoro, menacing that point; at this sight the light division and the English horse hastened to the support of Houstoun, while the first and third divisions made a movement parallel to that of the sixth corps. The latter, however, drove the left wing of the seventh division from the village of Poço Velho, and it was fast gaining ground in the wood also when the riflemen of the light division arriving there restored the fight. The French cavalry then passed Poço Velho and commenced forming in order of battle on the plain, between the wood and the hill of Nava d'Aver where Julian Sanchez was posted. He immediately retired across the Turones, partly in fear, but more in anger, because his lieutenant, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer and shot by a soldier of the guards before the action commenced.

Montbrun occupied himself with this weak partida for an hour, and when the guerilla chief was gone, turned the right of the seventh division, and charged the British cavalry which had moved up to its support; the combat was unequal, for by an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn from the ranks as orderlies to general officers, and for other purposes, that not more than a thousand English troopers were in the field. The French therefore drove in all the cavalry outguards at the first shock, cut off Ramsay's battery of horse artillery, and came sweeping in upon the reserves of cavalry and upon the seventh division. Their leading squadrons, approaching in a disorderly manner, were partially checked by fire, but a great commotion was observed in their main body; men and horses were seen to close with confusion and tumult towards

one point, where a thick dust and loud cries, and the sparkling of blades, and flashing of pistols, indicated some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude became violently agitated, an English shout pealed high and clear, the mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth sword in hand at the head of his battery, his horses, breathing fire, stretched like greyhounds along the plain, the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent low and pointed weapons, in desperate career. Captain Brotherton of the fourteenth dragoons, seeing this, instantly rode forth and with his squadron shocked the head of the pursuing troops, and general Charles Stewart, joining in the charge, took the French colonel Lamotte, fighting hand to hand; but then the main body of the French came on strongly and the British cavalry retired behind the light division, which was immediately thrown into squares. The seventh division, which was more advanced, did the same, but the horsemen were upon them first, and some were cut down. The mass however stood firm, and the Chasseurs Britanniques, ranged behind a loose stone wall, poured such a fire that their foes recoiled and seemed bewildered.

While these brilliant actions were passing on the right the French made progress in the wood of Poço Velho, and as the English divisions were separated and the right wing turned, it was evident the battle would soon be lost, if the original concentrated position above Fuentes Onoro was not quickly regained. The seventh division were therefore ordered to cross the Turones, and move down the left bank to Frenada while the light division retired over the plain; the cavalry covered this movement; and the first and third divisions, and the Portuguese were at the same time placed on the steppe of land before described, perpendicular to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro. General Craufurd, who had resumed the command of the light division, covered Houstoun's passage across the Turones, and then retired slowly over the plain in squares, followed by the French horsemen, who continually outflanked but never dared to assail him; however in approaching the new line they sabred some of the foot guards under colonel Hill, making that officer and fourteen men

prisoners, and then continuing their course were repulsed by the forty-second regiment. Many times Montbrun feigned to charge Craufurd's squares, but always he found them too dangerous to meddle with, and this crisis passed without a disaster, yet there was not during the whole war a more perilous hour. For Houstoun's division was separated from the position by the Turones, and the vast plain was covered with commissariat animals and camp-followers, with servants, led horses, baggage, and country people, mixed with broken detachments and piquets returning from the woods, all in such confused concourse that the light division squares appeared but as specks; and close behind those surging masses were five thousand horsemen, trampling, bounding, shouting for the word to charge. Fifteen guns were up with the French cavalry, the eighth corps was in order of battle behind them, the woods on their right were filled with Loison's skirmishers; and if that general, pivoting upon Fuentes, had come forth with the sixth corps while Drouet assailed the village, and the cavalry had made a general charge, the loose crowds of non-combatants and broken troops would have been violently dashed against the first division, to intercept its fire and break its ranks, and the battle would have been lost. No such effort was made, the plain was soon cleared, the British cavalry took post behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve on the right of the first division, having its riflemen amongst the rocks to connect it with Houstoun, who had reached Frenada and been there joined by Julian Sanchez. At sight of this new front, so deeply lined, the French stopped short and opened their guns, tearing the close masses of the allies; but twelve English guns soon replied so briskly that the violence of the French fire abated, and their cavalry drew back out of range. A body of infantry then attempted to glide down the ravine of the Turones, but they were repulsed by the riflemen and the light companies of the guards, and the action on this side resolved itself into a cannonade.

Meanwhile a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. There Drouet was to have carried the village when Montbrun's cavalry had turned the right of the line; he delayed his attack for two hours and thus marred the combination; but

finally he assailed with such fierceness and vigour that the three British regiments, overmatched in numbers and unaccustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, were pierced and divided. Two companies of the seventy-ninth were taken, colonel Cameron of that regiment was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the village was lost: the upper part was however stiffly held and the rolling of musketry was incessant. Had the attack been made earlier, and all Drouet's division thrown frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps moving through the wood closely turned the village, the passage must have been forced and the left of the new position out-flanked. But now Wellington, having all his reserves in hand, detached considerable masses to the support of the regiments in Fuentes; and as the French continued also to reinforce their troops, the whole of the sixth corps and part of Drouet's division were finally engaged. At one time the fighting was on the banks of the stream and amongst the lower houses, at another on the rugged heights and around the chapel, and some of the enemy's skirmishers penetrated completely through towards the main position; yet the village was never entirely abandoned by the defenders, and in one charge the seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and eighty-eighth regiments, led by colonel M'Kinnon, broke a heavy mass near the chapel and killed a great number of French. This fighting lasted until evening, when the lower part of the town was abandoned by both parties, the British remaining at the chapel and crags, the French retiring a cannon shot from the stream. After the action a brigade of the light division relieved the regiments in the village, a slight demonstration made by the second corps, near Fort Concepcion, was checked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion, and both armies remained in observation. Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which three hundred were prisoners, constituted the loss of the allies. That of the enemy was estimated at five thousand, upon the erroneous supposition that four hundred dead were lying about Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash estimates on such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcases immediately about the village, I found only one hundred and thirty bodies, one-third being British.



During the battle the French convoy for the supply of Almeida had remained at Gallegos, and Wellington now sent Julian Sanchez to menace it, and disturb Massena's communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; this had no effect, and a more decisive battle being expected on the 6th the light division made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes; the main position immediately behind that village was also entrenched; yet Fuentes Onoro was, in military phrase, not tenable. A wooded tongue of land, overlooking at half-cannon shot the upper as well as the lower part of the village both in flank and rear, was too distant to be occupied by the allies, but had Ney been there he would have crowned that ridge, and Fuentes could only have been held by submitting to a butchery.

On the 6th the enemy sent his wounded to the rear and made no demonstration of attack; the 7th passed in a like inaction and the British entrenchments were perfected. The 8th, Massena withdrew his main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and Gallegos, but still maintained posts at Alameda and Fuentes. On the 10th, without being molested, he retired across the Agueda; the sixth and eighth corps and the cavalry passed at Ciudad Rodrigo, the second corps at Barba del Puerco. Bessières then carried off the imperial guards, Massena was recalled to France, and Marmont assumed the command of the army of Portugal. Both sides claimed the victory. The French, because they won the passage at Poço Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank, made the cavalry retire, and forced the army to relinquish three miles of ground and change its front. The English, because the village of Fuentes, so often attacked, was successfully defended, and the blockade of Almeida was maintained. Massena at first gained great advantages, Napoleon would have made them fatal. Yet with an overwhelming cavalry, on suitable ground, the prince merely indicated as it were the English general's errors, and stopped short, when he should have sprung forward. By some this has been attributed to negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded by Marmont; but in truth discord had arisen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would not charge at his order—Junot did not second him cordially—Loison dis-

regarded his instructions—Drouet sought to spare his own divisions in the fight, and Reynier remained perfectly inactive: the machinery of battle would not work.

General Pelet, Massena's first aide-de-camp, censures Wellington for not sending his cavalry against Reynier after the second position was taken up: he asserts that danger on that side would have forced the French to retreat. This criticism is based on the notion that the allies had fifty thousand men in the field, whereas, including Sanchez' partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It may be with more justice objected to Massena, that he did not launch some of his numerous horsemen by the Sequiras or Sabugal bridges, against Guarda and Celorico, to destroy the magazines, cut the communication, and capture the mules and other means of transport belonging to the allied army. The vice of the English general's position would then have been clearly exposed; for though the second German hussars were on the march from Lisbon, they had not passed Coimbra, and could not have protected the dépôts. War, however adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is commonly a series of errors and accidents. Ney's opposition prevented Massena's march upon Coria, which would have secured Badajos and Campo Mayor, and probably added Elvas to them. Latour Maubourg's tardiness was like to cost Mortier a rear-guard and a battering-train. Beresford's blunder at Campo Mayor, and his neglect of the line of Merida, enabled the French to secure Badajos. At Sabugal, the petulance of a staff-officer marred an admirable combination, and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet's negligence placed Almeida at the mercy of the allies. A mistaken notion of Massena's sufferings during the retreat induced Wellington to undertake two operations at the same time, which was above his strength; and this error might have been his ruin, for Bessières, who only brought fifteen hundred men and six guns to the battle of Fuentes Onoro, could have brought ten thousand men and sixteen guns. In that battle more errors than skill were observable on both sides, and the train of accidents did not stop there, there was still another example of the uncertainty of war to be presented.

Appendix 17.  
§ 8. Vol. II.

Napoleon's  
official cor-  
respondence  
with Bessières.

## EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA.

General Brennier, made prisoner at Vimiero but afterwards exchanged, was governor of this fortress. During the battle his garrison, of fifteen hundred men, skirmished boldly with the blockading force, and loud explosions, supposed to be signals of communication with the relieving army, were frequent in the place. After the battle, a French soldier named Tillet, with extraordinary courage and presence of mind, contrived to penetrate in uniform, for he refused to be a spy, through the posts of blockade, carrying an order for Brennier to evacuate the fortress and rejoin the army by Barba del Puerco. Massena appeared to have abandoned the place to its fate, and Wellington having placed the light division on its old position on the Azava, with cavalry posts on the lower Agueda, directed general Campbell to resume the investment with the sixth division and Pack's brigade, and ordered sir W. Erskine to send the fourth regiment from Val de Mula to Barba del Puerco. Campbell disposed his troops negligently, Erskine sent no order to the fourth regiment, and Brennier, despairing of succour from without, resolved like Julian Estrada at Hostalrich, to break through the blockade, though an open country and a double line of posts aggravated the difficulty. To render the fortress useless for the allies, he mined the principal bastions and destroyed the guns by an ingenious expedient; for always he fired several at once with heavy charges, placing one across the muzzle of another, thus some shots flew towards the besiegers while others destroyed the pieces without attracting notice.

On the 10th at midnight, he sprung his mines, broke through the piquets in one column, and steered between the reserves with a nicety proving at once his coolness and previous observation. Pack followed him with a few men hastily collected, and plied him with fire, but silently steadily swiftly his column glided onward until the rough ground leading to Barba del Puerco was gained; there it halted for a moment, just as daylight broke, and Pack sent an officer to a village on the right to bring out some dragoons upon the French flank which occasioned a skirmish and more delay. Campbell's troops had

paid little attention to the explosion of the mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier's practice with the guns; but Pack's musketry had aroused them, and the thirty-sixth regiment was now close up. The fourth regiment also, having heard the firing at Val de Mula, was rapidly closing on the French right flank, and Brennier, having beat off the dragoons, resumed his march; then the English infantry throwing off their knapsacks overtook his column just as it was descending the chasm of Barba del Puercu, killed many, and made three hundred prisoners. The thirty-sixth, excited by the action, very rashly passed the bridge, whereupon Reynier's corps which was there, awaiting Brennier's arrival, drove it back with a loss of forty men: had Erskine obeyed his orders about the fourth regiment Brennier would have been lost. Stung by this event, and irritated by some previous examples of undisciplined valour, lord Wellington issued this severe rebuke, as applicable to many English writers as to the persons addressed:—*'The officers of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed is not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies unsupported successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons.'*

## CHAPTER VI.

WHEN Marmont had thus recovered the garrison of Almeiha, he withdrew most of his forces to Salamanca. Wellington then placed the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions and the cavalry on the Azava, under Spencer, and directed the third and seventh divisions and the second German hussars upon Badajos. On the 15th, hearing that Soult, hitherto reported by Beresford to be entirely on the defensive, was advancing at the head of a powerful army into Estremadura, he went in all haste to that province, but ere he could arrive a great battle had been fought with extraordinary fury.

While awaiting the adhesion of the Spanish generals, Beresford had fixed his head-quarters at Almendralejos, but Latour Maubourg remained at Guadalcanal, and his parties foraged the most fertile tracts between the armies. To check them, Penne Villamur was reinforced with five squadrons, and colonel Colborne was detached with a brigade of the second division, two Spanish guns, and two squadrons of cavalry, to curb their inroads and give confidence to the people. Colborne, having a fine talent for war, by rapid marches and sudden changes, in concert with Villamur, confused the enemy's parties, intercepted several convoys, and forced the French to quit Fuente Ovejuna, La Granja, Azuaga, and many other frontier towns; and he imposed upon Latour Maubourg with so much address, that the latter imagining a great force was at hand, fell back to Constantino. Having cleared the country on that side, he made a singularly bold attempt to surprise the fortified post of Benelcazar. For riding on to the drawbridge, with a few officers, in the grey of the morning, he summoned the commandant to surrender as a means of saving himself from the Spanish army, which was close at hand and would give no quarter; the French officer was amazed at the appearance of

the party, but too resolute to yield, and Colborne, perceiving the attempt had failed, galloped off under a few straggling shot, and then taking to the mountains, rejoined the army without any loss.

During his absence the Spanish generals had acceded to Wellington's proposition, the Guadiana had subsided, the bridge at Jerumenha was restored, and on the 5th of May William Stewart having two squadrons of horse, six field-pieces and three brigades of infantry had invested Badajos on the left of the Guadiana; on the 7th the remainder of the infantry, reinforced by two thousand Spaniards under Carlos d'España, encamped in the woods near the fortress, Madden's Portuguese horse were in observation near Merida, and a troop of horse-artillery, coming from Lisbon, was attached to the English cavalry which remained near Los Santos and Zafra. The flying bridge, moved from Jerumenha, was re-established near the mouth of the Caya, yet was soon drawn back, because the right bank of the Guadiana being still open some French horse had come down the river. On the 8th however, general Lunley invested Christoval with a brigade of the second division, four light Spanish guns, the seventeenth Portuguese infantry, and two squadrons of horse drafted from the garrison of Elvas. These troops did not arrive simultaneously at the point of assembly, which delayed the operation, and sixty French dragoons moving under the fire of the place maintained a sharp skirmish beyond the walls. This was the first serious siege undertaken by the British in the Peninsula, and, to the discredit of the English government, no army was ever worse provided for such an enterprise. The engineer officers were zealous; and notwithstanding some defects in the constitution and customs of their corps, tending rather to make regimental than practical scientific officers, many of them were well versed in the theory of their business: yet the ablest trembled at their destitution in all things necessary to real service. Without a corps of sappers and miners, without a private soldier who knew how to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age; and the best officers and the finest soldiers sacrificed themselves in a lamentable

manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government, always ready to plunge the nation into war without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on by the British in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because the commonest materials and means necessary for their art were denied to the engineers.

#### FIRST ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

The chief engineer, colonel Fletcher, proposed to breach the castle, while batteries established on the right bank of the Guadiana took the defence in reverse. False attacks against the Pardaleras and Picurina were to be made by re-opening Soult's trenches; yet it was necessary to reduce San Christoval before the batteries to take the castle in reverse could be constructed, and captain Squire was directed to break ground there on the night of the 8th. The moon shone bright, he was ill provided with tools, and exposed to a destructive musketry from the fort, and to shot and shell from the town; nevertheless he worked with great loss until the 10th, when the French made a furious sally and carried the battery. They were immediately driven back by the reserves, but the allies pursued too far, and being taken in flank and front with grape lost four hundred men. At this time five engineers had fallen and seven hundred officers and soldiers of the line had been inscribed upon the bloody list of victims offered to this Moloch, and only one small battery against an outwork was completed! On the 11th it opened, and before sunset the fire of the enemy had disabled four of its five guns, and killed many more of the besiegers: nor could any other result be expected, because the concert essential to success in double operations, whether in sieges or the field, was totally neglected by Beresford. Squire's single work was exposed to the undivided fire of the fortress before the approaches against the castle were even commenced; and two distant batteries, which had been constructed at the false attacks, scarcely attracted the notice of the enemy. To check future sallies, a second battery was erected against the bridge-head, but this was also overmatched;

Appendix 5,  
§ 3, 4.

and then Beresford, having received intelligence that the French army was in movement, arrested the progress of all the works. On the 12th, believing this information premature, he directed the trenches to be opened against the castle; yet the intelligence was true, and being confirmed at twelve o'clock in the night, the working parties were again drawn off and measures taken to raise the siege.

#### SOULT'S SECOND EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.

This marshal had resolved to succour Badajoz the moment he heard of Beresford's appearance at Campo Mayor, and he rejoiced that the latter's tardiness gave Phillipon time to organize a good defence, and himself a respite to tranquillize Andalusia, and arrange measures for resisting the allies in the Isla during his absence. With that object he had immediately commenced several additional fortifications in the city of Seville, and at the same time renewed the construction of those which had been suspended in other places by the battle of Barosa: he thus deceived Beresford, who believed that he was trembling for his own province. Nothing could be more fallacious. There were seventy thousand fighting men in Andalusia; and Drouet, who had quitted Massena immediately after the battle of Fuentes Onoro, was likewise in march for that province by the way of Avila and Toledo, bringing with him eleven thousand men.

On the 10th of May Soult quitted Seville with three thousand heavy dragoons, thirty guns, and two strong brigades of infantry under the command of Werlé and Godinot. This force, drawn from the first and fourth corps and Dessolles' reserve, entered Olalla the 11th, and was there joined by Maransin. Godinot then marched by Constantino to reinforce the fifth corps, which was falling back from Guadalcanal in consequence of Colborne's operations. The 13th a junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, who assumed the command of the heavy cavalry, resigning the fifth corps to Girard, who immediately advanced to Los Santos. The 14th Soult reached Villa Franca, and being then within thirty miles of Badajoz, caused his heaviest guns to fire salvos during the




night, to give notice of his approach to the garrison. This expedient failed, and the 15th, in the evening, the French army was concentrated at Santa Marta.

Beresford, as we have seen, perplexed by bad intelligence, did not raise the siege until the night of the 12th, and then contrary to the earnest representations of the engineers, who promised to win the place in three days. This promise was nought, and if it had been good Soult would yet have surprised him in his trenches: his firmness therefore saved the army, and his arrangements for carrying off the stores were admirably executed. The artillery and platforms were removed in the night of the 13th, and at twelve o'clock on the 15th, all the guns and stores on the left bank were over the Guadiana, the gabions and fascines burned, and the flying bridge removed. These transactions were well masked by the fourth division, which in concert with the Spaniards maintained the investment; it was only by a sally on the rear-guard, in which the Portuguese piquets were roughly treated, that the governor knew the siege was raised, and of the cause he was still ignorant.

In a conference with the Spanish generals, held the 13th at Valverde, it was agreed to receive battle at Albuera. Ballesteros' and Blake's corps being then united at Baracotta, were falling back upon Almendral, and Blake engaged to have them at Albuera before twelve o'clock on the 15th. Badajos was the centre of an arc, sweeping through Valverde, Albuera, and Talavera Real, and Blake undertook to watch the roads on the right, while Beresford and Mendizabel watched those in the centre, and Madden those on the left. The British being chiefly in the woods near Valverde could reach Albuera by a half march, and no part of the arc was more than four leagues from Badajos. Soult on the 14th was at Los Santos eight leagues distant, and Beresford, thinking he could not be forestalled on any point, kept the fourth division in the trenches. On the 14th Colborne came in, Madden retired to Talavera Real, Blake reached Almendral, and the Anglo-Portuguese cavalry under general Long fell back to Santa Marta, where they were joined by Blake's dragoons.


In the morning of the 15th the Anglo-Portuguese army





# BATTLE OF ALBUERA

16<sup>th</sup> May, 1811.



occupied the left of the Albuera position, a ridge about four miles long, having the Aroya Val de Sevilla in rear, and the Albuera river in front. The right was prolonged towards Almendral, the left towards Badajos, the ascent from the river was easy, and the ground practicable for cavalry and artillery. In advance of the centre were the bridge and village of Albuera, the former commanded by a battery, the latter occupied by Alten's German brigade. Behind the Germans, the second division under William Stewart formed one line, the right on a commanding hill over which the Valverde road passed, the left on the road of Badajos, beyond which the order of battle was continued, in two lines, by the Portuguese troops under Hamilton and Collins. The right of the position, stronger, higher, and broader than any other part, was left for Blake's army; because Beresford, thinking the hill on the Valverde road to be the key of the position, as protecting his only line of retreat, was desirous to secure it with the best troops. The fourth division and the infantry of the fifth Spanish army were still before Badajos; but Cole had orders to send the seventeenth Portuguese regiment to Elvas, to throw a Spanish battalion into Olivenza, to bring his second brigade, which was before Christoval, over the Guadiana, by a ford above Badajos, if practicable, and to be in readiness himself to march at the first notice.

In this posture of affairs, about three o'clock in the evening of the 15th, Beresford being at some distance on the left, the whole mass of the allied cavalry, closely followed by the French light horsemen, came in from Santa Marta, and finding no infantry beyond the Albuera in support passed that river. Thus the wooded heights on the right bank were abandoned to the enemy, whose force and dispositions were thereby effectually concealed, and the strength of the allies' position was already sapped. Beresford immediately formed a temporary right wing with the cavalry and artillery, stretched his piquets along the road to Almendral, and sent officers to hasten Blake's movements; but that general, who had only a few miles of good road to march and had promised to be in line at noon, did not reach the ground before eleven at night, and his rear did not arrive before three in

the morning of the 16th. Meanwhile, as the French army was now evidently in front, Cole and Madden were called up; the order failed to reach the latter, but Cole brought the infantry of the fifth army, two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades of the fourth division, into line between eight and nine o'clock; his third brigade, unable to pass the Guadiana above Badajos, was in march by Jerumenha. The Spanish troops joined Blake on the right, the two brigades of the fourth division were drawn up in columns behind the second division, and the Portuguese squadrons were sent to reinforce Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, were pushed forwards in front of the left wing. The principal mass of the allied cavalry was concentrated behind the centre, and Beresford, dissatisfied with general Long, gave the command to general Lumley.

Thirty thousand infantry, more than two thousand cavalry, and thirty-eight pieces of artillery, eighteen being nine-pounders, were in line, but the British infantry, the pith of battle, did not exceed seven thousand, and already Blake's arrogance was shaking Beresford's authority. Soult had forty guns, four thousand veteran cavalry, and nineteen thousand chosen infantry, all of one discipline, animated by one spirit and amply compensated for their inferiority in number by their fine organization and their leader's capacity, which was immeasurably greater than his adversary's. He had examined the position without hindrance on the evening of the 15th, and hearing that the fourth division was left at Badajos, and Blake would not arrive before the 17th, resolved to attack next morning, for he had detected the weakness of Beresford's dispositions. The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde road, was undoubtedly the key of the position if an attack was made parallel to the front; but Soult saw that on the right, a high rough broken table-land trended back towards the Valverde road and looked into the rear of Beresford's line. Hence, if he could suddenly place his masses there, he might roll up the allies on their centre and push them into the valley behind; the Valverde road could then be seized, the retreat cut, and the strong French cavalry would complete the victory.

Beresford's right and Soult's left approximated, being only divided by a hill, about cannon-shot distance from either, which was separated from the allies by the Albuera and from the French by a rivulet called the Feria. This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult. During the night he placed behind it the greatest part of the artillery under general Ruty, the fifth corps under Girard, the heavy cavalry under Latour Maubourg, thus concentrating fifteen thousand men and thirty guns within ten minutes' march of Beresford's right wing: yet that general could neither see a man, nor draw a sound conclusion as to the real plan of attack. The light cavalry, the brigades of Godinot and Werlé with ten guns remained. They were placed in the woods near the confluence of the Feria with the Albuera. Werlé was in reserve, Godinot was to attack the bridge and village, to bear against the centre, attract Beresford's attention, separate his wings, and double up his right when the principal attack should be developed.

#### BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

During the night and morning, sixteen thousand additional men had come into line under Blake and Cole, but so defective were Beresford's dispositions that Soult adhered to his first plan, and at nine o'clock just before Cole arrived, Godinot emerged from the wood in one heavy column preceded by ten guns. Being flanked by the light cavalry, and followed by Werlé, he made for the bridge and with a sharp cannonade and musketry endeavoured to force the passage. At the same time general Briché led two hussar regiments further down the river to observe Otway's horsemen, and the French lancers passed the river above bridge. The third dragoon guards drove the lancers back to their own side, and Dickson's Portuguese guns, opening from a rising ground above the village, ploughed Godinot's column, which crowded to the bridge though the river was fordable above and below. Beresford observing Werlé did not follow closely, judged the chief effort would be on the right, and therefore ordered Blake to form part of his first and all his second line on the broad part of the

hills at right angles to their actual front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry of the left wing to the centre, he sent one brigade to support Alten at the bridge, and directed Hamilton to hold the remainder in columns of battalions as a general reserve. The thirteenth dragoons he posted near the river, above bridge, and sent the second division to support Blake. The horse artillery, the cavalry under Lumley, and the fourth division also took ground to the right, and were posted, the horsemen and guns on a small plain behind the Aroya, the fourth division in an oblique line half musket shot behind them. This done, Beresford galloped to Blake, for that general had refused to change his front, and with great heat told colonel Hardinge, the bearer of the order, the real attack was at the village and bridge. A second time he was entreated to obey, yet remained obstinate until Beresford arrived in person, and then only assented because the enemy's columns were actively menacing his flank: yielding to this evidence he changed his front, yet with such pedantic slowness, that Beresford impatient of his folly took the direction in person.

Great was the confusion and the delay thus occasioned, and ere the troops were completely formed the French were amongst them. For scarcely had Godinot engaged Alten's brigade, when Werlé, leaving only a battalion of grenadiers to support the former, and some squadrons to watch the thirteenth dragoons and connect the attacks, countermarched with the remainder of his division, and rapidly gained the rear of the fifth corps as it was mounting the hills on the right of the allies. The great mass of light cavalry also quitted Godinot's column, crossed the river Albuera above the bridge, ascended the left bank at a gallop, and sweeping round the rear of the fifth corps joined Latour Maubourg's dragoons, who was already facing Lumley's squadrons. Thus half an hour had sufficed to render Beresford's position nearly desperate. Two-thirds of the French were in compact order of battle perpendicular to his right, and his army, composed of different nations, was making a disorderly change of front. Vainly he tried to get the Spanish line advanced to make room for the second division to support it, the French guns opened, their infantry threw out a heavy musketry fire, and their cavalry,

outflanking the front and menacing different points, put the Spaniards in disorder: they fell fast and went back.

Soult thought the whole army was yielding, he pushed forward his columns, his reserves mounted the hill behind him, and general Ruty placed all the French batterics in position; but then William Stewart reached the foot of the height with a brigade of the second division under Colborne, who, seeing the confusion above, desired to form in order of battle previous to mounting; but Stewart, whose boiling courage generally overlaid his judgment, led up in column of companies, passed the Spanish right, and attempted to open a line by succession of battalions as they arrived. The enemy's fire was found too destructive to be borne passively, and the foremost troops charged; but then heavy rain obscured the view, four regiments of French hussars and lancers galloped in from the right at the moment of advancing, and two-thirds of the brigade went down: the 31st regiment only, being on the left, formed square and resisted, while the French horsemen, riding furiously about, trampled the others and captured six guns. The tumult was great, a lancer fell upon Beresford, who, being a man of great strength, put aside the lance and cast him from his saddle; and then a shift of wind blowing aside the smoke and mist, Lumley perceived the mischief from the plain below, and sending four squadrons up against the straggling lancers cut many of them off: Penne Villemer's Spanish cavalry was also directed to charge the French Appendix 4,  
§ 4. horsemen in the plain, and they galloped forwards until within a few yards of their foes but then shamefully fled.

During this first unhappy effort of the second division, so great was the disorder, that the Spaniards in one part fired without cessation, though the British troops were before them; in another part, flying before the lancers, they would have broken through the twenty-ninth, then advancing to succour Colborne, but with a stern resolution that regiment smote friends and foes without distinction in their onward progress. Meanwhile Beresford, finding the main body of the Spaniards would not advance, seized an ensign by the breast and bore him and his colours by main force to the front, yet the troops



did not follow, and the coward ran back when released from the marshal's iron grasp. In this crisis the weather which had ruined Colborne's brigade saved the day. Soult could not see the whole field of battle, and kept his heavy columns inactive when the decisive blow might have been struck. His cavalry indeed began to hem in that of the allies, yet the fire of the horse-artillery enabled Lumley, covered as he was by the bed of the Aroya and supported by the fourth division, to check them on the plain; Colborne still remained on the height with the thirty-first regiment, the British artillery, under Julius Hartman, was coming fast into action, and William Stewart, who had escaped the charge of the lancers, was again mounting the hill with Houghton's brigade, which he brought on with equal vehemence, but in a juster order of battle. The day then cleared and a dreadful fire poured into the thickest of the French columns convinced Soult that the fight was yet to be won.

Houghton's regiments reached the height under a heavy cannonade, and the twenty-ninth, after breaking through the fugitive Spaniards, was charged in flank by the French lancers; yet two companies, wheeling to the right, foiled this attack with a sharp fire, and then the third brigade of the second division came up on the left, and the Spanish troops under Zayas and Ballesteros at last moved forward. Hartman's artillery was now in full play, and the enemy's infantry recoiled, but soon recovering, renewed the fight with greater violence than before. The cannon on both sides discharged showers of grape at half range, the peals of musketry were incessant, often within pistol-shot, yet the close formation of the French embarrassed their battle, and the British line would not yield them an inch of ground or a moment of time to open their ranks. Their fighting was however fierce and dangerous. Stewart was twice wounded, colonel Duckworth was slain, and the intrepid Houghton, having received many wounds without shrinking, fell and died in the very act of cheering on his men. Still the struggle continued with unabated fury. Colonel Inglis, twenty-two officers, and more than four hundred men, out of five hundred and seventy who had mounted the hill, fell in the fifty-seventh alone; the other

regiments were scarcely better off, not one-third were standing in any: ammunition failed, and as the English fire slackened a French column was established in advance upon the right flank. The play of the guns checked them a moment, but in this dreadful crisis Beresford wavered! Destruction stared him in the face, his personal resources were exhausted, and the unhappy thought of a retreat rose in his agitated mind. He had before brought Hamilton's Portuguese into a situation to cover a retrograde movement; he now sent Alten orders to abandon the bridge and village of Albuera, and to take, with his Germans and the Portuguese artillery, a position to cover a retreat by the Valverde road. But while the commander was thus preparing to resign the contest, colonel Hardinge had urged Cole to advance with the fourth division; and then riding to the third brigade of the second division, which, under the command of colonel Abercrombie, had hitherto been only slightly engaged, directed him also to push forward into the fight. The die was thus cast, Beresford acquiesced, Alten received orders to retake the village, and this terrible battle was continued.

The fourth division was composed of two brigades: one of Portuguese under general Harvey; the other, under sir William Myers, consisting of the seventh and twenty-third regiments was called the fuzileer brigade: Harvey's Portuguese were immediately pushed in between Lumley's dragoons and the hill, where they were charged by some French cavalry, whom they beat off, and meantime Cole led his fuzileers up the contested height. At this time six guns were in the enemy's possession, the whole of Werlé's reserves were coming forward to reinforce the front column of the French, the remnant of Houghton's brigade could no longer maintain its ground, the field was heaped with carcasses, the lancers were riding furiously about the captured artillery on the upper parts of the hill, and behind all, Hamilton's Portuguese and Alten's Germans, now withdrawing from the bridge, seemed to be in full retreat. Soon however Cole's fuzileers, flanked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion under colonel Hawkshawe, mounted the hill, drove off the lancers, recovered five of the captured guns and one colour, and appeared on the

right of Houghton's brigade, precisely as Abercrombie passed it on the left.

Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke and rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled the enemy's masses, which were increasing and pressing onwards as to an assured victory; they wavered, hesitated, and then vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed, Cole and the three colonels, Ellis Blakeney and Hawkshawe, fell wounded, and the fuzileer battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships; but suddenly and sternly recovering they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult with voice and gesture animate his Frenchmen, in vain did the hardiest veterans break from the crowded columns and sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and, fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horsemen hovering on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of their order, their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front, their measured tread shook the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as slowly and with a horrid carnage it was pushed by the incessant vigour of the attack to the furthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves mix with the struggling multitude to sustain the fight, their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass, breaking off like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the steep: the rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and eighteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill!

## CHAPTER VII.

WHILE the fuzileers were striving on the height, the cavalry and Harvey's brigade continually advanced, and Latour Maubourg's dragoons, being also battered by Lefebvre's guns, retired before them; yet still they threatened the fuzileers with their right, and with their left prevented Lumley's horsemen from falling on the defeated infantry. Alten's Germans had now retaken the village with some loss, and Blake's first line, which had not been engaged, was directed to support them; Hamilton's and Collins's Portuguese, forming a mass of ten thousand fresh men, were brought up to support the fuzileers and Abercrombie's brigade, and at the same time Zayas, Ballesteros, and España advanced. Nevertheless, so rapid was the execution of the fuzileers that the enemy's infantry were never attained by these reserves, which yet suffered severely; for Rutty got the French guns altogether, and worked them with prodigious activity while the fifth corps still made head; and when the day was irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of the Albuera and protected the passage of the broken infantry.

Beresford was too hardly handled to pursue. He formed a fresh line with his Portuguese, parallel to the hill from whence Soult had advanced, and where the French were now rallying with their usual celerity; the action still continued at the bridge, but Godinot's division and the connecting battalion of grenadiers were soon afterwards withdrawn, and all firing ceased before three o'clock. The serious fighting had endured four hours, and in that time, nearly seven thousand of the allies and above eight thousand of their adversaries were struck down. Three French generals were wounded, two slain, and eight hundred soldiers so badly hurt as to be left on the field. On Beresford's side only two thousand Spaniards and six

hundred Germans and Portuguese were killed or wounded; hence it is plain with what a resolution the pure British fought, for they had but eighteen hundred men left standing! The laurel is nobly won when the exhausted victor reels as he places it on his bleeding front.

The trophies of the French were five hundred unwounded prisoners, a howitzer, and several stand of colours. The British had nothing of that kind to boast of, but the horrid piles of carcasses within their lines told with dreadful eloquence who were the conquerors; and all that night the rain poured down, and the river and the hills and the woods resounded with the dismal clamour and groans of dying men. Beresford, compelled to place his Portuguese in the front line, was oppressed with the number of his wounded; they far exceeded the sound amongst the British soldiers, and when the piquets were posted few men remained to help the sufferers. In this cruel situation he sent Hardinge to demand assistance from Blake; but with him wrath and mortified pride were predominant, and he refused, saying, it was customary with allied armies for each to take care of its own men. Morning came, and both armies kept their respective positions, the wounded still covering the field of battle, the hostile lines still menacing and dangerous. The greater number had fallen on the French side, the best soldiers on that of the allies; and the dark masses of Soult's powerful cavalry and artillery, covering all his front, seemed alone able to contend again for the victory. The right of the French also appeared to threaten the Badajos road, and Beresford in gloom and doubt awaited another attack; but on the 17th, the third brigade of the fourth division came up by a forced march from Jerumenha, which enabled the second division to retake their former ground between the Valverde and the Badajos roads, and on the 18th Soult retreated.

He left to English generosity several hundred men, too deeply wounded to be removed; all that could travel he had, in the night of the 17th, sent by the royal road, through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio to Seville. Now protecting his movements with his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, he filed the army in the morning to its right, and so

gained the road to Solano; when this flank march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered the rear with the heavy dragoons, and Briché protected the march of the wounded men by the royal road. Soult however halted the 19th at Solano, designing to hold on in Estremadura, and draw reinforcements from Andalusia; for he knew well, though Beresford was no longer in a condition to hurt Badajos, Wellington would soon come down and fresh combats would be necessary to save that fortress. He had as early as the 14th commenced repairing the castle of Villalba, a large structure between Almendralejos and Santa Marta, and now he continued the work, with a view to form a head of cantonments, which the allies should be unable to take before the French army could be reinforced.

When Beresford discovered this retreat, he despatched Hamilton to make a show of re-investing Badajos, and it was effected at daybreak the 19th, but on the left bank only. The allied cavalry, supported by Alten's Germans, followed the French line of retreat. Soult then transferred his headquarters to Fuente del Maestre, and the Spanish cavalry cut off some of his men and menaced Villalba. Lord Wellington reached the field of battle the same day. After examining the state of affairs, he desired the marshal to follow the enemy cautiously, and returned to Elvas himself, directing the third and seventh divisions, which were already at Campo Mayor, to complete the re-investment of Badajos on the right bank. Beresford advanced by the Solano road to Almendralejos, where he found some more wounded French, and his further progress was not opposed. The number of officers who had fallen in the French army, together with the privations endured, had produced despondence and discontent; the garrison at Vallalba was so little disposed to maintain the castle, that Soult evacuated it, and continued his own retreat in the direction of Llerena, where he assumed a position on the 23rd, placing his cavalry near Usagre. This abandonment of the royal road to Seville was a well-considered movement; the country through which he passed was more fruitful and open, and he could draw greater advantage from his superior cavalry; the mountains behind him were so strong he had

nothing to fear from an attack, and by Belalcázar and Almadén, he could communicate with La Mancha, from whence he expected Drouet's division. The road of Guadalcanal was in his rear, by which he could draw reinforcements from Córdoba and from the fourth corps; and as the allies dared not expose their left flank by marching on Monasterio he effectually covered Andalusia.

From Llerona, a detachment was sent to drive away a Spanish *partida* infesting the communications with Guadalcanal, and Latour Maubourg was directed to scour the country beyond Usagre. That town, built upon a hill, and covered towards Los Santos by a river with steep and rugged banks, had only the one outlet by the bridge on that side, and when Latour Maubourg approached, Lumley who was there retired across the river. The French light cavalry then marched along the right bank, meaning to cross lower down and cover the passage of the heavy horsemen; but before they could effect this object, general Bron rashly passed the river with two regiments of dragoons, and drew up in line just beyond the bridge. Lumley was lying close behind a rising ground, and when the French had advanced a sufficient distance, Lefebvre's guns opened on them, and the third dragoon guards and fourth dragoons charged them in front while Madden's Portuguese fell on their flank. They were overthrown at the first shock and fled towards the bridge, which was however choked by other cavalry coming on to their support; the fugitives then turned to the right and left and endeavoured to save themselves in some gardens on the banks of the river, but they were pursued and sabred until the victors were checked by a fire of carbines and artillery from the opposite bank. Some wounded prisoners were taken and a guerilla band, which had not joined in the attack, suddenly massacred them. Forty killed in fair fight, and more than a hundred wounded, attested the vigour of Lumley's conduct in this affair, which terminated Beresford's operations; for the miserable state to which the regency had reduced the Portuguese army imperatively called for the marshal's presence elsewhere. General Hill, having now returned to Portugal, re-assumed the command of the second division amidst the

rejoicings of the troops, and lord Wellington directed the renewed siege of Badajos in person.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

No general ever gained so great a battle with so little increase of military reputation as marshal Beresford. His personal intrepidity and strength, qualities so attractive for the multitude, were conspicuously displayed, yet the breath of his own army withered his laurels: his triumph was disputed by the very soldiers who followed his car. Their censures have been reiterated without change and without abatement to this hour; and a close examination of his operations, while it detects many ill-founded objections and others tainted with malice, leaves little doubt that the general feeling was right.

When he passed the Guadiana and drove the fifth corps upon Guadalcanal, the delayed investment of Badajos was attributed to him unjustly, for he only obeyed lord Wellington's orders, founded upon the tardiness of the Spanish generals. But when the time for action arrived, the want of concert in the investment and the ill-matured attack on San Christoval belonged to himself; and he is especially responsible in reputation for both, because captain Squire earnestly warned him of the inevitable result, and Appendix 5. his words were unheeded. During the siege the want of correct intelligence, or a blunted judgment, misled the marshal; and it was remarked that at all times he too readily believed those idle tales of distress and difficulties in the French armies, with which the spies generally, the deserters always, interlarded their information; he was incredulous of Soult's enterprise, and that marshal was actually over the Morena before the orders were given to commence the main attack of the castle of Badajos. However, the firmness with which Beresford resisted the importunities of the engineers to continue the siege, and the quick and orderly removal of the stores and battering-train, were alike remarkable and praiseworthy: happy would it have been if he had shown as much magnanimity in what followed.

When he met Blake and Castaños at Valverde, the alterna-



tive of fighting or retiring behind the Guadiana was discussed. The Spanish generals demanded battle. Blake, who could not retire the way he had arrived without danger of having his march intercepted, was particularly earnest to fight, saying his troops, already in a miserable state, would disperse entirely if they entered Portugal. Castaños held the same opinion. Beresford, equally for fighting, argued, that it was unwise to relinquish the hope of taking Badajos, ungenerous to desert the people of Estremadura,—that a retreat would endanger Elvas, lay open the Alemtejo, and encourage the enemy to push his incursions further, which he could safely do, having Badajos with its bridge over the Guadiana, in his rear,—that a battle must then be fought in the Alemtejo with fewer troops and after a dispiriting retreat,—that there was a greater scarcity of food in the Portuguese than in the Spanish province,—that the weather was menacing, the Guadiana might again rise before the stores were carried over, and the latter must then be abandoned or the army endangered to protect their passage. These plausible reasons were a mask, he was pushed to fight against his judgment by the impatient temper of his British troops. None of them had fought in the late battles under Wellington. At Busaco the fourth division was idle on the left, as the second division had been on the right, while the action was decided in the centre. In Massena's retreat neither had been under fire, and the combats of Sabugal and Fuentes Onoro had been gained without them. Thus a burning thirst for battle was generated, and Beresford had not the art of conciliating, nor that of exacting the confidence of his troops; if he had retreated, a violent and unjust clamour would have been raised against him: and this was so strongly and unceremoniously represented to him by an officer on his own staff that he gave way. These are what may be termed the moral obstacles of war. Such men as lord Wellington or sir John Moore can stride over them; to second-rate minds they are insuperable. Practice and study may make a good general as to the handling of troops and the designing a campaign, but the ascendancy of spirit which leads the wise while it controls the insolence of folly, is a rare gift of nature.

Beresford yielded with an unhappy flexibility, for the resolution to fight was unwarrantable on any sound military principle. The taking of Badajoz was a chimera; neither the measures nor the means promised success; the siege would have died away of itself in default of resources to carry it on. The true question was, not whether Estremadura should be deserted or Badajoz abandoned, but whether Wellington's combinations, his great and well considered design for the deliverance of the Peninsula should be ruined and defaced at a blow. To say the Alemtejo could not have been defended until the commander-in-chief arrived from the north with reinforcements was mere trifling. Soult, with twenty, or even thirty thousand men, dared not attempt the siege of Elvas in the face of twenty-four thousand men such as Beresford commanded. The battle of Fuentes Onoro was known in the English and in the French camps before the allies broke up from Badajoz; hence Beresford was certain reinforcements would soon come to the Guadiana: the third and seventh divisions were actually at Campo Mayor the 23rd of May. The danger to the Alemtejo was therefore slight, the necessity of a battle by no means apparent, and it remains to analyse the chances of success.

It was known that Soult had twenty thousand veteran troops, and a great superiority in cavalry and artillery, the country being peculiarly suited for those arms: the martial character of the man was also known. The allies had more infantry by ten thousand than the French, but speaking various tongues, and the Spanish part ill-armed, starving and worn with fatigue, had been recently defeated by the very troops they were going to engage. The French force, compact and swift of movement, was inured to war, and under one able and experienced chief. The allied army was unwieldy, each nation mistrusted the others, and there was no unity of hope or spirit, or discipline or command. On what then rested the hope of success? The British troops. They were therefore to be freely used. Was it the time to risk two superb divisions, and court a certain loss of men, whose value their general fixed when he looked to them alone for victory? Albuera was the point of concentration. Colborne's brigade

did not arrive until the 14th, and it was doubtful if it could forestall the enemy. Blake did not come until three o'clock in the morning of the 16th; Cole came at nine o'clock, after the action had commenced; Kemmis's fine brigade, and Madden's cavalry did not come at all. The whole plan was faulty, it was accidental that a force sufficient for battle was assembled. Beresford was behind time, and his persevering investment of Badajoz, though laudable in one sense, was an error; it was only an accessory, yet the success of the main object was made subservient to it. If Soult, instead of moving by Villa Franca, had pushed straight from Los Santos to Albuera, he would have arrived the 15th, when Beresford had about half his force in position; the point of concentration would then have been lost and the allies scattered. If Soult had even continued his march by Solano instead of turning upon Albuera, he could have communicated with Badajoz, unless Beresford had fought without waiting for Blake, and without Kemmis's brigade. Why did the French marshal turn thus to seek a battle in preference to attaining his object without one? Why did he not operate by his right or left until the unwieldy allied force got into disorder? Because Beresford's dispositions were so defective no worse error could be expected, and there was a fair chance offered for a victory which would more than counterbalance Massena's failures. Soult knew on the 15th that only half the allied army was in line, and success appeared sure.

Beresford had studied his own field of battle a month before the action took place, and yet occupied it so as to render defeat almost certain; his infantry were not in hand, his inferiority in guns and cavalry was not compensated by entrenchments. \* He had superior numbers of infantry on a position which was contracted to three miles; yet ten thousand never fired a shot, and three times the day was lost and won, the allies being always fewest in number at the decisive point. Blake's conduct was undoubtedly perplexing, and William Stewart's vehemence annihilated a brigade, and paralysed Colborne, a man capable of deciding the turn of a battle with fewer troops than were swept from him by the French cavalry; but there also the loss is imputable to Beresford, because

general Long, expecting such a charge, advised the placing of Spanish cavalry to meet it and was disregarded. The neglect of the isolated hill between the two armies was another error; so also was the succession of attacks by brigades, and the hesitation about bringing up the fourth division. There was no promptness at critical moments. It was Hardinge who caused Cole and Abercrombie to win the victory; it was the astounding valour of their troops in offence, the astonishing firmness of Houghton in defence, that saved the day. The person of the general-in-chief was seen everywhere, a gallant soldier! The mind of the great commander nowhere.

Master of the field of battle, Beresford could not take Badajos; that prize was obtained by other efforts, and deeper combinations on the part of a far greater man; neither did he clear Estremadura, for Soult maintained his positions from Llerena to Usagre. What did he gain? The power of simulating a renewal of the siege, and keeping on the left bank of the Guadiana; simulating only, for if the third and seventh divisions had not arrived from Beira, even the investment could not have been completed. These illusive advantages were purchased at the price of seven thousand men. With smaller loss Wellington had fought two general and several minor actions, had baffled Massena, and turned seventy thousand men out of Portugal! What would have been the result of defeat? There was no retreat save by the temporary bridge of Jerumenha; and had Soult won the contested hill, the Valverde road would have been his, and the line of retreat cut. With four thousand victorious French cavalry at his heels Beresford could never have passed the Guadiana. Back then must have come the army from the north to re-occupy the lines of Lisbon—a French force would have been established south of the Tagus—Spain would have been ruined—Portugal prostrate—England in dismay. Could even the genius of Wellington have recovered such a state of affairs? And with these results in prospect the terrible balance trembled for two hours, twice leaned to the sinister side, and only yielded at last to the superlative vigour of the fusileers. The battle should never have been fought. The siege of Badajos could not have been renewed without re-

inforcements, and with them it could have been renewed without an action, or at least without risking an unequal one.

Could the day have been saved even by British soldiers if the French general had not also committed great errors? His attack, up to the moment when the Spanish line fell back in disorder, cannot be too much admired; after that, the mode of fighting in dense columns being followed beyond reason, lost the fairest field ever offered in Spain to the French arms. Had the fifth corps opened out while there was time to do so, that is, between the falling back of the Spaniards and the advance of Houghton's brigade, what could have saved Beresford? The fire of the French columns destroyed two-thirds of the British troops, the fire of lines would have swept away all! It has been said Latour Maubourg and Godinot did not second Soult with vigour; and the latter certainly did not display much energy; but he was opposed by Alten's Germans, good and hardy troops, backed by a great body of Portuguese. Latour Maubourg's movements do not seem open to censure. He took six guns, sabred many Spaniards, and overthrew a British brigade, without ceasing to keep the allied cavalry in check. He had superior numbers, but Lumley handled the allied squadrons with skill and courage, using all the advantages of his position, and in the choice of that position none can deny ability to Beresford. The rising ground behind the horsemen, the bed of the Aroya in their front, the aid of the horse artillery, the support of the fourth division, were all circumstances of strength, and well combined. They dictated Latour Maubourg's proceedings. If he had charged in mass under the fire of Lefebvre's guns, he must have been thrown into confusion in passing the bed of the Aroya at the moment when the fourth division, advancing along the slopes, would have opened a musketry on his right flank: Lumley could then have charged, or retired up the hill, according to circumstances. Great loss might thus have been sustained, and nothing decisive gained, because cavalry, if unsustained by infantry and artillery, cannot make a serious impression against the three arms united. It was therefore an error in

Soult not to have joined some guns and infantry to his cavalry when he perceived the enemy had done so. Ten guns, and half the infantry uselessly slaughtered in column on the height above, would have turned the scale of battle below,—for when the fuzileers came up the hill, Houghton's brigade was quite exhausted, and the few men standing were without ammunition: if a French battery and a body of infantry had been with their cavalry the fuzileers could not have moved.

As Latour Maubourg was not so strengthened, a repulse might have been fatal, not only to himself but to the infantry on the hill, whose left would then have been exposed to the allied cavalry. If he had stretched away to his own left, he would, in like manner, have exposed the flank of Soult's infantry: the movement would have been eccentric, and, the troops on the hill being beaten, destructive for the retreating army. By keeping in mass on the plain, and detaching squadrons from time to time, as favourable opportunities offered for partial charges, Latour Maubourg gained great advantages and kept his troopers in hand for the decisive moment: finally, he covered the retreat of the beaten infantry. Still with such superior numbers, he should have more closely pressed Lumley.

When the battle ceased, each side was exhausted. Here was the greatest failure of the French commander. He had lost eight thousand men, but he had still fifteen thousand, and his artillery and cavalry were comparatively untouched. In the allied army only eighteen hundred British infantry were left standing, and all the troops suffering from famine; the Spanish infantry were feeding on horse-flesh, and so attenuated by fatigue and misery, that previous to the battle they deserted even to the French, hoping thus to get food: under such a general as Blake, and enduring such privations, it was a great effort to fight at all. Their resistance, feeble compared to the desperate valour of the British, was not weak in itself; it was natural that men exhausted and ill-managed should have been unmoved by the appeals of Beresford, a strange general, whose exhortations they hardly understood: when the fortune of the day changed they followed the fuzi-

leers with alacrity, and, with exception of Villemur's cavalry, at no period gave way with dishonour. But they were not equal to a second struggle; a renewed attack on the 17th must have ended in favour of the French. Beresford conscious of this, wrote in the evening of the 16th to lord Wellington, saying he anticipated a ruinous defeat next day, and would not survive it. The resolution with which he maintained the position notwithstanding, was the strongest indication of military talent he gave during the whole of his operations; had Soult held his position with equal pertinacity, Beresford must have retired. It was a great mistake not to have done so. Nothing is more essential in war than a confident front, a general should never acknowledge himself vanquished; the front line always looks formidable, and the adversary can seldom know what is passing behind. The importance of this maxim is finely indicated in Livy, who relates, that after a drawn battle a god called out in the night, that the Etruscans had lost one man more than the Romans! Whereupon the former retired, and the latter remaining on the field gathered all the fruits of a real victory.

## BOOK THE THIRTEENTH.

## CHAPTER I.

THE siege of Badajos was now resumed, but the transactions in Spain during Massena's invasion of Portugal must first be noticed; for it is not by following one stream of action that a just idea of this war can be obtained. Many of Wellington's proceedings would seem rash, others timid, if taken separately, yet viewed as parts of a plan for delivering the whole Peninsula, they will be found discreet or daring, as circumstances warranted. No portion of his campaigns requires this wide-based consideration more than his early sieges, which were instituted contrary to the rules of art, and unsuccessful, or, when successful, attended with such a mournful slaughter, as to give occasion for questioning his great military qualities, which were, however, then most signally displayed.

## OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF SPAIN.

Gallicia after the failure of Renouales' expedition and the shipwreck that followed became torpid; the junta disregarded Walker's exhortations, and, although he furnished vast supplies, the army, nominally twenty thousand strong, mustered only six thousand in the field: there was no cavalry, the infantry kept in the mountains about Villa Franca, and a weak French division occupied the rich plains of Leon. Mahi refusing to combine his operations with those of the Anglo-Portuguese army, was thought disaffected, and at the desire of the British authorities removed to make way for Albuquerque: he was however immediately appointed by Blake to command in Murcia, despite of Mr. Wellesley's remonstrances. When Albuquerque died, Gallicia fell

Abstract  
of general  
Walker's  
Despatches.

Abstract of  
Mr. Wellesley's  
Despatches, MSS



to Castaños, and while he was acting with Beresford in Estremadura, Santocildes assumed military authority; it was then Caffarelli's reserve entered Spain, that Santona was fortified, and that Bessières assembled seven thousand men at Zamora.

In the Asturias, Bonnet was harassed by the partidas from the Leibaña mountains, and on the coast by the English frigates; but he held Oviedo, maintained his communications with the French in Leon, and in November, 1810, defeated the insurgents. General San Pol Lozada carried on operations in

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concert with partidas during December and January, yet he failed, and in February withdrew to the Navia; this gave the Gallicians such alarm

that he was forced to advance and was again driven back. Bonnet then dispersed the partidas and prepared to aid Bessières against Galicia. Wellington's arrival on the Coa, in pursuit of Massena, having stopped that project, Bonnet scoured the coast and seized all the Spanish stores of English arms and clothing. The war in the Asturias was indeed so slight, that in May Santander was evacuated, and all the cavalry of Castille and Leon joined Massena at Fuentes Onoro, yet the Gallician and Asturian regular armies gained no advantage. The partidas were more active, Porlier, Campillo, Longa, Amor, and Merino cut off small parties in the Montaña, the Rioja, Biscay, and the Baston de Laredo. They might have been destroyed by combined movements, but those were hard to make from the little accord

Intercepted  
letter of gen.  
Barthelemy,  
1810 MSS.

amongst the French generals. Campillo was next to Porlier in power. His haunts were the valleys of Mena and Caranza, and he concerted expeditions with Barbara, Honejas, and Curillas,

petty chiefs of Biscay. Sometimes he overrun the valleys of Gurieso, Soba, Carrado, and Jorrando, to raise recruits and contributions, but his chief aim was to intercept despatches between Bilbao and Santander. For this purpose he infested Liendo between Ovira and Laredo, which he could more safely do, because Barthelemy, the governor of the Montaña, was forced to watch Liebana on the side of Leon, which was the stronghold of Porlier. That chief, who vexed the valleys of Cabuerniego, Rio Nauza, Cieza, and Buelna, forced the people

to fly with their effects to the mountains whenever the French approached, and in Liebana this was popular, it was elsewhere disliked.

To ruin Porlier required great combinations, and it was necessary first to seize Espinoza, not that of Monteres, but a village in the Liebana, from whence the valleys all descended as from a point. When Drouet had the 9th corps on the upper Douro, Barthelémy proposed a combined movement of this nature, which was feebly executed; Liebana and Santander continued to be disturbed, and the chain of partidas was unbroken through Biscay and the Rioja to Navarre where Mina carried on the war. That chief had on the 22nd of May defeated at the Puerta de Arlaban, near Vitoria, twelve hundred men, escorting prisoners and treasure to France; the success was alloyed by the death of two hundred of the Spanish prisoners killed in the tumult, and horribly stained also by the cold-blooded murder, after the fight, of six Spanish ladies attached to French officers. Massena, whose baggage was taken, was to have gone with this convoy, but disliking the discipline of the escort he remained at Vitoria and so escaped.

1811.

Mr Stuart,  
MSS

June.

This partisan warfare, the descents on the coast, the aspect of affairs in Estremadura, the denuded state of Castille, now menaced by Santocildes, and an important event to be noticed hereafter, induced Bessières to contract his position. He ordered Reille and Caffarelli to scour Biscay, and in June caused Bonnet to dismantle the coast batteries, send his sick and baggage to Santander by sea and abandon the Asturias. Santocildes was then menacing Astorga with thirteen thousand men, and the French evacuated that place also, after ruining some of the works; but Serras and Bonnet were united on the Esla, and being supported by three thousand men from Rio Seco, skirmished the 23rd at Puente Orvigo with Santocildes, yet they had the worst, and general Valletaux was killed. Lord Wellington's operations in Estremadura soon drew the attention of the French to that side, and Santocildes kept Astorga until August, but meanwhile two thousand French were put into Santona, and general Roguet, coming from Burgos with a division of the

young guard, made another fruitless attempt on the Liebana. This warfare though harassing, proved that Galicia and the Asturias were not to be relied on as auxiliaries by lord Wellington. Galicia with its lordly junta, regular army, fortified towns, rugged fastnesses, numerous population, and constant supplies from England, had been of less weight in the contest than five thousand Portuguese militia conducted by Trant and Wilson. The irregular warfare was also producing bad effects; the tree though grafted in patriotism bore strange fruit. In Biscay the armed peasantry often fought in the ranks of the enemy, and on one occasion attacked the boats of the *Amelia* frigate to save French military stores!

Appendix 7,  
§ 1.

#### OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES.

It will be remembered that Suchet, after the fall of Mequinenza, was to besiege Tortosa while Macdonald marched against Taragona. Massena was then concentrating his army against Portugal, and Napoleon designed that Suchet, after taking Tortosa, should march with half his corps to support the prince of Esling. The reduction of Tortosa proved however a tedious task, and as the French armies of Catalonia and Aragon had now a common object, their situation and resources shall be compared with those of their adversary.

Suchet was master of Aragon, not more by force of arms than by the influence of his administration; the province was fertile, and so tranquil that his convoys travelled under the care of Spanish commissaries and conductors. But Mina was in Navarre on his rear, and communicated on the right bank of the Ebro with the partidas in the mountains of Moncayo and Albaracin. These last were occasionally backed by the Empecinado, Duran, and others whose strongholds were in the Guadalupe, and who from thence infested Cuenca and the vicinity of Madrid; and from Albaracin, Villa Campa connected the partisan warfare with the Valencian army, which had also a line of operation towards Cuenca. Mina received supplies of all kinds from Coruña through the English ships; and in like manner the other end of the chain was supplied, by the English consul Tupper, from Valencia. Thus a line

was drawn across the Peninsula which it was useless to break, the retreat being secure at both ends, and the excitement to renewed efforts constant.

On the other flank of Suchet's position, the high valleys of the Pyrenees were swarming with small bands, which formed the link between Mina and a Catalonian division holding Seu d'Urgel, a fortified castle closing the passage leading from the plain of that name to the Cerdaña. This division, acting in concert with Rovira, and other partisans, extended the irregular warfare on the side of Olot and Castelfolliit to the Ampurdam; and the whole depended upon Taragona, which itself was supported by the English fleet in the Mediterranean. Aragon was therefore like an invested fortress, which the Spaniards thought to reduce by famine, by assault, and by exciting the population against the garrison; but Suchet made such arrangements that his convoys were secure in the interior, and all important points on the frontier circle were fortified and connected with Zaragoza by minor forts radiating from that common centre. Lerida, Mequinenza, the plain of Urgel in Catalonia, and Morella in Valencia were his; and by fortifying Teruel and Alcanitz he secured the chief passages leading through the mountains to the latter kingdom: he could thus invade either Catalonia or Valencia; and from Mequinenza could, by water, transport stores for the siege of Tortosa.

In Catalonia affairs were different. Macdonald, who assumed command at the moment when Napoleon wished him to co-operate with Suchet, was inexperienced in the peculiar warfare of the province, and unprepared for extended operations. His troops were about Gerona and Hostalrich, the bounds of the French conquest at this period. Barcelona was a point beyond their field system to be maintained by expeditions, the country was exhausted of provisions, and the army could only be fed by land convoys from France, or coasters which, eluding the vigilance of the English cruisers, could reach Rosas, St. Filieu, and Palamos. Barcelona like the horse-leech continually cried for more; the inhabitants as well as the garrison depended on the convoys, which were enormous with reference to the limited means and difficulty of moving. The distance between Hostalrich and Barcelona was

only forty miles ; but the road, as far as Granollers, was a succession of defiles and crossed by several rivers, of which the Congosta and the Tordera were considerable obstacles, and the nature of the soil was clayey and heavy, especially in the defiles of the Trenta Pasos. It was therefore difficult for Macdonald to operate from his base of Girona ; and as stores for the siege of Taragona were to come from France, he could not until they arrived do more than make sudden incursions with light baggage, trusting to the resources still to be found in the open country, or to be gathered in the mountains by detachments which had to fight for every morsel. This then was the condition of the French armies, that starting from separate bases, they were to operate on lines meeting at Tortoza, which it was far more difficult for Macdonald than for Suchet to reach.

After the battle of Margalef, Henry O'Donnel reunited his scattered forces, and being of a stern unyielding disposition, not only repressed the discontent occasioned by that defeat, but forced the reluctant migueletes to fill his ranks and submit to discipline. Assisted with money and arms by the British agents, and having communication by sea with Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Minorca, he was soon enabled to re-organize his army, to collect vast magazines at Taragona, and strengthen that place by new works : in July he had twenty-two thousand men exclusive of partidas and somatenes. One division under Campo Verde was in the higher valleys, having a detachment at Olot, and it was supported by the fortified castles of Seu d'Urgel, Cardona, Solsona, and Berga ; a second division was on the Llobregat, watching the garrison of Barceloná, and having detachments in Montserrat, Igualada, and Manresa, to communicate with Campo Verde. The third division, the reserve and the cavalry were on the hills about Taragona, and that place and Tortoza had large garrisons.

Doyle's and  
Green's Cor-  
respondence,  
MSS.

By this disposition of his force, O'Donnel occupied Falset, the Col de Balaguer, and the Col del Alba, passages leading to Tortoza ; the Col de Ribas and Momblanch, commanding the roads to Lerida ; San Coloma de Queralt and Igualada, through which his connexion with Campo Verde was maintained. The two

French armies were therefore separated not only by the great spinal ridges descending from the Pyrenees, but by the position of the Spaniards, who held all the passes, and could at will concentrate and attack either Suchet or Macdonald. The Catalonian system was now also connected with Valencia, where, exclusive of irregulars, there were fifteen thousand men under Bassecour. That officer had in June occupied Cuenca, yet, being at variance with his officers, could do nothing, and was driven from thence by troops from Madrid; he returned to Valencia, but the disputes continued, and extending to the junta or congress of Valencia three members were imprisoned by the general: nevertheless, all parties being now sensible that Valencia should be defended at Tortosa, Bassecour prepared to march to its succour by the coast road, where he had several fortified posts. Thus while Suchet and Macdonald were combining to crush O'Donnel, the latter was combining with Bassecour to press upon Suchet; and there was always the English maritime force at hand to aid attacks or facilitate escape.

Abstract of  
Mr. Welles-  
ley's Des-  
patches, MSS.

In this exposition the native armies are named after their provinces, but in December, 1810, the whole military force being re-organized by the regency the armies had been designated by numbers. The Catalonian forces, formerly called *the army of the right*, was now called the *first army*. The Valencians, Villa Campa's division, and the partidas of the Empecinado and Duran, were called the *second army*. The Murcian force, the *third army*. The troops at Cadiz, at Algeiras, and in the Conde Niebla, the *fourth army*. The remnants of Romana's Gallician division which escaped the slaughter on the Gebora formed the *fifth army*. The new raised troops of Galicia and those of the Asturias were called the *sixth army*. The partidas of the north, that is to say, Mina's, Longa's, Campillo's, Porlier's, and other smaller bands, formed the *seventh army*.

Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon's order to besiege Tortosa arrived. Suchet was ready. More than fifty battering guns, selected from those at Lerida, were equipped, his depôts were established at Mequinenza, Caspe, and Alca-

nitz, and all the fortified posts were provisioned. Twelve thousand men under Musnier, destined to secure Aragon, were disposed at Huesca and other minor points on the left bank of the Ebro; and at Daroca, Teruel, and Calatayud on the right bank. The troops for the siege assembled at Lerida and Alcanitz, under Habert and Laval, their provisions being drawn from the newly conquered district of Urgel. From Mequinenza, the principal depôt, there was water-carriage; but the Ebro being crossed at several points by rocky bars, some of which were only passable in full water, the communication was too uncertain to depend upon, and Suchet set workmen to re-open an old road, thirty miles in length, which had been made by the duke of Orleans, during the war of the succession. It pierced the mountains on the right bank of the Ebro, passed through Batea to Mora, and from thence by Pinhel to Tortosa, running through a celebrated defile called indifferently the *Trincheras*, and the *Passage of Arms*.

When these preliminary arrangements were made, Habert assembled his division at Belpuig, near Lerida, feigning to go towards Barcelona, but suddenly turned to his right, and penetrating through the district of Garriga, reached Garcia, on the left bank of the lower Ebro, the 5th of July. Laval also, from Alcanitz, made a feint towards Valencia by Morella, and then turning to his left, came so unexpectedly upon Tortosa, by the right bank of the Ebro, that he surprised some of the outposts on the 2nd, and then encamped before the bridge-head. The 4th he extended his line to Amposta, seized the ferry-boat of the great road from Barcelona to Valencia, and posted Boussard's cuirassiers, with a battalion of infantry, and six guns, at Uldecona, on the Cenia river, to observe Bascour's Valencians. During these operations Suchet fixed his own quarters at Mora, and as the new road was not finished, he occupied Miravet, Pinhel, and the Trincheras on its intended line, placed flying bridges with covered works on the Ebro at Mora and Xerta, and made those places his depôt of siege. He seized the craft on the river, established posts at Rapita, near the mouth of the Ebro, and at Amposta, and made a fruitless attempt to burn the boat bridge of Tortosa with fire vessels. Following Napoleon's order, Macdonald should at

this time have been before Taragona; but on the 9th, Suchet learned from a spy, that the seventh corps was still at Gerona, and thus found himself exposed alone to the combined efforts of the Catalans and Valencians. This made him repent of having moved from Aragon so soon; yet thinking it would be bad to retire, he resolved to blockade Tortoza, hoping to resist both O'Donnel and Basseccour until Macdonald could advance.

The Spaniards, who knew his situation, sallied on the right bank the 6th and 8th, and on the 10th his outposts on the left bank were driven in at Tivisa by a division from Falcet, which, the next day, fell on his works at Mora, but was repulsed. The 12th, general Paris pushed back the Spanish line while Habert took post in force at Tivisa, by which he covered the roads to Xerta and Mora. O'Donoghue, who commanded Basseccour's advanced guard, now menaced Morella, but general Montmarie being detached to its succour, drove him away. The 30th, O'Donnel brought up fresh troops to Falcet, made a feint with ten thousand men against Tivisa, and then suddenly entered Tortoza, from whence at mid-day, on the 3rd of August, he passed the bridge, and fell with the bayonet on Laval's entrenchments. The French gave way at first, yet soon rallied; and the Spaniards, fearing for their communications, regained the town in disorder, having lost two hundred prisoners besides killed and wounded. This operation was concerted with general Caro, who had superseded O'Donoghue, and was moving with the Valencians by the coast-road towards Uldecona; wherefore Suchet, judging the Spaniards designed to force him from the lower Ebro before Macdonald could pass the Llobregat, resolved to strike a sudden blow at the Valencians, and then turn upon the Catalans: in this view he united at Uldecona, on the 13th, eleven battalions with eight hundred horsemen. Caro was then in a strong position covering the two great routes to Valencia, but when the French, after driving in his advanced guard from Vinaros, came up, his Valencians would not stand a battle, and being followed beyond Peniscola separated and retreated in disorder by different roads. Suchet then returned to Mora, where he found an officer of Macdonald's army bringing information



that the seventh corps was in the plains of Reus, and its communications with the third corps open.

#### OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.

When Macdonald succeeded Augereau he found the troops in a state of insubordination, accustomed to plunder, and excited to ferocity by the cruelty of the Catalans and the conduct of his predecessor; they were without magazines or regular subsistence, and lived by exactions, while the people, driven to desperation, were more like wild beasts than men. The war was repulsive to him in all its features. It was one of shifts and devices, and he better understood methodical movements; it was one of plunder, and he was a severe disciplinarian; it was full of cruelty on all sides, and he was of a humane and just disposition. He severely rebuked the troops for their bad discipline and cruelty, and endeavoured to soothe the Catalans; but neither were softened; the mutual injuries were too horrible and too recent to be forgiven. The soldiers, drawn from different countries, were without a common national feeling, and were irritated against a general, who made them pay for wanton damages, and punished them for plundering; and the Catalans, attributing his conduct to fear because he could not entirely restrain the violence of his men, still fled from the villages and massacred his stragglers with unrelenting barbarity.

While reforming this system Macdonald could not take the field, because, without magazines, no army can be kept in due discipline; wherefore he remained about Gerona, drawing with great labour and pains his provisions from France, and storing up the overplus for his future operations. On the 10th of June however, the wants of Barcelona had become so serious, that leaving his baggage under a strong guard at Gerona, and his recruits and cavalry at Figueras, he marched with ten thousand men and a convoy to its relief, by the way of the Trenta Pasos, Cardedieu, and Granollers. The road was heavy, the defiles narrow, the rivers swollen, the manner of march too pompous for the nature of the war; for Mac-

donald always formed in order of battle on each side of the defiles while the engineers repaired the ways, and in everything adhered to his resolution of restoring a sound system; but while thus imitating the Jugurthine Metellus, he forgot that he had not Romans, but a mixed and ferocious multitude under his command, and he lost more by wasting of time, than he gained by enforcing an irksome discipline. When he reached Barcelona, his own provisions were expended, his convoy furnished only a slender supply for the city, and the next day he returned with the empty carts in all haste to Gerona, where he resumed his former plan of action and demolished the forts beyond that city.

In July he collected another convoy and prepared to march in the same order, designing to form magazines in Barcelona, sufficient for that city and his own supply, during the siege of Taragona; meanwhile Suchet was unable to commence the siege of Tortosa, in default of his co-operation. Henry O'Donnel also gained time to re-organize his army and re-establish his authority, and was ready to interrupt Macdonald's march, proposing, if he failed, to raise a fresh insurrection in the Ampurdam, and thus give further occupation on that side. He had transferred a part of his forces to Caldas, Santa Coloma, and Bruñolas, taking nearly the same positions that Blake occupied during the siege of Gerona; yet the French detachments soon compelled him to concentrate again behind the defiles of the Congosta, where he hoped to stop the passage of the convoy. Nevertheless Macdonald entered Hostalrich the 16th, forced the Trenta Pasos on the 17th, and though his troops had only fifty rounds of ammunition, drove three thousand men from the pass of Garriga on the 18th, reached Barcelona that night, delivered his convoy, and returned immediately. The French soldiers then became sickly from the hardships of a march rendered oppressive by the severity of their discipline, and many deserted, while others, who had before gone off, returned to their colours. However reinforcements arrived from France, the emperor's orders to take the field were pressing, and Macdonald, giving Baraguay d'Hilliers the command of the Ampurdam, marched on the 8th of August with a third convoy for Barcelona,

resolved at last to co-operate with Suchet. Instructed by experience he moved this time with less formality, and having reached Barcelona, deposited his convoy, appointed Maurice Mathieu governor of that city, and then forcing the pass of Ordal, reached Villa Franca with sixteen thousand men. O'Donnel, still smarting from the affair at Tortosa, retired before him to Taragona without fighting, but directed Campo Verde to leave a body of troops under Martinez in the mountains about Olot, and to move himself through Montserrat to the district of Garriga, which lies between Lerida and Tortosa. The seventh corps then passed by Braffin and Valls into the plain of Reus, and opened the communication with Suchet, but to how little purpose shall be shown in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER II.

As the Spanish general knew the French could find provisions for only a few days at Reus, he withdrew his divisions from Falcet; and while Campo Verde occupied the passes behind them, and other troops were placed in the defiles between Valls and Villa Franca, he held his army concentrated at Taragona, to fall upon Macdonald whenever he moved. Macdonald cared little for the vicinity of the Catalan troops, but he had not yet formed sufficient magazines at Barcelona to commence the siege of Taragona, nor could he, as O'Donnel had foreseen, procure more than a few days supply about Reus; he therefore relinquished all idea of a siege and proposed to aid Suchet in the operation against Tortosa, if the latter would feed the seventh corps. Pending Suchet's decision he resolved to remove to Lerida, and leaving seven hundred sick men in Reus, made a feint against the Col de Balaguer, but then changing direction marched upon Momblanch and the Col de Ribas. His rear-guard, composed of Italian troops, being overtaken near Alcover, at the bridge of Goy, offered battle, which the Spaniards declined; and as they also neglected the heights on each side, the Italians turned the error to account, and made their way safely to Pixamoxons. They were however pursued, and Sarsfield coming from the Lerida side disputed the passage of Pixamoxons; whereupon Macdonald, keeping the troops from Taragona in check with a rear-guard, again sent his Italians up the hills on the flanks, while he pushed his French troops against the front of the enemy, and so succeeded. For the Italians quickly carried the heights, the rear-guard was slightly pressed, the front was unopposed, and in two hours the army reached Momblanch, whence after a short halt, it descended into the plains of Urgel.

Suchet, informed of this march, came from Mora to confer with Macdonald, and they agreed the seventh corps should have for its subsistence the magazines of Monzon, and the plain of Urgel, which had not yet delivered its contributions. In return Macdonald lent the Neapolitan division to guard Suchet's convoys down the Ebro, and promised the divisions of Severoli and Souham to cover the operations during the siege, by drawing the attention of the Catalan generals to the side of Cardona. The seventh corps was then quartered about Tarega, Cervera, Guisona, and Agramunt, and Severoli was detached with four thousand men over the Segre to enforce requisitions about Talarn. He drove four hundred Swiss

Vacani. from the bridge of Tresp, and executed his mission; but with such violence, that the people, becoming furious, assassinated the stragglers, and laid so many successful schemes of murder that Macdonald was forced to renew the executions and burnings of his predecessors. Indeed, to feed an army forcibly, will, when all things are paid for, create soreness in a poor and mountainous country, because the things taken cannot easily be replaced, and with requisitions severity is absolutely necessary. In rich plains the inhabitants can afford to supply troops, and will do so to avoid being plundered, whereas mountaineers having scarcely anything besides food, and little of that, become desperate and must be treated as enemies or left in quiet.

While Severoli was ravaging Tresp and Talarn, general Eugenio marched with another Italian detachment towards Castelfollit which had a French garrison, and Macdonald removed his own quarters to Cervera. O'Donnel then replaced a division at Falset to observe Suchet, and distributed his other forces on a line through San Coloma de Queralt, Igualada, Montserrat, and Cardona; he thus cut off all connexion between Macdonald and the Ampurdan, and enabled Campo Verde closely to follow the operations of the seventh corps. That general first menaced the head-quarters at Cervera, and then marching against Eugenio, was by him repulsed near Castelfollit; Eugenio, distinguished alike by his valour and ferocity, returned with his booty safely to Agramunt, and afterward spoiled and ravaged all the district of

Pons without hindrance. The provisions obtained were heaped up in Lerida and Balaguer; but while Macdonald was thus acting in the plain of Urgel, O'Donnel formed and executed the most skilful plan which had yet graced the Spanish arms.

It has been said that Baraguay d'Hilliers was left with eighteen or twenty thousand men in the Ampurdan; these troops were necessarily scattered; seven hundred were at Palamos, San Filieu, and other small ports along the coast; twelve hundred, under Swartz, were in Abispal, one short march from Gerona; two hundred were at Calonjé connecting Abispal with Palamos; the rest were in Figueras, Rosas, Olot, Castelfolli, Gerona, and Hostalrich, and several thousands were in hospital. O'Donnel having exact information, left a small garrison in Taragona, placed Eroles at Montserrat, Georget at Igualada, and Obispo at Martorel. Then with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry marched through the mountains, by San Culgat to Mattaro on the sea-coast; from thence passing by Vidreras he reached Llagostera the 12th. His arrival was unknown to Macdonald, or Maurice Mathieu, or Baraguay d'Hilliers; for though many reports were afloat, most of them spread by himself, no person divined his real object: some said he was to attack a French corps, which, from the side of Navarre, had entered the Cerdaña; others that he was concentrating at Manresa, and many thought he was still in Taragona.

O'Donnel's detachments, acting in concert with two English frigates, fell upon Calonjé and other posts, while he, leaving Campo Verde with a reserve in the valley of Aro, marched violently down from Casa de Silva upon Abispal. Swartz, always unfortunate, was there in an entrenched camp and accepted battle; he lost two hundred men and surrendered. All the French troops along the coast did the like, and the prisoners and spoil were carried to Taragona by the English vessels. Until that time Baraguay d'Hilliers knew nothing of O'Donnel's presence, the whole Ampurdan was thrown into confusion, and the somatenes cut off the communication with Macdonald, whose posts on the side of Calaf and Cervera were simultaneously harassed by Eroles and Obispo

A rumour of Swartz's disaster reached the marshal, but being incredulous he remained in the plain of Urgel, and Baraguay d'Hilliers, who was unable to do more than protect his own convoys from France, would have been in peril if O'Donnel's activity had continued; but he had been severely wounded, the Spanish vigour relaxed, and Napoleon, always watchful, sent general Conroux, in the latter end of October, with a convoy and reinforcement of troops from Perpignan to Gerona. O'Donnel then embarked, and Campo Verde sent a part of the army to Taragona, leaving Rovira, Claros, and Manso, to nourish the insurrection in the Ampurdam. Taking post himself at Manresa, he menaced Macdonald's posts at Calaf, his real object being, however, to break up that road, which he effected, and then passing suddenly through Berga and Cardona to Puigcerda, drove the French detachment, which had come to forage the Cerdaña, under the guns of Fort Louis. Macdonald being now apprised of Swartz's misfortune, hoped to repair it by crushing Campo Verde, taking Cardona, and dispersing the local junta of Upper Catalonia, which had assembled in Solsona. On the 18th, he put his troops in motion, passed the mountains of Portellas, and entered Solsona; but the junta and inhabitants escaped to Cardona and Berga, and up the valleys of Oleana and Urgel. Macdonald then sent columns in all directions, to collect provisions and chase the Spanish detachments; he thus forced Campo Verde to abandon the Cerdaña which was immediately foraged by the troops from Fort Louis. Cardona remained and the French marched against it, but Campo Verde arrived before them, and was in order of battle when they came up.

#### COMBAT OF CARDONA.

This town stands at the foot of a rugged hill, which is joined by a hog's-back ridge to the great mountain spine, dividing eastern from western Catalonia. The Cardona river washed the walls, a castle of strength crowned the height above, and though the works were weak, the Spanish army, covering all the side of the hill between the town and castle, appeared so formidable that Macdonald feared to engage.

His French and Italian troops, however, marched separately and Eugenio arriving first attacked contrary to his orders. He soon found his hands too full, and the battle was necessarily continued by the other division, to bring him off; but Campo Verde drove both French and Italians down the mountain, and followed them briskly to Solsona.

Macdonald who had lost many men returned to Guisona. He had now been two months from the Ampurdam, and had struck no useful blow, nor much aided Suchet's operations. For the Catalans continually harassed that general's convoys from the left of the Ebro, while the seventh corps, besides suffering severely from assassinations, had been repulsed at Cardona, had excited the people of the plain of Urgel to a state of rabid insurrection, and had lost its own communications with the Ampurdam. In that district Swartz had been destroyed, Filieu and Palamos taken, and the Catalans were everywhere more powerful and elated. Barcelona was again in distress, and a convoy from Perpignan destined for its relief, dared not pass Hostalrich. Macdonald therefore resolved to return to Gerona by the road of Manresa, Moya, and Granollers, and having communicated his intention to Suchet, and placed his baggage at Lerida, commenced his march the 4th of November. Campo Verde getting knowledge of this resolved to fight him in a pass near Calaf, but his heart failed and the French reached Manresa the 7th. Parties were immediately sent towards Vich and other places to mislead the Spaniards, while the main body moved by the Gariga pass to Granollers, where Baraguay d'Hilliers was to meet it with the convoy for Barcelona; he did not come, and Macdonald returned by the Trenta Pasos to Gerona the 10th and sent his convalescents to Figueras.

The vicinity of Gerona was exhausted and the troops were to be fed by convoys from France while the posts in the Ampurdam were re-established and the district re-organized. The muster-rolls showed ten thousand men in hospitals, six thousand in Barcelona, and several thousands distributed along the coast and lines of communication, leaving about thirty thousand for field operations. Of these fourteen thousand were under Baraguay d'Hilliers in the Ampurdam, and




Macdonald marched with the remaining sixteen thousand for the fourth time to succour Barcelona. Souham and Pino commanded his divisions, for Severoli had been recalled to Italy to organize reinforcements, and the march was made as before in one mass; the defiles were broken up and the bridge over the Tordera destroyed, but Macdonald in six hours opened new roads over the hills right and left of the Trenta Pasos, and so reached the more open country about Granollers. Campo Verde retired to Tarasa and Caldas, and the French marshal moved onwards to Barcelona, yet so resolved to avoid


a defeat, he would not suffer Pino to improve a favourable moment for crushing the Catalans in his front; nor would he pursue Campo Verde to Tarasa as all his generals advised. Having delivered his convoy and sent his carts back to France he moved to the Llobregat, leaving Souham and Pino discontented at Barcelona, and giving their divisions to Frere and Fontanes.

Macdonald had no design of besieging Taragona. He marched without artillery or wheel-carriages, and the Spaniards, seeing that he would return to Lerida, posted their main body at Montserrat and Igualada; he disregarded them, drove Sarsfield from Arbos and Vendril, and turned towards the pass of Massarbones, which leads through the range of hills separating Villa Franca from the district of Valls. The Catalans had broken up that and the pass of Christina leading to the Gaya, but the French general made new ways, and the 30th spread his troops over the Paneda or plain of Taragona, thus showing how useless it is to destroy roads as a defence, unless men are also there to fight. Instead of occupying Reus as before, Macdonald now took post about Momblanch, having his rear to Lerida and leaving the passes from Taragona to the Ebro open. But in this position he could not feed his troops, nor stop the Catalans from succouring Tortosa; for Campo Verde encamped at Lilla above the defiles between him and Taragona, and O'Donnel, who still directed the movements although not able to take the field, sent parties into the rocky Gariga district behind their right, to interrupt Macdonald's foragers and harass Suchet's water communications by the Ebro. From the heights of Lilla the Catalans called on the French soldiers to come





EXPLANATORY SKETCH  
AND  
SIEGE OF TORTOZA.  
1811



up and flight, and they would have done so if Macdonald would have suffered them; but after ten days of inactivity he divided his troops into many columns, and in concert with Abbé's brigade of Suchet's corps, which marched from Xerta, endeavoured to inclose and destroy the detachments in the Gariga. The Spaniards immediately dispersed in the mountains, and the French army only gained some mules and four thousand sheep and oxen; with this spoil they united again on the left bank of the Ebro, and were immediately disposed on a line extending from Vinebre which is opposite to Flix—to Masos which is opposite to Mora—and from thence to Garcia and Gnicstar. Suchet was thus enabled to concentrate his troops about Tortoza, and the siege of that place was immediately commenced. His operations during the five months he had been waiting on the slow movements of Macdonald shall now be related.

When he resigned the Urgel, and his magazines at Monzon to Macdonald in September, he deprived himself of the resources on the left bank of the Ebro from Mequinenza to Tortoza, and was forced to fetch provisions from Zaragoza, Teruel, and other parts a hundred miles from his camp. Macdonald by going to Cardona had exposed his water-carriage to attacks from the Spaniards stationed between Taragona, Momblanch, and Falset; and the difficulty of getting his battering-train down the river became more difficult as the sinking of the water exposed the bars and weirs impeding the navigation. He had however taken advantage of an accidental flood to bring down twenty-six pieces, which were escorted by Macdonald's Neapolitan division, before that marshal marched to Cardona. When that march occurred Habert was at Tivisa, and a reserve occupied Mas de Mora. And as Laval died about this time, his division was given to Harispe, a general distinguished throughout the war by ability, courage, and humanity. The Valencians then prepared again to disturb the blockade of Tortoza, wherefore Suchet strengthened Boussard's detachment at Uldecona, and gave the command to Musnier, who was replaced at Zaragoza by general Paris. At the same time colonel Kliski was sent to command the detachments on the side of Montalvan,

Teruel, Daroca, and Calatayud, where a partisan warfare was continued with undiminished activity by Villa Campa. He had opened secret communications, and excited commotions even in Zaragoza, and on the 7th of August, beating a foraging detachment near Cuevas, had recaptured six thousand sheep, and at Andorra had taken both convoy and escort: on the side of Navarre also, Mina coming down into the Cinco Villas destroyed some detachments, and impeded the foraging parties. Thus the third corps also began to suffer privations, and no progress was made towards the conquest of Catalonia.

In September, Villa Campa with increased forces, advanced so near Suchet that Habert attacked and drove him over the frontier in dispersion, recapturing all the sheep before lost. Suchet then brought down the remainder of the battering train, and stores for the siege; but as the waters of the Ebro were low, the new road was used for the convoys, which thus came slowly and with many interruptions and considerable loss; especially on the 17th of September, when a whole Neapolitan battalion suffered itself to be taken without firing a shot. In this manner affairs dragged on until the 28th of October when Macdonald returned to Gerona, and Suchet's hopes of commencing the siege were again baffled. At this time the assembling of the Cortes had given new vigour to the resistance in Spain, and the regency's plan of sending secret juntas, to organize and regulate the partidas, being put in execution, the activity of those bands became proportioned to the supplies and promises conveyed to them. One of those secret juntas, composed of clergy and military men having property or influence in Aragon, endeavoured to renew the insurrection formerly excited by Blake in that province; they sent emissaries to all quarters, concerted operations with Mina, and diligently followed the plan of secretly drawing off provisions from Aragon to starve the French. Carbajal, one of the junta, joining Villa Campa assumed command on that side; while the English naval captain, Codrington, carried a detachment by sea to Peniscola, with intent to fall on Suchet's flank if he should march by the coast road against Valencia. And when Macdonald returned to the

Ampurdan, the Aragonese also became unquiet, the partidas from Navarre and the district of Montalvan and Calatayud, closed in on Suchet's communications, the Valencians came up towards Uldecona, and Garcia Navarro moving from Taragona with a division, again took the position of Falcet.

To disperse these gathering clouds Suchet struck first at the insurgents. Chlopiski was sent with a strong force against Carbajal, and defeated him at Alventoza. Villa Campa rallied the beaten troops on the mountain of Fuente Santa, received reinforcements, and renewed the project of insurrection; but Chlopiski again defeated him on the 12th of November, and drove him to the river Libras, where the bridge broke and many Spaniards were drowned: the French lost a hundred men, and Chlopiski returned to Tortosa leaving Kliski with twelve hundred to watch Villa Campa. Now the Ebro rose, and the remainder of the battering train and stores, being embarked at Mequinenza on the 3rd, dropped down the stream; but the craft outstripped the escort, and the convoy being assailed from the left bank, lost two boats; the others grounded on the right bank, and were there defended by the cannoneers, until the escort came up on the one side, and on the other general Abbé, who had been sent from Guardia to their succour. The waters, however, suddenly subsided, and the convoy was in danger until Suchet reinforced Abbé, who was thus enabled to keep the Spaniards at bay, while Habert, with fifteen hundred men, made a diversion by attacking the camp at Falcet. On the 7th, the river rose again, and the boats with little loss reached Xerta on the 9th. All things were therefore ready to commence the siege, but the seventh corps still kept aloof. •

Suchet was perplexed. The provisions he had with so much pains collected from the most distant parts of Aragon, were rapidly wasting, forage was becoming scarce, and as the plain of Urgel was given over to the seventh corps, the latter had become a burthen to him instead of an aid. He had since the beginning of the year supplied his army entirely from the resources of Aragon without help from France, and had in six months used up a hundred and twenty thousand sheep and twelve hundred bullocks. Anxious about the future

consumption he called the notables and heads of the clergy in Aragon to his head-quarters, and with their advice re-organized his internal administration. He removed many absurd restrictions upon industry and trade, placed the municipal power and police entirely with the natives, and thus obtained greater supplies with less discontent. And he was well served and obeyed, both in matters of administration and police by the Aragonese, whose feelings he was careful to soothe, showing himself in all things a shrewd governor and an able commander.

When Macdonald marched from Barcelona towards Tarragona Suchet attacked the Spanish troops at Falset. Habert assailed their camp in front while detachments turned it by both flanks, and the Catalans fled, leaving Garcia Navarro and three hundred men in the hands of the victors. But while Suchet operated on the side of Falset, the Valencian Bassecour, thinking he would be detained by Navarro on the left bank of the Ebro, resolved to surprise Musnier at Uldecona. To aid this operation, a flotilla from Peniscola, attacked Rapita, and other small posts on the coast between the Cenia and the Ebro, and the governor of Tortosa menaced Amposta and the stations at the mouth of the Ebro.

Bassecour moved in three columns; one, following the coast-road towards Alcanar, turned the French left; another passing behind the mountains took post at Las Ventallas, in rear of Musnier, to cut him off from Tortosa; the main body moved against his front. In the night of the 26th the Spanish cavalry fell upon the French camp outside the town, but the guards checked the attack until the troops came out of the town and formed in order of battle. At daylight, the Spanish army covered the hills in front, and those in rear also, for the detachment at Ventallas was in sight: the French were thus surrounded when the action commenced. The Valencians in front were however beaten with loss of sixteen hundred men, and those in rear made off to the mountains again. Bassecour withdrew behind the Cenia, Musnier surprised him there in the night, and sending the cuirassiers by the route of Vinaros cut off his retreat, which was made with such haste and disorder, that the French cavalry falling in with the fugi-

tives near Benicarlo killed or took nine hundred: the Spanish general saved himself in Peniscola, and thither also the flotilla, having failed at Rapita, returned. Suchet then sent his prisoners to France by Jaca, and directed a convoy of provisions, newly collected at Mequinenza, to fall down the Ebro to the magazines at Mora. Fearing the current might again carry the boats faster than the escort, he directed the latter to proceed first, and sent Abbé to Flix to meet the vessels, but the Spaniards in the Garriga placed an ambuscade near Mequinenza, and attacked the craft before they could come up with the escort. The boats were then run ashore on the right side, and seventy men from Menquinenza came down the left bank to their aid, which saved the convoy, though the succouring detachment was cut to pieces. Soon after this Macdonald took post on the left bank of the Ebro, when the long delayed siege was commenced.

Abstract  
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## CHAPTER III.

TORTOZA, with a population of ten thousand souls and a garrison of from eight to nine thousand regular troops, was justly considered the principal bulwark of Catalonia and Valencia; but it was commanded by Lilli, conde d'Alacha, a feeble man, whose only claim was, that he had shown less incapacity than others before the battle of Tudela in 1808. The Spaniards outside, confiding in the strength of the place, let the attack advance far ere any interruption was contemplated; and had any project for its relief been framed, it could not have been executed, because discord raged amongst the Spanish chiefs. Campo Verde desired to supersede O'Donnell, Bassecour held unceasing dispute with his own officers, and with the members of the Valencian congress, and Villa Campa repelled both Carbajal and Bassecour. At this critical time therefore all was stagnant, except the English vessels, blockading Rosas, Barcelona, and the mouths of the Elbro. Watching from certain head-lands they pounced upon the enemy's convoys as they crept from port to port, threw provisions, ammunition, and stores into Taragona and Tortoza, and were generally successful, yet at times met with disasters. Thus, captain Rogers of the Kent, having with him the Ajax, Cambrian, Sparrow-hawk, and Minstrel, disembarked six hundred men and two field-pieces under captain Fane at Palamos, where they destroyed a convoy intended for Barcelona, but re-embarking in a disorderly manner, the French took or killed two hundred, Fane being amongst the prisoners. The Catalan army was thirty thousand strong, including garrisons, and in a better state than it had hitherto been; the Valencians, although discouraged by the defeat at Uldecona, were still numerous, and the Spaniards were con-

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vinced that succoured or unsuccoured the place would not fall. O'Donnel, created conde de' Bispal, was so disabled by wounds, that he resigned the command, and Campo Verde was by the voice of the people raised in his stead: for it was their nature always to believe that the man who made most noise was the fittest person to head them, and in this instance, as in most others, they were mistaken.

Tortosa, situated on the left of the Ebro, communicated with the right bank by a bridge of boats, which was the only Spanish bridge on the river from Zaragoza to the sea. Below and above the place there was a plain, so narrowed by the juttings of the mountains where the town was built, that while some houses were close to the water on flat ground, others stood on bluff rocky points shot from the hills above, and appeared to tie the mountains, the river, and the plains together. Five of these shoots were taken in by the ramparts and outworks. One, south of the town, was crowned by the fort of Orleans, and on the north another was occupied by a fort called the Tenaxas. To the east a horn-work was raised on a third shoot, which being prolonged, and rising suddenly again between the suburbs and the city, furnished the site of a castle or citadel: the other two, and the deep ravines between them were defended by the ramparts, which were extremely irregular, and strong from situation, rather than construction.

There were four fronts.

1°. *The northern, defending the suburb.* This front, built on the plain, was so embedded between the Ebro, the horn-work, the citadel, and the Tenaxas, that it could not even be approached until the latter fort was taken. •

2°. *The eastern. Extending from the horn-work to the bastion of San Pico.* Here the deep ravines and the rocky ground, which was also overlooked by the citadel and flanked by the horn-work, rendered any attack very difficult.

3°. *The south-eastern. From the bastion of San Pico to the bastion of Santa Cruz.* This front, protected by a deep narrow ravine, was again covered by the fort of Orleans, which was itself covered by a second ravine.

4°. *The southern. From the Santa Cruz to the Ebro.* The

ground of approach here was flat, the soil easy to work, and the fort of Orleans not sufficiently advanced to flank it with any dangerous effect; wherefore against this front Suchet resolved to conduct his attack.

A rising ground opposite the bridge-head on the right bank of the Ebro, called the Roquetta, was fortified and occupied by three regiments; and on the 15th, Suchet crossed the Ebro by his own bridge at Xerta, with eight battalions, the sappers, and two squadrons of hussars. He marched between the mountains and the river upon the fort of Tenaxas, while Habert, with two regiments and three hundred hussars, moving from Perillo, attacked a Spanish detachment encamped on the Col d'Alba. When Suchet's column arrived in sight of it, the rear, under Harispe, filing across the rugged shoots, swept round the place, leaving in every ravine and on every ridge a detachment, until the half circle ended on the Ebro below Tortoza. The investment was perfected on the left bank by the troops from Roquetta, and by Habert who entered the line of investment, driving before him six hundred men from the Col d'Alba. The communication across the water was then established by three, and afterwards by four flying bridges, placed above and below the town; a matter of some difficulty and importance, because all the artillery and stores had to come from Roquetta across the water, which was there two hundred yards wide and in certain winds very rough.

Suchet's  
Memoirs.  
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lesley,  
MSS.

Macdonald finding no forage sent his cavalry back to Lerida by the road of Lardecans, and marched from Mas de Mora across the hills to Perillo to cover the siege; his patrols discovered a Spanish division near the fort of Felipe de Balaguer, yet he would not attack them, and thinking he could not remain for want of provisions, returned on the 19th to Guiestar. This retrograde movement was like to have exposed the investing troops to a disaster; for as the seventh corps retired, a second Spanish division coming from Reus reinforced the first; but Macdonald then placed Frere's division of six thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry at Suchet's disposal, on condition that the latter should feed them, which he could well do. These troops were stationed behind the investing

force on the road of Amposta, by which the Spaniards from Taragona could most easily approach; the remainder of the seventh corps encamped at Gniestar, a strong position covering the siege on the side of Falcet, and only fifteen miles from Tortosa. In this situation it could be fed from Lerida, and with greater facility send detachments up the Ebro, to protect the convoys coming from Mequinenza. During these movements one division of Catalans took post on the Llobregat under Caro; another under Yranzo at Momblanch; a third under Campo Verde in observation of Frere's covering division. O'Donnel had previously sent two convoys to Tortosa, which from the rapidity of the investment failed; he then proposed combined movements to raise the siege, when his wounds forced him to resign, as before noticed: Yranzo should have succeeded him, but the popular cry gave the authority to Campo Verde.

Wimphen's  
Memoir.

#### SIEGE OF TORTOSA.

San Pedro, a half bastion situated in the plain close to the river, was the first object of attack; and to prevent Fort Orleans incommoding the trenches, the approach was traced in a slanting direction, refusing the right and pushing forward the left. To cover the flanks, Fort Orleans was masked by a false attack on one side of the Ebro, and trenches opened against the bridge-head were brought down close to the water on the other side. The 19th the posts of the besieged were driven in, and an unfinished work in advance of Fort Orleans was taken possession of. In the night a deceitful flying sap was commenced one hundred and sixty yards from the fort, upon an extent of three hundred and sixty yards, but the following night the true attack was opened in the plain during a storm; and as the Spaniards had placed no guards in front, the French worked within a hundred and fifty yards of the San Pedro. Their parallel was five hundred yards long, extending from the false sap down to the bank of the river; two communications were also begun, and ground was broken on the left bank against the bridge-head.

At daylight, the Spaniards, perceiving the works, com-

menaced a heavy fire and made a sally. They were overwhelmed by musketry from the false attack of Fort Orleans, and the trenches on the right bank of the Ebro; and in the night, the communication was extended to fourteen hundred yards, nine batteries were commenced, and bags of earth placed along the edge of the trenches, whence chosen men shot down the Spanish artillery men.

On the 23rd, a night sally, made from the bridge-head, was repulsed, and next day the second parallel of the true attack was commenced. In the night of the 25th, separate sallies were again made and repulsed, and the works were advanced to within twenty-five yards of the palisades; a tenth battery was also commenced, and when day broke the Spanish gunners quailed under the aim of the chosen marksmen. In the night of the 26th, the besieged overturned the head of the sap and killed the sappers, but were finally repulsed by the reserve, and the approach was immediately pushed forward to the place of arms. Thus, on the seventh night of open trenches, the besiegers were lodged in the covered way before a shot had been fired from either breaching or counter batteries; a remarkable instance of activity and boldness, and a signal proof that the defence was ill-conducted.

During the night of the 27th, the works were enlarged as much as the fire of the place would permit; whereupon the Spaniards, seeing the batteries ready to open, made a general sally through the eastern gates against the false attack at Fort Orleans, and through the southern gates against the works in the plain. Habert drove them back with slaughter from the former point; at the latter they won the covered way, reached the second parallel, burnt the gabions, and did much damage ere the reserves could repulse them. Next night the batteries were armed with forty-five pieces, seventeen being on the right bank, to take the works at the main attack in reverse and break the bridge. At daybreak all these guns opened with success against the demi-bastion on the left bank of the river; but the fire from the castle, the bridge-head, the horn-work, and the quay, overpowered the guns on the right bank, and although the bridge was injured, it was not rendered impassable.

On the 30th, the Spanish fire was overpowered, the bridge was broken, and in the night an attempt was made to pass the ditch at the true attack, but two guns, still untouched, defeated this effort. However, the Spaniards abandoned the bridge-head, and the French batteries on the right bank dismounted the two guns which had defended San Pedro. The besiegers then effected the passage of the ditch without difficulty, and the miner being attached to the scarp, worked into the wall while the batteries opened a breach in the curtain. A lodgment was then made in preparation for an assault, but at ten o'clock in the morning the besieged displayed the white flag: the negotiations for a surrender were, however, prolonged until evening by the governor, without any result, and the miner resumed his work in the night.

At seven o'clock on the 1st of January, two practicable breaches, besides that in the curtain, were opened by the artillery, and the mine was ready to explode, when three white flags were seen to wave from different parts of the fortress; nevertheless the disposition of the garrison was mistrusted, and Suchet demanded as a preliminary the immediate possession of one of the forts,—a necessary precaution, for disputes arose amongst the besieged, and Lilli intimated to Suchet, that his own authority was scarcely recognised. In this critical moment, the French general gave proof that he was more than a mere soldier; for riding up to the gates with a considerable staff, and escorted only by a company of grenadiers, he informed the Spanish officer on guard, that hostilities had ceased, and then, leaving his grenadiers on the spot, desired to be conducted to the governor who was in the citadel. Lilli was just yielding to the remonstrances of the officers about him against a surrender, when the French general thus suddenly appeared at his council board; the Spanish guard began to stir, but Suchet assumed an arrogant tone, spoke of the impatient fierceness of the French troops, and even menaced military execution if further delay occurred. During this extraordinary scene Habert brought in the grenadiers from the gate, and the stupefied governor after signing a short capitulation gave over the citadel to them. This event being made known, the Spanish troops assembled, and

Alacha, in presence of Suchet, ordered them to lay down their arms.

Four hundred French and fourteen hundred Spaniards had fallen during the siege; many thousand prisoners, nine standards, one hundred pieces of artillery, ten thousand muskets, and immense magazines enhanced the value of the conquest, which by some was attributed to Lilli's treachery, by others to his imbecility,—there seems reason for both charges, and it was a heavy treason. For the fall of the place, besides opening the western passage into Catalonia, and cutting off the communication between that province and Valencia, reduced the Catalan army to twenty thousand men, including the garrisons of the towns still in their possession. Campo Verde immediately retired from Falset to Moul Blanch, and Suchet, always prompt to make one success the prelude to another, endeavoured in the first moment of consternation and surprise to get possession of the forts of Peniscola and San Felipe de Balaguer. Nor was he deceived with respect to the last, for that place, in which were five guns and a hundred men, was taken on the 9th by Habert; but at Peniscola his summons was disregarded.

Meanwhile Macdonald, leaving the Neapolitan brigade still on the Ebro, passed by Falset to Reus, where he encamped the 11th, as if to invest Taragona; yet without any real intention to do so, for his cavalry and field artillery were left at Lerida and Tortosa, and his actual force did not exceed twelve thousand men. Campo Verde, who had retreated before him, then posted Sarsfield with six thousand men at Valls, from whence he made incursions against Macdonald's foragers, and also surprised at Tarega, on the other side of the mountains, a regiment of Italian dragoons which he would have destroyed but for the succour of a neighbouring post.

On the 14th Macdonald marched towards Valls, Sarsfield retired to Pla, and was pursued by Eugenio with two thousand Italian infantry. This officer, headstrong and intractable, pushed into the plain of Pla, contrary to his orders, and was nearing that town, when a strong body of cavalry poured out of it, and on each side the Spanish infantry were seen descending the hills in order of battle. Eugenio attacked the first

that entered the plain, but fell mortally wounded and his men retreated fighting. The firing being heard at Valls, Palombini marched to his assistance, but <sup>Vacani.</sup> was himself beaten and thrown into confusion; <sup>Doyle, MSS.</sup> Sarsfield, at the head of the Spanish horse, was then preparing to complete the victory, when the French colonel Delort coming up with some squadrons charged with great fury, and so brought off the Italians: Delort himself was however desperately wounded, and the whole loss was not less than six hundred men. Macdonald would scarcely suffer Palombini to succour Eugenio's troops, and did not move himself; a great error, for Sarsfield was so eager in pursuit as to come within two miles of Valls, and being on open ground might have been crushed in turn. Being unmolested he returned to the pass of Cabra, leaving his cavalry as before in Pla, whence through bye-roads they communicated with Taragona.

A few days after this, Sarsfield came out again in order of battle, and at the same time Campo Verde appeared with a division on the hills in rear of Valls. Macdonald was thus surrounded, but Palombini's brigade sufficed to send Campo Verde back to Taragona, and Sarsfield refused battle; then the French marshal, who had resolved to go to Lerida yet wished to move without fighting, broke up from Valls in the night, and with great order and silence passed by the road of Fuencalde, between the defiles of Cabra and Ribas; both were occupied by the Spaniards, yet his movement was not discovered until next day. From thence he marched by Momblanck upon Lerida, where he arrived the 19th, and three days afterwards spread his troops over the plains of Urgel, to collect provisions, money, and transport, and to watch the defiles of the mountains. But the Catalan general, having received stores and arms from England and Cadiz, called out all the miguelotes and somatenes of the hills round the plain of Urgel, and united them at Santa Coloma de Queralt under Sarsfield, while the regular army assembled at Igualada and Villa Franca. The Spaniards thus occupied a concentrated position and cut off Macdonald from Barcelona and the Ampurdan, which was then harassed by Eroles, Rovira, and the brigade of Martinez.



Suchet being called by the exigencies of his government to Zaragoza, carried one division there, and distributed another under Musnier at Teruel, Molina, Alcanitz, and Morella. He also withdrew his troops from Cambril, which Habert had surprised on the 7th of February; but he left that general, with a division, in command of Tortosa, having two thousand men at Perillo to connect the city with San Felipe de Balaguer. These things gave importance to the success against Eugenio, for the Spaniards attributed the separate retreats of the French corps to fear. Macdonald's movement had the appearance of a flight; but while gathering provisions at Lerida, he repaired the works of Balaguer as a pivot for the troops employed to forage the country watered by the Noguera, Cinca, and Legre rivers.

It may appear extraordinary that the war could have been continued under such difficulties, but the resources were still great. A junta had been formed in Catalonia to procure provisions, and although the English orders of council interfered with the trade of neutral vessels bringing grain, bread could be bought at the rate of 12lbs. to the dollar, while with Wellington's army in Castille it often cost half a dollar a pound. When the French foraging parties came out from Barcelona, their march could be always traced by the swarms of boats, loaded with people and provisions, shooting out from the coast-towns, to hover for a while under the protection of the English vessels, and then return when the danger was over: and the enemy did never meddle with these boats, lest they should remove the cover to their own supplies. Suchet also armed Rapita and other small places at the mouth of the Ebro, with a view to afford shelter to the armed craft, which watched provision-vessels sailing from Valencia for Taragona, and aided French vessels engaged in a like course coming from France. To feed Barcelona, Maurice Mathieu at times occupied the head-lands from St. Filieu to Blanes, while small convoys crept along shore, and a fleet loaded with provisions and powder and escorted by three frigates, entered it in February. A continual supply was likewise kept up by sailing-boats and small vessels, which could not be easily detected amidst the numerous craft belong-

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ing to the people along the coast; and as the claims of hunger are paramount to all others, it was necessary, for the sake of the inhabitants, to permit provision sometimes to reach Barcelona by land. The Spanish generals winked at it, and Milans and Lacy have even been charged with permitting corn to pass into that city for private profit. Yet by these and like expedients the war was sustained.

No important event occurred after Eugenio fell, until the 3rd of March, when the garrison of Tortosa being weakened by the detachment at Perillo, the Spaniards endeavoured to cut the latter off, intending if successful to assault Tortosa itself. They also attacked the fort of San Felipe, yet failed, and the French at Perillo effected their retreat with considerable loss. This attempt was followed by a more important effort. On the 19th of March, Campo Verde assembled eight thousand men at Molinos del Rey, four thousand at Guisols, and three thousand at Igualada, to surprise the city and forts of Barcelona, for he had, as he thought, corrupted the town-major of Montjuic. He sent eight hundred chosen grenadiers in the night by the hills of Hospitalette, to enter that fort, and they descended into the ditch, where Maurice Mathieu, apprised of the plan, in an instant overwhelmed them with fire.

Mr. Wel-  
lesley's  
Despatches,  
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Napoleon now changed the system of the war. All Catalonia west of the upper Llobregat, and from Igualada by Orda to the sea, including the district of Tortosa, was placed under Suchet's government; and seventeen thousand of Macdonald's troops were united to the third corps, which was thus augmented to forty-two thousand men, and took the title of the '*Army of Aragon.*' It was destined to besiege Taragona, while Macdonald's force, reduced to twenty-seven thousand under arms, including fifteen thousand in garrison and in the Ampurdan, was restricted to the upper part of Catalonia. His orders were to attack Cardona, Berga, San d'Urgel, and Montserrat; and to war down Martinez, Manso, Rovira, and other chiefs in the mountains between Olot and the Cerdaña. Five thousand men, chiefly composed of national guards, was also ordered to assemble at Mont Louis, to act in the Cerdaña, and on the rear of the partisans in the high valleys who had

even penetrated into France and burnt some villages there. The line of operations against Catalonia was thus altered from France to Aragon, the difficulties were lessened, and the seventh corps, reduced in numbers, became the secondary army; finally Macdonald's formal method was exchanged for the lively vigorous talent of Suchet. But the delay already caused in the siege of Tortosa could never be compensated; Suchet had been kept on the Ebro, when he should have been on the Guadalaviar, and this enabled the Murcians to keep the fourth corps in Grenada, when it should have been on the Tagus aiding Massena.

## CHAPTER IV.

DURING the siege of Tortosa, Villa Campa and others waged active war against Aragon. Stimulated by the secret juntas, and supported by English supplies this warfare was now from experience more ably conducted. The English squadrons on the northern coast combined their operations better, and the partidas thus supported acquired a more solid military organization. They were not equal to the deliverance of their country but were useful auxiliaries, and the interruption they gave to the French correspondence was certainly tantamount to a diminution of forty thousand troops, without reckoning those who were necessarily employed to watch and pursue the bands. The moral effect produced in Europe by a struggle thus maintained was also very considerable. Nevertheless the same number of men under good discipline would have been more efficacious, less onerous to the country people, less subversive of social order. When the regular army is completed, all that remains in a country may be turned to advantage as irregulars, yet they are to be valued as their degree of organization approaches that of the regular troops: militia are better than armed bodies of peasantry, and these last, if directed by regular officers, better than sudden insurrections of villagers. The Spanish armies were never completed, never well organized; when they were dispersed, which happened nearly as often as they took the field, the war must have ceased in Spain, had it not been kept alive by the partidas, and it is there we find their moral value. When the British armies kept the field, the partidas harassed the enemy's communications, and this constituted their military value. It is however certain they never much exceeded thirty thousand in number; and they could not have long existed in any numbers without English

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supplies, unless a spirit of order and providence, different from anything witnessed during the war, had arisen in Spain. How absurd then to reverse the order of the resources possessed by an invaded country, to confound the moral with the military means, to place the irregular resistance of the peasants first, and that of the soldiers last in the scale of physical defence.

That many *partida* chiefs became less active, after they received regular rank, is true; but this was a consequence of the inveterate abuses which oppressed the vigour of the regular armies, and necessarily affected the *partidas* when they became a constituent part of those armies. Many persons of weight ascribed to this bestowal of rank on the chiefs, the acknowledged after inactivity of the *partidas*. It is however probable that a life of toil and danger, repeated defeats, the scarcity of plunder, and general discontent at the exactions of the chiefs, had abated the fire of patriotism; inactivity was rather the sign of subjection than the result of an injudicious interference by the government. During the siege of Tortosa, the concentration of the third and seventh corps exposed Aragon and Catalonia to desultory enterprises, when the *partidas*, more numerous and powerful, were also more ardent, because the assembly of the Cortes seemed to acknowledge the people's importance in the struggle. Hence no better test of their real influence can be found than their exploits during that period, when two French armies were fixed as it were to one spot, the supplies from France nearly cut off by natural difficulties, the district immediately round Tortosa completely sterile, Catalonia generally exhausted, and a project to create a fictitious scarcity in the fertile parts of Aragon diligently and in some sort successfully pursued by the secret *juntas*. The number of French foraging parties, and the distances to which they were sent were then greatly increased, and the facility of cutting them off proportionably augmented, yet nothing important was effected by the *partidas*.

Villa Clampa's operations during the blockade have been already related, but, although sometimes successful, the results were mostly adverse to him; and when after the siege was actually commenced, he came down towards the side of

Daroca, his cavalry was surprised by colonel Kliski who captured or killed one hundred and fifty in the village of Blancas. Then he retired, but being soon after joined by the Empecinado from Cuenca, he returned in January to the frontier of Aragon, and took post between Molina and Albaracin. At this period Tortoza had surrendered, and Musnier's division was spread along the western part of Aragon; wherefore Suchet detached Paris with one column from Zaragoza, and Abbé with another from Teruel, to chase these two partidas. Near Molino, Paris found the Empecinado, who joined Villa Campa, but the French general forced both from their mountain position near Frias, and being joined by Abbé continued the pursuit for several days, until the fugitives took different routes. Paris then followed Villa Campa, and Abbé pursued the Empecinado through Cuenca, from whence Carbajal and the secret junta immediately fled. Paris failed to overtake Villa Campa, but entered Beleta, Cobeta, and Paralejos, all three containing manufactories for arms, which he destroyed, and then returned. This expedition lasted only twelve days, yet the smaller bands in Aragon, had taken advantage of it to cut off a detachment of fifty men near Fuentes: and on the side of Navarre Mina entered the Cinco Villas and cut to pieces one hundred and fifty *gens-d'armes* near Sadava. However Chlopiski pursued him so closely, that his band dispersed near Coseda in Navarre.

During this time the Valencians, always swayed by factions, displaced Bassecour and appointed Coupigny in his stead. The notables raised money for recruits, but Coupigny would not take the command, because the Murcian army was not also given to him; and that army, although numerous, was in a very neglected state, and unable to undertake any service. When Tortoza fell, the Valencians were frightened. They repaired and garrisoned the fort of Oropesa, and some smaller posts on the coast, along which runs the only artillery-road to their capital; they commenced fortifying Murviedro, or rather the rock of Saguntum overhanging it, and they sent fifteen hundred men into the hills about Cantavieja. These last were dispersed on the 5th of April by a column from Teruel; and on the 11th another body having attempted to surprise Ude-

cona, which was weakly guarded, were also defeated and sabred by the French cavalry. These events, especially the destruction of the gun-manufactories, repressed the activity of the partisans, and Suchet went to Lerida in the latter end of March, to receive the soldiers to be drafted from the seventh corps.

Macdonald, desirous to reach Barcelona, was forced to take an escort of seven thousand men, and marched, not by Igualada, which was occupied in force by Sarsfield, but by the circuitous way of Manresa; for neither he nor Suchet wished to engage in desultory actions with the forces destined for the siege. Sarsfield, however, passing by Calaf with his own and Eroles' troops, waited on Macdonald near the Cardenera river, while a detachment, barricading the bridge of Manresa, opposed him in front. The bridge was carried, and the town being abandoned, the Italian soldiers wantonly set fire to it in the night; an act immediately revenged; for the flames, seen to a great distance, so enraged the Catalans, that in the morning all the armed men in the district, regulars migueletes and somatenes, assembled on the neighbouring hills, and fell with infinite fury upon Macdonald's rear as it passed out from the ruins of the burning city. The French then pushed for the bridge of Villamara over the Llobregat, which was two leagues distant; but the country between the rivers was one vast mountain, and Sarsfield, seeing the French rear halting to receive the somatenes, while the front still advanced, thought to place his division between, by moving along the heights which skirted the road. Macdonald, however, finally passed the Llobregat, but with difficulty and the loss of four hundred men, for his march was continually under Sarsfield's fire, and some of his troops were forced to cross by a ford. During the night he collected his scattered men, and moved upon Sabadel, whence he pushed on alone for Barcelona, and Harispe returned by the Momblanch road to Lerida with the escort.

The invasion of Catalonia was now divided into three parts, each assigned to a distinct army.

1°. Suchet, with that of Aragon, was to take Taragona and subdue the lower part of the province.

2°. Macdonald, with that part of the seventh corps called the active army of Catalonia, was to break the long Spanish line, extending from Taragona through Montserrat to the Cerdaña, and the high mountains about Olot.

3°. Baraguay d'Hilliers, having his head-quarters at Gerona, was to hold the Ampurdan and co-operate with Macdonald, under whose orders he still remained. The five thousand men collected near Mount Louis, at the entrance of the French Cerdaña, were to act on the rear of the Spaniards in the mountains, while the others attacked them in front. Nor did the success appear doubtful, for the hopes and means of the province were sinking. The loss of men at Tortosa and other places, the reputation of Suchet, the failure at Barcelona, Perillo, and San Felipe de Balaguer, the incapacity of Campo Verde, now generally felt, and the consequent desertion of the migueletes, would have insured success for the French if they had not been suddenly thwarted by Rovira, who surprised the great fortress of Fernando de Figueras, the key of the Pyrenees. This, the boldest and most important enterprise effected by a partida chief during the whole war, merits a particular detail.

Guillot, governor of the place, enforced no military discipline. His guards were weak, the soldiers used the palisades for fuel, and the garrison often made incursions to a distance. The town, situated below the hill, upon which the great fortress of Fernando stands, had been momentarily occupied by the Italian general Peyri, with six hundred men destined to join Macdonald, and, trusting to the fortress above, they were negligent; the garrison above was still more so; for Guillot having on the 9th sent his best men to drive some somatenes from the neighbouring hills they returned at night fatigued, and being to go out again next day slept while gates were confided to convalescents, or men unfit for duty, and the ramparts were unguarded.

There were in the fort two Catalan brothers named Palopos, and a man called Juan, under-storekeepers, who being gained by Rovira had obtained from the head of their department the keys of the magazines, and of a postern under one of the gates. Things were in this state when Rovira came down from

Vacani,  
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Campbell,  
Doyle,  
Codrington,  
Stuart,  
MSS.



St. Lorenzo de Muga in the night of the 9th, and secretly reached the covered way with seven hundred chosen men of his own partida. Martinez followed in support with three thousand migueletes, and the Catalan brothers opened the postern for Rovira, who immediately disarmed the guard and set wide the gate for the reserve. Some shots being fired the garrison took arms, but Martinez came in so quickly no effectual resistance could be made. Thirty or forty men were killed or wounded, the magazines were seized, the governor and sixteen hundred soldiers and camp-followers were taken in their quarters, and in an hour Rovira was master of one of the strongest fortresses in Europe: three cannon-shot were then fired, as a signal to the somatenes in the surrounding mountains to bring in provisions as rapidly as possible. Peyri alarmed by the noise in the fortress and guessing the cause, had collected the troops, baggage, sick men, and stores in the town below, and sent notice to Gerona; but he made no attempt to retake the place, and at daylight retired to Bascara. He had mounted the hills during the night, to observe how matters went, and thought nothing could be done: this opinion was condemned at the time, and during the confusion of the first surprise, it is probable a brisk attempt by six hundred fresh men might have recovered the fortress.

At Bascara five hundred men detached from Gerona on the spur of the occasion, met him with orders to re-invest the place, and Baraguay d'Hilliers promised to follow with all his forces. Then Peyri, although his troops, many of whom were only national guards, were fearful, returned to Figueras, drove the Spaniards out of the town and took post in front of the fort: yet he could not prevent Martinez from receiving men and provisions from the somatenes. Rovira's exploit spread with inconceivable rapidity throughout the Peninsula, and its exhilarating influence affected even the Anglo-Portuguese army, then not much given to credit or admire the exploits of the Spaniards. However Baraguay d'Hilliers invested the fort with six thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, and this so quickly that the Spaniards had not time to remove sixteen thousand muskets which were in the fort.

Martinez remained governor, Rovira went to the mountains,

and all Catalonia, animated by the Promethean touch of this chief, seemed to be moving at once upon Figueras. Campo Verde came to Vich, designing to relieve it, and in concert with the English and Spanish vessels to blockade Rosas by land and sea. Rovira collected a convoy of provisions near Olot. Captain Bullen with the *Cambrian* and *Volontaire* frigates, seeing the French troops withdrawn from Gerona, drove out the garrisons of San Filieu and Palamos, destroyed the batteries, and made sail to join captain Codrington at Rosas. A Spanish frigate with a fleet of coasting-vessels loaded with supplies anchored at Palamos; Francisco Milans, after beating a detachment near Arens de Mar, invested Hostalrich; Juan Claros hovered about Gerona, and Eroles and Manso coming from Montserrat reduced Olot and Castellfollit. Sarsfield remained in the *Seu d'Urgel* and directed the mountaineers to establish themselves at Balaguer, but they were driven away with great loss by a detachment from Lerida.

On the 3rd of May Campo Verde, having drawn Milans from Hostalrich, marched with eleven thousand men from Avionet and Villa Fan against Figueras, hoping to draw the French general to that side, while Rovira, whose convoy was at Besalu, forced a small camp near Llers on the opposite quarter and entered the fortress. The circuit of investment was wide, rugged, and thinly garnished with men; but some works had been raised, and when the Catalans approached, Baraguay d'Hilliers, reinforcing the camp at Llers, marched with four thousand men against Campo Verde who was already in the Figueras valley. He had driven back the French cavalry, and had but one battalion in his front when this column took him in flank, and at the same time the dispersed cavalry rallied and charged, whereupon he retreated with the loss of fifteen hundred men. His confidence had been so great that he kept the sheep of the convoy too far behind to enter the fort while the way was open, and the succour was confined to a few artillerymen some tobacco and medicines. Captain Codrington by agreement made a simultaneous attack on Rosas but it produced no serious effect, and Fernando was left to its own resources; those were few, for the French with

a strange negligence had never stored the place. Martinez who had four thousand men was therefore driven to a rigid economy of food, but in bearing such privations the Peninsula race are unrivalled.

Macdonald setting aside his own plans, now earnestly adjured Suchet to suspend the siege of Taragona, and restore him the troops of the seventh corps. Maurice Mathieu also wrote from Barcelona in a like strain, thinking the possession of upper Catalonia depended upon one powerful effort to recover the lost fortress. But Suchet, who had no immediate interest in that part of the province, whose hope of obtaining a marshal's staff rested on the taking of Taragona, his preparations being all made for that siege,—Suchet whose judgment was unclouded, and military talent of a high order, refused even to delay for a moment his march against Taragona. His battalions, he said, were scattered in search of supplies, he could not reunite them and reach Figueras under twenty-five days; in that time the enemy, unless prevented by Baraguay d'Illiers, could gather provisions, receive reinforcements, and secure the fortress. A simple blockade might be established by the nearest troops; to accumulate numbers on such a sterile spot would not forward the recapture, but would create infinite difficulties with respect to subsistence. It was probable Napoleon had received information of the disaster and given orders for the remedy; and it would be unwise to renounce the attack on Taragona, the only remaining bulwark of Catalonia, at the moment of execution, because of the loss of a fort. In Taragona the greatest part of the Catalan forces would be shut up, and it was only in such situations they could be made prisoners. At Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, eighteen thousand men and eight hundred officers had been captured; and if ten or twelve thousand more could be taken in Taragona the strength of Catalonia would be entirely broken. If the Spaniards failed in revictualing Fernando, that place would, by occupying their attention become more hurtful than useful to them. Campo Verde would probably march to its succour and thus weaken Taragona, which was a reason for hastening rather than suspending the investment of the latter; wherefore, notwithstanding the

separation of his battalions and the incomplete state of his preparations, he would move down immediately and commence the siege.' A wise determination and justifying his reputation as a general.

Macdonald was now fain to send all the troops he could safely draw together, to reinforce Baraguay d'Hilliers; a detachment from Toulon and some frontier guards arrived at Figueras in June, and fifteen thousand men being thus united he took the command in person. Establishing a rigorous blockade, he worked day and night on works of circumvallation and contravallation, and his lines, six miles in length, crowning the tops of mountains and sinking into the deepest valleys, showed what prodigious labours armies are capable of. With these works and incessant wakefulness Macdonald recovered the place, but at a late period in the year, and when Suchet's operations had quite changed the aspect of affairs in Catalonia.

After the fall of Tortosa, that general had been so diligent, that when the siege of Taragona was confided to him, his magazines at Lerida and Mora were full, and his battering train formed at Tortosa; to which place his tools, platforms, and other materials, fabricated at Zaragoza, were also conveyed. Fifteen hundred draft horses, with artillerymen and engineers, and ten battalions of infantry were there collected, and from thence shot and shells were continually forwarded to San Felipe de Balaguer; this was a fine application of Caesar's maxim, that war should maintain itself; for all the money, the guns, provisions, and materials, collected for this siege, were the fruits of former victories; nothing was derived from France but the men. It is however curious that Suchet praises the English ministers' financial ability, exemplified by making Spain pay all the expense of the war, and never permitting English gold to circulate in the Peninsula! He was ignorant that Spain and Portugal lived upon England, and that the English ministers' paper system had left them no English gold to send.


To avoid difficulties, the French artillery moved by the carriage road of the Col de Balaguer, but the provisions and stores passed from Mora by Falcet and Momblanch to Reus;

Mora was itself supplied from Zaragoza, Caspe, and Mequinenza, and the following general precautions were adopted:—*Gens-d'armes* and frontier guards, descending the high valleys of Aragon, occupied the castles of Jaca and Venasque. The great line of correspondence with France was changed from Pampe-luna, to run by Pau and Jaca to Zaragoza, being guarded by four or five thousand troops of all arms, who watched the partidas of the Moncayo mountains and Navarre. General Paris occupied Daroca with four battalions, some cavalry and guns, and his command extended to Molina, which was armed and garrisoned. Abbé, having five battalions, three hundred cuirassiers, and two guns at Teruel, watched Villa Campa and the Valencian army. Alcanitz and Morella, guarded by fifteen hundred infantry, furnished a short passage through the mountains into Valencia; from the former, the line to Caspe, and down the Ebro from Mequinenza to Tortosa, was protected by twelve hundred men; two battalions were in Tortosa and four hundred men in Rapita.


This line of defence was from right to left fourteen marches, but the fortified posts enabled the troops to protect it. The Valencian army, Villa Campa, and the partidas of New Castille and Navarre, including Mina and the Empecinado, were thus held in check by twelve thousand French on a line of one hundred and fifty miles. Covered only by that slight curtain, Suchet proceeded to besiege a strong city, having a powerful garrison, an open harbour, and sea communications with Cadiz, Valencia, Gibraltar, and the Balearic islands; detachments from the army of the centre did, indeed, at times, chase the partidas from the line of defence thus traced, but at this period, that army, from circumstances to be hereafter noticed, was nearly paralysed.

To avoid using up the sheep and cattle of Aragon, which would have alienated the people and annihilated his own future supply by destroying the breeding flocks, Suchet contracted for his meat in France; and so entirely had he pacified Aragon, that none of the contractors failed though their herds and flocks passed through that province and were paid for by Aragonese contributions. This resource however, not being immediate, and the scarcity of meat great, incursions were





EXPLANATORY SKETCH  
 AND  
 SIEGE OF TARRAGONA



made beyond the frontier of Aragon and in the higher valleys of the Pyrenees to obtain cattle. This was the state of affairs when the surprise of Figueras took place, but then Suchet, fearing Mina would intercept his communication with France, detached Chlopiski with four hundred infantry and two hundred hussars to watch that chief only; and he besought the emperor for troops from Pampeluna and the army of the north to relieve his posts at Sanguessa, Soria, and Calatayud. Then, having recovered his foraging detachments from the high valleys, he reviewed his army, issued a month's pay and six rations to each soldier, loaded many carriages and mules with flour, spread a report that he was going to Figueras, and moved by Momb Blanch upon Taragona. Some migueletes entrenched in the pass of Ribas were dispersed by Harispe, and the army descended the hills to Alcover; but four hundred men were left in Momb Blanch, where a post was fortified to protect the communication with Lerida, and prevent the partisans on that flank troubling the line between Mora and Reus. The Spanish outposts were soon driven over the Francoli, the artillery moved by the Col de Balaguer, and Habert came with a large convoy from Mora to Reus.



## CHAPTER V.

IN Taragona, there was a scarcity of money and ammunition; and so many men had gone to succour Figueras, that the garrison, commanded by Gonzales, was not more than six thousand, including twelve hundred armed inhabitants and the seamen of the port. The town, encumbered with defensive works, most of them ill-constructed, irregular, and without convenient places for making sallies, was built upon rocks, steep on the north-east and south, but sinking gently on the south-west and west into low ground. The mole harbour could receive ships of the line, and beyond that there was a roadstead. The upper town, surrounded by ancient walls, crowned the rocks, which were again enclosed by a second rampart with irregular bastions running round the whole city. On the east, across the road to Barcelona, was a chain of redoubts connected by curtains, with ditch and covered way; and behind this line was a rocky space called the Milagro, opening between the body of the place and the sea. The lower town on the west, separated from the upper by the ramparts of the latter, was protected by three regular and some irregular bastions with a ditch. A square work, called Fort Royal, formed a species of citadel between the two towns, and the whole offered an irregular oblong figure, whose length, lying parallel to the sea, was about twelve hundred yards. On the west beyond the walls, a newly constructed line, carried along the coast to the mouth of the Francoli, ended in a large redoubt built to secure access to that river when the ancient aqueducts which furnished the city with water should be cut by the French. This line was strengthened by a second redoubt, called the Prince, raised between that near the Francoli and the town, and it was supported by the mole, which being armed with batteries, and nearly in a parallel direction, formed as it were a second sea-line.

On the Francoli side the approach was level, and exposed to the fire of the Olivo, a very large outwork which, on the north, crowned a rocky table-land, equalling the upper town in height but divided from it by a ravine nearly half a mile wide, yet united by a double aqueduct. Of irregular construction, the Olivo was four hundred yards long with a ditch twenty-four deep and forty wide; but the covered way was incomplete, and the gorge of the work only closed by an unfinished loopholed wall, because the steepness of the rock and the fire of the upper town seemed sufficient for its protection. On the left, one bastion was cut off by a ditch and rampart from the rest of the work, and on the right was a small interior redoubt of refuge, having a high cavalier from which three guns overlooked everything around. The ordinary garrison was from twelve to fifteen hundred men, and it contained fifty out of three hundred pieces mounted for the defence of Taragona.

The nature of the soil combined with the peculiarities of the works determined Suchet's line of attack. On the north and east side the ground was rocky, the fronts of defence wide, the approaches unfavourable for breaching batteries: and as all the guns and stores would have to be dragged over the hills on a great circuit, unless the Olivo was first taken, no difficulty could be avoided. The lower town was therefore chosen, although the artificial defences were there accumulated, and the ground between the walls and the Francoli taken in reverse by the Olivo, which rendered it necessary first to reduce that outwork. But the soil was deep and easily moved, the depôts and parks close at hand, the ground-plot of the works so salient they could be embraced with fire, and the attack, it was supposed, would deprive the garrison of fresh water. •

On the 4th of May the French, passing the Francoli, drove in the outposts, took possession of two small detached redoubts situated on the northern side called the forts of Loretto, and invested the place. The Spaniards, supported by the fire of the Olivo, killed and wounded two hundred men, and the next day made a fruitless attempt to retake the lost ground. Captain Codrington, having three English ships of the line three frigates and several Spanish vessels of war, aided the defence by cannonading the French right, and harassing their

convoys coming by the coast road, but the investment was completed.

Habert's division on the right extended from the sea to the Francoli bridge. Frere's division connected Habert with Harispe, who was before the Olivo. The Italians prolonged Harispe's left across the Barcelona road to the coast, eastward of Taragona. A trestle-bridge was constructed on the upper Francoli; the parc, established west of that river at Canonja, contained sixty-six battering guns and mortars, with seven hundred rounds of ammunition, and thirty-six field-pieces; two thousand artillerymen, seven hundred sappers and miners, fourteen hundred cavalry, and fifteen thousand infantry were present. Head-quarters were at the village of Constanti, which offered a strong covering position. The depôt at Reus was secured by fortified convents; Mora by a strong detachment; and other troops from Falset watched over the communications, which were also protected by the escorts of the convoys. The aqueducts leading from the Olivo to the town were cut by the French, but the water, which was as necessary to them as to the besieged, had its source twelve miles distant, and the somatenes cut it off again, which forced Suchet to guard the whole course during the siege.

Campo Verde after his defeat at Figueras sent Sarsfield and Eroles to their old posts about Valls, Momblanch, and Igualada, and went himself with four thousand men to Taragona, where the consternation at Suchet's appearance was great; but when Campo Verde came with men, and the English agent Green, brought from Cadiz fifty thousand dollars and two transports laden with arms and stores, apathy ensued and military measures were neglected. Beyond the walls indeed, an attack was made by the miguelotes on Momblanch, and the somatenes assembled against Reus, but without success at either place; French patrols were then pushed over the Gaya to Torre-d'embarra, where some Spaniards remained under the protection of St. Cyr's convention with Reding, by which wounded men were to be placed in the civil hospitals and taken care of without being made prisoners. This compact, strange to say, was never violated, while beyond the hospitals the utmost ferocity was

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displayed: but there is always some point of honour reserved even by the worst men, which if rightly touched may be depended upon.

#### SIEGE OF TARAGONA.

Sarsfield's arrival near Momblanch menaced the French communications with Mora, and a Valencian column, acting in concert with captain Adam of the *Invincible*, attacked Rapita and Amposta; the first was abandoned, but a French regiment succoured the second and defeated the Valencians. Suchet, unwilling to weaken his force, would not restore Rapita, and immediately commenced operations against the lower town of Taragona; but first he constructed a fort and batteries on the right of the Francoli, near the shore, to keep off the ships of war and the gun-boats which could otherwise have looked into his trenches. These works begun in the night of the 7th, were successfully continued under the fire of the ships, and a trench lined with musketeers was also carried up the bank of the river to the bridge. The Spaniards however harassed the camp and the investing troops from within and without so incessantly, that a brigade posted near the Olivo was compelled to raise a rampart, and yet lost fifty or sixty men daily in skirmishes; but in the night of the 13th, during a tempest, the French having stormed two advanced entrenchments near the Olivo turned them against the besieged. A vigorous attempt to retake them was repulsed with a loss of one hundred men; and on the Francoli side, a sally supported by the shipping failed in consequence of the cowardice of some Spanish officers. On the same day, the garrison came out from the Barcelona gate, and six hundred somatenes from the Upper Gaya fell on the patrols of the Italian division, whereupon Palombini scoured the country on the 15th as far as Arbos.

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On the 18th a powerful sally was made from the lower town by Gonzales. Covered by the fire from the ramparts, the Olivo and the fleet, he passed the bridge over the Francoli, and pressed Habert hard, until Suchet pushing the reserves between that river and the Olivo menaced his rear and forced him to retire. On the 20th three other sallies from the

Olivo and the upper town were made on the Barcelona side, and likewise repulsed. Sarsfield now came down with twelve hundred men to a high rock near Alcover, and menaced the depôt at Reus; he was dislodged by general Broussard with a loss to the French of one hundred men; yet three days after he appeared at Momblanch, and it required two brigades to drive him off. Divers attempts were also made on the Falcet line, especially at Grattalopes, where the Spanish colonel Villamil was repulsed by Morozinski, a Pole, with the bravery inherent to his heroic nation: a nation whose glory springs like an *ignis fatuus* from the corruption of European honour!

These repeated attacks warned Suchet that his force was too weak for the extent of communication, and he abandoned Momblanch, retaining only Falcet and Felipe de Balaguer. It was time to concentrate, for Blake, having gone to Valencia, had got from Carlos O'Donnel two thousand infantry and a hundred cannoneers, and returned with them on the 22nd to Taragona. Two thousand stand of arms were in return given by captain Codrington to O'Donnel, to equip fresh levies, and thus twelve thousand fighting men were in the fortress; but the richest citizens had removed with their families and effects to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and the people were dispirited.

Suchet broke ground before the Olivo in the night of the 21st, his approaches being made from both ends of the Spanish entrenchments seized on the night of the 13th. The engineers aimed at a round hill, close to the works, on which to plant their first breaching battery; they crowned it the 22nd, but with much loss, being obliged to carry earth up the hill in baskets, under continual interruption from sallies. Three counter-batteries were however completed, and armed on the 27th with thirteen pieces, of which six threw shells. To effect this, the artillery had been dragged over the rocks under a heavy fire of grape, and in despite of a sally in

which general Salmé was killed. The contest was long doubtful, but was finally decided for the French, and on the 29th, a breach being formed, the assault was ordered.

## STORMING OF THE OLIVO.

Upon the success of this attack Suchet felt his chance of taking the town would depend, for his army was too feeble to bear a serious check. Wherefore, having formed his columns, he personally encouraged them, and directed the troops along the whole line of investment to advance simultaneously and menace every part of the town. The night was dark, the Spaniards unexpectant of an attack because none of their guns had been silenced, but the French, full of hope, eagerly watched for the signal: when that was given, the troops on the Francoli, and those on the Barcelona side, made a sudden discharge of musketry, beat their drums, and loudly shouting approached the town at opposite quarters; the ramparts were instantly covered with fire from within and from without, the ships in the offing threw up rockets, and amidst the noise of four hundred guns the storming column rushed upon the Olivo. The strongest one made for the breach; a second, turning the work, got between it and the town: just as fifteen hundred men, sent to relieve the garrison, were entering the gates: the French instantly fell on their rear, and hurrying forward, entered with it before the gates could be closed. Thirty sappers endeavoured to cut down the door while Papignay, their officer, climbed the wall, but the Spaniards killed him and most of the sappers; the other troops planted their ladders, and breaking the stakes above, opened the gate.

Suchet.

Vacani.

At the main attack a narrow breach was boldly assailed, yet the ditch was fifteen feet deep, the Spaniards firm, the fire heavy, and the French were wavering, when the historian, Vacani, followed by some of his countrymen,—it is a strange error to think the Italians have not a brave spirit!—forced some piling, blocking a subterranean aqueduct, and thus got into the ditch, and afterwards into the fort. The Spaniards, although driven from the ramparts to the little works of refuge at each end of the Olivo, continued to resist until the reserves and a third column under Harispe came up, and with a terrible slaughter ended the contest. Twelve hundred men perished, some escaped, a thousand were taken,

amongst them their commander who had received ten wounds. In the morning three thousand Spaniards came out of Taragona, yet retired without attacking, and Suchet demanded a suspension of arms to dispose of the dead. This was treated with scorn, and the heaps were burned, for the sterile rocks afforded no earth to bury them. Campo Verde now gave Senens de Contreras the command of Taragona, and went himself to the field-army, which was ten thousand strong, including some new levies made by the junta of Catalonia.

Suchet's investment having been precipitated by the fall of Figueras, his stores were not all collected until the 1st of June, when trenches were opened to embrace the whole of the lower town, including the fort of Francoli and its chain of connecting works running along the sea-shore, that is to say, 1°. The Nun's bastion and a half-moon called the King's, which formed on the Spanish right a sort of hornwork to the royal fort or citadel. 2°. The bastion of San Carlos, and a half-moon called the Prince's, which, standing in the retiring angle where the sea-line joined the body of the place, served as a counter-guard to the bastion of San Carlos. 3°. The sea-line itself and the Francoli fort. A fruitless sally was made the 2nd, and in the night of the 3rd some advanced entrenchments were destroyed by the French. Sarsfield then entered Taragona with a detachment, and took command of what was called the Port, which included the mole the works leading to the Francoli and the suburb or lower town: Contreras still remained governor of all, but he expected no success.

The approaches were now carried forward by the sap, the second parallel was commenced, and on the 6th the besiegers were within twenty yards of the Francoli fort, which had a wet ditch and was of regular construction. The breaching batteries opened against it the 7th, the fresh masonry crumbled away rapidly, and at ten o'clock that night, the fort being entirely destroyed, three hundred chosen men in three columns, one of which forded the Francoli river, attacked the ruins. The Spaniards retired fighting towards the half-moon of the Prince, and the French made a disorderly attempt to

enter with them, but were quickly repulsed with a loss of fifty men. Next night a battery of six pieces was constructed in the ruins to silence the guns of the mole, which, together with that of the place, endeavoured to overwhelm the new lodgment with shot. In the nights of the 8th and 9th, under terrible discharges from the upper and lower town, the second parallel was prolonged to fort Francoli on the right, and on the left carried to within seventy yards of the Nun's bastion. On the 11th Sarsfield, in a sally, killed some men and retarded the works, but finally three approaches by the sap were conducted against the Nun's bastion where the besiegers crowned the glacis, and against the half-moon of the King and Prince. Fresh batteries were also constructed, whose fire embraced the whole front from the Prince to the Nun's bastion.

On the morning of the 16th fifty-four guns opened from the French batteries, and the Spaniards, placing sand-bags along the parapets, endeavoured to kill the gunners, who were much exposed; all the cannon which could be directed upon the trenches were employed to crush the batteries, and towards evening this fire mastered that of the besiegers, destroyed the centre of their second parallel, and silenced a battery on their right: the loss and damage was however great on both sides, for two consumption magazines exploded in the town, and the Nun's bastion was breached. The French engineers now observed that the ditch of the Prince was not carried round to the sea, and Suchet who feared a continuation of this murderous artillery battle resolved to storm that point at once. Wherefore at nine o'clock two columns, supported by a reserve, issued from the trenches and after a short resistance entered the work by the gap of the ditch and by escalade; yet the garrison fought well, and a few escaping to another point endeavoured to defend themselves, but being unsupported were put to the sword like the rest: the lodgment thus made was included in the trenches.

During the night of the 17th the old batteries were repaired and a new one, to breach the San Carlos, was begun upon the half-moon of the Prince, a lodgment was effected in the covered way of the Nun's bastion, and the third parallel was com-



menced; but on the right of the trenches the workmen were stopped by water. However, on the 18th the third parallel was completed and the descent of the ditch at the Nun's bastion was commenced by an under-ground gallery; yet the fire from the upper town plunged into the trenches, and thirty-seven shells thrown very exactly into the lodgment on the counterscarp delayed the operations there. The gun-boats, hitherto of little service in the defence, were now put under the British navy; yet the enemy suffered little from the vessels of war, beyond the interruption sometimes given to their convoys on the Col de Balaguer road.

In the nights of the 19th and 20th all the French works were advanced, and the morning of the 21st the new battery in the Prince opened its fire against San Carlos and was followed by all the other batteries. The explosion of an expense magazine silenced the French battery, but the damage was repaired, and at four o'clock in the evening, the Spanish fire being nearly abated and the breaches enlarged, Suchet resolved to storm the lower town. But previous to describing this terrible event, the proceedings within and without the place must be noticed, to give a just idea of the state of affairs.

Macdonald had blockaded Figueras with unceasing vigilance, the best of the migueletes were shut up there, the defeat of Campo Verde spread consternation throughout the province, and the efforts to succour Martinez were confined to Rovira, Manoso, and other chiefs. Francisco Milans had been left in the Hostalrich district, and being popular was enabled to keep up an irregular force; but he sought to be made captain-general of the province, and this, or some other motive, led him to favour the towns of his district at the expense of the general cause: Mattaro and Villa Nueva de Sitjes trafficked in corn with Barcelona, and a secret convoy

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was detected at a later period passing the outposts with Milans' written authority. He put the men to death who permitted the convoy to pass, but did not remove the suspicion of corruption from himself. This traffic was so advantageous to the French, that Maurice Mathieu, who had recently suffered in a skirmish at Mattaro,

was unwilling to disturb it, and made no movement to aid Suchet, which he might have done by occupying Villa Nueva de Sitjes.

In the western parts of Catalonia, Sarsfield Eroles and Caro had formed from the new levies an army of seven or eight thousand men, of which one thousand under Caro were cavalry: they might have done much if Campo Verde, a man of weak character, had not continually changed his plans. At the opening of the siege, Sarsfield had some success on the side of Momblanch and Reus; but when he was sent into the lower town, the active army, reduced to Eroles' division and Caro's cavalry, could only watch the French convoys and posts. Campo Verde fixed his quarters at Igualada, sent detachments to the Gaya and Villa Franca, and holding Villa Nueva de Sitjes as his post of communication with the fleet, demanded assistance from Murcia and Valencia, but in Taragona his proceedings were disliked. Succours came however from various quarters. After captain Codrington had landed the reinforcements from Valencia, stores of powder and mortars were sent from that place and from Cadiz, and more men from Murcia; yet with inexplicable folly, these soldiers were deprived of their arms before embarking, although there were already two thousand men without muskets in the fortress; this was attributed by some to the Murcian authorities, by others to the military agent Roche, and the confusion did not end there. When Codrington embarked the Valencian reinforcement he gave four thousand muskets to O'Donnel for the recruits who were to supply the place of the men he carried away, and to enable Villa Campa and the Empecinado to resume operations: thus while arms were sent away from Taragona to Valencia, troops without arms were being conveyed to Taragona. The garrison was thus augmented nominally to seventeen thousand men, yet not more than twelve thousand were available; for the Murcians were necessarily sent to Montserrat to receive arms, and the hospitals were full. Everything was confused and disorderly. Several colonels and other officers, feigning sickness or with open cowardice quitting the place,

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left their regiments under subordinate officers; the general of artillery was an incapable man; and Contreras, unknown to the inhabitants and unacquainted with the place and its resources, was likewise vacillating and deceitful to those under his orders. He had accepted the command reluctantly and was at variance with Campo Verde outside, and jealous of Sarsfield inside the fortress; in the fleet the Spanish captains of the *Diana* and *Prueba* were accused of gross misconduct, and disputes also arose between the English captains Codrington and Bullen.

Carlos O'Donnell and his brother Henry at the desire of Codrington, now permitted four thousand of the best Valencian troops to embark under general Miranda to join in a grand sally from Taragona; but they exacted a pledge from him to bring back the survivors of this their second detachment when the action was determined. They landed the 12th, and the next day Miranda instead of making the sally, went, at Campo Verde's order, by sea, to Villa Neuva de Sitjes. From thence he marched to meet a detachment of cavalry coming from Villa Franca, and being joined on the 15th by two other squadrons which had broken out of Taragona by the Barcelona gate, he united with Campo Verde at Igualada. This movement was in pursuance of a new plan to succour Taragona. The junta, after quitting the place on the fall of the *Olivo*, had repaired to Montserrat and from thence made the Peninsula ring with their clamours, and they had received promise of aid from O'Donnell and Villa Campa, and from the *partida* chiefs. On this foundation, forgetting the sally, Campo Verde proposed that the English ships should cannonade the French convoys between the Col de Balaguer and the place; that troops should take post at Ordal in observation of the Barcelona garrison; and the remainder of the army, which, including Miranda's men amounted to ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry, should occupy a position near Reus. His design was to communicate with the fleet, to avoid any serious action, and by operating with small corps against the French line of supply compel them to raise the siege, or come out of their entrenchments and fight him in strong positions. Contreras treated this with contempt. He said it would cause the loss of the place and the army; the

French would not raise the siege except for a general battle, and the best mode of fighting them would be in concert with the garrison; wherefore he desired the general-in-chief to attack them in conjunction with himself, and the junta, hating Campo Verde, backed this proposal.

Neither plan was sound. If the generals could have depended upon their troops, Suchet's force was so reduced and his investment so extensive it would have been easy to break through; yet, unless he was entirely routed, which was unlikely, no great advantage would have followed, because the communication was already open by sea. Campo Verde's plan was only proposed the 13th, and would have been too slow for the critical nature of the case. It would have been more in accord with that great maxim of war, which prescribes the *attack of an enemy's weakest point with the greatest possible numbers*, to have marched with his whole force upon Mora, or upon Reus to beat the troops there and destroy the depôts; and then seizing some strong posts on the hills close to the besieger's lines to have entrenched it and operated daily and hourly against their rear. If either of these depôts had fallen the siege must have been raised; and if he could not beat two or three thousand infantry at those places, he could not hope, even with the assistance of the garrison, to destroy sixteen thousand of all arms in the entrenchments before Taragona. Suchet did not fear a battle on the Francoli river; but so tender was he of the depôts, that when Campo Verde sent an officer to raise the somatenes about Mora, he called Abbé with three thousand infantry from Teruel. And that general, active and experienced in guerilla operations, soon dispersed the Spanish levies and took their chief with many other prisoners, after which he joined the besieging army. Suchet required this reinforcement. He had lost a general, two hundred inferior officers, and two thousand five hundred men during the siege, and had not more than twelve thousand infantry fit for duty.

But Villamil, a partisan of Campo Verde's, taking advantage of Abbé's absence, marched with a thousand men to attack Mora, and being beaten on the 16th was succeeded by Eroles, who came with his whole division to Falset on the 20th, and captured a convoy of loaded mules. The design

was to tempt Suchet to send a strong detachment in pursuit of Eroles, in which case the latter was by a rapid march to rejoin Campo Verde near Alcover, when the whole army was to attack Suchet thus weakened: the French general did not, however, move, and his magazines at Reus were still so full that the loss of the convoy was little felt.

Such was the situation of affairs on the 21st of June, when the order to assault the lower town was given to an army small in number but full of vigour and confident of success; while in the place, confusion falsehood and folly were working. Contreras acted a shameful part. Sarsfield had prudently concerted that if the lower town was stormed, the ships of war should come close to the mole, and the garrison should retire there instead of going to the upper town. Scarcely was this settled when Campo Verde recalled him to the active army, intending that Velasco should replace him; but the latter did not arrive, the breaches were open, the assault momentarily expected; and yet Contreras ordered Sarsfield to embark instantly, falsely averring that to be Campo Verde's peremptory commands. Vainly he remonstrated, saying

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the troops would be left to an inefficient subordinate, he was compelled to embark, the assault took place, and Velasco, who came a few hours later, found only the dead bodies of his garrison: Contreras then assured Codrington and the junta, that Sarsfield had gone without orders and betrayed his post!

#### STORMING OF THE LOWER TOWN.

"This calamitous event happened in the evening of the 21st. Two breaches had been made in the bastions and one in the fort Royal; they were not wide, and a few Spanish guns still answered the French fire; nevertheless the assault was ordered, and as some suppose, because Suchet had secret intelligence of Sarsfield's removal and the consequent confusion. Fifteen hundred grenadiers assembled under Palombini in the trenches; a second column was to support the stormers and repel any sally from the upper town; and while the arrangements were in progress, the French

Captain  
Codrington,  
MSS

guns thundered incessantly, and the shouts of the infantry, impatient for the signal, were heard between the salvos, redoubling as the shattered walls gave way. Soon Harispe began to menace the city on the side of Barcelona to distract the attention of the besieged, and then Suchet exhorting his soldiers let them loose while it was still day, and in an instant the breaches were crowned, and the assailants swarmed on the bastions, the ramparts, and the fort Royal. The Spaniards, without a leader, and falling in heaps, broke and fled towards the port, towards the mole, and towards the upper town, where even a reserve stationed under the walls was overthrown: some of the fugitives running towards the mole were saved by the English launches, others escaped into the upper town, and a few were made prisoners, the rest were slaughtered.

At eight o'clock the lower town was won. Fifteen hundred bodies, many of them citizens, were stretched upon the place, and the mercantile magazines of the port being set on fire, the flames finished what the sword had begun. When the carnage ceased, working parties were formed, and ere the confusion in the upper town had subsided, the besiegers were again hidden in their trenches and burrowing onwards. Before them was a front of four bastions with curtains, but no ditch. The bastion of St. Paul was opposite their left, that of St. John opposite their centre; the bastion of Jesus was opposed to their right, but that of Cervantes, which covered the landing place of the Milagro, being somewhat retired, was not embraced by the attack. A hollow piece of ground, serving as a trench, enabled the French engineers to establish their left on a side bastion of a wall connecting the upper with the lower town, and their right was strongly protected by some houses lining the road; for between the two parts of the city there were four hundred yards of open garden-ground interspersed with single houses. A battery was constructed to play upon the landing-places of the Milagro, two mortars from the hill of fort Loretto concurred in this object, and the light troops were pushed close up. At daylight however, the ships of war passed the port delivering their broadsides in succession, Contreras showed the heads of columns as for a sally, and the French skirmishers retired.

The men saved by the ships during the assault were now re-landed in the upper town, and the second reinforcement from Murcia arrived, but again without arms, thus adding to the confusion and difficulties. Nevertheless, as the French had lost six hundred, and the Spaniards only two thousand, Contreras had still nine thousand fighting men, a number nearly equal to the whole infantry of Suchet's army; and far from quailing, he would not even receive a flag of truce sent to offer honourable conditions. Suchet's position was indeed very embarrassing. He had delivered four assaults, his force was diminished nearly one-fifth, and the men's strength was spent with labour on his prodigious works; his line of communication with Lerida was intercepted, that with Mora interrupted, and he had lost a large convoy of provisions together with the mules that carried it. The resolution of the besieged seemed in no manner abated, and their communication with the sea, although partially under the French fire, was still free; the sea itself was covered with ships of war, overwhelming reinforcements might arrive at any moment, and Campo Verde with ten thousand men was daily menacing his rear. The Valencian army, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, Duran who had defeated a French detachment near Mirando del Ebro, Mina who had just then taken the convoy with Massena's baggage at the Puero de Arlaban, in fine, all the partidas of the mountains of Albaracin, Moncayo, and Navarre were in motion, and menacing his position in Aragon. This rendered it dangerous to call up any more troops from the right of the Ebro; and yet a single check might introduce despondency amongst his soldiers, men of different nations, and some but lately come under his command: indeed their labours and dangers were so incessant and wearing, that it is no small proof of the general's talent and the men's spirit, that the confidence of both was still unshaken.

On the 24th intelligence arrived, that the Spanish army was coming down the Gaya river to fight, the garrison was seen to get under arms, and an active interchange of signals took place between the town and the fleet. Suchet leaving a support for his trenches, marched at once to meet Campo Verde. That general had relinquished his own plan, recalled Eroles, united his army at Momblanch on the 22nd, and

moving by Villadoña, descended the hills between the Gaya and the Francoli; he was moving to deliver battle and had directed Contreras to make a sally; but Miranda, who commanded his right wing, found, or pretended to find, some obstacles and halted; whereupon Campo Verde relinquished the attack, and retired to Vendril. The 25th he again promised Contreras to make a decisive attack, and desired that three thousand of the garrison should be sent to Vendril, and the remainder held ready to cut their way through the enemy's lines during the action: he said also that four thousand English were coming by sea to aid in this project. The breaching batteries had not then opened their fire, the wall of the place was consequently untouched; ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry under Campo Verde were within a few miles on the Barcelona side; eight thousand men accustomed to fire were still under arms within the walls; and on the 26th colonel Skerrett appeared in the roadstead, not with four thousand, but twelve hundred British soldiers, sent from Cadiz and Gibraltar to succour Taragona. This force, the increase of shipping, and the promises of Campo Verde, raised the spirits of the Spaniards; and they were more elated when Skerrett and his staff, accompanied by Doyle, Codrington, and others disembarked to examine the means of defence. But they were struck with consternation when they heard the British commander, because his engineers thought the wall would give way after a few salvos, had resolved to keep his troops on board, idle spectators of an assault on the place they had come to succour.

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Contreras, disappointed on all sides, and without dependence on Campo Verde, resolved, if the French delayed the storm until the 29th, to make way by a sally on the Barcelona road, and so join the army in the field: meanwhile to stand the assault if fortune so willed it. And he was not without means, for though there was neither ditch nor covered way, the approach to the walls was high and narrow, and a hedge of aloes, no slight obstacle, grew at the foot of the breached rampart, which was cut also off from the town and side works by an internal ditch and retrenchment. Behind this the houses of the great street called the Rambla, were prepared



for defence, furnishing a second line of resistance; and although the cuts on the flanks hindered the making of sallies in force, the reduced numbers of the French gave good hope that eight thousand brave men would resist them effectually. Still the predominant feeling was to break out on the Barcelona side, the fleet and the active army being to co-operate. Eroles was to enter the place and lead the sally on the 29th, but Suchet's batteries opened on the 28th with crushing effect, a magazine exploded in the Cervantes, the guns of St. Paul were dismounted, the rampart fell away in huge fragments before the incessant stroke of the batteries, and from the Olivo and the old trenches, guns and mortars showered bullets and shells into the town. This fire was well returned, and the shoulders of the breaching batteries were beaten down; but the French gunners stood to their work, the musketry rattled round the walls, the men on both sides crowded forward, and while opprobrious words and defiance passed between them, the generals, within hearing of each other, exhorted their soldiers to fight manfully.

#### STORMING OF THE UPPER TOWN.

At five o'clock in the evening the French fire suddenly ceased, and fifteen hundred men led by Habert, passing out from the parallel, went at full speed up against the breach; twelve hundred under Ficatier followed in support; Montmarie led a brigade round the left, to the bastion of Rosario, with a view to break the gates there during the assault, and thus turn the interior defence of the Rambla; Harispe took post on the Barcelona road, to cut off all retreat. The columns had to pass an open space of a hundred yards to reach the breach, and within twenty yards of it, the hedge of aloes forced them to turn to the right and left, under a terrible fire of musketry and of grape, which the Spaniards poured upon them. The destruction was great and the head of the French gave back and was beginning to fly, when the reserves led by a crowd of officers rushed up in a body. Suddenly, one Bianchini, an Italian soldier who had demanded leave to join the column as a volunteer, and whose white clothes amidst the blue uniform of the French gave him a

Suchet.  
Rogniat.  
Vacani.  
Codrington,  
Mss.

supernatural appearance, issued from the ranks and gliding silently and sternly up the breach reached the top and there fell dead with many wounds. Then his comrades bounded forward with a shout, the Spaniards fled, and the ramparts were darkened by the following masses of the French. Montmarie's sappers had cut away the palisades at Rosario, and his light troops finding a rope hanging from the wall mounted by it at the moment when the breach was carried, and the whole poured into the town like a devastating torrent. In the Rambla a momentary stand was made, but the impulse of victory was too strong, and a dreadful scene of slaughter and violence ensued. Citizens and soldiers, maddened with fear, fled, some by the Barcelona gates, others, throwing themselves over the ramparts, made for the landing-places of the Milagro; but that way also had been intercepted, and numbers leaping from the steep rocks were dashed to pieces, while those who gained the shore were still exposed to the sword of the enemy. The multitude flying by the Barcelona gate were met by Harispe's men, and some being killed, the rest, three thousand, were made prisoners.

Within the town all was horror. Houses were in flames, Gonzales fighting manfully was killed, Contreras, wounded with the stroke of a bayonet, was saved by a French officer, and though the hospitals were respected by the soldiers, in every other part their fury was unbounded. The ship-launches had come close into the Milagro and now saved some of the fugitives, but their guns swept the open space beyond, killing friends and enemies, as mixed together they rushed to the shore; and the French dragoons, passing through the flaming streets at a trot, rode down upon the fugitives, sabreing those who had outstripped the infantry. In every quarter there was great rage and cruelty, and though most of the women and children had been previously removed by the English shipping, and the richest citizens had gone to Sitjes, this assault was memorable as a day of blood. Seven or eight hundred miserable creatures, principally soldiers, escaped on board the vessels, nine thousand including sick and wounded were made prisoners, more than five thousand persons were slain, and a great part of the city was reduced to ashes.

## CHAPTER VI.

SUCHET lost in killed and wounded during the siege between four and five thousand men; yet scarcely had the necessary orders to efface the trenches, secure the prisoners, and establish order in the ruined town been given, than he was in movement to disperse Campo Verde's force. In the night of the 29th Frere's division marched upon Villa Franca, Harispe's upon Villa Nueva, followed by Suchet with Abbé's brigade and the heavy cavalry. Campo Verde abandoned Vendril, Harispe's column, although cannonaded by the English squadron, reached Villa Nueva, where a great multitude, military and others, were striving to embark; the light cavalry sabred some and made fifteen hundred prisoners, including the wounded men who had been carried there from Taragona during the siege: Frere's column in like manner dispersed the Spanish rear-guard at Vendril and Villa Franca. Campo Verde fled with the main body to Igualada, Suchet pushed on to Barcelona, where he arranged with Maurice Mathieu a plan to prevent the Valencian division from re-embarking or marching to aid the blockade of Figueras.

«Distrust, confusion, and discord prevailed amongst the Catalans. The people were enraged against Campo Verde, the junta demanded Infantado for chief; Milans proposed himself; and Sarsfield, whose division was the only one in any order, was at variance with Eroles. The country people desired to have the latter made captain-general, and a junta of officers actually appointed him; yet he would not accept it while Campo Verde remained, and that general had already reached Agramunt, whence, overwhelmed with his misfortunes, he meant to fly towards Aragon. Being persuaded to return to Cervera and call a council of war, it was proposed to abandon Catalonia and embark the

Appendix 8.  
§§ 2, 3.

army; and this disgraceful resolution, although opposed by Sarsfield, Santa-Cruz, and even Campo Verde himself, was adopted by the council, and spread universal consternation. The junta remonstrated loudly, but all the troops who were not Catalans deserted, making principally for the Segre and Cinca rivers, in hope to pass through Aragon into New Castille and so regain their own provinces: every place was filled with grief and despair.

In this conjuncture captain Codrington refused to embark any Catalans; but having promised to take back the Valencians, although the conditions of his agreement had been grossly violated by Campo Verde and Miranda, he performed his contract: yet even this was not arranged without a contest between him and Doyle on the one side, and Miranda and Caro on the other. Green, instead of remaining at the Spanish head-quarters, returned to Peniscola with all the money and arms under his control; and the captain of the *Prueba* frigate, having under his command several Spanish vessels of war loaded with wounded men, the archives of the municipality, ammunition, stores and money, all belonging to Catalonia, set sail for Majorca under such suspicious circumstances, that Codrington thought it necessary to send a ship to fetch him back by force. In this afflicting disorder Suchet brought up his troops to Barcelona, and Maurice Mathieu dispersed a small body of men that Eroles had collected at Mataro. Two thousand four hundred Valencian infantry, having escaped to Arens de Mar, got on board the English vessels and were sent back to their own country; but the cavalry, unwilling to part with their horses, would not embark, and menaced their general Caro, who fled from their fury. Eroles rallied them, and having gathered some stores and money from the smaller depots, marched inland; Campo Verde then embarked privately in the *Diana* to avoid the vengeance of the people, and general Lacy, who had arrived from Cadiz, took the command: he would however have been disregarded, if Eroles had not set the example of obedience. Suchet immediately moved against him, and first scouring the valley of the Congosta and that of Vich, spread his columns in all directions, and opened a communication with Macdonald at Figueras; thus pressed,

Lacy collected the cavalry and a few scattered Catalonian battalions remaining about Solsona, Cardona, and Seu d'Urgel, and took refuge in the hills, while Eroles threw himself into Montserrat, where large magazines had been previously formed. But Suchet resolved to attack this celebrated place, and in that view, leaving Frere and Harispe at Vich and Moya, with orders to move at a given time, returned with the reserve to Reus. Here despatches from Napoleon conveyed to him the title of marshal, and orders to take Montserrat, destroy the works of Taragona, with the exception of a citadel, and finally to march against Valencia. He therefore preserved the upper town, ruined the rest of the works, carried the artillery to Tortosa, and marched against Montserrat on the 22nd of July by the way of Mombianch San Coloma and Igualada: at the same time Harispe and Frere moved by Manresa, and Maurice Mathieu entered Esparaguera with a part of the garrison of Barcelona.

#### TAKING OF MONTSERRAT.

This stronghold was occupied by fourteen or fifteen hundred migueletes and somatenes, and Eroles was daily raising recruits and adding works to its natural strength. It would soon have been impregnable, for the approaches were through steeps and precipices; and high upon a natural platform, opening to the east and overlooking the Llobregat, stood the convent of '*Neustra Señora de Montserrat*,' a great edifice, and once full of riches, but the wary monks had removed their valuables to Minorca early in the war. It was now well stored and armed, and above it huge peaks of stone shot up into the clouds, so rude, so naked, so desolate, that, to use Suchet's expressive simile, 'It was like the skeleton of a mountain.'

There were three ways to reach the convent. From Igualada, by Casa Mansana on the north, one wound between a perpendicular rock and a precipice, and was defended by two batteries in succession, and by a retrenchment in front of the edifice. The other ways were a foot-path leading to Colbato, and a narrow road running by Monistrol on the east; but

both so crossed by precipices as to be nearly inaccessible to troops. Suchet disposed one brigade at Colbato to menace that front and intercept the retreat of the Spaniards; then occupying the roads of Igualada and Monistrol with Harispe's and Frere's divisions, he directed Abbé to attack the convent by the northern line. Abbé drove the Spaniards from Casa Mansana, and the 25th advanced up the mountain, flanked by some light troops, and supported by Suchet in person with the Barcelona troops. He was exposed to the fire of the somatenes, who had gathered round the peaks above, and the first Spanish battery opened upon the head of the column as it turned an angle; yet his light troops being reinforced, climbed the rock, got above the battery and shot down the gunners; then the head of the column went on, and reached the foot of the battery beneath the line of fire. The Spaniards threw down large stones, but soon the fire of the light troops above became so galling the work was abandoned, the French followed close, and the men above clambering along with the energy inspired by success overtook and bayoneted the Spaniards in the second battery.

Abbé was in march to assail the entrenchments of the convent, when a sharp musketry was heard on the opposite quarter, and suddenly the Spanish garrison came flying out of the building pursued by French soldiers, who were supposed to be the brigade from Colbato, but they were light troops first sent out to keep off the somatenes from the right flank. For when the column advanced up the mountain, these men, three hundred in number, wandering to the right, insensibly gained ground up hill, seized one or two of the hermitages with which the peaks are furnished, and growing more daring, finally gained the rock overhanging the convent itself, and with the intelligence proper to veterans, immediately attacked the Spanish reserves. Their commanding position, the steep rocks, and narrow staircases, compensated the inferiority of numbers; they gained one door, and fought the defenders amongst the cloisters and galleries with various turns of fortune, until the fugitives from the batteries, followed by Abbé, arrived. The garrison then gave way and fled down the eastern precipices to the Llobregat, where from

their knowledge of the country they easily avoided Harispe's men.

Eroles and others attributed the fall of Montserrat to Green, because he had carried off the money destined to fortify it. The loss was deeply felt both in a military view, and from the religious veneration in which it was held: several towns and many villages then submitted, and fear of Suchet spread over Spain. However the Catalans, a fierce and constant race, were not yet conquered. Mischief was indeed at work far and wide; those who might have restored order increased the confusion, and their bad example infected the authorities of all the places immediately connected with Catalonia. Cuesta now governor of the Baleares, Bassecour at Cuenca, Palacios, just appointed captain-general of Valencia, all failed to act with vigour. Cuesta, who had before neglected to send from Minorca the guns wanted in Catalonia, now offered to exchange the prisoners at Cabrera against the captives of Taragona; a praiseworthy act, if as Suchet asserts, it was an impulse of humanity; nor was it ill-judged in itself, because the Catalan soldiers were the best in Spain, and the French prisoners were broken in constitution by their hard captivity. But it was at this time viewed with suspicion in Catalonia as tending to increase the French forces, and Mr. Wellesley, involving the English in this shameful cruelty and breach of faith towards those miserable men, so wrought with the regency that it was peremptorily forbidden. Cuesta then refused to receive any more prisoners at Cabrera, and this, whatever the motive, was a meritorious act and the last important one of his life, for he soon afterwards died. The prisoners therefore remained a disgrace to Spain and to England; for if her envoy interfered to prevent their release, she was bound to insist, that thousands of men whose prolonged captivity was the result of her interference should not be exposed upon a barren rock, naked as  
 Appendix 7. they were born, and fighting for each other's  
 § 4. miserable rations to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched.

This untoward state of affairs in Catalonia was aggravated by the English, Spanish, and French privateers, who taking

advantage of the times plundered the people along the coast in concert; and they were all engaged in smuggling tobacco, the monopoly of which was the principal revenue. Yet there were many considerable resources left to the Catalans. The chief towns had fallen, but the mountainous districts had been scarcely crossed by the French lines of invasion. The somatenes were numerous, more experienced, and ready to come forward under a good general if arms were provided for them. English squadrons were always at hand to aid; admiral Keats brought three thousand muskets from Gibraltar; sir E. Pellew, who had succeeded to the command of the Mediterranean fleet, was anxious to succour the province, and Minorca was a great depôt of guns, stores, and even men. Lacy, Eroles, Rovira, and others, raised fresh levies; and while the blockade of Figueras kept Macdonald's army employed, the Catalans operated partially on the side of Besalu and Bispal and even in the French Cerdaña, which being unprotected was invaded by Lacy.

Suchet, whose posts now extended from Lerida to Montserrat on one side, and on the other from Taragona to Mequinenza, foresaw that a new and troublesome Catalanian war was preparing; yet he was forced to return to Zaragoza, partly to prepare for the invasion of Valencia, partly to restore tranquillity in Aragon, which had been disturbed by the passage of the seceders from Campo Verde's army. The Valencian cavalry also had, when Eroles threw himself into Montserrat, endeavoured under the conduct of Gasca to push through Aragon towards Navarre; and although they were intercepted by Reille, and followed closely by Chlopiski, they reached Valencia without much loss: the rest of the fugitives gained the Moncayo mountains and afterwards joined Mina. That chief was in a low state. He had been defeated by Chlopiski and Reille on the 14th of July at Sangüessa, and the reinforcements then pouring into Spain, previous to Massena's invasion of Portugal, enabled those generals to beat him at Estrella the 23rd, at Soriada the 24th, and at Val de Baygory the 25th. He finally escaped to Motrico on the Biscay coast, where he received fresh arms and stores from the English vessels, but was once more defeated by Caffarelli, and



finally driven for refuge to the Liebana, where, however, the soldiers flying from Taragona and Figueras joined him, and he soon re-appeared more fierce and powerful than before.

Villa Campa, whose division had been re-equipped from the supplies given by Codrington, concerted operations with the partida chiefs Duran and Campillo, and their combined forces, eight thousand strong, advanced from different quarters on the right bank of the Ebro, invested Calatayud, and sought to carry off grain which was now very scarce. This delayed the invasion of Valencia, for Suchet would not undertake it until he had again secured the frontier of Aragon, and many of his battalions were then escorting the prisoners to France. When they returned he directed numerous columns against the partidas, while French troops from the army of the centre came down by Medina Celi; the Spaniards then retired to their fastnesses in the mountains of Soria on one side, and to those of Albaracin on the other. Four thousand of the Valencian army had meanwhile marched against Rapita and Amposta, the former post having been re-established after the fall of Taragona; and though Habert, marching out of Tortosa, defeated them with a considerable loss, the embarrassments of the third corps were not removed. For the Catalans began to harass the posts between Lerida and Montserrat, and on the 9th of August the somatenes fell on some Italians placed in Monistrol and were with difficulty repulsed; a few days after, a convoy coming from Igualada to Montserrat was attacked by fifteen hundred insurgents, and was unable to proceed until Palombini arrived with a battalion and dislodged the Catalans, yet he lost more than a hundred of his own men in the action. Suchet, seeing then he could not safely withdraw from Catalonia until the fall of Figueras should let loose the army of the upper province, sent fresh troops to Montserrat, and ordered Palombini to aid Macdonald in the blockade of Fernando, but that place had yielded before Palombini passed Barcelona.

Martinez, after many vain efforts to break the line of blockade, and having used all edible substances, had prepared, the 16th, to make a final effort in concert with Rovira, but an officer deserting from the garrison betrayed the project,

and Rovira was beaten the morning before the garrison sallied; nevertheless Martinez strove to cut his way through on the side of Rosas, but was driven back with a loss of four hundred men. Three days after, the place was given up and three thousand famishing men were made prisoners. Thus ended the fourth great effort of the Catalonians. The success of the French was not without alloy, more than a quarter of the blockading troops had died of a pestilent distemper. Macdonald himself was too ill to hold command, and his army so weakened, that no further active operations could be undertaken; Suchet was still occupied in Aragon, and Lacy thus obtained time and means to re-organize troops for a fifth effort. The persons who had originally betrayed the place to Rovira were shot, and the commandant whose negligence had occasioned the misfortune was condemned to death. But Napoleon, so foully misrepresented as a sanguinary tyrant, Napoleon who had commuted the sentence of Dupont, now pardoned Guillot: a clemency in both cases remarkable, seeing that the loss of an army by one, and of a great fortress by the other, not only tended directly and powerfully to the destruction of the emperor's projects, but were in themselves great crimes. No other sovereign in Europe could have displayed such a merciful greatness of mind.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1°. The emperor was discontented with Macdonald, who seems to have mistaken the nature of mountain warfare in general, and that of Catalonia in particular. The first requires a persevering activity in seizing commanding posts on the flanks or rear of an adversary; and as the success depends upon rapidity and vigour, the troops should be excited by continual enterprise, and nourished by commendation and rewards. Macdonald, if we may believe Vacani, an eye-witness, did neither gain the confidence of his soldiers nor cherish their ardour; and while he exacted a more rigid discipline than the composition of his troops and the nature of the war would bear, let pass important opportunities of crushing his enemies in the field. His intent was to reduce the ferocious and

insubordinate disposition of his men ; but the peculiar state of feeling on both sides did not permit this, and his marches appeared rather processions and ceremonies than warlike operations. He won no town, struck no important blow in the field, gave no turn to the public feeling, and lost an important fortress, which with infinite pains and trouble he could scarcely regain.

2°. All the French generals had acted on different plans. St. Cyr remained quiet until the Spaniards gathered in such numbers that he could crush them in general battles, but then he lost the fruit of his success by after inactivity. Augereau neither fought battles nor made excursions with skill, nor fulfilled the political hopes which he had excited. Macdonald was in constant movement, yet avoided battles, although in every previous important attack the Catalans had been beaten, whether in strong or in weak positions. Suchet combined skill, activity and resolution, and the success which distinguished his operations is the best comment upon the proceedings of the others. It is in vain to allege that he was in a better condition for offensive operations, and that the emperor required of the seventh corps exertions which want of provisions prevented it from making. Napoleon might have been deceived as to the resources at first, and have thus put it upon enterprises beyond its means ; but after two years' experience, after receiving the reports of all the generals employed there, and having the most exact information of all occurrences, it is impossible to imagine so consummate a captain would have urged impracticable operations. Nor did Macdonald give any convincing proof that his own views were sound. It would be presumptuous to doubt the merit of a man who in so many wars has maintained a noble reputation, amidst innumerable dangers and great political convulsions, but Macdonald's military talent seems to have been at fault in the warfare of Catalonia. St. Cyr and other French writers have endeavoured to show indeed that Napoleon was the only man who did not understand the nature of the war in Spain, and that the French armies were continually overmatched. This criticism is easily refuted. After Baylen, the French armies never

lost a great battle except to the English; they took every town they besieged, and suffered no reverse from the Spaniards which cannot be distinctly traced to the executive officers. Where then was Napoleon's error?

3°. The surprise of Figueras has been designated a misfortune to the Spaniards, because it shut up a large body of the best migueletes who fell with the place; and because it drew Campo Verde from Taragona at a critical period. Contrast the advantages, however, and apart from the vigour and enterprise displayed in the execution, no mean help to the cause at the time, it will be found a great gain. It carried Macdonald from Barcelona, and thus the fall of Montserrat was deferred, and great danger of failure incurred by Suchet at Taragona; a failure infallible if the adverse generals had behaved with skill or courage. It employed all the French army of Upper Catalonia the national guards of the frontier, and even troops from Toulon in a blockade, during which the sword and sickness destroyed more than four thousand men, and the remainder were so weakened as to be incapable of field service for a long time: meanwhile Lacy re-organized fresh forces, and revived the war, which he could never have done if the seventh corps had been disposable. Campo Verde was incapable of handling large masses, it is doubtful if he could have resisted or retarded for any time the investment of Taragona; but it is certain the blockade of Figueras gave an opportunity for recovering the loss of Taragona, and it forced Suchet, instead of Macdonald, to take Montserrat, which disseminated the former force and retarded the invasion of Valencia. Wherefore Rovira's daring surprise and Martinez' resolute maintenance of Figueras were useful and glorious.

4°. During this campaign, resolution, perseverance, and talent were evinced by Suchet in all his operations, but the success was in a great measure due to the faults of his opponents, amongst which Skerrett's conduct was prominent. Captain Codrington and others agreed indeed in the resolution not to land, there was a heavy surf, and the engineers predicted that the wall would soon be beaten down: but the question should have been viewed in another light. Taragona was the bulwark of the principality, the stay and hope of the

war; it was the city of Spain whose importance was next to Cadiz, and before its walls the security or the ruin of Valencia as well as of Catalonia was to be found. Of the French scarcely fourteen thousand infantry were under arms, and exhausted with toil. The upper town was still unbreached, and attacked only upon one very narrow front, and behind it the Rambla offered a more powerful line of defence. There were, to use the governor's expression, within the walls '*eight thousand of the most warlike troops in Spain*,' and there was a succouring army without, equal in number to the whole infantry of the besiegers: hence the stoutest assailants might have been repulsed, and a severe repulse would have been fatal to the French operations.

5°. Captain Codrington says that in the skirmishes beyond the walls the valour of the garrison was eminent: that he saw a poor ragged fellow endeavouring, such was his humanity and greatness of mind, to stifle the burning fuze of a shell with sand, that some women and children might have time to escape. Feeling and courage, the springs of moral force, were therefore not wanting, but the virtue of the people was diminished and the spirit of the soldiery overlaid by the bad conduct of their leaders. The rich citizens fled early to Villa Nueva, and were followed by many superior officers of regiments; Contreras, jealous of Sarsfield, forced him to quit his post at a critical moment, and then represented it to the garrison as a desertion; the Valencians were carried off after being one day in the place, and the Murcians came without arms. All this confusion and mischief being palpable, the poor Spanish soldiers could anticipate nothing but failure if left to themselves, and it was precisely for that reason the British should have been landed to restore confidence. Was there nothing to be allowed for the impetuous fury of an English column breaking out of the place at the moment of attack? A seventy-four, convoying the transports, had arrived with Skerrett, and such was the number of ships, that a thousand seamen and marines might have been added to the troops. Who then can believe that three or four thousand French and Italians, the utmost able to bear in mass on one point, and that not an easy point, the breach being narrow and scarcely practicable, would have carried the place

against eight thousand Spaniards and two thousand British. But then the surf and the enemy's shot at the landing-place, and the opinion of Doyle and of Codrington and of the engineers! The enemy's shot could not at night have stopped the disembarkation, and the engineers only reported on the walls, which touched not the moral considerations. When the Roman Pompey was adjured by his friends not to put to sea during a violent storm he replied, '*It is necessary to sail—it is not necessary to live.*' It was also necessary to save Taragona! Was no risk to be incurred for so great an object? Was an uncertain danger to be weighed against such a loss to Spain? Was the British intrepidity to be set at nought? Were British soldiers to be quiet spectators, while Spaniards stood up in a fight? Is that false but common doctrine, so degrading to soldiers, that brick-and-mortar sentiment, that the courage of the garrison is not to be taken into account, to be implicitly followed? What if the Spaniards had been successful? The result was most painful. Taragona strongly fortified, having had at different periods fifteen thousand men thrown into it, with an open harbour and free communication by sea, was taken by less than twenty thousand French and Italian infantry, in the face of a succouring army, a British brigade, and a British fleet!

6°. Suchet's cruelty, and the ferocity of his soldiers, have been dwelt upon by several writers, but he has vindicated his own conduct, and it is unnecessary here to investigate facts which have been distorted, and reasoning which has been misapplied. That every barbarity commonly attendant upon the storming of towns was practised may be supposed; there is in the military institutions of Europe nothing calculated to arrest such atrocities. Soldiers of every nation look upon the devastation of a town taken by assault as their right, and it would be unjust to hold Suchet responsible for the violence of an army, composed of men from different countries, exasperated by the obstinacy of the defence and a cruel warfare: in Spanish towns also the people generally formed a part of the garrison.

## OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA.

The transactions in the first of these provinces have been noticed; those in Murcia were of little interest, for the defeat of Blake at Cullar in November, 1810, and the fever which raged at Carthagena, together with the frequent change of commanders, and the neglect of the government, had completely ruined the Murcian army. The number of men was considerable, and the fourth corps, weakened by draughts and menaced by the Barossa expedition, could not oppose more than five or six thousand men. Murcia had not been touched by the French, yet in February, 1811, Roche, the military agent, described the whole army as 'ready to disperse on the first appearance of an enemy;' and in the following June says, 'after being left to themselves for three years, the Murcian troops are absolutely in a worse state than they were at the commencement of the revolution. General Freire, at the head of sixteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, will not attack the six thousand French before him lest his men should disperse; and they think as little of their general as he does of them. Indolence, lassitude, and egotism prevail in all parts, the establishment of the Cortes has proved a very slight stimulus to enthusiasm, and the most agreeable thing in the world to the Spaniards, would be to remain neuter while England and France fought the battle and paid all the expense.' The Murcian force was increased after Mahi's arrival to twenty-two thousand men, but remained inactive until August, when Blake assumed the command.

In the south of Grenada and Andalusia little passed worth notice, for during Blake's absence in Estremadura the war was principally confined to the Ronda, where the Serranos, aided at times by the troops from Algesiras, and by succours from Gibraltar, were always in arms; yet even there, the extreme arrogance of the Spanish generals so vexed the Serranos they were hardly prevented from capitulating in form with the French: and while Soult continued at Llerena, after the battle of Albuera, the escopeteros and civic guards sufficed to keep the partidas in check. Thus the blockade of the Isla remained undisturbed from without, and Cadiz itself, the seat

of all intrigues and follies, was fed by English fleets and defended by English troops. But the narrative of secondary operations being now completed, and the fate of Spain proved to depend upon the British general alone, it will be proper in the next book to take a view of political affairs, showing how strongly they bore upon lord Wellington's decisions: and if such an interruption of the military story should be distasteful, the reader must reflect, that war is not so much a series of battles as a series of difficulties in the preparations to fight them with success.



## BOOK THE FOURTEENTH.

## CHAPTER I.

## POLITICAL SITUATION OF JOSEPH.

AFTER the conquest of Andalusia, the intrusive monarch pursued his own policy with more eagerness than before. He published amnesties, granted honours and rewards to his followers, took many of the opposite party into his service, and treated the people generally with mildness. He was however guided generally by his Spanish ministers, who, tainted with the national weakness, were, especially Orquijo, continually making exaggerated reports, intriguing against the French generals, and striving, sometimes with, sometimes without justice, to incense the king against them. This course, which was perhaps inevitable, excited angry feelings and produced constant disputes; and in the conquered provinces, Joseph's civil agents sought more of the spoil than comported with the wants of the armies, wherefore bickerings between the French and Spanish authorities were as unceasing as they were violent. The prefects, royal commissaries, and intendants would not act under military orders with respect to the supplies, nor would they furnish sums for the military chests. The generals often seized the king's revenue, raised extraordinary and forced contributions, disregarded legal forms, and threatened to arrest the royal agents when they refused compliance with their wishes. Nor was Joseph's conduct always free from violence; in the latter part of 1811 he compelled the merchants of Madrid to draw bills for two millions of dollars on their correspondents in London, to meet a forced loan. He con-

Joseph's  
Papers,  
MSS.

Appendix 9.  
§ 1.

Mr. Stuart,  
MSS.

stantly complained to the emperor that the niggardly allowances from France, the exactions of the generals, and the misery of the country left him no means of existence as a monarch. During the greatest part of 1810 and the beginning of 1811, Santa Fé, Almenara, and Orquijo, succeeding each other as ambassadors at Paris, had angry negotiations upon this subject, and upon the cession of the Ebro provinces in exchange for Portugal.

Joseph's  
Papers.  
MSS.

Against this project Joseph protested as a violation of the constitution of Bayonne, likely to alienate the Spaniards, degrading to himself, and unjust as a bargain; seeing that Portugal was neither so rich, so industrious, so pleasant, nor so well affected to him as the provinces to be taken away: and the well-known hatred between the Spaniards and Portuguese would never allow the latter to be quiet subjects.

Napoleon answered with his usual force and clearness of judgment. He said the cost of the war had drained the French exchequer; he had employed nearly four hundred thousand men for the king's interest, and rather than increase the expenses he would withdraw some of the troops. He reproached Joseph with the feebleness of his operations, the waste and luxury of his court, his ill-judged schemes of conciliation, his extravagant rewards, his too great generosity to the opposite party, and his raising, contrary to the opinion of the marshals, a Spanish army which would desert on the first reverse. The constitution of Bayonne, he said, was rendered null by the war, nevertheless he had not taken a single village from Spain, and he had no wish to seize the provinces of the Ebro, unless the state of the contest compelled him to do so. He required indeed a guarantee for the repayment of the money France had expended for the Spanish crown; yet the real wishes of the people were to be ascertained before any cession of territory could take place, and to talk of Portugal before it was conquered was folly. As this last observation was Joseph's own argument, an explanation ensued, when it appeared that Almenara, thinking the seizure of the Ebro provinces a settled plan, had, of his own accord, asked for Portugal as an indemnification; a fact characteristic of Spanish politicians. Napoleon also assured the king there must be a great

deal of money in Spain; for, besides the sums sent from France, the plate of the suppressed convents, and the silver received by the Spaniards from America, there were the subsidies from England and the enormous expenditure of her troops. Then the seizure and sale of national domains, and of confiscated colonial produce, were to be taken into calculation, and if the king wanted more, he must extract it from the country; France would only continue her subsidy of two millions of francs monthly, the emperor had always supported his wars by the resources of the territory in which it was carried on, and the king might do the same.

Joseph replied that his court was neither luxurious nor magnificent; that he recompensed services, by giving bills on the contingent sales of national domains, which could not be applied to the wants of the soldiers; that he could scarcely keep the public servants alive, and his own expenses were not greater than the splendour of the crown required. Many of the best generals approved of his raising a Spanish army, desertions from it were less frequent than was imagined, and were daily diminishing; and these native troops served to garrison towns while the French were in the field. He wished, he said, to obtain large loans rather than small gifts from the French treasury, and desired that the confiscated property of the Spanish noblemen who had been declared traitors in 1808, should be paid to him; but with regard to harsh measures, the people could not pay the contributions, and the proceedings of a king with his subjects should not be like those of a foreign general; lenity was necessary to tranquillize the provinces subdued, and as an example to those which resisted. The first thing was to conciliate the people's affections. The plate of the suppressed convents was not so valuable as it appeared at a distance, the greater part of it was already plundered by the guerillas, or by the French troops. The French marshals intercepted his revenues, disregarded his orders, insulted his government, and oppressed the country. He was degraded as a monarch and would endure it no longer. He had been appointed to the throne of Spain without his own consent, and although he would never oppose his brother's will, he would not live a degraded king, and was therefore

ready to resign, unless the emperor would come in person and remedy the present evils.

Napoleon admitted the reasonableness of some of the king's statements, but still insisted, with propriety of argument, that it was necessary to subdue the people before they could be conciliated. Yet to prevent wanton Appendix 9,  
§ 8. abuses of power, he fixed the exact sum which each person from the general governors down to the lowest subaltern was to receive, and he ordered every person violating this regulation to be dismissed upon the spot, and a report of the circumstance sent to Paris within twenty February. hours after. Bessières, acknowledged by all to be a just and mild man, had been sent to remedy the mischief said to have been done by Kellerman and others in the northern provinces. In respect of conciliation, the emperor remarked he had himself, at first, intended to open secret negotiations with the Cortes, but on finding what an obscure rabble they were, he had desisted. He therefore recommended Joseph to assemble at Madrid a counter-cortes, composed of April. men of influence and reputation, wherein advertising to the insolence of the Spaniards towards their colonies, he might by discussing really liberal institutions, and exposing the bad faith with which the English encouraged the Americans, improve public opinion, and conciliate the Spaniards, with hopes of preserving the integrity of the empire, so rudely shaken by the revolt of the colonies.

An additional subsidy was peremptorily refused, but the emperor finally consented to furnish Joseph with half a million of francs monthly, for the particular support of his court; and it is worthy of notice, as illustrating the character of Appendix 9. Napoleon, that in the course of these disputes, Joseph's friends at Paris repeatedly advised him, that the diplomatic style of his letters incensed and hardened the emperor, whereas his familiar style as a brother always softened and disposed him to concede what was May. demanded. Joseph would not however endure the decree for establishing the military governments, by which the administration was placed entirely in the hands of the generals, and their reports upon the civil and judicial admi-

nistration referred entirely to the emperor:—it was a measure assailing at once his pride, his power, and his purse. His mind, therefore, became daily more embittered, and his prefects and commissaries, emboldened by his opinions, absolutely refused to act under the French marshals' orders. Many of these complaints, founded on the reports of his Spanish servants, were untrue and others distorted. The habitual exaggerations, and downright falsehoods of the juntas and the regency, thwarted the English general's operations, and the king, as well as the French generals, must have encountered a like disposition in the Spanish ministers. Nevertheless, the nature of the war rendered it impossible but that much ground of complaint should exist. Joseph's personal sentiments, abstractedly viewed, were high-minded and benevolent; but they sorted ill with his situation as an usurper. He had neither patience nor profundity in his policy, and at last, such was his irritation, having drawn up a private but formal renunciation of the crown, he took an escort of five thousand men, and about the period of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, passed out of Spain and reached Paris: there Ney, Massena, Junot, St. Cyr, Kellerman, Augereau, Loison, and Sebastiani were also assembled, all discontented with the war and with each other.

By this proceeding, the intrusive government was left without a head, and the army of the centre was rendered nearly useless at the critical moment, when Soult, engaged in the Albuera operations, had a right to expect support from Múrid. The northern army also was in a great measure paralysed, and the army of Portugal, besides having just failed at Fuentes, was in all the disorganization attendant upon the retreat from Santarém, and upon a change of commanders. This was the principal cause why Bessières abandoned the Asturias and concentrated his forces in Leon and Castille on the communications with France; for it behoved the French generals everywhere to hold their troops in hand, and to be on the defensive until the emperor's resolution in this extraordinary conjuncture should be known. Napoleon astounded at the king's precipitation, complained, that having promised not to quit the country without due notice, Joseph

had failed to him, both as a monarch and as a general: he should at least have better chosen his time. If he had retired in January, when the armies were all inactive, the evil would have been less, as the emperor might then have abandoned Andalusia and concentrated Soult's and Massena's troops on the Tagus, which would have been in accord with the policy fitting for the occasion. But now when the armies had suffered reverses, when they were widely separated and in pursuit of different objects, the mischief was great, and the king's conduct not to be justified!

Joseph asserted that he had taken good measures to prevent confusion during his absence, and then reiterating his complaints and declaring his resolution to retire into obscurity, finished by observing with equal truth and simplicity of mind, that it would be better for the emperor that he should do so, inasmuch as in France he would be a good subject, but in Spain a bad king. Napoleon's intellect was however too powerful for his brother. Partly by reason, partly by authority, partly by concession, he induced him to return in July, furnished with a species of private treaty by which the army of the centre was placed entirely at his disposal. He was empowered to punish delinquents, to change the organization and remove officers who were offensive to him, even to the chief of the staff, Belliard, who had been represented by Orquijo as inimical to the system. And if any of the other armies should by the chances of war arrive within the district of the centre army, they also while there were to be under the king; and at all times, even in their own districts, when he placed himself at their head. The army of the north was to remain with its actual organization and under a marshal, but Joseph had liberty to change Bessières for Jourdan.

To prevent the oppression of the people, especially in the north, Napoleon required the French military authorities to send daily reports to the king of all requisitions and contributions exacted. He advised his brother also to keep a Spanish commissary at the head-quarters of each army to watch over Spanish interests: promising that whenever a province should have the means and the will to resist the incursions of the partidas, it should

revert entirely to the government of the king, and be subjected to no charges, save those made by the Spanish civil authorities for general purposes. The armies of the south and of Aragon were placed in a like situation on the same terms, and Joseph was to receive a quarter of the contributions from each, for the support of his court and of the central army. But the entire command of the forces in Spain the emperor would not grant, observing that the marshal directing from Madrid as major-general, would naturally claim the glory as well as the responsibility of arranging the operations; and the other marshals, finding themselves in reality under his instead of the king's command, would obey badly or not at all. All their reports and the intelligence necessary to the understanding of affairs were therefore to be addressed directly to Berthier for the emperor's information. Finally the half million of francs hitherto given monthly to the king was to be increased to a million for the year 1811: and it was expected that Joseph would immediately re-organize the army of the centre, restore its discipline, and make it, what it had not yet been, of weight in the contest.

The king afterwards obtained some further concessions, the most important being the employment and assembling of Spaniards according to his own directions and plans. This arrangement and the importance given to Joseph's return, for by the emperor's orders he was received as if he had only been to Paris to concert a great plan, produced a good effect for a short time; but after the fall of Figueras, Napoleon, fearing to trust Spanish civilians, extended the plan, hitherto confined to Catalonia, of employing French intendants in all the provinces on the left of the Ebro. Then the king's jealousy returned, and the bickering between him and the marshals revived. But the political situation of France determined Napoleon's proceedings. For though in 1811 his power over the continent, as far as the frontier of Russia, was absolute, and in France internal prosperity was enjoyed with external glory, the emperor of Russia, stimulated by English diplomacy, and personal discontent, in dread also of his nobles who were impatient under losses inflicted by the continental system, was plainly opposed to French ascendancy.

Napoleon therefore clearly perceived the coming of a more gigantic contest than any he had hitherto engaged in, and would no longer lavish money and soldiers on the Spanish war. He had indeed poured men continually into that country, but these were generally conscripts, while in the north of France he was forming a reserve of two hundred thousand old soldiers; yet with such art that it was doubtful whether they were intended for the Peninsula or for ulterior objects, being ready for either, according to circumstances. This state of affairs prevented him from taking those decided steps in person with relation to Spain, which he would have done, if that war had been the only great matter on his hands. The aspect of French politics in Spain and other places, was therefore favourable to lord Wellington's views, and a Russian war, sooner or later, was one of the principal chances upon which he rested his hopes of final success. His anticipations were however dashed with fears, for the situation of the Spanish and Portuguese governments, and their armies, and the condition of the English government, were by no means so favourable to his plans.



## CHAPTER II.

POLITICAL STATE OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO  
THE WAR.

It was clear that merely to defend Portugal with enormous loss of treasure and of blood would be a ruinous policy; and to redeem the Peninsula, the Spaniards must be brought to act more reasonably. The national character and the extreme ignorance of public business, military and civil, which distinguished the generals and statesmen rendered this a very difficult task: yet Wellington, finding the English power weak to control, its influence as weak to sway the councils of Spain, hoped by industry, patience, and the glory of his successes to acquire a personal ascendancy which would enable him to direct the resources of the whole Peninsula towards a common object. The difficulty of attaining that ascendancy can, however, only be made clear by a review of the intercourse between the British government and the Spanish authorities, from the first bursting out of the insurrection to the period now treated of: a review which will disclose the utter unfitness of Mr. Canning to conduct great affairs. For heaping treasure, stores, arms, flattery, upon those who were unable to bear the latter or use the former beneficially, he neglected all persons who were capable of forwarding the cause. And neither in the choice of his agents, nor in his instructions to them, nor in his estimation of the value of events, did he discover wisdom or diligence, although he covered his misconduct at the moment by his glittering oratory.

When the Spanish deputies first applied for the assistance  
 1808. of England, Mr. Charles Stuart, who was the  
 only regular diplomatist sent to Spain, carried  
 to Coruña such a sum as made up with previous subsidies one

million of dollars for Galicia alone. The deputies from Asturias had demanded five millions of dollars, and one was paid in part of their demand; but when this was known, two millions more were demanded for Galicia and not refused: yet the first point in Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Stuart was, '*to enter into no political engagements.*' Mr.

Duff, consul at Cadiz, also carried out a million of dollars for Andalusia, the junta asked for three

Appendix 1,  
§ 1. Vol. II.

or four millions more, and the demands of Portugal although less extravagant were very great; thus above sixteen millions of dollars were craved, and more than four millions, including the gift to Portugal, had been sent. The remainder was not denied, and the amount of arms and stores given may be estimated by the fact, that eighty-two pieces of artillery, ninety-six thousand muskets, eight hundred thousand flints, six millions and a half of ball-cartridges, seven thousand five hundred barrels of powder, and thirty thousand swords and belts had been sent to Coruña and Cadiz. The supply to the Asturians was in proportion, but Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Duff and other agents were still the same. '*His majesty had no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary assistance which he furnished to Spain.*'

Mr. Canning said he considered the amount of money as nothing! yet he acknowledged *specie* was so scarce, that it was only by a direct and secret understanding with the former government of Spain, under the connivance of France, that any considerable amount of dollars had been collected in England. 'Each province of Spain,' he said, 'had made its own particular application, and the whole occasioned a call for *specie* such as had never before been made upon England at any period of its existence. There was a rivalry between the provinces with reference to the amount of sums demanded which rendered the greatest caution necessary. And the more so, that the deputies were incompetent to furnish either information or advice upon the state of affairs in Spain;' yet Mr. Duff was commanded, by the man representing these astounding things to the junta of Seville, '*to avoid any appearance of a desire to overrate the merit and value of the exertions then making by Great Britain in favour of the*

*Spanish nation, or to lay the grounds for restraining or limiting those exertions within any other bounds than those which were prescribed by the limits of the actual means of the country.'* In proof of Mr. Canning's sincerity upon this head, he afterwards sent them two millions of dollars by Mr. Frere, while the British army was without any funds at all! Moreover the supplies, so recklessly granted, being transmitted through subordinates and irresponsible persons were absurdly and unequally distributed.

This obsequious extravagance produced the utmost arrogance on the part of the Spanish leaders, who treated the English minister's humble policy with the insolence it courted. When Mr. Stuart reached Madrid, after the establishment of the supreme junta, that body, raising its demands upon England in proportion to its superior importance, required in the most peremptory language, additional succours so enormous as to startle even the prodigality of the English government. Ten millions of dollars instantly, five hundred thousand yards of cloth, four million yards of linen for shirts and for the hospitals, three hundred thousand pair of shoes, thirty thousand pair of boots, twelve million of cartridges, two hundred thousand muskets, twelve thousand pair of pistols, fifty thousand swords, one hundred thousand arobas of flour, besides salt meat and fish! These were their demands, and when Mr. Stuart's remonstrance compelled them to alter the insulting language of their note, they insisted the more strenuously upon having the succours; observing that England had as yet only done enough to set their force afloat, and that she might *naturally expect demands like the present to follow the first*. They desired also that the money should be furnished at once by bills on the British treasury, and at the same time required the confiscation of Godoy's property in the English funds!

Such was Mr. Canning's opening policy. The sequel was worthy of the commencement. His proceedings with respect to the Erfurth proposals for peace, his injudicious choice of Mr. Frere, his leaving of Mr. Stuart without instructions for three months at the most critical period of the insurrection, and his management of affairs in Portugal and at Cadiz during

sir John Cradock's command, have been already noticed: and that he was not misled by any curious accordance in the reports of his agents is certain, for he was early and constantly informed of the real state of affairs by Mr. Stuart. That gentleman was the accredited diplomatist, and in all important points his reports were very exactly corroborated by the letters of sir John Moore, and by the running course of events; yet Mr. Canning neither acted upon them nor published them, although he received all the idle vaunting accounts of subordinate civil and military agents with complacency, and published them with ostentation: thus encouraging the misrepresentations of ignorant men, increasing the arrogance of the Spaniards, deceiving the English nation, and as far as he was able misleading the English general.

Mr. Stuart reached Coruña in July, 1808, and on the 22nd of that month informed Mr. Canning that the reports of successes in the south were not to be depended upon, seeing they increased exactly in proportion to the difficulty of communicating with the alleged scenes of action, and with the dearth of events, or the recurrence of disasters in the northern parts. He also assured him the numbers of the Spanish armies within his knowledge were by no means so great as they were represented. On the 26th of July he gave a detailed history of the Gallician insurrection, by which he plainly showed that every species of violence disorder intrigue and deceit were to be expected from the leading people,—that the junta's object was to separate Galicia from Spain,—that so inappropriate was the affected delicacy of abstaining from conditions while furnishing succours, that the junta of Galicia was only kept in power by the countenance of England, evinced in her lavish supplies, and by the residence of her envoy at Coruña. The interference of British naval officers to quell a political tumult had been asked for and had been successful; Mr. Stuart had been entreated to meddle in the appointments of the governing members, and in other contests for power which were daily taking place. In fine the folly peculation waste and improvidence characterising Spanish proceedings were by Mr. Stuart forcibly laid before Mr. Canning, without altering the latter's egregious

policy, or even attracting his notice: he even intimated to the ambitious junta of Seville, that England would acknowledge its supremacy if the other provinces would consent; thus offering a premium for anarchy.

Mr. Stuart was kept in a corner of the Peninsula whence he could not communicate freely with any other province, and where his presence materially contributed to cherish the project of separating Galicia; and this without a pretence, because there was a British admiral and consul, and a military mission at Coruña, all capable of transmitting local intelligence. Indeed, so little did Mr. Canning care to receive his envoy's reports, that the packet conveying his despatches was ordered to touch at Gihon to receive the consul's letters, which caused the delay of a week when every moment was big with important events: a delay not to be remedied by the admiral on the station, because he had not even been officially informed that Mr. Stuart was an accredited person! And when the latter, looking to the public interest, proceeded on his own responsibility to Madrid and finally to Andalusia, he found the evils springing from Mr. Canning's inconsiderate conduct everywhere equally prominent. In the capital the supreme junta regarded England as a bonded debtor; and the influence of her diplomatist at Seville may be estimated from the following note, written by Mr. Stuart to Mr. Frere, upon the subject of permitting British troops to enter Cadiz. 'The junta refuse to admit general Mackenzie's detachment, you tell me it is merely from alarm respecting the disposition of the inhabitants of Seville and Cadiz. I am not aware of the feelings which prevail in Seville, but with respect to this town, whatever the navy or the English travellers may assert to the contrary, I am perfectly convinced there exists only a wish to receive them, and general regret and surprise at their continuance on board.'

Nor was the mischief confined to Spain. Frere, apparently tired of the presence of a man whose energy and talent were a continued reflection upon his own imbecile diplomacy, ordered Mr. Stuart either to join Cuesta's army or to go by Trieste to Vienna; he chose the latter, because there was not even a subordinate political agent there, although this was the criti-

cal period which preceded the Austrian declaration of war against France in 1809. He was without formal powers as an envoy, yet his knowledge of the affairs of Spain, and his intimate personal acquaintance with many of the leading statesmen at Vienna, enabled him at once to send home the most exact information of the proceedings, the wants, the wishes, and intentions of the Austrian government, in respect to the impending war. But that great diversion for Spain, which with infinite pains had been brought to maturity by count Stadion, was on the point of being abandoned because of Mr. Canning's conduct. He had sent no minister to Vienna, and while he was lavishing millions upon the Spaniards without conditions, refused in the most haughty and repulsive terms the prayers of Austria for a subsidy, or even a loan, without which she could not pass her own frontier. When Mr. Stuart suggested the resource of borrowing some of the twenty-five millions of dollars which were then accumulated at Cadiz, it was rejected because Mr. Frere said it would alarm the Spaniards. Thus, the aid of a great empire with four hundred thousand good troops, was in a manner rejected in favour of a few miserable self-elected juntas in the Peninsula, while one-half the succours which they received and misused, would have sent the whole Austrian nation headlong upon France; for all their landwehr was in arms, and where the emperor had only calculated upon one hundred and fifty battalions, three hundred had come forward voluntarily, besides the Hungarian insurrection. In this way Mr. Canning proved his narrow capacity for business, and how little he knew either the strength of France, the value of Austria, the weakness of Spain, or the true interests of England; although he had not scrupled, by petulant answers to the proposals of Erfurth, to confirm a war which he was so incapable of conducting. Instead of improving this great occasion, he angrily recalled Mr. Stuart for having proceeded to Vienna without permission; the breach of form was with him of higher importance than the success of the object. Yet it is capable of proof that Mr. Stuart's presence would have made the Austrians slower to negotiate after the battle of Wagram; and the Walcheren expedition would have been turned towards Germany, where

a great northern confederation was ready to oppose France. The Prussian cabinet, in defiance of the king, or rather of the queen, whose fears influenced the king's resolutions, only waited for that expedition to declare war, and it seems certain Russia would also have adopted that side.

The misfortunes of Moore's campaign, the folly and arrogance of the Spaniards, the loss of a British army in Walcheren, the exhausting England of troops and specie when she most needed both; finally the throwing Austria entirely into the hands of France, may be distinctly traced to Mr. Canning's incapacity as a statesman. But through the whole of the Napoleonic war he was the evil genius of the Peninsula. He gave misplaced military power to Mr. Villiers' legation in Portugal while he neglected the political affairs in that country; he sent lord Strangford to Rio Janeiro whence all manner of mischief flowed; and when Mr. Stuart succeeded Villiers at Lisbon, Mr. Canning insisted upon having the enormous mass of intelligence received from different parts of the Peninsula translated before it was sent home,—an act of undisguised indolence, which retarded the real business of the embassy, prevented important information from being transmitted rapidly, and exposed the secrets of the hour to the activity of the enemy's emissaries at Lisbon. In after times, when Napoleon returned from Elba and Mr. Canning was by a notorious abuse of ministerial power sent ambassador to Lisbon, he complained that no archives of former embassies remained, and compelled Mr. Stuart, then minister plenipotentiary at the Hague, to employ several hundred soldiers copying papers relating to the previous war, to be sent at great public expense to Lisbon, where they were to be seen in 1826 unpacked!

And while this folly was passing, the interests of Europe in general were neglected, and the particular welfare of Portugal seriously injured by another display of official importance still more culpable. It had been arranged that a Portuguese auxiliary force was to have joined the duke of Wellington's army, previous to the battle of Waterloo, and to have this agreement executed, was the only business of importance which Mr. Canning had to transact during his

embassy. Marshal Beresford, well acquainted with the character of the Portuguese regency, had assembled fifteen thousand men, the flower of the old troops, perfectly equipped, with artillery baggage and all things needful to take the field: the ships were ready, the men willing to embark, and the marshal told the English ambassador that he had only to give the order and in a few hours the whole would be on board, warning him at the same time that in no other way could the thing be effected. This summary proceeding did not give Mr. Canning an opportunity to record his own talents for negotiation, and he replied, that it must be done by diplomacy; the Souza faction eagerly seized the opportunity of displaying their talents in the same line, they beat Mr. Canning at his own weapons, and as Beresford had foreseen, no troops were embarked at all. Wellington was thus deprived of important reinforcements, the Portuguese were deprived of the advantage of supporting their army for several years on the resources of France, and of their share of the contributions from that country. Last and worst, those veterans of the Peninsula war, the strength of the country, were sent to the Brazils, where they all perished by disease or by the sword in the obscure wars of Don Pedro! If such errors may be redeemed, by an eloquence always used in defence of public corruption, and a wit that made human sufferings its sport, Mr. Canning was an English statesman and wisdom has little to do with the affairs of nations.

When the issue of the Walcheren expedition caused a change of ministry, lord Wellesley obtained the foreign office. Mr. Henry Wellesley then replaced Mr. Frere at Cadiz, and he and Mr. Stuart received orders to demand guarantees for the due application of the British succours; those succours were more sparingly granted, and the envoys were directed to interfere with advice and remonstrances in all the proceedings of the respective governments to which they were accredited. Mr. Stuart was even desired to meddle with the internal administration of the Portuguese nation, the exertions and sacrifices of Great Britain, far from being kept out of sight, were magnified, and the system adopted was in everything a contrast to that of

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Appendix 1,  
§ 2. Vol. IV.  
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Mr. Canning. But there was in England a powerful, and as recent events have proved an unprincipled parliamentary opposition, and two parties in the cabinet. The one headed by lord Wellesley, who was anxious to push the war vigorously in the Peninsula without much regard to the ultimate pressure upon the people of his own country; the other headed by Mr. Perceval who sought only to maintain himself in power. Narrow, harsh, factious, and illiberal in everything relating to public matters, this man's career was one of unmixed evil. His bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, but his religion did not deter him from passing a law to prevent the introduction of medicines into France during a pestilence; he lived by faction; he had neither the wisdom to support, nor the manliness to put an end to the war in the Peninsula; and his crooked contemptible policy was shown, by withholding what was necessary to sustain the contest and throwing on the general the responsibility of failure.

With all the fears of little minds he and his coadjutors awaited the result of Wellington's operations in 1810. They affected to dread his rashness, yet could give no reasonable ground for their alarm; and their private letters were at variance with their public instructions that they might be prepared for either event. They deprived him without notice of his command over the troops at Cadiz; they gave Graham power to furnish pecuniary succours to the Spaniards at that place, which threw another difficulty in the way of obtaining money for Portugal; and when Wellington complained of the attention paid to the unfounded apprehension of some superior officers more immediately about him, he was plainly told that those officers were better generals than himself. At the same time he was with a pitiful economy ordered to dismiss the transports on which the safety of the army depended in the event of failure! Between these factions there was a constant struggle, and Wellington's successes in the field only furthered the views of Perceval, because they furnished ground for asserting that due support had been given to him. Such a result is to be always apprehended by English commanders. The slightest movement in war requires a great effort, and is attended with many vexations, which the general feels

acutely and unceasingly; the politician, believing in no difficulties because he feels none, neglects the supplies charges disaster on the general and covers his misdeeds with words. The inefficient state of the cabinet under both Canning and Perceval may however be judged of by the following extracts, the writers of which as it is easy to perceive were in official situations.

‘I hope by next mail will be sent, something more satisfactory and useful than we have yet done in the way of instructions. But I am afraid the late O. P. riots have occupied all the thoughts of

II.  
April, 1810.

our great men here, so as to make them, or at least some of them, forget more distant but not less interesting concerns.’—

‘With respect to the evils you allude to as arising from the inefficiency of the Portuguese government, the people here are by no means so satisfied of their existence as you who are on the spot. Here we

II.  
April, 1811.

judge only of the results, the details we read over, but being unable to remedy forget them the next day; and in the meantime, be the tools you have to work with good or bad, so it is that you have produced results so far beyond the most sanguine expectations entertained here by all who have not been in Portugal within the last eight months, that none inquire the causes which prevented more being done in a shorter time; of which indeed there seems to have been a great probability, if the government could have stepped forward at an earlier period with one hand in their pockets, and in the other strong energetic declarations of the indispensable necessity of a change of measures and principles in the government.’

‘I have done everything in my power to get people here to attend to their real interests in Portugal, and I have clamoured for money! money! money! in every office to which I have had access. To all my clamour and all my arguments I have invariably received the same answer, ‘*that the thing is impossible.*’ The prince himself certainly appears to be *à la hauteur des circonstances*, and has expressed his determination to make every exertion to promote the good cause in the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley

S.  
Sept. 1811.

has a perfect comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, and is fully aware of the several measures which Great Britain ought and could adopt. But such is the state of parties and such the condition of the present government, that I really despair of witnessing any decided and adequate effort, on our part to save the Peninsula. The present feeling appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all that is in our power, that the rest must be left to all-bounteous Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console ourselves by the reflection that Providence has not been so propitious to us as we deserved. This feeling you must allow is wonderfully moral and Christian-like, but still nothing will be done until we have a more vigorous military system, and a ministry capable of directing the resources of the nation to something nobler than a war of descents and embarkations.'

A more perfect picture of an imbecile administration could scarcely be exhibited, and it was not wonderful that lord Wellington, oppressed with the folly of the Peninsula governments, should have often resolved to relinquish a contest that was one of constant risks, difficulties, and cares, when he had no better support from England. In the next chapter shall be shown the ultimate effects of Canning's policy on the Spanish and Portuguese affairs.

## CHAPTER III.

## POLITICAL STATE OF SPAIN.

As the military operations were by the defeat of the regular armies broken into a multitude of petty and disconnected actions, so the political affairs were by the species of anarchy which prevailed rendered exceedingly diversified and incongruous. Notwithstanding the restoration of the captain-generals, the provincial juntas remained very powerful, and while nominally responsible to the Cortes and the regency acted independently of either, except when interested views urged them to a seeming obedience. The disputes between them and the generals, who were for the most part the creatures of the regency or of the Cortes, were constant. In Galicia, in the Asturias, in Catalonia, in Valencia, and in Murcia, discord augmented. Mahi, Abadia, Moscoso, Campo Verde, Lacy, Sarsfield, Eroles, Milans, Bassecour, Coupigny, Castaños, and Blake were always in contention with each other or with the juntas. Palacios, dismissed from the regency for his high monarchical opinions, was made captain-general of Valencia, where he immediately joined the church-party against the Cortes. In the Condado de Niebla, the junta of Seville claimed superior authority, but Ballesteros declared martial law, and the junta appealed to colonel Austin the British governor of the Algarves!

The Cortes often annulled the decrees of the regency, and the latter, of whomsoever composed, always hating and fearing the Cortes, were only intent upon increasing their own power, and entirely neglected the general cause; their conduct was at once haughty and mean, violent and intriguing, and it was impossible ever to satisfy them. Thus confusion was everywhere perpetuated, and it is proved by the intercepted

papers of Joseph, as well as by the testimony of the British officers and diplomatists, that with the Spaniards, the only moral resource left for keeping up the war was their personal hatred of the French, when partially called into action by particular oppression. Sir John Moore, with that keen and sure judgment which marked all his views, had early described Spain as being '*without armies, generals, or government.*'

Letter to  
general  
Dumouriez,  
1811, MSS.

In 1811, after three years of war, lord Wellington complained that '*there was no head in Spain, neither generals nor officers, nor disciplined troops, and no cavalry; that the government had commenced the war without a magazine or military resource of any kind, without money or financial resource, and that the people at the head of affairs were as feeble as their resources were small.*' But the miserable state of the soldiers, the unquenchable vanity of the officers, need no further illustration; they hated and ill-used the peasantry, and were so odious that the poorer people, much as they detested the French almost wished for Joseph's success.

Only four points of real interest presented themselves. Improvement and better guidance of the military,—prevention of a war between Portugal and Spain,—the pretensions of the Portuguese princess Carlotta,—the dispute with the American colonies. Wellington had laboured strenuously on the first, and had more than once saved the armies; and partial attempts had been made to introduce British officers into them, but to the system adopted in Portugal the leading Spaniards would not listen: this also was a result of Mr. Canning's fostering of Spanish arrogance. It was by no means certain that the people would have objected, if the matter had been prudently urged before the republicans in the Cortes and the popular press had prejudiced them on the subject. For the Catalans repeatedly desired to have an English general, and in 1812 Green did organize a small corps there, while Whittingham and Roche formed in the Balearic isles large divisions; colonel Cox proposed a like scheme for the north, but it was rejected by lord Wellington. No important service was indeed rendered by those officers with their divisions, yet the principle was acknowledged, and

it was extended by one Downie, who had passed from the British commissariat into the Spanish service. The English ministers, taken with his boasting manner, supplied him with uniforms and equipments for a body of cavalry called the Estremadura Legion, of such an expensive and absurd nature as to induce a general officer to exclaim on seeing them that he blushed for the folly of his government.

When the British ministers found themselves unable to deal with the Spanish regulars, they looked to the irregulars; but the increase of this force gave offence to the regular officers, and amidst these distractions, the soldiers, ill-organized, ill-fed, and quite incapable of moving in the field in large bodies, lost all confidence in their generals. The latter, as in the case of Freire with the Murcian army, expected to be beaten in every action, and cared little about it; the regency were sure to affirm that they were victorious, and another of those wandering starved naked bands called armies could be formed in a month. But a war with Portugal was always to be apprehended. The ravages of the Spanish insurgent forces when Junot was in Lisbon, the violence of Romana's soldiers, the burning of the village of San Fernando by Mendizabel, coupled with disputes between the Algarve people and the Andalusians, revived the mutual national hatred. The governments indeed entered into a treaty for recruiting in their respective territories, but it was with the utmost difficulty that the united exertions of Mr. Stuart and Wellington could prevent the Portuguese regency first, and afterwards the court of the Brazils, from provoking a war by re-annexing Olivença to Portugal, when it was taken from the French by Beresford. And so little were the passions of these people subordinate to their policy, that this design was formed at the very moment when the princess Carlotta was strenuously and with good prospect of success pushing her claim to the regency of Spain.

Her intrigues were constant sources of evil, she laboured against the influence of the British at Cadiz, and her agent, Pedro Souza, proffering gold to vulgar baseness, diamonds to delicate consciences, and promises to all, was adroit and

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persevering. In August, 1810, a paper, signed by only one member, but with an intimation that it contained the sentiments of the whole Cortes, was secretly given to Mr. Wellesley as a guide for his conduct. Its purport was that the impos-

sibility of releasing Ferdinand and his brother  
 Mr. Stuart, from their captivity being apparent, the princess  
 MSS. Carlotta should be called to the throne, and her

eldest son, Pedro, should marry the princess of Wales or some other princess of the house of Brunswick, to give a 'sudden and mortal blow to the French empire.' Mr. Wellesley was also told that a note, of the same tendency, would in the first session of the Cortes be transmitted to the English legation. This however did not happen, because Arguelles, openly and eloquently, expressed his reasons against the appointment of a royal person as regent, and some months later procured a decree rendering such persons ineligible. Carlotta's intrigue was then quashed, but though continually overborne by the English influence, her pretensions were always renewed, and often on the point of being publicly admitted. This assumption that Ferdinand's escape could not be effected, was founded partly on the great influence which it was known Napoleon had acquired over his mind, partly on his personal timidity which rendered it hopeless to attempt his deliverance. For at this time there were two brothers called Sagas, Spaniards and daring men, who were only deterred from undertaking the enterprise by a previous experiment made at Bayonne. There they had for an hour implored Ferdinand to escape, all things being ready, yet in vain, because Escoiquez who ruled the prince and was as timid as himself opposed it. To prevent ill effects from this well-known weakness the Cortes passed a decree to render null every act of Ferdinand while in captivity.

Carlotta's intrigues were however of minor consequence compared to the proceedings of the American colonies, which were of the highest interest and importance. The causes and the nature of their revolt have been already touched upon. When the Spanish insurrection first commenced, the leading men of Mexico signed a paper which was sent to the Peninsula in November, 1808, urging the immediate appointment

of Infantado to the vico-royalty. He was averse to quitting Spain, but his wife persuaded him to consent, provided the central junta, just then established, was not opposed to it. Mr. Stuart foreseeing great advantage from this appointment laboured to persuade Mr. Frere to support it; but the latter, always narrow in his views, refused because Infantado was personally disliked in England! This joined to the duke's own reluctance seemed to end the matter. Carlotta however urged her claim to be regent of Spain and ultimately queen of that country and America, and her interests were strongly supported in the latter country until May, 1809, when Cisneros the Spanish viceroy reached Monte Video and spoiled her schemes.

A cry for free trade with England was then raised in America, and Cisneros assented under September. conditions presenting a curious contrast to the affected generosity of Mr. Canning; and affording also an additional proof how little the latter knew of the people he was dealing with. After detailing the danger of his situation from the tendency to revolt, and the impoverishment of the royal treasury, Cisneros said the only mode of relief was a temporary permission to trade with England for the sake of the duties; necessity drove him to this measure, but he regretted it, and the ordinary laws relative to the residence of foreigners, rigorous in themselves, should be most rigorously executed. He added others which would seem to be directed against an enemy of mankind, rather than the subjects of a nation which was supporting the mother-country with troops and treasure in the most prodigal manner. Englishmen were not to possess property, to have a residence, to keep an hotel, or even to remain on shore except for a fixed period. Any property already acquired by them was to be confiscated, and when the goods by which he hoped to raise his revenue were landed, the owners were not to have them carried to the warehouses by their own sailors!

In April, 1810, the Caraccas and Porto Rico declared or independence, and the British governor of Curaçoa expressed his approval of their proceedings. This alarmed the Spaniards, who looked upon it as a secret continuation of Miranda's affair.



Lord Liverpool disavowed the governor's manifesto, but his policy produced no effect, because he sought three incompatible objects at once, namely, to obtain the trade, to conciliate the Spaniards, and force the colonists to declare for Ferdinand. Mexico remained obedient in outward appearance, but the desire to have Infantado existed, and a strong party of the Mexicans purposed raising him to the throne, if Napoleon's success should separate the two countries: the Spanish regency, with characteristic folly, chose this moment to appoint Venegas, the avowed enemy of Infantado, viceroy of Mexico, and thus revolt was forced on that country also. This state of affairs affected the war in Spain many ways. The Spaniards, thinking to retain the colonies by violence, sent out a small squadron at first, but at a later period employed the succours received from England to fit out large expeditions of their best troops, when the enemy were most closely pressing them in the Peninsula. The remonstrances of the British were considered as indications of a faithless policy; and Carlotta also wrote to Elio, the governor of Buenos Ayres, and to the Cortes, warning both, to beware of the English as 'a people capable of any baseness where their own interests were concerned.' Thus a notion was engendered that England designed to connect itself with the colonies independently of Spain, which greatly diminished the English influence at Cadiz.

By this dispute the supply of specie, which involved the existence of the war, was also endangered. Lord Wellesley therefore hastened to offer mediation, and to please the Spaniards removed the governor of Curaçoa; but like lord Liverpool, he desired to preserve the colonial trade, and this feeling pervaded and vitiated his instructions to Mr. Wellesley.

Lord Wellesley. That gentleman was to discuss the matter on  
 ley to Mr. H. principles of cordial amity and good faith, and  
 Wellesley, seek to convince the regency that the British  
 May, 1811, proceedings had hitherto been best for all parties.  
 MSS.

For the primary object being to prevent a French party rising in America, England had opened an intercourse of trade, a measure consistent with good faith to Spain, inasmuch as the colonists would otherwise have had recourse to France, whereas now England was considered by them as a safe and

honourable channel of reconciliation with the mother-country. There had been no formal recognition of the self-constituted governments, and if any had taken place by subordinate officers they would be disavowed. Protection and mediation had indeed been offered, but the rights of Ferdinand had been supported; and as war between Spain and America would only injure the great cause a mediatory policy was pressed upon the latter. The blockade of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas had already diverted money and forces from Spain, and driven the Americans to seek for French officers to assist them. The trade would enable England to continue her assistance to Spain, and this had been frequently represented to the regency; yet the latter had sent ships fitted out in English ports, and stored at the expense of Great Britain for the war with France to blockade the colonies and cut off the English trade; and it was done at a moment when the regency was unable to transport Blake's army from Cadiz to the Condado de Niebla without the assistance of British vessels. 'It was difficult,' lord Wellesley said, 'to state an instance in which the prejudices and jealousy of individuals had occasioned so much confusion of every maxim of discretion and good policy, and so much danger to the acknowledged mutual interests of two great states engaged in a defensive alliance against the assaults of a foreign foe:—'Spain could not expect England to concur in a system by which, at her own expense, her trade was injured, and by which Spain was making efforts, not against the French but against the main sources of her own strength.'

These instructions being given before the constitution of Spain was arranged by the Cortes, were pressed upon Bardaxi the Spanish minister, who agreed to accept the mediation upon condition that Mexico, which had not declared a form of government, should be excepted,—that England should immediately break off all intercourse with the colonies and if the mediation failed should assist Spain to reconquer them. The injustice and bad policy of this proposition was objected to, but Bardaxi maintained that it was just and politic, and pressed it as a secret article; he however finally offered to accept the mediation, if England were pledged to break off the intercourse of trade. This was

June.

refused, yet the negotiation continued. Bardaxi asserted that lord Wellington had agreed to the propriety of England going to war with the colonies, whereupon Mr. Wellesley referred to the latter, and that extraordinary man, while actually engaged with the enemy, was thus called upon to discuss so grave and extensive a subject. It was however on such occasions his great power of mind was displayed, and his manner of treating this question proved, that in political and even in commercial affairs, his reach of thought and enlarged conceptions immeasurably surpassed the cabinet he served: his opinions, stated in 1811, have been since verified in all points.

‘He denied he had given grounds for Bardaxi’s observation. His opinion had always been that Great Britain should follow, as he hoped she had, liberal counsels towards Spain, by laying aside at least during the existence of the war all consideration of merchants’ profits. Such a policy would equally suit her commercial interests and her warlike objects as well as add greatly to her character. The immediate advantages extorted by an open trade with the colonies he considered ideal. Profit was to be made there and eventually the commerce would be very great; but its value must arise from the increasing riches of the colonies and the growth of luxury; and the period at which this would happen was more likely to be checked than forwarded by the extravagant speculations of English traders. Whatever might be the final particular relations established between Spain and her colonies, the general result must be, the relaxation if not the annihilation of their colonial commercial system, and Great Britain was sure to be the greatest gainer. In expectation of this ultimate advantage her policy ought to have been liberal throughout, that is, the colonies themselves should have been checked, and the endeavours of traders and captains of ships to separate them from Spain ought to have been repressed. England should, when the colonies first showed a disposition to revolt, have considered not only what they could do but what Great Britain could assist them to effect. His knowledge of the Spanish government and its means enabled him to say she could not reduce even one of the weakest of her colonies, and to make the attempt would be a gross folly and misapplication

of means. Nay England could not in justice to the great object in the Peninsula give Spain any effectual assistance; for it was but too true that distant colonies could always separate from the mother country when they willed it, and certainly it would be the highest madness for Spain to attempt, at that time, to prevent such a separation by force, and for England to assist or even encourage her in such an attempt. 'The latter should by influence and advice have prevented the dispute coming to extremity, and should now divert Spain from the absurdity of having recourse to violence. The reception of the deputies from America which the Spaniards so much complained of, was useful to the latter. It prevented those deputies from going to France, and if they had gone, the fact that colonies have the power to separate, if they have the will, would have been at once verified.

'Great Britain, although late, had *offered* mediation which he wished to have been *asked* for, it remained to consider on what terms it ought to be accepted. It would have been better if Spain had come forward with an explicit declaration of what her intentions towards the colonies in respect to constitution and commerce were. England could then have had something intelligible to mediate upon, but now Spain only desired her to procure the submission of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas; and if she failed in that impracticable object she was to aid Spain in forcing them to submission! and he, lord Wellington, was said to have approved of this! One would really,' he exclaimed, 'believe that Mr. Bardaxi has never adverted to the means and resources of his own country, to the object they have at home, nor to the efforts making by England in the Peninsula: and he imagines I have considered these facts as little as he appears to have done? Great Britain cannot agree to that condition!'

'In respect to constitution' (alluding to the acknowledgment of the civil rights of the Americans by the Cortes) 'the Spaniards had gone a great way, but not so far as some of her colonies would require, they would probably ask her to have separate local representative bodies for their interior concerns, such as the English colonial assemblies. Yet this important point had not been considered in the treaty of mediation,

and in respect of commerce the Spanish government had said nothing: although it was quite certain her prohibitory system could not continue, and the necessary consequence of the actual state of affairs required that in the treaty of mediation the colonies should be put with respect to trade, exactly on the same footing as the provinces of Old Spain. If that was not done it would be useless to talk to the colonists of equal rights and interests; they would feel that their interests were sacrificed to those of the mother country. It was true that Spain would lose immediately, though probably not eventually, very largely in revenue and commercial profit by such a concession. This was the unavoidable result of the circumstances of the times, she had therefore a fair claim to participate in the advantages the colonies would enjoy from it. To this object the treaty of mediation should have adverted. Spain should have confidentially declared to Great Britain her intended course, what system she would follow, what duties impose, and what proportion she would demand for general imperial purposes. Upon such materials England might have worked with a prospect of permanently maintaining the integrity of the Spanish empire on just and fair principles; or at all events have allayed the present disputes and so removed the difficulties they occasioned in the Peninsula, and in either case have insured her own real interests. Spain had however taken a narrow view both of her own and the relative situation of others; *if she did not enlarge it, matters would grow worse and worse. It would be useless for England to interfere, and after a long contest which would only tend to weaken the mother country and deprive her of the resources which she would otherwise find in the colonies for her war with France, the business would end in the separation of the colonies from Spain.*

After much discussion the mediation was accepted by the Cortes, Mexico only being excepted, and an English commission, Mr. Stuart being the head, was appointed in September, 1811, but from various causes never proceeded beyond Cadiz. The Spaniards continued to send out expeditions, Mr. Wellesley's remonstrances were unheeded, and though the regency afterwards offered to open the trade under certain duties in return for a subsidy nothing was concluded.

## CHAPTER IV.

## POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.

ALL the crafty projects of the Souzas, their influence over their weak-minded prince, their cabal to place the duke of Brunswick at the head of the Portuguese army, the personal violence of the patriarch, the resignation of Das Minas, and the disputes with lord Wellington, have been before touched upon; but the difficulties thus engendered cannot be understood without a more detailed exposition.

Mr. Villiers's mission, like all those emanating from Mr. Canning, had been expensive in style, tainted by intrigues, useless in business, and productive of disorders. When Mr. Stuart arrived, he found everything except the Feb. 1810. army under Beresford in a state of disorganization; and the influence of England was decreasing from the vacillating system hitherto pursued by her government. As early as 1808 Wellington had advised the ministers not only to adopt Portugal as the base of operations in the Peninsula, but to assume in reality the whole administration of that country; to draw forth all its resources of men and money, and make up any deficiency by the power of England. This advice had been neglected, and an entirely different policy pursued with a feeble and uncertain execution.

Like most constitutions springing from the feudal system that of Portugal was excellent for defence, but overwhelmed by abuses. It was a favourite maxim that it did not become a paternal government to punish neglect of duty. When court intrigues were to be effected, or poor men to be oppressed, there was no want of vigour or of severity; but in the administration of affairs it was considered sufficient to give orders without looking to their execution, and no animad-

version, much less punishment, followed disobedience. Weakness characterised the government—the taxes, partially levied, produced only half their just amount—the payments from the treasury were in arrears—the army was neglected in all things dependent on the civil administration, and a bad navy was kept up at the cost of a quarter of a million to meet a war with Algiers. The last matter was however a knife with a double edge,—for peace involved a tribute paid in coin which drained the treasury, and in war the fleet did nothing; the feeding of Lisbon, and still more of Cadiz, was thus rendered precarious. In commercial affairs the usual Peninsular jealousy was displayed; the import of British goods was prohibited to the advantage of smugglers, while the government, neglecting its own resources to the injury of both countries, was clamorous for subsidies. Finally, the power of the Souzas was so great and the regency so entirely subservient to them, that, although Mr. Stuart had been assured by Canning that a note forbidding Domingo Souza to meddle with affairs at Lisbon had been procured from the Brazils, all representations to the regency were still met by references to that nobleman, who was in London! The business of the mission was thus paralysed.

In March, 1809, the British government took ten thousand Portuguese troops into pay; in May twenty thousand; in June thirty thousand. Their cost, added to the subsidy, amounted to two millions sterling; but partly from negligence, principally from poverty caused by Canning's prodigal donations to Spain, the subsidy was in arrears. This being however in unison with their own method did not much disturb the regency; but they were eager to obtain a loan, in the disposal of which they would have been quite uncontrolled, and for that reason Wellington strenuously opposed it. In revenge, by wilful misinterpretations of the debates in parliament and the distortion of facts the regency assailed the sincerity of England; and the Whigs, encouraging all Portuguese malcontents and clamouring justly against the ministers, but unjustly against the generals, greatly augmented the disorder of the times. In 1810 after Mr. Canning had, happily for the country, lost his office, lord Wellesley changed the diplomatic

instructions. The envoys and agents were then to make conditions as to the supplies, and in Portugal were to meddle with civil changes, augmentations of revenue and military resources, even to demanding monthly reports of the condition of the troops and the expenditure of the subsidy. Lord Wellesley also, thinking the Spanish Cortes might excite a desire for more temperate government in Portugal, was willing to forward a change provided old forms were preserved, and that it should appear to flow from the crown. Resistance to the enemy, he said, would be in proportion to the people's attachment, and it was advisable to make timely concessions, giving no more than was absolutely necessary.

This notion of a Cortes was ill-received by the regency. Mr. Stuart and lord Wellington also affirmed that the people's docility and hatred of the French were sufficient for action. The time was perhaps inconvenient, the people certainly did not desire this revolutionary measure, which, as Spain proved, would not necessarily help the war, and Wellington, looking only to military success, acted consistently; but the English cabinet displayed wondrous absurdity. The military conscription in France, authorized by the laws, was they said an unheard-of tyranny! In Portugal that conscription, enforced by foreigners, was a wise measure! Lord Wellesley, acknowledging the Portuguese government to be harsh oppressive weak and capricious, was yet content to withhold from the people, expressly because they loved their country and were obedient subjects, a better system which he would have granted them if they had been unruly and of doubtful patriotism!

Mr. Stuart in concert with lord Wellington diligently laboured to remedy the evils of the hour, but whenever they complained of any particular disorder, they were offered arbitrary power to punish, an expedient to render the British odious to the people, and therefore refused. The intrigues of the fidalgos were now apparent, and the first regency was broken up in 1810. Das Minas retired under pretext of ill health, but really because he could not uphold one De Mello, a fidalgo officer, thrust forward to oppose the authority of Beresford; Cypriano Freire was then made minister of finance



and of foreign affairs, and Forjas, secretary at war with a vote in the regency on matters of war. The former soon resigned from some disgust, and the conde Redondo having undertaken the office, commenced, with the advice of Mr. Stuart, a better arrangement of the taxes, especially the '*decima*' or income tax, an impost neither impartially nor strictly enforced on the rich towns, nor on the powerful people of the fidalgo faction. The clergy also evaded the imposts, and the British merchants, although profiting enormously from the war, sought exemption under the factory privileges from the taxes, which in certain cases they could legally do; and from the billets and recruiting laws affecting their servants, which they could not justly demand when all other classes in the community were liable.

This organization of the regency was soon changed by the working of the Souzas in the Brazils, where the finance minister desired to have the regulation of the Portuguese treasury. Freire's resignation was therefore not accepted, Redondo was excluded from the regency, and Forjas, the most efficient member of the government, was deprived of all his functions. The remaining members proposed to fill Das Minas' vacancy, but lord Wellington resisted on the ground of illegality, which would involve him in an indefensible quarrel with the Brazils. The removal of Redondo and the dismissal of Forjas he in concert with Mr. Stuart withstood, and thus for the moment stopped a change which would have impeded the ameliorations begun; but the finances were so disordered that Mr. Stuart as the least difficulty proposed to take the whole direction on himself, England being responsible for the sums required. Lord Wellington thought this could only be done by assuming the whole government, which he had previously advised but judged it now too late. Other springs of mischief soon bubbled up. Lord Strangford, in reward for his diplomatic dexterity about the Bruton-street despatch, had been appointed minister plenipotentiary at the Brazils, and failed not to justify his previous character for intrigue. The policy of the English general and Mr. Stuart was to keep the regency permanent, and the secretariats in the hands of Redondo and Forjas, men who co-operated best with the

British authorities. Lord Strangford soon intimated that he had persuaded the prince to add the English envoy at Lisbon, the conde Redondo, doctor Nogueira, and the principal Souza to the old regency; to appoint admiral Berkeley naval commander-in-chief; and to direct that all traitorous correspondence should be prevented, and the exuberant power of subordinates limited. This last article was aimed at Forjas, and the whole designed to give preponderance to the Souzas: even the envoy's appointment, settled by lord Strangford before he knew of Mr. Villiers' recall and designed to give the latter power, not Mr. Stuart, had the same view of favouring that pernicious faction.

This change, although very offensive, was submitted to by the English general and by the envoy to avoid an appearance of disregarding the prince regent's rights; Mr. Stuart was however averse to join a government where a diversity of views existed, without any casting vote or controlling power; and only yielded to the wishes of the general who justly thought his presence would obviate much evil. Nogueira's appointment was by lord Strangford called a tribute to democracy: whereas the real object was to sap the power of those secretariats which Wellington and Stuart were labouring to uphold. But lord Strangford prided himself chiefly on the appointment of principal Souza, who had, he said, been recommended to him by Mr. Villiers, a confession showing the secret spirit of the arrangement. For the principal, while in a subordinate situation, had always opposed the British authorities in Portugal, was the avowed enemy of Beresford, the contriver of all confusion, and known as the most mischievous person in the kingdom. So pernicious indeed had been his proceedings that lord Wellesley and Mr. Stuart formally intimated to him that his absence from Portugal was desirable; and now he was armed with additional power by lord Strangford's diplomacy, which tended in effect to ruin the cause he had been sent to the Brazils to support.

Lord Strangford in announcing this change described himself as a voluntary agent; but in a subsequent despatch he affirmed that Mr. Canning had directed him to press the appointment of the English envoy as a regent; and that Nogueira's

appointment was the prince regent's own will. In like manner when lord Wellesley was intent to assemble a Portuguese Cortes, lord Strangford called it '*a great and essential measure strongly and wisely urged by the government,*' yet afterwards acknowledged that he neglected to press it, because he thought it '*useless and even hurtful.*' This inconsistency renders it difficult to determine on whom these affairs rested. As affecting Mr. Canning's policy, if he arranged the change, his object was to put Mr. Villiers in the regency; not with a view to control Portugal for the purposes of war, but, as the instructions to Cradock prove, to ensure a preponderance to the diplomatic department over the military chief in that country.

Lord Wellington had earnestly sought a better arrangement of the financial system—the execution of the laws without favour to the *fidalgos*—the suppression of the *junta di vivres*, a negligent and fraudulent board for which he wished to establish a Portuguese commissariat—the due supply of provisions and stores, for the national troops and fortresses—the consolidation of the arsenal department under one head—the formation of a military chest distinct from the treasury which was always diverting the funds to other purposes—the enforcing regulations about military transport—the repairs of roads and bridges—the reformation of the hospitals—the succouring of the starving people, and the revival of agriculture in the parts desolated by the war. He had hope of success until lord Strangford effected his change, but then unceasing acrimonious disputes ensued with the government: and no species of falsehood or intrigue, not even personal insult and the writing of anonymous threatening letters were spared by the Souza faction. In the beginning of 1811 they had organized an anti-English party, and a plot was laid to force the British out of the country; which would have succeeded if less vigilance had been used by Mr. Stuart, or less vigour of control by lord Wellington. The execution of this dangerous conspiracy however required the patriarch's presence in the northern provinces, which Mr. Stuart always dexterously prevented, and so saved the cause.

Lord Wellington's complaints, accompanied with a demand

for the removal of principal Souza, reached the Brazils in February, 1811, and Das Minas died about the same time; but the Souza's faction were so powerful at Rio Janeiro, that in May the prince announced his approval of their proceedings and his high displeasure with Forjas and Mr. Stuart. His minister the conde de Linhares wrote, that the capture of Massena and his army, which he daily expected to hear of, would not compensate the devastation of the country by the allies; and officially to lord Strangford he declared, that the prince would not permit Mr. Stuart to vote on the internal government because he consulted persons suspected of disaffection: an expression referring, lord Strangford said, solely to Forjas. The prince also wrote to Wellington, charging Mr. Stuart with acting separately and mischievously so as to produce the factions complained of; and unless he were recalled Souza should remain in power: Forjas, he said, was the real opponent of the British and must come to the Brazils to answer for his conduct: finally he would write in like strain to the king of England. In reply to this royal intemperance lord Wellington proposed to quit Portugal;—

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Forjas resigned,—the envoy and the admiral decided to do so likewise, and the latter withdrew from council until the pleasure of the English cabinet was made known. The war was then on the point of being ended without the public being aware of the crisis, because Wellington kept the matter secret to avoid disturbance, and in hopes the prince would finally yield. But now other embarrassments were superadded, sufficient to dash aside hopes of continuing the war even though the intrigues at Rio Janeiro should be abated. Forjas, Nogueira, and Redondo had been supported against their enemies because they were the best public men to be found; but, tainted alike by national habits and the fear of ultimate consequences, they continually thwarted the execution of measures they had agreed to in council. No delinquent was ever punished, no fortress ever stored in due time and quantity, the suffering people were uncared for, disorders were unrepessed, the troops were starved, the fidalgos favoured, the junta de viveres supported, the formation of a military chest and commissariat delayed: wild and foolish schemes

were daily broached, and the natural weakness of the government was increased by its instability, because the prince regent early in 1811 intimated an intention of immediately returning to Europe.

To the favourite maxim with the regency, that a paternal government should not punish delinquents in the public service, was now added another more pernicious, namely, that the Portuguese troops could thrive under privations of food which would kill men of another nation. With these two follies they excused neglect, whenever denying the neglect became fatiguing. Collisions in the market between the British commissariat and the junta de viveres were frequent and hurtful; for the former, able to outbid and more in fear of failure, overbought the latter; which contracted the small sphere of their activity. Lord Wellington was also prevented feeding the whole Portuguese army himself by a curious obstacle. He depended for the support of his own troops upon the Spanish mulcteers attached to the army; they were the life and sustenance of the war, and their patient hardiness and fidelity to the British were remarkable; but they abhorred the Portuguese people and would not carry provisions for their soldiers: their services could only be obtained for the native brigades attached to the English divisions by making them think the food was entirely for the latter. Upon such nice management even in apparently trifling matters did this war depend. Yet it is not uncommon for politicians, versed only in the classic puerilities of public schools and the tricks of parliamentary faction, to hold the rugged experience of Wellington's camp as nothing in the formation of a statesman!

Very soon and severely were the effects of this complication of evils felt. Abrantes was like to be abandoned from want while Massena held Santarem; the Portuguese troops were starved during that general's retreat, Beresford's operations in the Alemtejo were also impeded, and his hospitals left without succour. At Fuentes Onoro ammunition failed, and the Portuguese artillery had to pick up the enemy's bullets; the cavalry of that nation was entirely ruined; and of more than forty thousand regular troops formed by Beresford.

only nineteen thousand were under arms after the battle of Albuera: the rest had deserted or died from extreme want. When Massena retreated, the provincial organization of the country was restored, and seed corn furnished by Mr. Stuart on the credit of the subsidy; an amnesty for deserters was also published, the feudal imposts for the year were remitted, and fairs were established to supply tools of husbandry. But so great was the misery that at Caldas eighty persons died daily; and at Figueras, where twelve thousand people, chiefly from Portuguese Estremadura, had taken refuge, the daily deaths were above a hundred: the whole would have perished but for the active benevolence of major Von Linstow, an officer of Trant's staff. Bands of robbers were so numerous that military persons could not travel on service in safety, and it was feared troops must be employed to scour the country. Officers on duty were insulted daily, and even assassinated in Lisbon with impunity, the whole army was disgusted, and the letters to England were engendering a dislike to the war. The British soldiers when not with their regiments committed many outrages on the lines of communication, and as a climax of misery the harvest failed in Portugal and in England. No corn could be got from the Baltic, because there was no specie to pay for it and bills were refused; hence famine, dire and wasting, prevailed, until Mr. Stuart obtained leave to license fifty American corn vessels, whose cargoes were paid for partly by English charitable donations, partly by a parliamentary grant passed when Massena retreated.

In this crisis the British cabinet granted an additional subsidy to Portugal; but the greatest part was of necessity paid in kind, and the distress of the regency for money was scarcely lessened; for these supplies merely stood in the place of the plunder which had hitherto prevailed in the country. Thus Mr. Canning's prodigality, Mr. Vansittart's paper system, and Mr. Perceval's economy, all combined to press upon the British general; to use his own words, he was supplied with only one-sixth part of the money necessary to keep the great machine going which had been set in motion; and in answer to his remonstrances, a secretary of the Treasury was employed by Mr. Perceval to prove in a laboured paper, founded upon

false data, that the army had been over-supplied and must have money to spare.—That minister, whose speeches were big with the final destruction of France, was then intent to confine the efforts of England to the defence of Portugal without regard to the rest of the Peninsula!

Amongst the follies of the Portuguese regency was a resolution to issue proclamations, filled with bombastic adulation of themselves, vulgar abuse of the French, and altogether unsuited to the object of raising the public feeling, which flagged under their system. To the English general's remonstrances on this head, Forjas replied, that praise of themselves and abuse of the French was the national custom and could not be dispensed with! English writers who have implicitly followed the accounts of the Portuguese authors, such as Accursio de Neves and men of his stamp, relative to French enormities, would do well to consider this fact. And here it may be remarked, that so many complaints were made of the cruelty committed by Massena's army while at Santarém, that lord Wellington had some thoughts of reprisals; but having first caused strict inquiry to be made, it was discovered that in most cases, the *ordenanças*, after having submitted to the French and received their protection, took advantage of it to destroy the stragglers and small detachments, and the cruelty complained of was only the infliction of legitimate punishment: the projected retaliation was therefore changed for an injunction to the *ordenanças* to cease such warfare.

Mr Stuart,  
MSS.

Reithless and foul as the regency's conduct was on all subjects, it was most openly displayed in reference to the convention of Cintra. All benefits insured to Portugal were complacently accepted, all points affecting England's character overlooked or annulled. In violation of that treaty French residents in Lisbon were cast into loathsome dungeons without offence charged; and in respect to the count Mascarheñas, wanton cruelty and useless treachery were alike exhibited. This youth, when fifteen years old, had with many others entered the French service in Junot's time, but with the permission of his own prince. He and Sabugal were captured in 1810, passing from Massena's army to Spain,—Sabugal in

uniform, Mascarheñas in disguise. Being tried for treason, the first, a general with friends amongst the fidalgos, was acquitted, which was just: but he was immediately employed under the regency, which was disgraceful and the result of faction. Mascarheñas, a boy without powerful friends, was condemned to death! Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart impugned the justice of the sentence, and desired, if humanity were unheeded, that he might be executed as a spy for being disguised, as that would obviate the danger of reprisals already menaced by Massena. The boy's mother and sisters grovelling in the dust implored mercy of the regency, but that body told the miserable women that the British general and envoy demanded his death, and they were sent with this brutal falsehood to weep and ask grace of those who had no power to grant it. Mascarheñas was publicly executed as a traitor for entering the French service under the authority of his native prince, while Sabugal was acquitted and rewarded, although precisely in the same circumstances when the excuse of the disguise had been rejected!

In 1810, one Corea, calling himself an aide-de-camp of Massena, was seized in disguise within the British lines. He gave useful information, and was kept in St. Julians to protect him from the Portuguese government. Becoming deranged he was released, whereupon the regency desired he might be sent as a prisoner of war to England; thus for convenience admitting the principle which they had rejected when honour and humanity were concerned. A process against d'Alorna was also commenced, but his family was too powerful; yet the government refused madame d'Alorna leave to join her husband, thus showing themselves spiteful and contemptible as well as cowardly and bloody. Even the court of Brazil was shocked; the prince rebuked the regency severely for the death of Mascarheñas, reversed the sentences on some others, and banished Sabugal to Terceira.

This was the political state of Portugal.

Lord Liverpool's intimation, that neither corn nor specie could be had from England, threw Wellington on his own resources for feeding his troops. He had created a paper money by means of commissariat bills paid regularly at



certain periods, which passed with the people when the national bonds called 'apologies' were at an enormous discount. He now in concert with Mr. Stuart engaged in commerce to supply his necessities. For having ascertained that grain in different parts of the world, especially in South America, could be bought by bills cheaper than it is sold for hard cash in Lisbon; and that in Egypt although only to be bought with specie it was at a reduced price, they employed agents to purchase for the army account, and after filling the magazines sold the overplus to the inhabitants. This transaction was however impeded by the disputes with North America, which were now rapidly hastening to a rupture; and American ships frequenting the Tagus, being prevented by the non-importation act from bringing back merchandise, were forced to demand coin, which helped to drain the country of specie.

Mr. Stuart could obtain no assistance from the English merchants of Lisbon to aid a traffic interfering with their profits. Wherefore he wrote circular letters to the consuls in the Mediterranean, and in the Portuguese islands, and to the English minister at Washington, desiring them to negotiate treasury bills, to increase the shipments of corn to Lisbon, and pay with new bills to be invested in the articles of British manufacture still permitted by the non-importation law to go to America. This commerce, which Wellington truly observed was not what ought to have occupied his time and attention, saved the army and the people when the proceedings of Mr. Perceval would have destroyed both: yet it was cavilled at and censured by the ministers on the representations of the merchants with whose exorbitant gains it interfered. These accumulated difficulties and the want of adequate support in England caused the English general seriously to think of quitting his command. But when he reflected that it was more an English than a Peninsula cause,—that the French embarrassments might be greater even than his own,—that Napoleon, gigantic as his exertions had been, was scarcely aware of all the difficulty of conquering while an English army held in Portugal, and that light was breaking in the north on the chances of war there, his mental eye perceived a coming

glory and he retempered his mighty energy to bear the bullet of the tempest.

But many obstacles choked his path, and yet he could not stand still lest the ground should open beneath his feet. If he moved in the north, Marmont and Bessières were there to oppose him, and he must take Ciudad Rodrigo or blockade it before he could advance against them. To take that place a battering-train was to be brought through a mountainous country from Lamego, and there was no covering position for the army during the siege. To blockade and pass it would so weaken his forces, already inferior to the enemy, that he could do nothing effectual; and then Soult would again advance from Llerena, and perhaps add Elvas to his former conquests. To act on the defensive in Beira, and invade Andalusia in concert with Blake, Beguines, Graham, and the Murcians, while Joseph's absence paralysed the army of the centre,—while the army of Portugal was being re-organized in Castille, and Suchet engaged with Taragona, would have been an operation suitable to circumstances. But then Badajos must have been blockaded with a force able to meet the army of the centre; and the Portuguese government had so reduced the native forces that a sufficient army to encounter Soult would not have remained. Hence, after the battle of Albuera, the only thing to be done was to renew the siege of Badajos. It contained the enemy's bridge equipage and battering-train, and on ordinary military calculations could scarcely be expected to fall before Soult and Marmont would bring succour; but it was only by reducing it that Portugal itself could be secured beyond the precincts of Lisbon, and a base for further operations obtained. •

Following the rules of art, Soult should have been driven over the mountains before the siege was begun, but there was no time for this, and Marmont was equally to be dreaded on the other side; wherefore Wellington sought, as it were, to snatch away the fortress from between them; and those who knowing his real situation censure him for the attempt are neither generals nor statesmen. The question was, whether the attempt should be made or the contest in the Peninsula resigned. It was made and failed, yet the Peninsula was not

lost; but no argument can be thence derived, because the attempt rather than success was requisite to keep the war alive: moreover the French did not push their advantages as far as they might have done, and the unforeseen circumstance of a large sum of money being brought to Lisbon by private speculation at the moment of failure, enabled the English general to support the crisis.

## CHAPTER V.

## SECOND ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

THERE is no operation in war more certain than a modern siege if the rules of art are strictly followed; and unlike the ancient sieges in that particular it is also different in this, that no operation is less open to irregular daring, because the course of the engineer can neither be hurried nor delayed without danger. Wellington knew the siege of Badajos in form required longer time and better means than were at his disposal; but he was compelled to incur danger and loss of reputation, which is loss of strength, or to adopt some compendious mode of taking that place. The time he could command, and time is in all sieges the greatest point, was precisely that which the French required to bring up a force sufficient to disturb the operation. Their doing so depended on Marmont, whose march from Salamanca to Badajos through Baños, or the Gata, could not be stopped by Spencer, seeing that those defiles were commanded by the French positions: it was possible also at that season to ford the Tagus near Alcantara, and more than twenty days' free action against Badajos could not be calculated upon. The battering-gun carriages used in Beresford's siege were damaged; the artillery officers asked eleven days to repair them, and the scanty means of transport for stores were diminished by carrying the wounded from Albuera. Fifteen days of open trenches and nine days of fire was all that could be expected, and with good guns, plentiful stores, and a corps of regular sappers and miners this time would have sufficed; but none of these things were in camp, and it was a keen jest of Picton to say, that 'lord Wellington sued Badajos in forma pauperis.'

Of the guns, some cast in Philip the Second's reign were of

soft brass and false in their bore; the shot were of different sizes and the largest too small; the Portuguese gunners were inexperienced, there were but few British artillerymen, fewer engineers, no sappers or miners, and no time to teach the troops how to make fascines and gabions. Regular approaches against the place by the Pardaleras and the Picurina outworks could not be attempted; Beresford's lines of attack on the castle and Fort Christoval were therefore adopted, avoiding the errors of that general: that is to say, the double attacks were to be pushed simultaneously and with more powerful means. San Christoval might thus be taken, and batteries from thence sweep the interior of the castle, which was meanwhile to be breached: something also was hoped from the inhabitants, and something from the effect of Soult's retreat from Albuera. In this hope the work was begun. Major Dickson, an artillery officer conspicuous for talent, prepared with unexpected rapidity a battering train of thirty twenty-four pounders, four sixteen-pounders, and twelve eight and ten inch howitzers used as mortars by placing them on trucks. Six iron Portuguese ship-guns were forwarded from Salvatierra, making altogether fifty-two pieces; a convoy of engineer's stores arrived from Alcacer do Sal; and some British artillery came from Lisbon to be mixed with the Portuguese, making a total of six hundred gunners. The regular engineer officers present were twenty-one in number; eleven volunteers from the line were joined as assistant engineers; and a draft of three hundred intelligent infantry, including twenty-five artificers of the staff corps, strengthened the force immediately under their command.

Hamilton's Portuguese division was already before the town, and the 24th of May, at the close of evening, Houston's division, increased to five thousand men by the seventeenth Portuguese regiment and the Tavira and Lagos militia, invested San Christoval. The flying bridge was then laid down on the Guadiana, and on the 27th, Picton's division arrived from Campo Mayor, crossed the river by the ford above the town, and joined Hamilton, their united force being about ten thousand men. The covering army which included the Spaniards was under Hill, and spread from Merida to Albuera; the cavalry pushed

forward in observation of Soult; and when intelligence arrived that Drouet was effecting his junction with that marshal, two regiments of cavalry and two brigades of infantry, quartered at Coria as posts of communication with Spencer, were called up to reinforce the covering army.

Phillipon had used the respite given him to level Beresford's trenches, repair his own damages, and obtain small supplies of wine and vegetables from the people of Estremadura, who were still awed by Soult's vicinity. Within the place all was quiet, for the citizens did not now exceed five thousand souls and when the place was invested parties of the townsmen, mixed with soldiers, were observed working to improve the defences. Wherefore, as retrenchments behind the intended points of attack would prolong the siege, a large telescope was placed in the tower of La Lippe at Elvas, with which the interior of the castle was plainly seen and all preparations discovered.

In the night of the 29th ground was broken for a false attack against the Pardaleras; and the following night sixteen hundred workmen, having a covering party of twelve hundred, sunk a parallel against the castle on an extent of eleven hundred yards, without being discovered by the enemy, who did not fire until after daylight. The same night twelve hundred workmen, covered by eight hundred men, opened a parallel, four hundred and fifty yards from San Christoval and seven hundred yards from the bridge-head. On this line one breaching and two counter batteries were raised against the fort and bridge-head to prevent a sally: a fourth battery was also commenced to search the defences of the castle, but the workmen were discovered and a heavy fire struck down many of them.

On the 31st the attack against the castle, the soil being very soft, was rapidly pushed forward without much interruption; but the Christoval attack, carried on in a rocky soil and the earth brought from the rear, proceeded slowly and with considerable loss. This day the artillerymen from Lisbon came up on mules, and the engineers hastened the works. The direction of the parallel against the castle made the right gradually approach the point of attack, by which the heaviest fire of the place was avoided; yet, so great was the desire to save

time, that before the suitable point of distance was attained a battery of fourteen twenty-four-pounders with six large howitzers was marked out.

On the Christoval side the batteries were not finished before the night of the 1st of June, for the rocky soil required that the miner should first level the ground for platforms; and the garrison having mortars of sixteen and eighteen inches' diameter mounted on the castle sent every shell amongst the workmen. These huge missiles would have ruined the batteries on that side altogether, if the latter had not been on the edge of a ridge from whence most of the shells rolled off before bursting; yet so difficult is it to judge rightly in war that Phillipon stopped this fire thinking it thrown away! The work was also delayed by the bringing of earth from a distance, and wool-packs purchased at Elvas were used instead. However, in the night of the 2nd, all the batteries were completed and armed with forty-three pieces of different sizes, twenty being pointed against the castle; the next day the fire opened, but the windage caused by the smallness of the shot rendered it ineffectual at first, and five pieces were soon rendered unserviceable. Towards evening the practice became steadier, the fire of the fort was nearly silenced, and the covering of masonry falling from the castle wall discovered a perpendicular bank of clay. Next night the parallel against the castle was prolonged and a battery for seven guns traced out six hundred and fifty yards from the breach. On the 4th the garrison's fire was increased by several additional guns, and six pieces of the besiegers were disabled; their batteries told also but slightly against the bank of clay.

Christoval was now much injured, and some damage was done to the castle from one of the batteries on that side; but the guns were so soft and bad the rate of firing was of necessity greatly reduced in all the batteries. In the night the new battery was armed, the damaged works repaired, and next day, the enemy having trained a gun in Christoval to plunge into the trenches on the castle side, the parallel was deepened and traverses constructed to protect the troops. Fifteen pieces still played against the castle, yet the bank of clay, although

French  
Register of  
the Siege,  
MSS.

falling away in flakes, always remained perpendicular: one damaged gun was repaired on the Christoval side, but two more had become unserviceable.

In the night the parallel against the castle was again extended, and a fresh battery traced out five hundred and twenty yards from the breach to receive the Portuguese iron guns which had arrived at Elvas; on the Christoval side also some new batteries were opened and some old ones abandoned. During this night the garrison began to entrench themselves behind the castle breach, and two additional pieces from Christoval plunged into the trenches with great effect. On the other hand the besiegers' fire had broken the clay bank, which took a slope nearly practicable, and the stray shells set fire to the houses nearest the castle, but three more guns were disabled. On the 6th there were two breaches in Christoval, the principal one seeming practicable, and a company of grenadiers with twelve ladders were directed to assault it, while a second company turned the fort by the east to divert the enemy's attention. Three hundred men from the trenches were at the same time pushed forward by the west side to cut the communication between the fort and the bridge-head, while a detachment with a six-pounder moved into the valley of the Gebora to prevent any passage of the Guadiana by boats.

#### FIRST ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL.

Major M'Intosh of the 85th regiment led the stormers, being preceded by a forlorn hope under lieutenant Dyas of the 51st; and that very gallant gentleman, guided by the engineer Forster, a young man of uncommon bravery, reached the glacis and descended the ditch without being discovered. The French had cleared the rubbish away, the breach had still seven feet of perpendicular wall, and above it were pointed beams of wood and carts chained together, large shells being also ranged along the ramparts to roll down. The forlorn hope finding the opening impracticable was retiring with little loss, when the main body, which had been exposed to a flank fire from the town as well as a direct fire from the fort, came leaping into the ditch with ladders. Then an effort was made to esca-



lade at different points, but the ladders were too short, and the garrison, consisting of only seventy-five men besides the cannoneers, made so stout a resistance, and the confusion and mischief occasioned by the bursting of the shells was so great, that the assailants finally retired with the loss of more than one hundred men.

Bad success always produces disputes. This failure was attributed by some to the breach being impracticable from the first, by others to confusion after the main body had entered. French writers affirm that the breach, certainly practicable on the night of the 5th, was not so on the 6th; for, as the besiegers did not attack until midnight the workmen had time to clear the ruins away and raise fresh obstacles, and the bravery of the soldiers who were provided with three muskets each did the rest. It is however evident, that from inexperience, accident, or other causes, the combinations for the assault were not well calculated; the storming party was too weak, the ladders few and short, the breach not scoured by the fire of the batteries. The attack was also ill-combined, for the leading troops were repulsed before the main body entered the ditch. The intrepidity of the assailants was admitted by all sides, yet it is a great point in such attacks that the supports should form almost one body with the leaders; the sense of power derived from numbers is a strong incentive to valour, and obstacles insurmountable to a few vanish before a multitude.

During this night the iron guns were placed in battery against the castle, but two more of the brass pieces became unserviceable, and the following day three others were disabled. The bank of clay however sloped more, and captain Pafton of the engineers examined it closely; he was mortally wounded in returning yet lived to report it practicable. The French as usual cleared away the ruins, and with bales of wool and other materials formed interior defences. They likewise ranged a number of huge shells and barrels of powder with matches fastened to them along the ramparts, placed chosen men, each supplied with four muskets, to defend the breaches, and in that order fearlessly awaited another attack, which was soon made. For intelligence now arrived that

Drouet was close to Llerena, and Marmont on the move from Salamanca, wherefore, lest the prey should escape, another assault on Christoval was ordered. This time four hundred British, Portuguese, and French men of the Chasseurs Britanniques, carrying sixteen long ladders, were employed; the supports were better closed up; the appointed hour was nine instead of twelve; and more detachments were distributed on the right and left to distract the enemy's attention, cut off his communication with the town, and improve success. Philippon in opposition made the garrison two hundred strong.

#### SECOND ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL.

Major M'Geechy commanded the stormers, the forlorn hope was again led by the gallant Dyas, accompanied by the engineer Hunt. A little after 9 o'clock the first troops bounded forward, and were closely followed by the support under a shattering musketry which killed M'Geechy, Hunt, and many men, but the others with loud shouts jumped into the ditch; then the French scoffingly calling to come on rolled the barrels of powder and shells down, and the musketry made fearful havoc. The two leading columns united at the main breach, the supports also came up, confusion arose about the ladders, of which only a few could be reared, and the enemy standing on the ramparts bayoneted the foremost, overturned the ladders, and again poured their destructive fire upon the crowd below. When a hundred and forty had fallen the order to retire was given. After this failure the breach in the castle remained to be stormed; but the stormers could not there gather in force, between the summit and the interior entrenchment, unless Christoval was taken and its guns used to clear the castle of obstacles; this would have taken several days and Soult was now ready to advance: wherefore on the 1st a blockade was substituted for the attack.

#### OBSERVATIONS.

1°. This siege in which four hundred men and officers fell, violated all rules. The working parties were too weak, the

guns and stores too few, the point of attack ill chosen; the defences were untouched by counter fire, and the breaching batteries were too distant for the bad guns; howitzers on trucks were poor substitutes for mortars, and the sap was not practised: lastly, the assaults were made before the glacis had been crowned and a musketry fire established against the breach.

2°. It was not strange that the siege failed. It was strange, and culpable, that the British government after such long wars should have sent an engineer corps into the field so ill-organized and equipped that all the officers' bravery and zeal could not render it efficient. The very tools used, especially those supplied from the store-keeper general's department, were unfit for work; the captured French cutting instruments were eagerly sought for in preference; and when the soldiers' lives and the honour of England's arms were at stake English cutlery would not bear comparison with French!

3°. Want of foresight has also been objected to the general, inasmuch as he might have previously obtained a good battering train from England. But in the lines the conduct of the English and Portuguese governments led him to think rather of embarking than besieging a frontier fortress; moreover the extreme badness of the Portuguese guns was not known before trial, and the time between Soult's capture of Badajos and this siege was not sufficient for bringing out an English battering train. It may also be taken as a maxim that in the requirements of war no head was ever strong enough to fore-calculate all.

## CHAPTER VI.

SOULT's position at Llerena after the battle of Albuera was adopted with great knowledge of war. It was the most favourable point for securing Drouet's junction, and though closely watched by Hill, while his own troops were oppressed in spirit by their losses and unruly from want, he maintained an offensive attitude until assured of Drouet's vicinity, and then advanced to Los Santos, near which place his cavalry sustained some disadvantage in a skirmish. On the 14th Drouet arrived, and Soult, who knew Wellington was expecting large reinforcements from Beira, and was desirous to forestal them, again advanced to Fuente del Maestro, whereupon Hill concentrated the covering troops at Albuera. Meanwhile Marmont who had re-organized the army of Portugal in six divisions of infantry and five brigades of cavalry, received Napoleon's orders to co-operate with Soult, and in that view sent Reynier with two divisions by the pass of Baños, marching himself with a considerable force of infantry cavalry and guns to introduce a convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo.

Soult to  
Marmont,  
intercepted.

General Spencer was then behind the Agueda with four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry; Pack's Portuguese were near Almeida which had now been rendered defensible against a sudden assault. Spencer's orders were to make his marches correspond with Marmont's if the latter pointed towards the Tagus; but if the French attacked, he was to take the line of the Coa and blow up Almeida when the movements went to isolate that fortress. On the morning of the 6th, Marmont marched out of Rodrigo in two columns, one moving upon Gallegos the other upon Espeja. The light division fell back before the latter, Slade's cavalry before the former, but so as to lend its flank to the enemy, who

soon closed and opened a cannonade from eight pieces. The British rear-guard thus got jammed between the French and a marsh, and would have been destroyed, if captain Purvis had not gallantly charged the French with a squadron of the royals, during which the other troopers having strong horses and a knowledge of the firmest parts got through the marsh: Purvis then passed also and the French horses could not follow. The retreat was thus effected with the loss of only twenty men, and after the action an officer calling himself Montbrun's aid-de-camp deserted to the allies.

General Spencer, more noted for intrepidity than military quickness, was now vacillating, and the army was ill-placed; the country was covered with baggage, the movements were wide and without concert, Pack had too hastily destroyed Almeida, and some decided step was absolutely necessary. In this state the adjutant-general Pakenham observed that the French did not advance as if to give battle, that their numbers were small, their movements more ostentatious than vigorous, and probably designed to cover a flank movement by the passes leading to the Tagus. He therefore urged Spencer to assume a position of battle and thus force the enemy to discover his numbers and intentions, or march at once to lord Wellington's assistance. His views were supported by colonel Waters, who, having been close to the French, said they were too clean and well dressed to have come off a long march, and must therefore be a part of the garrison: he had also ascertained that a large body was pointing towards the passes.

Yielding to these representations Spencer marched in the evening by Alfayates to Soito, and the next day crossed the Coa. There certain intelligence that Marmont was in the passes reached him, wherefore he continued his march to the Alentejo by Penamacor, detaching a division and his cavalry to Coria as flankers, while he passed Castello Branco, Villa Vella, Niza, and Portalegre. The season was burning, the marches long, yet so hardened and so well organized was the light division that, covering from eighteen to eight-and-twenty miles daily, they did not leave a single straggler behind: the flanking troops, who had been rather unnecessarily exposed at

Coria, then followed; and Marmont satisfied with his demonstration in front of Ciudad Rodrigo filed off by the pass of Perales, while Reynier moved by Bejar and Baños, and the whole were by forced marches soon united at the bridge of Almaraz. A pontoon bridge expected from Madrid had not arrived and the passage of the Tagus was made with only one ferry boat, which caused a delay of four days and would have been fatal to Badajos if the allies' battering-guns had been effective. The French army then marched in two columns with the greatest rapidity upon Merida and Medellin, where they arrived the 18th and communicated with Soult.

Wellington had been attentively watching these movements. He had never intended to press Badajos beyond the 10th, because he knew that Soult reinforced with Drouet's division would be strong enough to raise the siege, hence the hurried assaults. But he was resolved to fight Soult, and as a deciphered intercepted letter told him Phillipon's provisions would be exhausted on the 20th he continued the blockade, hoping some such accident of war as the delay at Almaraz might impede Marmont. Here it may be asked why he did not retrench his camp and persist in the siege? Because Elvas being out of repair, and exhausted of provisions and ammunition for the attack on Badajos, Soult would have taken that fortress.

Hamilton's Portuguese division now joined Hill's covering force, and Wellington went in person to Albuera expecting a battle, but unlike Beresford, he had that position entrenched and did not forget to occupy the heights on his right.

On the 14th it was known that Marmont had reached Truxillo and would in four days unite with Soult, wherefore the blockade was also raised with a view to repass the Guadiana. Wellington lingered at Albuera hoping to fall on Soult separately, but that cautious captain, always refusing his left and edging with his right towards Almendralejos, soon extinguished this chance; hence the blockade being raised the 16th the allies repassed the Guadiana in two columns the 17th; the British and Portuguese by the pontoon bridge near Badajos, Blake's Spaniards at Jerumenha. This movement, not an easy one, was executed without loss of men or

stores, and without accident, save that William Stewart by some error, took the same line as Blake, and coming on the Spaniards at night, they thought his division French and were like to have fired.

On the 19th the united French armies entered Badajos, which was thus succoured after two honourable defences, and at a moment when Phillipon, despairing of aid and without provisions, was preparing to break out and escape. The 21st Godinot's division which had marched by Valverde took possession of Olivenza; the 22nd he pushed a detachment under the guns of Jerumenha; and the next day the whole of the French cavalry crossed the Guadiana in two columns, advancing towards Villa Viciosa and Elvas on one side, and Campo Mayor on the other.

But now Spencer was come up and Wellington held a position on both sides of the Caya, having cavalry posts near the mouth of that river and on the Guadiana in front of Elvas. His right stretched behind the Caya to the lowest bridge, and his left, having a field of battle on high ground, rested on the Gebora a little beyond Campo Mayor, which was occupied and the space between it and the troops strongly entrenched. The cavalry was beyond the Gebora and about Albuquerque, and the whole position presented an irregular arc embracing the stone bridge of Badajos. The wood and fortified town of Arouches were a few miles behind the centre, and the small fortified place of Ouguella was behind the left. The right wing being on weaker ground was most numerous, and the Monte Reguingo, a wooded ridge between Campo Mayor and the Caya, was held by the light division in reserve, but hidden from the enemy. If the French attacked the left a short movement would bring the bulk of the army to that side, for the whole position was not more than twelve miles long, and the communications were good. On the open plains in front, extending to Badajos, the enemy's movements could be distinctly observed from Campo Mayor, from Elvas, and from the many atalayas or watch-towers anciently erected for that purpose. This position could not be recognised by the enemy, and to prevent his turning it on either flank the first division was retained at Portalegre, from whence it could intercept him at Marvao and Castello de Vide on the

left, and between Estremos and Elvas on the right; but it was too distant to aid in a battle near Campo Mayor.

The French cavalry having passed the Guadiana on the 23rd in two columns, one by the bridge of Badajos the other by the fords below the confluence of the Caya, the former drove back the outposts, yet being opposed by Madden's horse-men and the heavy dragoons retired without being able to discover the position on that side. The other column, moving towards Villa Viciosa and Elvas, cut off a squadron of the eleventh dragoons, and the second German hussars escaped from it to Elvas with great difficulty; one hundred and fifty men were killed or taken in this affair, and the French aver that colonel Lallemand drew the British cavalry into an ambuscade. The rumours in the allied camp were discordant, but no more fighting occurred, and a fruitless attempt to surprise the English detachments at Albuquerque ended the demonstrations: the French marshals then spread their forces along the Guadiana from Xeres de los Cavalheiros to Montijo, and proceeded to collect provisions.

A great and decisive battle had been expected, and though the crisis glided away quietly, the moment was one of the most dangerous of the whole war. Marmont had brought down of his own and the centre army nearly thirty-six thousand men with fifty-four guns. Soult came with twenty-eight thousand combatants and thirty-six guns. Sixty-four thousand fighting-men, of which more than seven thousand were cavalry, having ninety field-pieces were in line; but to effect this Andalusia and Castille had been nearly stript of troops, and Bessières had abandoned the Asturias without being able to do more than hold the Gallicians in check on the Orbijo. The chief armies of the Peninsula were therefore in presence, a great battle was for the interest of the French, they had the power of forcing it on, and the repulsed assaults at Badajos, and the cavalry success on the Caya had compensated for the defeats at Los Santos and Usagre; hence when Badajos was succoured and the allies forced back into Portugal Albuera seemed a victory. The general results of the campaign had therefore been favourable, and the political state demanded some dazzling action. Their

Appendix 9,  
§ 3.



army was powerful, they were strong in cavalry, and on favourable ground. A successful blow would have avenged Massena and sent Wellington to Lisbon, perhaps to England; an unsuccessful one would have involved no serious consequences, because of their strength in horse, and the nearness of Badajos. But the allied force was supposed to be stronger than it really was by the whole number of the Spanish troops, the position was difficult to be recognised, Wellington showed a bold front, and no battle took place.

Napoleon's estimation of moral over physical force in war was here exemplified. Marmont's army was conscious of recent defeats at Busaco, Sabugal, and Fuentes Onoro; the horrid field of Albuera was fresh, the fierce blood there spilled still reeked in the nostrils of Soult's soldiers; and if Cæsar held it unsafe at Dyrracchium to risk his veterans in battle after a partial check, the French marshal may be excused, for there were fighting men on the Caya as good at all points, and more experienced than those he met on the Albuera. Soult knew the stern nature of the British soldier, and he could not hope here to overmatch the general: nevertheless Wellington's offer of battle was one of unmitigated boldness, as the occasion was one of unmitigated peril. The Portuguese government had brought the native troops to the last degree of misery, and the fortresses were destitute. The English cabinet had undertaken to pay the native troops, not to feed them, and Wellington in consequence repeatedly refused supplies from the English stores; yet at last, unable to endure the sight of their misery, and to prevent them from disbanding, he took three-fourths on his own commissariat, charging the cost to the subsidy; but then the infamous government starved the remnant likewise, and during the siege of Badajos it was subsisted from and exhausted the magazines of Elvas. Thus by desertion, famine, and sickness, this fine army which had presented forty thousand good soldiers under arms to Massena, could only present fourteen thousand sinking men for a battle on the Caya when their country's fate was at stake.

Although largely reinforced, the British troops had so many sick and wounded that only twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets were in line; wherefore the French had a fourth

more of artillery and infantry, and twice as many cavalry. To accept battle with such disparity of force on mere military considerations would have been reckless folly; but the Portuguese government had neglected the fortresses as it had the troops, and Elvas, Jerumenha, Campo Mayor, Ouguella, Aronches, Santa Olaya, were unprovided. No carriage for the transport of stores had been provided, and hence the siege of Badajos had been necessarily furnished entirely at the expense of Elvas; but all the carts and animals to be found in the vicinity and as far as detachments could go, and all the permanent commissariat means, scarcely sufficed to convey ammunition-stores and subsistence for the Portuguese troops day by day from Elvas to the siege; and it was impossible to replace this consumption by drawing from the magazines of Abrantes and Lisbon: wherefore, when the army crossed the Guadiana, Elvas had only ten thousand rounds of shot and less than a fortnight's provisions for the garrison; the works were mouldering, houses and enclosures encumbered the glacis, most of the guns had been rendered unserviceable at Badajos, the rest were bad, and the garrison was a mixture of young soldiers and militia. Jerumenha was in no better condition, Olaya Campo Mayor and Ouguella had only their walls.

Had Soult known this state of affairs he might have passed the Guadiana by the fords, and by means of his pontoon train from Badajos, overpowered the allies' right, invested Elvas and covered his army with lines, unless the English general anticipating the attempt defeated him between the Caya and Elvas; which might not have been easy in an open country offering every advantage for the overwhelming cavalry and artillery of the French. Soult could also have turned the right by Estremos and menaced the communication with Abrantes, which would have forced on a retreat or a battle. Wellington's position on the Caya was therefore a political one to impose on the enemy, and it did so: he thus saved Elvas and Jerumenha, perhaps the whole Peninsula.

While a front of battle was thus presented the rear was cleared of hospitals and heavy baggage, workmen laboured day and night to restore the fortifications, and guns ammunition and provisions were brought up from Abrantea,

by the animals and carts before employed in the siege of Badajos.

Meanwhile Portugal was on the brink of perdition, and the Peninsula character was displayed in a manner forcibly illustrating the difficulties of the English general. The danger of Elvas aroused all the bustle of the Lisbon government, but when its tardy efforts were forestalled by Wellington's activity, the regency with prodigious effrontery asserted that he had exhausted Elvas to supply his Englishmen, and they had replenished it! His imperturbable temper under these crosses and insults was the more admirable, that Perceval's policy, prevailing in the cabinet, had left him with an empty military chest and with little hope of future support. Yet his daring was no wild cast of the net for fortune, he threw it with circumspection, and his penetration and activity let no advantages escape. He looked over the whole Peninsula and beyond it; he knew his true situation, and he told the Spaniards how to push their war while the French were concentrated in Estremadura. From them he had a right to expect much aid, but he obtained little. Soult and Marmont were before him, the armies of the north and centre were paralysed by the king's flight, the armies of Catalonia and Aragon were entirely occupied by Figueras and Taragona. Thus nearly all Spain was open to patriotic enterprise, and the Murcians and Valencians had above forty thousand regular troops besides numerous partidas with which they might have menaced Madrid, while the Gallicians operated in Castille and the Asturians supported the northern partidas. Yet nothing useful was effected. Sanchez, indeed, cut off a convoy, menaced Salamanca, and blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo while Santocildes came down to Astorga; Mina and the northern chiefs harassed the French communications; some stir was made by the guerillas near Madrid, and Suchet was harassed; but the commotion soon subsided, and a detachment from Madrid surprising a congregation of partidas at Peneranda killed many, and recovered a large convoy which had been taken. But though the war, spreading over the Peninsula and quivering like a spider's web to the most distant extremities if a drag was made at any point, offered the regular Spanish

armies good opportunity, they effected nothing; nor did any general insurrection take place. The French retained all their fortified posts, and their civil administrations governed the great towns tranquilly as if peace prevailed.

To dissipate the storm lowering over the Caya, Wellington had relied chiefly on Blake. That Spaniard, as usual, wanted to fight beyond the Guadiana and was discontented at being denied. In this mood the English general knew he would prove an uneasy colleague, and bring into line ten or twelve thousand bad soldiers who would quarrel with the Portuguese, and weaken rather than strengthen the army. Wherefore, giving him the pontoons used at Badajos, he persuaded him to move down the Guadiana to Mertola, and cross there to attack Seville, then slightly guarded by a mixt force of French and Spanish troops in Joseph's pay. This blow, apparently easy of execution, would have ruined the arsenals and magazines supporting the blockade of Cadiz, and have broken up the united French force on the Caya; to aid it, Wellington urged the regency to push Beguines likewise against Seville from San Roque, while the Ronda insurgents harassed the small force left in Grenada on one side, and the Murcian army pressed them on the other.

Blake crossed the Guadiana at Mertola, but halted from the 22nd until the 30th, when he detached a small force against Seville, and sent his heavy artillery by water to Ayamonte. He wasted two days more before the small castle of Niebla, which he could not take for want of the guns he had just parted with; but the force of the combination was strongly felt; Soult instantly destroyed Olivenza, and passed the Morena with some cavalry and Godinot's infantry, to succour Seville, sending a detachment off from Monasterio, to succour Niebla; at the same time, general Conroux, moving from Xeres de los Cavalheiros, crossed the mountains by Aracena, to cut Blake off from Ayamonte. Thus far, notwithstanding Blake's stupidity, the plan was successful, Soult was drawn off, Marmont could not remain alone, and Portugal was safe. Blake's cavalry under Penne Villemur, and some infantry under Ballesteros, had also, during the investment of Niebla, menaced Seville, and a slight insurrection had place at

Carmona. The Serranos, always in arms, being aided by Beguines with three thousand men, blockaded the town of Ronda; and the Murcians menaced Laval, who had succeeded Sebastiani in Grenada. General Daricau, unable to keep the field, shut himself up in a great convent fortified by Soult in the Triana suburb of Seville; Joseph's Spanish soldiers did not shrink from him, and the Sevillanos were quiet, but a great blow might have been struck if Blake's incapacity had not marred the whole.

On the 6th Soult approached Seville, Ballesteros and Villemur retired, and the Carmona insurrection ceased. Blake, to avoid Conroux, fled from Niebla, and only escaped into Portugal because colonel Austin laid a bridge for him at San Lucar de Guadiana. He would then have embarked some troops to attack San Lucar de Barameda, but being interrupted by the advancing French fled to Ayamonte and from thence got into the island of Canelas, where a Spanish frigate and three hundred transports had accidentally arrived. Ballesteros, who was near, took a position on the Rio Piedra, but Blake embarking with great disorder sailed away. The French after reinforcing San Lucar entered Ayamonte, whereupon the Algarve militia was called out, and Ballesteros, losing some men on the Piedra, entered the Aroche mountains until the enemy retired, when he entrenched himself in Canelas. There he remained until August, and then embarked his infantry under protection of the Portuguese militia while his cavalry went up the Guadiana to join Castaños who remained with a few troops in Estremadura. A battalion left in the castle of Paymago was soon after unsuccessfully attacked, but the partisan warfare of the Condado de Niebla ceased.

Soult now recalled the troops of the fourth corps from Estremadura, to take the place of detachments sent from Seville, Cadiz, Grenada and Malaga, to quell the Serranos of the Ronda, and prepared to move himself against the Murcians: Beguines was soon after driven back to San Roque, and the Serranos, disgusted by the insolence of the regular Spanish general, were inclined to capitulate. Meanwhile Godinot, quitting the pursuit of Blake, came to Jaen, and

was directed to march against the Murcians at Pozalçon and Baza, where Blake, who had landed at Almeida, joined them raising their numbers to twenty-seven thousand. He designed, to attack Grenada, but first he went to Valencia, where Palacios was making mischief, and before he could return his army was dispersed by Soult and Godinot.

#### ROUT OF BAZA.

The Murcian right wing at Pozalçon was under general Quadra, who had orders to rejoin the centre and left wing under Freire at Venta de Bahul, but he disobeyed. Hence Soult, leading a mixed force of French, and Spanish troops in Joseph's service, drove back Freire's advanced guards and came in front of Bahul the 9th, before the army was concentrated. The Murcians had strong ground and a deep ravine covered their front, wherefore Soult, who designed to cut off their retreat by Lorca, only showed a few troops at first, skirmishing slightly to draw attention while Godinot forced his way by Pozalçon to Freire's rear; but Godinot also lost time. When his advanced guard had defeated Quadra with loss, he halted for the night near Baza, and let Freire's troops, who were then falling back in disorder before Soult, pass in the dark through that place and make for Lorca: yet the French cavalry, intercepting that line also, drove the fugitives to the by-roads, slaughtering many. Murcia was then in a defenceless state, yet the people generally took arms to protect the city, which was entrenched, and as the yellow fever was raging at Carthagena, the French marshal, whose troops were few and fatigued with constant marching, returned to Grenada. From thence he sent detachments to disperse some insurgents in the Alpuixaras, and thus the province was quieted.

His vigour and ability had now been signally displayed for six months. Taking the field with a small force in the depth of winter he reduced Olivenza, Badajos, Albuquerque, Valencia d'Alcantara, and Campo Mayor, defeated a large army on the Gebora, and captured twenty thousand men. When unexpectedly assailed by Beresford from the north, by the Murcians on the east, by Ballesteros on the west, by Gra-

ham and Lapeña in the south, he found means to repel three of those attacks, to continue the blockade of Cadiz, and to keep Seville tranquil while he marched against the fourth. At Albuera he lost one of the fiercest battles upon record at a moment when the king by abandoning his throne had doubled every embarrassment; nevertheless, holding fast to Estremadura, he maintained the struggle, and again taking the offensive compelled the allies to repass the Guadiana. If he did not then push his fortune it must be considered, that his command was divided and his troops still impressed with the recollection of Albuera, while the genius of his adversary was working new troubles for him in Andalusia. With what resolution and activity he repressed those troubles has just been shown; and he is likewise to be commended for the prudent vigour of his administration, which, despite the opposition of Joseph's Spanish counsellors, had impressed the Andalusians with such a notion of his power and resources that no revolt of any real consequence took place, and none of his civic guards or escopeteros failed him in the hour of need. Let the wide extent of country he had to maintain be considered; the frontiers fringed as it were with hostile armies, the interior suffering under war requisitions, the people secretly hating the French, a constant insurrection in the Ronda, a national government and a powerful army in the Isla de Leon. Innumerable English and Spanish agents, prodigal of money and of arms, continually instigating the people to revolt, the coast covered with hostile vessels, Gibraltar sheltering beaten armies on one side, Cadiz on another, Portugal on a third, Murcia on a fourth; the communication with France difficult, two battles lost, the reinforcements few, and all the material means to be created in the country. Few men could have stood firm in such a whirlwind; yet Soult did not merely keep his ground but contemplated gigantic offensive enterprises, and was always to be dreaded. What though his skill in actual combat was not so remarkable as in some of his contemporaries, who can deny him firmness, activity, vigour, foresight, grand conceptions, and admirable arrangement?

## CHAPTER VII.

MARMONT having covered Soult's retrograde operations retired gradually from Badajos, and quartered his army in the valley of the Tagus, leaving one division at Truxillo. The fifth corps went to Zafra, and Wellington was thus relieved from the French when he had most reason to dread their efforts. He had secured the fortresses, but his troops were beginning to suffer from the terrible pestilence of the Guadiana, which, coupled with Marmont's well-chosen position, forbade any renewal of the siege, and compelled him to relinquish the brilliant and grand combinations he had designed after Massena's retreat for a new plan of operations conformable to his altered circumstances. But to appreciate the motives of this change, another hasty glance must be thrown over the general state of the war, which was constantly varying.

In Catalonia Suchet had stormed Taragona, seized Montserrat and dispersed the Catalan army. The army of the centre had chased the partidas from Guadalaxara and Cuenca, and re-established the communications with Aragon. Valencia and Murcia were in confusion from internal intrigue and the disasters on each side of their frontiers at Baza and Taragona. Napoleon was again pouring reinforcements into Spain by the northern line, and as usual they scoured the country to put down the guerillas on each side of their march. Forty thousand fresh men, mostly old soldiers, were come, or coming into the north of Spain; and the king was on his return from Paris in harmony with his brother, and having the powers and duties of all persons defined. The young guard, now under Dorsenne, was at Burgos increased to seventeen thousand; and as the Spaniards had made no effort to profit from the concentration of their enemies before Wellington, the French were enabled to plan extensive measures for further conquest.



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JULY, 1811.]

BOOK XIV.

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Suchet, urged by the emperor to attack Valencia, proposed to batter its gates in the middle of September; and Soult was secretly revolving a gigantic enterprise calculated to change the whole aspect of the war. On the northern line when the king, who re-entered Madrid the 14th, had passed Valladolid, the young guards quitted Burgos to enter Leon, and thirteen thousand men of the army of the north were concentrated at Benevente. Santocildes withdrew into the mountains, and Bessières then sent a large convoy to Rodrigo, but, following the convention between Joseph and Napoleon, returned himself to France. Dorsenne succeeded to his command, and immediately prepared to invade Gallicia. Castille and Leon were also consigned to him by Marmont, who had orders to withdraw all his own posts and dépôts, except the garrison of Rodrigo, which was delayed for a more convenient time. Madrid was to be Marmont's base and chief dépôt, his permanent positions were to be in the valley of the Tagus and at Truxillo, he was to fortify Alcantara and Almaraz, and to secure his communication across the river.

Napoleon's instructions to Marmont were clear and powerful. Penetrating Wellington's secret thoughts, he observed that an invasion of Andalusia to succour Cadiz could be the only object of the allies at that time, and Marmont could from his new position always frustrate it by moving against their flank. In the north they would not make any serious attempt, because as they advanced, the French would retire upon their resources, and must in time overmatch them. Marmont also would then act on their right flank, as he could on their left flank if they entered Andalusia; and while he remained stationary he protected Madrid, and gave power and activity to the king's administration. United with Dorsenne, seventy thousand troops would be opposed to Wellington; united with Soult, sixty-five thousand men would be in line; and if the allies advanced on either side of the Tagus, Marmont, reinforced with ten thousand men from the army of the north, fifteen thousand from the army of the south, and six thousand from the army of the centre, could offer battle with more than seventy thousand combatants.

It was in pursuance of these instructions that Marmont

placed a division at Truxillo, repaired the castles of that place and Medellin, and extended his army from Talavera to Plasencia down the valley of the Tagus, with posts at Bejar and Baños;—that Girard's division of the fifth corps held Zafra to connect Soult and Marmont, and support Badajos, which Napoleon wisely garrisoned with detachments from the three armies, to give them a direct interest in its safety: in the same policy Rodrigo was in time to be garrisoned by Dorsenne, that Marmont might not neglect the army of the south under pretence of succouring that fortress. To restore and maintain Alcantara was beyond Marmont's means, but he repaired the bridge of Almaraz, and constructed strong forts, one on each bank, to protect it and serve as field depôts. A third and more considerable fort was erected on the Mirabete ridge to secure the passage to Truxillo, by which free intercourse with Soult was maintained; and on the other side the communication with Dorsenne was maintained by the fortified pass of Baños, and by Bejar; and by the old Roman road through the Pico pass, which had been restored in 1810 and was now being enlarged.

Napoleon's affairs in Spain at this time bore a favourable aspect. There was indeed want of money, but the people scrupulously obeyed the military authorities, not only in the occupied districts but even where the partidas acted. Wellington attributed this submission to fear, and thought the heavy exactions would finally force the people to fight or flee from their habitations; but this did not happen generally, and the obedience seems rather to have been the sign of subjection, which by a judicious mixture of mildness and severity, would have been complete, if England had not kept the war alive: for on the Spanish side weakness and anarchy increased. The disputes between the British general and Portuguese government were also becoming unappeasable, and lord Wellington drawing up powerful expositions of his grievous situation, sent one to the Brazils, another to England, declaring that if a new system was not adopted he could not and would not continue the war. Lord Wellesley made strenuous exertions in both countries to avoid this termination, but his brother while awaiting the effect of his efforts had to contend

with the most imperious difficulties, and seek in his personal resources the means of holding Portugal. He had sent Beresford to Lisbon, immediately after Albuera, to organize the restoration of the Portuguese army; and Beresford had sent De Lemos an officer of his staff to the Brazils to represent the evils of the regency interfering in military matters. To meet this the Souzas sent one Vasconcellos, who had been their spy at the British head-quarters, to Rio Janeiro, and thus the political affairs became more complicated while the military prospect became less promising.

Wellington understood and felt the force of the emperor's new combinations, yet he did not despair of overcoming them if he could sustain the political burthens so recklessly heaped upon his shoulders. He had a powerful and experienced British force, the military departments were become more skilful and ready, and he had seen enough of his adversaries to estimate their powers justly. The king was no general and was discontented with the marshals; Soult was able in administration and vast in his military plans, yet too cautious in execution; Marmont was vigorous and prompt, but had already shown some rashness in pushing Reynier's division forward after passing the Tagus. It was easy to conceive that no very strict concert would be maintained by these different commanders in their combined operations, and Wellington had now also established good channels of information. His Spanish spies were numerous within the French lines, and a British officer constantly visited their armies in disguise. Sobral, a Spanish counsellor of state, living at Victor's head-quarters, gave intelligence from that side; and Fuentes, a guitar-player of celebrity, repeatedly made his way to Madrid. Mr. Stuart, under cover of vessels licensed to fetch corn from France, kept *chasse marées* constantly plying along the Biscay coast, by which he not only acquired direct information, but facilitated the transmission of intelligence from the land spies; amongst those the most remarkable was a cobbler, living in a little hutch at the end of the bridge of Irun, where, always plying his trade, he continued for years without being suspected to count every French soldier passing in or out of Spain by that bridge, and transmitted

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their numbers by the *chasse marées* to Lisbon. With exception of Sobral, a double traitor, all the persons thus employed were meritorious. The greater number, and the cleverest also, were Spanish gentlemen, alcaldes, and poor men, who disdained rewards, disregarded danger, and are to be lauded alike for their boldness, their talent, and their virtue. Many are dead. Fuentes was drowned in passing a river on one of his expeditions. The alcalde of Cáceres, a man of the clearest courage and patriotism, who expended his own property in the cause and spurned at remuneration, was on Ferdinand's restoration cast into a dungeon, where he perished, a victim to the unbounded ingratitude and baseness of the monarch he had served so well!

With such means Wellington did not quail before the military policy of the emperor. He thought the saying of Henry the Fourth of France, that '*large armies would starve and small ones be beaten in Spain,*' was still applicable. Solid possession of Portugal and her resources, which, through his brother's aid he still hoped to have, would enable him to strike partial blows against the French, or compel them to concentrate in large masses, which he could hold in check, while the Spaniards ruined the small posts, and disorganized the civil administrations in their rear. Hitherto the Spaniards had not made any such efforts except by the *partidas*, which were insufficient; but time, his own remonstrances, and the palpable advantages of the system might yet teach them what to do. Wherefore, having meditated upon these matters and received reinforcements from England, he resolved to place Hill with ten thousand infantry, a division of cavalry and four brigades of artillery, about Portalegre, Villa Viciosa, and Estremoz. From these rich towns, beyond the influence of the Guadiana fever, his troops could rapidly concentrate for advance or retreat; and the latter could be collected upon Abrantes, or by Niza, to Vilha Velha, where a permanent boat-bridge was established. Elvas, Jerumenha, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella were in front; and Castaños remained in Estremadura with the fifth army, which, by the return of the cavalry from Ayamonte and the formation of Downie's legion, now amounted to a thousand infantry and

nine hundred horse. This force, posted near Montijo, had Albuquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara as points of support, and could retreat by the fords of the Tagus near the bridge of Alcantara, or upon Portugal by Marvão and Castello de Vide. Hill was thus so well covered he could not be surprised, nor pressed except by a very strong army; and he could make incursions against the fifth corps in Estremadura. The rest of the army was placed in quarters of refreshment at Castello de Vide, Marvão and other places near the Tagus, partly to avoid the Guadiana fever, partly to correspond with Marmont's movement; partly to sustain a great stroke now meditated. For as Napoleon had foreseen, the disposition of the French army barred any sustained offensive operations, and Wellington, ignorant of the great strength of Dorsenne's army, thought to take Rodrigo by surreption. In this view he caused a battering train of iron guns and mortars just arrived from England with their gunners, to be re-embarked ostentatiously at Lisbon as if for Cadiz, but had them shifted at sea to smaller craft, and while the original vessels went to their destination, the train was secretly landed at Oporto, and carried up the Douro in boats to Lamego. From thence they were brought to Villaponte near Celorico without attracting attention, because Lamego and Celorico being great depôts the passage of stores was constant. Other combinations deceived the enemy and facilitated the project, before the troops commenced their march for Beira; but to hide such extensive preparations would have been scarcely possible, if the personal hatred borne to the invaders by the peninsulars, combined with the latter's peculiar subtlety of character, had not prevented any information spreading abroad, beyond the fact that artillery had arrived at Oporto. The bringing of sixty-eight huge guns, with proportionate stores across fifty miles of mountain was an operation of magnitude; five thousand draft bullocks were required for the train alone, and above a thousand militia were for several weeks employed merely to repair the road: the effort however marred one of Napoleon's formidable projects.

Appendix 10.

After quitting the Caya considerable reinforcements, especially in cavalry, had arrived, but the army was generally

sickly and required change of quarters, wherefore as an intercepted despatch said Ciudad Rodrigo wanted provisions, Wellington, hoping to profit from this circumstance, suddenly crossed the Tagus at Vilha Velha and moved by Castello Branco towards that fortress pretending he sought healthy cantonments. This was in August, and the march was unmolested save by some French dragoons from Plasencia, who captured a convoy of mules loaded with wine, got drunk, and in that state falling on some Portuguese infantry were beaten and lost the mules again. But there were other ostensible causes for the movement to blind the French generals. Dorsenne was then menacing Galicia, Soult was operating against the Murcians, and at first designed to invade that kingdom; Wellington's march therefore appeared to have the double object of saving Galicia by threatening Dorsenne, and of relieving Murcia by drawing Marmont from the support of Soult, who would not then quit Andalusia. But Galicia was in great peril. The partidas of the north had been so repressed by Caffarelli and Reille, that Dorsenne was able to assemble twenty thousand men on the Esla. Abadia who had succeeded Santocildes was a vain weak man, disputing with, and fearing Moscoso the chief of his staff, and on bad terms with the junta. He had only seven thousand starving troops on the Esla, and a reserve of fifteen hundred at Foncebadon, for to this had the Gallician army dwindled; and the danger was so manifest that general Walker advised the removal of the ships, the stores, and fifteen hundred guns, from Ferrol, which was untenable, to Coruña.

In this state of affairs general Dorsenne passed the AVer Esla in four columns, and general Abadia after a sharp conflict near La Baneza retired by the line sir John Moore had taken in 1809, having nearly the same disproportion of force; but wanting that general's skilful diligence he was forestalled by the enemy at Bemibre, entirely cut off from Villa Franca and driven into the Val des Orres. From that strong country he could always retire upon Portugal; but his army was ready to disband from misery, Galicia was helpless, and Dorsenne would have taken

August.

General  
Harvey's  
Journal,  
MSS.

General  
Walker,  
MSS  
Abadia,  
MSS.

Sir H.  
Douglass,  
MSS.



Coruña and Ferrol if the arrival of Wellington on the Coa had not alarmed him. Then he relinquished the invasion, and Souham also, who was in march from Burgos to aid him, halted at Rio Seco, events which Abadia with laughable vanity ascribed to his own fighting at La Baneza. This saving of Galicia was a great thing. That kingdom was the base of all the operations against the great French line of communication; from thence went forth British squadrons to nourish the guerrillas of Biscay, of the Montaña, Navarre, the Rioja, and the Asturias; it was the chief resource for the supply of cattle to the allied army, it was the outwork of Portugal; and if honestly and vigorously governed, would have been more important than Catalonia. But like the rest of Spain it was always weak from disorders, and there was nothing to prevent Dorsenne from conquering it. Had he only occupied St. Jago, Lugo, Villa Franca, and Orense, they would have given him entire command of the interior, and the Spaniards holding only the ports could not have dislodged him.

Wellington reached the Coa on the 8th of August, intending first a close blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo and finally a siege, he was too late: the place had been revictualled for two months on the 6th by Bessières' convoy, and the blockade being necessarily relinquished the troops were quartered near the sources of the Coa and Agueda, close to the line of communication between Marmont and Dorsenne, and in a country where there was still some corn. From thence if the enemy advanced in superior numbers, there was a retreat through a strong country to a position of battle near Sabugal, whence the communication with Hill was direct. Nor was the rest of Beira much exposed, as the French would have lent their left flank by an advance towards Almeida, and the allies could, by Guarda, send detachments to the valley of the Mondego in time to secure the magazines at Celorico; but the battering train and line of supply from Lamego was unprotected. In these positions the preparations for the siege went on until Wellington learned, contrary to his former belief, that Dorsenne's disposable force was above twenty thousand good troops, and Ciudad Rodrigo could not be attacked in face of that force and Marmont's army. Then changing his plans,

he again resolved to blockade the place and watch to strike a sudden blow against the fortress, or against the enemy's troops: for it was the foundation of his hopes, that as the French could not long keep in masses for want of provisions, so he could check those masses on the frontier of Portugal, and always force them to concentrate or suffer the loss of some important post. But it is worthy of observation, that he did not comprise the Gallician army as an auxiliary; he had no expectation that it would act at all, and was certain it would not act effectually; yet this was in August, 1811, and Galicia had not seen an enemy since June, 1809!

Early in September, Marmont pushed a detachment from Plasencia through the passes, surprised a British cavalry piquet at St. Martin de Trebejo, and thus opened his communications with Dorsenue. Wellington had however then formed his blockade, and fixing head-quarters at Guinaldo placed the fifth division at Perales to watch Marmont, the first division, which was now under Graham, occupied Penamacor; a field battery was withdrawn from Hill, and three of his brigades, reinforced by a Portuguese regiment, were posted on the Ponçul, beyond Castello Branco, to protect the magazines on that line. The battering train then reached Villa Ponte, the troops made gabions and fascines, and two hundred men of the line were instructed as sappers; the Almeida bridge on the Coa was permanently repaired, and Almeida was once more restored as a place of arms for guns and stores. Carlos d'España also came from Leon to form a new army under the allies' protection, but he was without money, officers, arms or stores.

## CHAPTER VIII.

DURING the first arrangements for the blockade, the garrison had made excursions to beat up the quarters of the British cavalry and forage the villages, and some lancers from Salamanca drove Julian Sanchez out of Ledesma. In Estremadura, Morillo chased the enemy from Caceres and menaced Truxillo, but was beaten by Foy and returned to Montijo, whence some French cavalry coming from Zafra drove him to Albuquerque. Other military operations worth relating there were none, but the civil transactions in Portugal were very important. Mr. Stuart's exertions had improved the revenue; the ranks of the infantry were filled by the return of deserters and by fresh recruits, which with the reinforcements from England had raised the allied army to upwards of eighty thousand men, fifty-six thousand being English. The number under arms did not however exceed twenty-four thousand Portuguese and thirty-three thousand British, five thousand being cavalry, with ninety pieces of artillery; for the sick-

ness acquired in the Alentejo was increasing and  
 Appendix 6, § 1. Vol. IV. twenty-two thousand were in hospital: hence, Hill's corps being deducted, Wellington could not bring to the blockade of Ciudad above forty-four thousand of all arms, including Sanchez's partida. But Marmont alone could in a few days bring quite as many to its succour; and Dorsenne had from twenty to twenty-five thousand men in hand, because the French reinforcements having relieved the old garrisons in the north the latter had joined the army in the field.

At this time the British military chest was bankrupt; even the muleteers, upon whose fidelity and efficiency the war absolutely depended, were six months in arrears; and the disputes with the Portuguese government were more acrimonious

than ever. The regency had proposed a new system of military regulations, calculated to throw the burthen of feeding the native troops entirely upon the British commissariat without any reform of abuses; Wellington rejected it, which caused more violence, and as Beresford had fallen sick at Cintra, Mr. Stuart, deprived of his support on military questions and himself no longer a member of the regency, was unable to restrain the triumphant faction of the Souzas. The prince regent's return to Portugal was prevented by troubles in the Brazils, and the regency, expecting a long hold of power, and foolishly imagining the war was no longer doubtful, were, like all people who employ powerful auxiliaries, devising how to get rid of the British army. With this view they objected to or neglected every necessary measure, and made many absurd demands, such as that the British general should pay the expenses of the Portuguese post-office; at the same time they preferred various vexatious and unfounded charges against British officers, while gross corruption and oppression of the poorer people marked the conduct of their own magistrates.

But the fate of Portugal, which to these people appeared fixed, was in the eyes of the English general more doubtful than ever. Intercepted letters gave reasons to believe the emperor was coming to Spain. This was corroborated by the assembly of an army of reserve in France, and the formation of great magazines at Burgos and other places, to supply which and to obtain money, the French generals were exacting the fourth of the harvest and selling the surplus again even by retail. Minute reports of the state of these magazines were demanded by Napoleon, reinforcements, chiefly of the imperial guards, were pouring into Spain; and Wellington, judging the emperor must either drive the British from the Peninsula or lower his tone with the world, thought he would invade Portugal from the side of Rodrigo, moving also by the valley of the Tagus and the Alentejo; and that he would risk his fleet in a combined attack upon Lisbon by sea and land. It is uncertain if Napoleon really meant this, or spread the report with a view to restrain the allies from offensive operations during the summer; or to

mislead the English cabinet as to the real state of his negotiations with Russia, intending if the latter proved favourable to turn his whole force against the Peninsula; but everything in Spain at this time indicated his approach. Wellington's notion, that he was bound to drive the British army away or lose his influence in the world, does not however seem conclusive. The mighty expedition to Moscow proved that the emperor did not want force to conquer Spain; success in Russia would have enabled him to prolong the war in the Peninsula as a drain on the English resources for many years; and the rest of Europe could not from thence draw conclusions unfavourable to his influence.

Napoleon's coming being probable, Wellington with characteristic prudence turned his own attention again to the lines of Torres Vedras, and urgently desired the government to put the fortresses in order, repair the roads, and restore the bridges broken during Massena's invasion. An increased number of workmen were also put to the lines, for the engineers had never ceased to improve those on the northern bank of the Tagus. On the southern bank the double entrenchments of Almada had been continued on a gigantic scale. A defensive canal there was planned on a depth to float ships of three hundred tons, and serve as a passage from the Tagus to Setuval by joining the navigation of the Sado and Marateca rivers, thus conducing to objects of general utility as well as the military defence; and it will be found that Wellington did at all times sustain, not only the political and financial and military affairs, but also the agricultural commercial and charitable interests of Portugal. The batteries at the mouth of the Tagus being likewise put in order were provided with furnaces for heating shot; and captain Holloway of the engineers, at a trifling expense, constructed four jetties at St. Julian's in such an ingenious manner, that they withstood the most tempestuous gales and secured the embarkation of the army in any season. The militia also were again called out, a measure of greater import in the actual state of affairs than would at first appear; for the expense was a heavy drain upon the finances, and the number of hands thus taken away from agriculture was a serious evil.

Had all these things been duly executed, even Napoleon was not to be feared; but the Portuguese government, if that can be called government which was but an idle faction, was, as usual, entirely negligent. The regency refused to publish any proclamation announcing danger, or exciting the people to prepare for future efforts; and though the ancient laws of Portugal provided ample means for meeting such emergencies, the bridges over the Ceira the Alva and other rivers on the line of retreat were left unrepaiied. The roads were therefore impassable, the rainy season was coming on, and the safety of the army would have been seriously endangered if it had retired before the emperor. The regency pleaded want of money, a result of its own negligence in the collection of taxes, for, the devastated districts excepted, the people were richer than they had ever been, and in hard cash also from the enormous sums expended by the British army. Another terrible embarrassment was likewise caused by the culpable indiscretion of the regency. The secret correspondents on the side of Salamanca suddenly ceased to write, because the Portuguese government published in the Lisbon Gazette the intelligence sent to Silveira, and the English newspapers by copying it drew the enemy's attention. At first it was feared the poor people had lost their lives, but fortunately it was not so; yet an aggravating sense of all his difficulties was thus pressed on the English general when he compared his own situation with that of the enemy. Neither his necessities nor his money could procure due assistance from the Portuguese, while the French generals had only to issue their orders to the Spaniards through the prefects of provinces, and all kinds of aid possible to be obtained were surely provided on the day and at the place indicated.

Wellington  
to Lord Javerpool, MSS


In the midst of these cares Wellington was suddenly called into military action. Ciudad Rodrigo again wanted food, and Marmont, who had received eleven thousand men from France, and had fifty thousand under arms, concerted with Dorsenne a combined operation for its succour. In this view Truxillo had been occupied by a part of the fifth corps, and Girard with the remainder advanced to Merida while Foy, reinforced

with a strong division of the army of the centre, occupied Plasencia. Marmont passed the mountains and collected a large convoy at Bejar; Dorsenne reinforced by eight thousand men under Souham, collected another convoy at Salamanca; and leaving Bonnet's division, which now included Mayer's troops, at Astorga to watch the Gallicians, came down to Tamames. They met on the 21st, presenting altogether sixty thousand men, six thousand being cavalry, with a hundred pieces of artillery. Wellington immediately concentrated his scattered troops. He could not fight beyond the Agueda, but he would not retreat until he had seen the whole French army, lest a detachment should relieve the place to his dishonour. With this object, he placed the third division, reinforced by three squadrons of cavalry, in the centre on the heights of Elbodon and Pastores, within three miles of Ciudad Rodrigo and overlooking the plains round that place. The right wing, composed of the light division some squadrons of cavalry and six guns, was sent beyond the Agueda to the Vadillo, a river rising in the Peña de Francia and falling into the Agueda, three miles above Rodrigo: from this line an enemy coming from the eastern passes could be descried. The left wing, formed of the sixth division and Anson's cavalry, the whole under Graham, was at Espeja, with advanced posts at Carpio and Marialva. From thence to Rodrigo was about eight miles over a plain; and on Graham's left, Julian Sanchez's partida, nominally commanded by Carlos d'España, was spread along the lower Agueda in observation.


The heads of these columns were thus presented towards the fortress from three points—namely, the ford of the Vadillo, the heights of Pastores, and Espeja. The left and centre were connected by two brigades of heavy cavalry posted on the upper Azava, and supported at Campillo by Pack's Portuguese; the left was however far from Guinaldo the pivot of operations, and to obviate danger from a flank march in retreat, the seventh division was in reserve at Alamedillo, and the first division at Nava d'Aver. These dispositions spread the army out on all the roads like a fan, the sticks of which led to one point on the Coa. The fifth division remained at San Payo to watch the passes, lest Foy should







EXPLANATORY SKETCH  
 AND COMBAT OF  
 EL BODON.



from Plasencia take the right wing in reserve. Meanwhile Hill, sending Hamilton's Portuguese towards Albuquerque to support the Spanish cavalry, then menaced by the fifth corps, drew nearer the Tagus, to take, if necessary, the place of his third brigade, which marched from the Pongul to Penamacor. But the army was too much spread. The broad range of heights lining the left bank of the Agueda ended somewhat abruptly above Elbodon and Pastores where the centre was posted, and was flanked in its whole length by plains and woods extending from Ciudad Rodrigo to the Coa; it was therefore untenable against an enemy commanding that open country; and if the centre were driven rapidly beyond Guinaldo, the distant wings could be intercepted in retreat. To avoid that, three field redoubts were constructed at Guinaldo to impose upon the enemy, and thus gain time to concentrate and feel Marmont's disposition for battle, because a retreat beyond the Coa was if possible to be avoided.

On the 23rd the French, advancing from Tamames, encamped behind the hills to the north-east of Ciudad Rodrigo, and a strong detachment, entering the plain, communicated with the garrison examined the position of the light division on the Vadillo and returned. The 24th, six thousand cavalry and four divisions of infantry crossed the hills in two columns, and placing some troops in observation on the Vadillo introduced the convoy. On this day the fourth division of the allies was brought up to the position of Guinaldo, and the redoubts were completed; yet no other change was made, for it was thought the French would not advance further. But the 25th, soon after daybreak, fourteen squadrons of the imperial guards drove the outposts of the left wing from Carpio across the Azava, and the lancers of Berg crossed that river in pursuit; they were however flanked by some infantry in a wood, and then charged and beaten by two squadrons of the fourteenth and sixteenth dragoons, who re-occupied the post at Carpio.

During this skirmish, fourteen battalions of infantry, thirty squadrons of cavalry, and twelve guns, the whole under Montbrun, passed the Agueda by the bridge of Rodrigo and the fords above it, and marched towards Guinaldo. The road

divided, one branch turned the Elbodon heights on the right hand, the other leading nearer to the Agueda passed through Pastores, La Encina, and Elbodon; and as the point of divarication was covered by a gentle ridge it was for some time doubtful which branch the French would follow. Soon the doubt vanished, their cavalry poured along the right-hand road leading directly to Guinaldo, the small advanced posts which the allied squadrons had on the plain were rapidly driven in, and the enemy's horsemen, without waiting for their infantry, commenced the combat of Elbodon.

This action began disadvantageously for the allies. The seventy-fourth and sixtieth regiments of the third division being at Pastores on the right, were too distant to be called in, and Picton with three other regiments, being at Elbodon, could not immediately join in the fight. Wellington sent to Guinaldo for a brigade of the fourth division, and directed Colville to draw up the seventy-seventh and fifth British regiments, the twenty-first Portuguese, and two brigades of artillery of the same nation, on a hill over which the road to Guinaldo passed, supporting their flanks with Alten's three squadrons. This height was convex towards the enemy and covered in front and on both flanks by deep ravines; but it was too extensive, and before Picton could come from Elbodon the crisis had passed. The Portuguese guns sent their shot into Montbrun's horsemen in the plain, yet the latter crossing the ravines rode up the rough height on three sides, and fell vehemently upon the allies. The loose fire of the infantry and artillery could not stop them, but they were checked by the fine fighting of the cavalry, who charging the heads of the ascending masses, not once but twenty times, maintained the upper ground above an hour.

It was astonishing to see so few troopers resist the surging multitude even on that steep rocky ground; and when Montbrun, obstinate to win, brought up his artillery, his horsemen, gaining ground in the centre, cut down some gunners and captured the guns; one of the German squadrons charging too far then got entangled in the intricacy of the ravines and the crisis was perilous; but suddenly the fifth regiment, led by major Ridge, a daring man, dashed into the midst of

the French cavalry and retook the artillery, which again opened its fire, and nearly at the same time the seventy-seventh, supported by the twenty-first Portuguese, vigorously repulsed the enemy on the left. This charging of infantry against a powerful cavalry could only check the foe at that particular point. Montbrun pressed on with fresh masses against the left flank of the allies, while other squadrons penetrated between the right flank and Elbodon, from the vineyards of which village Picton was then with difficulty and some confusion extricating his troops; he could give no succour, the brigade of the fourth division was not in sight, the French infantry rapidly approached, the position was untenable, and Wellington directed both Picton and Colville to fall back and unite in the plain behind. Colville, forming his battalions in squares, immediately descended, but Picton was at a considerable distance; and the German squadrons, fearing to be surrounded by the French who had completely turned their right, took refuge at a gallop with the Portuguese regiment, then the farthest in retreat. Thus the fifth and seventy-seventh, two weak battalions formed in one square, were quite exposed, and in an instant the whole of the French cavalry came thundering down upon them. But how vain to match the sword with the musket, to send the charging horseman against the steadfast veteran! The multitudinous squadrons rending the skies with their shouts closed on the glowing squares like the falling edges of a burning crater, and were as instantly rejected, scorched, and scattered abroad; the rolling peal of musketry echoed through the hills, bayonets glittered at the edge of the smoke, and with firm and even step the British regiments came forth unscathed as the holy men from the Assyrian's furnace. Picton then effected his junction and the whole retired over the plain for six miles to the position at Guinaldo. The French would not renew the close attack but plied shot and shell until four o'clock, when the entrenched camp was gained. Here the fourth division presented a fresh front, Pack's brigade came from Campillo, the heavy cavalry from the upper Azava, and the action ceased. This retrograde movement of the left and centre of the third division isolated the seventy-fourth and the sixtieth regiments posted at

Pastores, and they had to ford the Agueda, and then moving up the right bank happily reached Guinaldo in the night after a march of fifteen hours, in the course of which they captured a French cavalry patrol.

During the retreat from Elbodon, the left wing of the army was ordered to fall back on the first division at Nava d'Aver, but to keep posts in observation on the Azava. Carlos d'Espana retired with Sanchez's infantry behind the Coa, and the guerilla chief himself passed with his cavalry into the French rear. The seventh division was withdrawn from Allamudilla to Albergaria, and the head-quarters baggage moved to Casilla de Flores. The light division should have marched by Robledo to Guinaldo, and Craufurd received the order at three o'clock, heard the cannonade, and might have reached Guinaldo before midnight; but fearing a night march he only moved to Cespedosa, one league from the Vadillo, which river was immediately passed by fifteen hundred French. The position at Guinaldo was therefore occupied by only fourteen thousand men, of which about two thousand six hundred were cavalry. The left of the army, concentrated at Nava d'Aver under Graham, was ten miles distant; the light division being at Cespedosa and debarred the direct route by the ford of Carros, was sixteen miles distant; the fifth division, posted at Payo in the mountains, was twelve miles distant. Meanwhile Marmont brought up a second division of infantry, and in the course of the night and following day, united sixty thousand men in front of Guinaldo. Wellington was then dangerously menaced, but he would not abandon the light division, which being intercepted by the French cavalry at Robleda, and compelled to make a circuit, did not arrive until after three o'clock in the evening. Marmont's fortune was fixed in that hour! Ignorant of the true state of affairs, he detached a strong column by the valley of the Azava to menace the left, and made an ostentatious display of the imperial guards in the plain instead of attacking an adversary, who, being too weak to resist, laughed to see him so employed and soon changed the state of affairs.

In the night, by a skilful concentric movement from Guinaldo, Nava d'Aver, Perales, and Payo, the allies were united

between the Coa and the sources of the Agueda, twelve miles beyond Guinaldo; and Marmont so little knew his own advantages, that he also retired during the night, and was actually in march to the rear when the scouts of the column which had marched by the valley of Azava, told him the allies were in retreat and their divisions still widely separated. Dorsenne's remonstrances then compelled him to wheel round and pursue, but Wellington was already in a strong position behind the stream of the Villa Maior. The fifth division was on the right at Aldea Velha; the fourth and light divisions, Victor Alten's cavalry, and the heavy dragoons under Cotton, were in the centre covering Alfayates, with the convent of Sacaparte on their left; the line was prolonged to Rebulon by Pack's and M'Mahon's Portuguese brigades, and the sixth division with Anson's cavalry closed it at Bismula. The cavalry piquets were pushed beyond the Villa Maior to Aldeaponte in the centre, and Furcalhos on the right; the third and seventh divisions were in reserve behind Alfayates. This position was extensive, but the days were short, the allies covered all the practicable roads leading to the bridges and fords of the Coa, they could not be turned, and serious dispositions were necessary for a battle.

#### COMBAT OF ALDEAPONTE.

Coming on by the roads both of Furcalhos and Aldeaponte, the French were checked by the piquets of the light division on the former; but on the latter their horsemen drove the cavalry posts across the stream of the Villa Maior, and about ten o'clock took possession of Aldeaponte. At twelve o'clock the head of their infantry arrived and immediately attacked Pakenham's brigade of the fourth division, which was posted on the opposite heights. Wellington came up at the moment, and directed the seventh fuzileers to charge in line, supporting them on each flank with a Portuguese regiment in column. The French, who had nearly crowned the hill, were driven back; and though they afterwards attempted to turn the brigade by a wood, distant about musket-shot from the right, while their cavalry advanced to the

foot of the hill, the artillery baffled that effort. Then the allies taking the offensive turned the French left and seized the opposite hills, but the fire soon ceased, Aldeaponte was re-occupied, and Wellington who had been personally much exposed rode to another part of the position. Scarcely was he gone when the French, coming by the Furcalhos road, joined those at Aldeaponte and retook that village, and Pakenham, though he recovered it with his fuzileers, finding the enemy numerous, and unable in that rugged and wooded country to see what was passing on his flanks, knowing also the final battle-ground was behind the Coa, abandoned Aldeaponte for his original post.

In the night the allies retreated, and on the morning of the 28th occupied a strong position in front of the Coa, the right resting on the Sierra de Mesas, the centre covered by the village of Soita, the left at Rendo upon the river. The army thus shut up as it were in a deep loop of the Coa river could only be attacked on a narrow front, and Marmont, who had only a few days' provisions and could gather none in that country, retired the same day. The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo was then changed, and Marmont returned to the valley of the Tagus. Dorsenne re-occupied Salamanca, and placed a division at Alba de Tormes to connect his left with Marmont. Foy, who had come with his two divisions to Zarza Mayor, returned to Plasencia. Girard, menaced by Hamilton's Portuguese division, which Hill had sent to check his advance, left two thousand men of the fifth corps at Merida and retired to Zafra. When these movements were known, the light division, reinforced by some cavalry, resumed the nominal blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo in concert with Julian Sanchez, and the rest of the army was cantoned on both sides of the Coa, head-quarters being fixed at Frenada. Nearly a month had been employed by the French in preparation and execution of this great operation, which terminated feebly and abruptly because the generals were as usual at variance; Ciudad Rodrigo had been victualled, but the opportunity of invading Galicia was lost, nothing had been gained in the field, time was wasted, and the English general's plans were forwarded.

## OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Wellington's position behind the Soita has been noticed by two military authors. One censures the imprudence of offering battle where there was no retreat; the other intimates that it was assumed in contempt of the adversary's prowess. This last appears a mere evasion of what was not understood: had Wellington despised Marmont he would have fought him beyond the Agueda. But sixty thousand French soldiers were never to be despised; and it is not difficult to show that the position was chosen without imprudence, and without presumption.

Hamilton's  
Annals  
London-  
derry's  
Narrative.

From the Sierra de Mesas to the Coa was less than six miles, and the part open to attack was much reduced by the rugged bed of a torrent covering the left. Forty thousand men were enough to defend this line, which was little more than one-third of their full front; and as the roads were bad, the country broken with woods and ravines, the enemy's superiority in horse and guns would have availed him little. Wellington had a right to affront an adversary who had not molested him at Guinaldo, and it is always of importance to show a menacing front. Great combinations must have been made by Marmont for a general battle; it was known that he had only a few days' provisions and the neighbourhood could not supply him: it was therefore reasonable to expect he would retire rather than fight, and he did so.

Let it be supposed Marmont was prepared and resolute to fight. The position behind Soita would have been good. The French, too strong on the plain, were not so powerful as to warrant a retreat indicating fear; hence the allies had retired slowly or three days, although each day engaged, and the enemy's powerful horse and artillery always close upon their rear. The rugged bed of the Coa offered only a few points of passage, the principal being the ford of Serraleira behind the right of the allies; the ford of Rapoulha de Coa behind their left; the bridge of Sabugal behind their centre. The ways to those points were narrow, and the passage of the river with all the baggage, could not have been easily effected in face of an



enemy without some loss and perhaps dishonour; and the difficulty of passing after losing the position would not have been much increased, because the incumbrances would have been at the other side, and a second range of heights half-a-mile in front of Sabugal was favourable for a rear-guard. The position of Soita was therefore well taken to oppose the enemy, but the battering-train, then between Pinhel and Villa Ponte, was completely exposed to the enemy: Marmont, however, had not sufficiently considered his enterprise, and knew not where or how to strike.

2°. Aldea Ponte was also a good position. Had the allies retreated at once from Guinaldo to Soita, baggage and stores would have been lost, the movement would have seemed a flight, the road from Payo would have been uncovered, and the junction of the fifth division endangered. At Aldea Ponte the meeting of all the roads was strongly commanded, and it was easy for such a quick general, having excellent troops and knowing the country, to check the heads of the advancing columns until the baggage had gained a sufficient offing and the fifth division came in.

3°. Guinaldo rests on different grounds. The early entrenching of it denoted foresight; the holding it for thirty-six hours was proof of firmness. It is said sir George Murray urged Wellington to abandon it in the night of the 25th, but anxious for the light division he would not stir; that delay was one of those daring impulses of fine genius which rules were never made to control. The position was contracted, of no great natural strength in front, and easily to be turned; the entrenchments, a few breastworks and two weak field redoubts, were open in rear and without palisades; not more than fourteen thousand British and Portuguese troops were in line, and sixty thousand French veterans with a hundred pieces of artillery were before them! When Marmont heard of the escape of the light division and discovered the deceit, he, alluding to Napoleon's fortune, prophetically exclaimed, '*And Wellington's star also is bright!*'

4°. If the positions of Aldea Ponte and Soita are to be commended, that at Guinaldo is to be admired rather than

imitated, but the preceding operations are censurable. The country beyond Ciudad Rodrigo furnished no covering position, and the sudden floods of the Agueda rendered the communications with the left bank precarious. Nor with bridges could the allies have encamped round the place within lines of contravallation and circumvallation, because Marmont would have advanced by Castello Branco, seized the bridge at Vilha Velha, and in concert with the fifth corps endangered Hill. This would have compelled Wellington to quit his entrenched camp, and Dorsenne could have revictualled the place. It was necessary to have a position, central with respect to Marmont and Dorsenne, strong enough to hold both in check while separate, and defensible against them when united. Such a position was found on the Coa; for Salamanca and Bejar, the two nearest points where convoys for Ciudad Rodrigo could be collected, were fifty and sixty miles distant; and the French were as much compelled to assemble in large masses for its relief by this distant investment as they would have been by a close one. So far the combination was well calculated, but when sixty thousand men came to Ciudad Rodrigo the allies should have concentrated at Guinaldo without delay. Instead of this, a line many miles long was maintained, and the right wing separated from the centre by a difficult river. The English general justified it because he wanted to verify by actual observation some uncertainty as to the French numbers; but that is not a valid reason; his object could have been obtained by other means, and the whole war should not have been endangered, and the following vital rules of war violated for such a secondary object.

1°. An army should never be parcelled before a concentrated enemy.

2°. The point of concentration should not be within the enemy's reach.

Now on the 24th and 25th the army was parcelled from the ford of the Vadillo beyond the Agueda to Marialva on the Azava, and from those places to Guinaldo was as long as from Ciudad Rodrigo to Guinaldo, and by worse roads: the distance from Rodrigo to Elbodon was as nothing compared to

the distance of the wings from the latter point. Wherefore, when Elbodon was abandoned, the right wing was cut off, and if the light division and the troops at Pastores escaped it was by fortune and gallantry. But what if Marmont had made good dispositions for a great battle? He must have known through the garrison of the allies' positions and their camp at Guinaldo, and he might have reached Campillo two hours after daybreak the 25th with one column, while another assailed Elbodon and Pastores. The third division would thus have been enveloped, or broken and driven over the Agueda at the Zamara ford and irretrievably separated from Guinaldo; and then Marmont would have overwhelmed the fourth division on that position. Meanwhile a few thousand men, thrown across the ford of Caros near Robleda, would have kept the light division at bay, because the channel of the Robleda torrent, over which their retreat lay, was a very deep and rugged ravine. The French could then at their choice, have surrounded the light division or directed the mass of their forces against the reserves, and have compelled the left wing to retreat from the Azava to Almeida.

It is true all the French were not up on the 25th, but they might have been so, and as Wellington was resolved to see their number he would have been in the same position the 26th. It is however sufficient to remark that the allies exclusive of the fifth division, which was at Payo, did not exceed thirty-five thousand men of all arms; that they were on an irregular line of at least twenty miles, and mostly in an open country; that at no point were the troops more than eight, and at Pastores, the principal point, only three miles from a fortress whence sixty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry with one hundred and twenty guns were ready to issue. Finally the point of concentration at Guinaldo was only twelve miles from that fortress. The allies escaped because their adversary was blind! Wellington's conduct at Guinaldo was above rules, at Elbodon it was against rules, which is just the difference between genius and error.

5°. Marmont was a general rather shining than great. Before he commenced his march he had desired Girard to advance on the side of the Alentejo, assuring him the whole

of the allied army, and even the Spanish troops under Castaños had crossed the Tagus to operate against Rodrigo; but in fact only one brigade of Hill's corps had moved, and Girard would have been destroyed, if, fortunately for him, the allies had not intercepted the original and duplicate of the letter containing this false information. Again, when the convoy entered Ciudad, Marmont had no intention of fighting; but tempted by the false position of the allies, and angry at the repulse of his cavalry on the lower Azava, he turned his scouting troops into columns of attack; yet he permitted his adversary to throw dust in his eyes for thirty-six hours at Guinaldo. At Aldea Ponte his attack was a useless waste of men, because there was no local advantage offered and he did not intend to fight a great battle.

6°. The loss was not heavy on either side. Three hundred men and officers fell on the part of the allies; of the French rather more, because of the fire of the squares and artillery at Elbodon; but the movements for three days were full of interest and instruction, diversified also by brilliant examples of heroism. Ridge's daring charge has been noticed, and in one of the cavalry encounters a French officer, while striking at Felton Harvey of the fourteenth dragoons perceived he had only one arm, and with a rapid change brought down his sword into a salute and passed on! In the next book will be found the contemporary events in Spain.



# APPENDIX.

## No. I.

### EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE BY THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE PRINCE OF WAGRAM AND OF NEUFCHATEL.

#### SECTION 1.

*Seville, August 4th, 1810.*

'PAR une décision de l'empereur du mois de Février dernier S. M. détermine qu'à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> Janvier toutes les dépenses d'administration générale du génie et de l'artillerie seraient au compte du gouvernement Espagnol; aussitôt que j'en fus instruit je sollicitai S. M. C. d'assigner à cet effet une somme; mais je ne pus obtenir que 2,000,000 de réaux (533,000f.) et encore le roi entendait il que les paiements ne remontassent qu'au mois de Février; cette somme était de beaucoup insuffisante. Je n'ai cessé d'en faire la représentation, ainsi que Monsr. l'Intendant Général; nos demandes n'ont pas été accueillies, et pour couvrir autant que possible la différence j'ai dû avoir recours aux recettes extraordinaires faites sans la participation des ministres Espagnols. J'espère que ce moyen réussira, déjà même il a produit quelques sommes. L'état que je mets ci joint fait connaître les recouvrements qui ont été opérés sur les fonds de 533,000f. du crédit mensuel à l'époque du 1<sup>er</sup> Août lesquels forment la somme de 3,731,000f. mais indépendamment il y a eu des recettes extraordinaires pour au moins 500,000f. qui ont reçu la même destination (les dépenses d'administration générale) antérieurement à cette époque. J'avais fait mettre à la disposition de Monsr. l'Intendant Général, des valeurs pour plus d'un million qui devait servir à payer une partie de l'armée. Mr. l'Intendant Général justifie de l'emploi de toutes ces sommes dans ses comptes généraux. Les ministres de S. M. C. n'admettent pas les comptes que je présente; d'abord ils ne veulent pas allouer la somme de 500,000f. qui a été reportée à l'article des dépenses d'administration générale, s'appuyant sur ce sujet sur la décision du roi qui ne fait remonter ces dépenses que jusqu'au mois de Février, quoique l'empereur ait expressement entendu que le mois de Janvier devait aussi y être compris; ils ne veulent pas non plus reconnaître les recettes extraordinaires, où ils prétendent en précompter le produit sur le crédit mensuel de 533,000f.; il n'est pas dans mon pouvoir d'admettre leurs motifs; la décision

de l'empereur est expresse, et tant que je serai dans la situation délicate où je me trouve, mon devoir m'obligera de pourvoir aux besoins du service par tous les moyens praticables. Les recettes qui ont eu lieu en Andalousie ont servi à toutes les dépenses de l'artillerie, du génie, des états majors et de l'administration générale qui sont vraiment immenses, et quoiqu'on ait absolument rien reçu de France ni de Madrid, j'ai en même temps pu faire payer trois mois de solde à l'armée; c'est sans doute bien peu quand il est du 8 à 10 mois d'arrière à la troupe et que l'insuffisance des moyens oblige à augmenter encore cet arrière, mais ne recevant rien je crois qu'il m'était impossible de mieux faire. V. A. en sera elle-même convaincue si elle veut s'arrêter un moment sur l'aperçu que je vais lui donner des charges que l'Andalousie supporte. On consomme tous les jours près de 100,000 rations de vivres et 20,000 rations de fourrage; il y a 2000 malades aux hôpitaux. La forteresse de Jaen, le fort de Malaga, l'Alhambra de Grenade, au dessus duquel on a construit un grand camp retranché; tous les châteaux sur les bords de la mer depuis le cap de Gata jusqu'à Fuengirola, le château d'Alcala la Real, la place de Ronda, les anciens châteaux d'Olvera et de Moron, le château de Belalcazar, le château de Castillo de Los Guardias et plusieurs autres portes sur les frontières de l'Estremadura qu'on a dû aussi occuper. On a pourvu aux dépenses que les travaux devant Cadix et la construction d'une flottille occasionnent. On a établi à Grenade une poudrière et une fabrique d'armes, laquelle jusqu'à présent a peu donné, mais qui par la suite sera très utile. On a rétabli et mis dans une grande activité la fonderie et l'arsenal de Seville où journellement 1500 ouvriers sont employés. Nous manquions de poudre et de projectiles de feu et d'affûts. J'ai fait rétablir deux moulins à poudre à Seville et fait exploiter toutes les nitrières de l'Andalousie. A présent on compte aussi à Seville des projectiles de tous les calibres, jusqu'aux bombes de 12 pouces; tout le vieux fer a été ramassé; on a construit les affûts nécessaires pour l'armement des batteries devant Cadix. On a fait des réquisitions en souliers et effets d'habillement dont la troupe a profité. J'ai fait lever dans le pays 2000 mules qui ont été données à l'artillerie, aux équipages militaires et au génie. J'ai fait construire et organiser un équipage de 36 pièces de montagnes, dont 12 obusiers, de 12 qui sont portés à dos de mulets et vont être repartis dans tous les corps d'armée. La totalité de ces dépenses ainsi qu'une infinité d'autres dont je ne fais pas l'énumération sont au compte du gouvernement Espagnol, et le pays les supporte indépendamment du crédit mensuel de 533,000f. et des recettes extraordinaires que je fais opérer lorsqu'il y a possibilité dont l'application a lieu en faveur de l'administration générale de l'armée, du génie, de l'artillerie, des états majors, des frais de courses et des dépenses secrètes. Ces charges sont immenses, et jamais le pays n'aurait pu les supporter si nous n'étions parvenus à mettre de l'ordre et la plus grande régularité dans les dépenses et consommations; mais il serait difficile de les augmenter, peut-être même y aurait il du danger de chercher à la faire; c'est au

point que malgré que nous soyons à la recolte il faut déjà penser à faire venir du bled des autres provinces, le produit de l'Andalusie étant insuffisant pour la consommation de ses habitans et celle de l'armée. Cependant S. M. C. et ses ministres qui sont parfaitement instruits de cette situation ont voulu attirer à Madrid les revenus de l'Andalusie : je dis les revenus, car leurs demandes dépassaient les recettes; des ordres ont même été expédiés en conséquence aux commissaires royaux des Préfectures, et je me suis trouvé dans l'obligation de m'opposer ouvertement à l'effet de cette mesure dont l'exécution eut non seulement compromis tous les services de l'armée, mais occasionné peut-être des mouvemens séditieux; d'ailleurs il y avait impossibilité de la remplir, à ce sujet j'ai l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de V. A. extrait d'une lettre que j'eus l'honneur d'écrire au roi le 13 Juillet dernier, et copie de celle que j'adressai à Monsieur le marquis d'Almenara, ministre des finances, le 30 du même mois pour répondre à une des siennes, où il me peignait l'état désespérant des finances de S.M.C. Je supplie avec instance V. A. de vouloir bien rendre compte du contenu de ces lettres et du présent rapport à S. M. l'empereur.

J'aurai voulu pour que S. M. fut mieux instruite de tout ce que s'est fait en Andalusie pouvoir entrer dans des détails plus étendus; mais j'ai dû me borner à traiter des points principaux, les détails se trouvent dans ma correspondance, et dans les rapports de Monsieur l'Intendant Général sur l'administration. Cependant d'après ce que j'ai dit S. M. aura une idée exacte des opérations administratives et autres qui ont eu lieu, ainsi que de l'état de ces troupes et des embarras de ma situation: elle est telle aujourd'hui que je dois supplier avec la plus vive instance S. M. au nom même de son service de daigner la prendre en considération: j'ai des devoirs à remplir dont je sais toute l'étendue, je m'y livre sans réserve mais la responsabilité est trop forte pour que dans la position où je me trouve je puisse la soutenir: en effet j'ai à combattre des prétentions et des intérêts qui sont évidemment en opposition avec ceux de l'armée et par conséquent avec ceux de l'empereur; je suis forcé par mes propres devoirs de m'opposer à l'exécution des divers ordres que le roi donne et faire souvent le contraire. J'ai aussi constamment à lutter contre l'amour propre des chefs militaires, que souvent peuvent différer d'opinion avec moi et naturellement prétendent faire prévaloir leurs idées. Toutes ces considérations me font regarder la tâche qui m'est imposée comme au dessus de mes forces et me portent à desirer que S. M. l'empereur daigne me faire connaître ses intentions ou pourvoir à mon remplacement et mettre à la tête de son armée dans le midi de l'Espagne, un chef plus capable que moi d'en diriger les opérations. Je me permettrai seulement de faire observer à ce sujet que le bien du service de l'empereur commande impérieusement que toutes les troupes qui sont dans le midi de l'Espagne depuis le Tage jusqu'aux deux mers suivent le même système d'opérations, et soient par conséquent commandés par un seul chef lequel doit être dans la pensée de



l'empereur, et avoir ses instructions afin que le cas se présentant où il lui serait fait opposition d'une manière quelconque, il puisse se conduire en conséquence et parvenir au but qui lui sera indiqué; tout autre système retardera la marche des affaires et occasionnera inévitablement des désagrémens qu'on peut autrement éviter.

‘J’ai l’honneur, &c.  
(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.’

## SECTION II.

*Intercepted Letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor,  
13th July, 1810.*

‘SIRE,—L’état de nullité où je suis depuis que Monsieur le duc de Dalmatic, major-général, a pris l’initiative de tous les mouvemens même le plus minutieux de 5<sup>ème</sup> corps rend ici ma présence tout-à-fait inutile, il ne me reste que le chagrin de voir excellentes troupes animées du meilleur esprit, disséminées dans tout l’Andalousie et perdant tous les jours de braves gens sans but ni résultat. Dans cet état des choses je prie V.M. de vouloir bien me permettre de me retirer à Burgos pour y attendre des ordres s’il ne juge pas à propos de m’accorder un congé pour retourner en France, congé que réclame ma santé à la suite d’une maladie grave dont je suis à peine convalescent.

‘J’ai l’honneur, &c. &c.  
‘LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE TREVISE.’

## No. II.

### SECTION I.

*Extract from an intercepted despatch of Massena, dated  
July 10, 1810.*

‘Generals Romana and Carrera have gone to lord Wellington’s headquarters, but the latter has not abandoned his lines.’

“ General *P. Boyer* to *S. Swartz*, July 8, 1810.

‘We are covering the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a place strong by its position and works, and which has been attacked with but little method. The English army is opposite ours, but, for good reasons, does not move: we compose the corps of observation, we are on the look out for them.’

*Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet, premier aide-de-camp  
du maréchal prince d'Essling.*

‘1810. 5 Août, à Ciudad Rodrigo.—Le capitaine du génie Bouchérat arrive du 2<sup>o</sup> corps; il a fait la campagne du Portugal,

1807. Beaucoup causé avec lui sur ce pays. Il a fait la route de Lisbonne à Almeida avec M. Mairet, et me remet un itinéraire qu'il en a dressé. Il prétend ces routes très difficiles; les rivières très encaissées, et inabordable sur les deux rives du Mondego. Celui-ci a peu d'eau, doit être guéable presque partout; et une partie de ses rives bien difficiles, et en certains endroits il n'y a pas plus de 20 toises de largeur; un seul pont sans chemin (je crois à Fornos;) mais la rivière n'est pas un obstacle aux communications des deux rives. La route d'Idanha, Castelbranco, &c. mauvaise, cependant non absolument impraticable à des pièces légères. Tage, très escarpé, rocailleux, profond jusqu'à Abrantes \* \* \* \* Au dessus de cette ville, ou plutôt au confluent du Zézère, le pays devient plat; le lit du Tage s'élargit; il n'y a plus que des collines même éloignées, et tout est très praticable. Les montagnes de Santarem sont des collines peu élevées, praticables, accessibles sur leur sommet, peu propres à être défendues ce qui est commune jusqu'à la mer pour celles de Montachique, qui sont des plateaux arrondis, accessibles à toute les armes; et on pourrait marcher ou manœuvrer dans toutes les directions. J'ai fait copier cet itinéraire.'

'1810. 7 Octobre, à Leyria.—Causé avec le général Loison des position de Montachique, ensuite avec le prince.'

'1810. 9 Octobre, à Riomajor. On dit que l'ennemi se retranche à Alhandra et Bucollas. Les généraux Reynier et Foy ont une carte de Riomajor à Lisbonne; espèce de croquis fait à la hâte, d'après de bons matériaux, mais où la figure est très mauvaise. Je le fais copier.'

### SECTION III.

*A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essing. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heures  $\frac{1}{2}$ .*

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser une lettre que je viens de recevoir du général Reynier et copie d'une réponse.

Vous trouverez également ci-joint une lettre du général Reynier adressée à votre excellence.

Je vous renouvelle, prince, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(Signé)

LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ELCHINGEN.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Elchingen. St. Antonio, le 26 Septembre, à 8 heures du matin.*

Depuis que le brouillard est dissipé, on aperçoit sur le Serra au delà de St. Antonio, cinq bataillons Portugais qui étoient à mi-côte et qui sont montés sur la crête à mesure que le brouillard s'est éclairci. Il y a de plus au col où passe le chemin, 6 pièces de canon et un détachement d'infanterie Anglais, et à mi-côte une ligne de tirailleurs partie Anglais qui s'étend depuis le chemin qui monte du village de Carvailha à ma gauche, jusques vis-à-vis des postes du 6<sup>e</sup> corps, on voit des troupes sur les sommités qui

font face au 6<sup>e</sup> corps; mais comme on ne les aperçoit que de revers, on ne peut juger de leur nombre.

On ne peut deviner s'il y a des troupes en arrière, mais d'après l'organisation de la montagne dont les crêtes sont étroites, et qui a des pentes rapides de chaque côté, il ne doit pas avoir de terrain pour y placer de fortes réserves et manœuvres. Cela me paraît une arrière garde, mais la position est forte, et il faut faire des dispositions pour l'attaquer avec succès. J'attends des nouvelles de ce que l'ennemi fait devant vous pour faire aucun mouvement; si vous jugez que c'est une arrière garde et que vous l'attaquiez, j'attaquerai aussi. Si vous jugez convenable d'attendre les ordres de Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, j'attendrai aussi; comme je pense qu'il viendra vers votre corps, je vous prie de lui faire parvenir le rapport ci-joint avec les vôtres.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le maréchal, d'agréer l'hommage de mon respect.

(Signé)

REYNIER.

*A Monsieur le général Reynier. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heures  $\frac{1}{2}$  du matin.*

Je reçois à l'instant, mon cher général, votre lettre de ce jour. Je pense qu'une grande partie de l'armée Anglo-Portugaise a passé la nuit sur la crête des montagnes qui domine toute la vallée de Moira. Un paysan dit qu'il existe de l'autre côté de ces montagnes une plaine assez belle d'une demi-lieue d'étendue, et très garnie d'oliviers. Depuis ce matin, l'ennemi marche par sa gauche, et semble diriger ses colonnes principales sur la route d'Oporto; cependant il tient encore assez de monde à la droite du parc qui couvre le couvent des minimes nommé Sako; et il montre une 12<sup>me</sup> de pièces d'artillerie. Le chemin de Coimbre passe très près de ce couvent.

J'ai envoyé ce matin un de mes aides-de-camp au prince d'Essling pour lui dire que nous sommes en présence, et qu'il serait nécessaire qu'il arrivât pour prendre un parti. Si j'avais le commandement, j'attaquerais sans hésiter un seul instant; mais je crois, mon cher général, que vous ne pouvez rien compromettre en vous échelonnant sur la droite de l'ennemi; et en poussant ses avant-postes, car c'est véritablement par ce point qu'il faudrait le forcer à faire sa retraite.

Je vous renouvelle, &c.

(Signé)

LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ELCHINGEN.

#### SECTION IV.

*A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, commandant-en-chef l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 4 Décembre, 1810.*

MONSIEUR LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.—Le général Foy que vous avez expédié est arrivé à Paris le 22 Novembre; il a fait connaître à sa majesté et dans le plus grand détail ce qui s'est passé et votre situation.

Dès le 4 Novembre le général Gardanne était en avant

d'Almeida avec un corps de 6000 hommes. Le comte d'Erlon avec les divisions Caparède, Conroux, et la division Fournier a dû se trouver à Guarda vers le 20 Novembre.

L'empereur, prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous aviez établi des ponts sur le Tage et que vous en avez un sur le Zézère, défendu sur les deux rives par de fortes têtes de pont. Sa majesté pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position que vous occupez devant l'ennemi; qu'Abrantès se trouvant à 800 toises du Tage, vous l'aurez isolé de son pont et bloqué pour en faire le siège. L'empereur vous recommande d'établir deux ponts sur le Zézère, de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, comme ceux du Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne d'opérations et de communications devant être établie par la route de Garda, partant du Zézère, passant par Cardigos, suivant la crête des montagnes par Campinha et Belmonte, vous aurez toujours la route de Castelbranco et Salvatera pour faire des vivres.

Je viens de donner de nouveau l'ordre déjà réitérée plusieurs fois au duc de Dalmatie, d'envoyer le 5<sup>me</sup> corps sur le Tage entre Montalveo et Villafior, pour faire sa jonction avec vous. L'empereur croit qu'il serait nécessaire de s'emparer d'Aleantara, de fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage, d'assurer toutes vos communications en sassissant les points favorables que peuvent offrir les localités pour fortifier de petites positions; des châteaux ou maisons qui, occupées par peu de troupes, soient à l'abri des incursions des milices.

Vous sentirez, Monsieur le prince d'Essling, l'avantage de régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de profiter de la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, pour marcher sur lord Wellington et attaquer la gauche de sa position, soit pour l'obliger à se rembarquer en marchant sur la rive gauche du Tage, ou enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient pas, vous serez en mesure de rester en position pendant les mois de Décembre et de Janvier, en vous occupant d'organiser vos vivres et de bien établir vos communications avec Madrid et Almeyda.

L'armée du centre qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements sur Placentia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas difficiles. ●

Deux millions 500 mille francs destinés à la solde de votre armée sont déjà à Valladolid; deux autre millions partent en ce moment de Bayonne. Ainsi votre armée sera dans une bonne situation.

Votre position deviendra très embarrassante pour les Anglais, qui, indépendamment d'une consommation énorme d'hommes et d'argent, se trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et ayant toujours une immensité de bâtimens à la mer pour leur rembarquement. Il faut donc, prince, travailler sans cesse à vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la position des ennemis, et pouvoir garder la vôtre avec moins de monde; ce qui rendra une partie de votre armée mobile et vous mettra à même de faire des incursions dans le pays.

Vous trouverez ci-joint des Moniteurs qui donnent des nouvelles de Portugal, parvenues par la voie de l'Angleterre, datées du 12 Novembre.

Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,  
Major-général,  
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

#### SECTION V.

*A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, commandant-en-chef l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 22 Décembre, 1810.*

Je vous expédie, prince, le général Foy que l'empereur a nommé général de division; je vous envoie les Moniteurs; vous y verrez que nous apprenons par les nouvelles d'Angleterre qu'au 1 Décembre, vous vous fortifiez dans votre position de Santarém.

L'empereur met la plus grande importance à ce que vous teniez constamment en échec les Anglais, à ce que vous avez des ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage; la saison va devenir bonne pour les opérations militaires, et vous aurez le moyen de harceler les Anglais et de leur faire éprouver journellement des pertes. Par les nouvelles des journaux Anglais, il paraît qu'il y a beaucoup de malades dans leur armée, ils ne comptent que 27 à 28 mille hommes sous les armes et un effectif de 31 mille, y compris la cavalerie et l'artillerie. La situation de l'armée Anglaise en Portugal tient Londres dans une angoisse continuelle, et l'empereur regarde comme un grand avantage de tenir les Anglais en échec, de les attirer et de leur faire perdre du monde dans les affaires d'avant-gardes, jusqu'à ce que vous soyez à même de les engager dans une affaire générale. Je réitère encore au maréchal duc de Trévise l'ordre de marcher sur le Tage avec le 5<sup>me</sup> corps.

Le comte d'Erlon, qui réunit son corps à Ciudad-Rodrigo, va profiter de ce moment où les pluies cessent pour reprendre l'offensive et battre tous ces corps de mauvaises troupes que so trouvent sur vos communications et sur vos flancs.

Vos ponts étant bien assurés sur le Zézère, la ligne de vos opérations la plus naturelle paraît devoir être par la rive gauche de cette rivière.

Le général Foy, à qui l'empereur a parlé longtemps, vous donnera plus de détails.

Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,  
Major-général,  
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

#### SECTION VI.

*A Monsieur le maréchal d'Essling, commandant-en-chef l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 16 Janvier, 1811.*

Je vous prévins, prince, que par décret impérial, en date du 15 de ce mois, l'empereur a formé une armée du Nord de

l'Espagne, dont le commandement est confié à Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie qui va établir son quartier général à Burgos.

L'arrondissement de l'armée du Nord de l'Espagne est composé :—

- 1°. De la Navarre formant le 3<sup>e</sup> gouvernement de l'Espagne.
- 2°. Des trois provinces de la Biscaye et de la province de Santander, formant le 4<sup>e</sup> gouvernement.
- 3°. De la province des Asturies.
- 4°. Des provinces de Burgos, Aranda, et Soria, formant le 5<sup>e</sup> gouvernement.
- 5°. Des provinces de Palencia, Valladolid, Leon, Benevento, Toro, et Zamore, formant le 6<sup>e</sup> gouvernement.
- 6°. De la province de Salamanque.

Ainsi cet arrondissement comprend tout le pays occupé par les troupes Françaises entre la mer, la France, le Portugal, et les limites de l'arrondissement des armées du centre et de l'Aragon.

Cette disposition, en centralisant le pouvoir, va donner de l'ensemble et une nouvelle impulsion d'activité aux opérations dans toutes les provinces du Nord de l'Espagne ; et Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie mettra un soin particulier à maintenir les communications entre Valladolid, Salamanque, et Almeida.

Je vous engage, prince, à correspondre avec Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie toutes les fois que vous le jugerez utile au service.

D'après les ordres de l'empereur je prévien Monsieur le duc d'Istrie que dans des circonstances imprévues, il doit appuyer l'armée de Portugal et lui porter du secours ; je le prévien aussi que le 9<sup>me</sup> corps d'armée serait sous ses ordres dans le cas où ce corps rentrerait en Espagne.

Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,

Major-général,  
(Signé)

ALEXANDRE.

## SECTION VII.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, Paris, le 24  
Janvier, 1811.*

Vous verrez par le Moniteur d'hier, Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, que les armées de Portugal étaient à la fin de l'année dernière dans la même position. L'empereur me charge de vous renouveler l'ordre de vous porter au secours du prince d'Essling, qui est toujours à Santarem ; il a plusieurs ponts sur le Zézère, et il attend que les eaux soient diminuées pour en jeter un sur le Tage. Il paraît certain que le 9<sup>me</sup> corps a opéré sa jonction avec lui par le Nord, c'est-à-dire, par Almeida.

L'empereur espère que le prince d'Essling aura jetté un pont sur le Tage ; ce que lui donnera des vivres.

Les corps insurgés de Valence et de Murcie vont se trouver occupés par le corps du général Suchet, aussitôt que Taragone

sera tombé entre nos mains, comme l'a fait la place de Tortose; alors sa majesté *pense que le 5<sup>me</sup> corps et une partie du 4<sup>me</sup>* pourront se porter au secours du prince d'Essling.

Le major-général,  
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

## SECTION VIII.

*A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, Paris, le 25 Janvier, 1811.*

Je vous prévien, prince, que Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie s'est mis en marche dans les premiers jours de Janvier avec le 5<sup>me</sup> corps d'armée, un corps de cavalerie, et un équipage de siège pour se porter sur Badajoz et faire le siège de cette place. Ces troupes ont dû arriver le 10 de ce mois devant Badajoz; je mande au duc de Dalmatie qu'après la prise de cette place il doit se porter sans perdre de tems sur le Tage avec son équipage de siège pour vous donner les moyens d'assiéger et de prendre Abrautés.

Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,  
Major-general,  
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

## SECTION IX.

*Au prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général, Paris, le 6 Février, 1811.*

Mon cousin, je pense que vous devez envoyer le Moniteur d'aujourd'hui au duc de Dalmatie, au duc de Trévise, au général Belliard, au duc d'Istrie, aux commandans de Ciudad-Rodrigo et d'Almeida, aux général Thiébaud, et aux généraux Dorsenne, Cafarelli, et Reille. Ecrivez au duc d'Istrie en lui envoyant le Moniteur, pour lui annoncer qu'il y trouvera les dernières nouvelles du Portugal, qui paraissent être du 13; que tout paraît prendre une couleur avantageuse: que si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, le duc de Dalmatie a pu se porter sur le Tage, et faciliter l'établissement du pont au prince d'Essling: qu'il devient donc très important de faire toutes les dispositions que j'ai ordonnées afin que le général Drouet avec ses deux divisions puisse être tout entier à la disposition du prince d'Essling. Ecrivez en même tems au duc de Dalmatie pour lui faire connaître la situation du duc d'Istrie, et lui réitérer l'ordre de favoriser le prince d'Essling pour son passage du Tage; que j'espère que Badajoz aura été pris dans le courant de Janvier; et que vers le 20 Janvier sa jonction aura eu lieu sur le Tage, avec le prince d'Essling; qu'il peut, si cela est nécessaire, retirer des troupes du 4<sup>me</sup> corps; qu'enfin tout est sur le Tage. Sur ce je prie Dieu, mon cousin, qu'il vous ait dans sa sainte et digne garde.

(Signé) NAPOLEON.

P.S. Je vous renvoie votre lettre au duc d'Istrie, faites lo partir.

## SECTION X.

*A Monsieur le maréchal prince d'Essling, commandant-en-chef l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 7 Ferrier, 1811.*

Je vous envoie, prince, le *Moniteur* du 6; vous y trouverez les dernières nouvelles que nous avons du Portugal; elles vont jusqu'au 13 Janvier, et annoncent que tout prend une tournure avantageuse. Si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, comme cela est probable, le duc de Dalmatie aura pu faire marcher des troupes sur le Tage, et vous faciliter l'établissement d'un pont. Je lui en ai donné et je lui en réitère l'ordre; l'empereur espère que la jonction des troupes de ce maréchal a eu lieu maintenant avec vous sur le Tage.

Les deux divisions d'infanterie du corps du général Drouet vont rester entièrement à votre disposition d'après les ordres que je donne à Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, commandant-en-chef l'armée du nord de l'Espagne: je lui mande de porter son quartier général à Valladolid, d'établir des corps nombreux de cavalerie dans la province de Salamanque afin d'assurer d'une manière journalière et rapide la correspondance entre Almeyda, Ciudad Rodrigo et Valladolid, et nous envoyer promptement toutes les nouvelles qui pourront parvenir à l'armée de Portugal.

Je lui prescris de tenir à Ciudad Rodrigo un corps de 6000 hommes qui puisse éloigner toute espèce de troupe ennemie de Ciudad Rodrigo et d'Almeida, faire même des incursions sur Pinhel et Guardo, empêcher qu'il se forme aucun rassemblement sur les derrières du 9<sup>me</sup> corps, et présenter des dispositions offensives sur cette frontière du Portugal.

De réunir une forte brigade de la garde impériale vers Zamora d'où elle sera à portée de soutenir le corps de Ciudad Rodrigo, et où elle se trouvera d'ailleurs dans une position avancée pour agir suivant les circonstances.

De réunir une autre forte brigade de la garde à Valladolid où elle sera en mesure d'appuyer la première; et de réunir le reste de la garde dans le gouvernement de Burgos.

Par ces dispositions, prince, les deux divisions d'infanterie du 9<sup>me</sup> corps, seront entièrement à votre disposition, et avec ce secours vous serez en mesure de tenir longtemps la position que vous occupez, de vous porter sur la rive gauche du Tage; ou enfin, d'agir comme vous le jugerez convenable sans avoir aucune inquiétude sur le nord de l'Espagne, puisque le duc d'Istrie sera à portée de marcher sur Almeyda et Ciudad Rodrigo et même sur Madrid, si des circonstances inattendues le rendaient nécessaire.

Dès que le duc d'Istrie aura fait ses dispositions il enverra un officier au général Drouet, pour l'en instruire et lui faire connoître qu'il peut rester en entier pour vous renforcer.

Le général Foy a dû partir vers le 29 Janvier de Ciudad Rodrigo, avec 4 bataillons et 300 hommes de cavalerie pour vous rejoindre.

Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,  
Major-général,  
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.



## SECTION XI.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Guarda, le 20 Mars, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL,—Vous aurez appris notre arrivée aux frontières du Portugal, l'armée se trouve dans un pays absolument ruiné; et avec toute ma volonté et la patience de l'armée, je crains de n'y pouvoir tenir 8 jours, et je me verrai forcé de rentrer en Espagne.

J'écris à M. le <sup>et</sup> d'Erlon pour qu'il fasse approvisionner Almeyda et Rodrigo; ces deux places n'auraient jamais dû cesser d'avoir pour 3 mois de vivres aux quels on n'aurait pas dû toucher sous aucun prétexte; et ma surprise est extrême d'apprendre qu'il n'y a que pour 10 jours de vivres à Almeyda. Je lui écris aussi de prendre une position entre Rodrigo et Almeyda, avec ses deux divisions; vous sentez combien il est nécessaire, qu'il se place à portée de marcher au secours d'Almeyda.

Si je trouvais des vivres, je ne quitterais pas les frontières d'Espagne et du Portugal, mais comme je vous l'ai dit, je ne vois guère la possibilité d'y rester, . . . . .

(Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

## SECTION XII.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Alfayates, le 2 Avril, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL,—Le pays que l'armée occupe ne pouvant au aucune manière le faire vivre, je me vois forcé de la faire rentrer en Espagne. Voici les cantonnements que je lui ai assignés et l'itinéraire de marche de chaque corps d'armée. . . . .

(Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

## SECTION XIII.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Rodrigo, le 5 Avril, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL,—Je suis arrivé avec toute l'armée sur Ciudad Rodrigo, mes troupes depuis plusieurs jours sont sans pain; et je suis obligé de faire prendre sur les approvisionnements de Rodrigo 200 mille rations de biscuit, que je vous prie d'ordonner de remplacer avec les ressources qui peuvent se trouver à Salamanque et Valladolid. Nous partirons ensuite pour les cantonnements que j'ai eu soin de vous faire connaître. J'espère que vous aurez bien voulu faire donner des ordres aux intendans de province, d'y faire préparer des vivres, seul moyen d'y faire maintenir l'ordre.

Je compte séjourner 3 à 4 jours ici pour voir si l'ennemi ne s'approcherait pas des places.

(Signé)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

## SECTION XIV.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 15 Avril, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL, — Ma position devient toujours plus allarmante; les places appellent des secours; je ne reçois pas de réponses de vous à aucune de mes demandes; et si cet état de chose se prolonge, je serai forcé de faire prendre à l'armée des cantonnements où elle puisse vivre, et d'abandonner les places que je ne suis pas chargé de défendre et encore bien moins d'approvisionner, mes troupes manquant absolument de vivres.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

## SECTION XV.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Paris, le 3 Avril, 1811.*

Le général Foy est arrivé, Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, ainsi que les deux aides-de-camp du maréchal prince d'Essling, le capitaine Porcher, et le chef d'escadron Pelet. Il paraît que le prince d'Essling avec son corps d'armée prend position à Guarda, Belmonte, et Alfayates. Ainsi il protège Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeyda, Madrid et l'Andalousie. Ses communications doivent s'établir facilement avec l'armée du midi par Alcantara et Badajoz. Si ce qu'on ne prévoit pas, le prince d'Essling étoit vivement attaqué par l'armée Anglaise, l'empereur pense que vous pourriez le soutenir avec une 15<sup>me</sup> de mille hommes. L'armée du centre doit avoir poussé un corps sur Alcantara. L'armée du midi sera renforcée par ce que vous aurez déjà fait partir, et d'après le prince d'Essling, elle va se trouver assez forte pour ne rien craindre de l'ennemi.

(Le reste est sans intérêt.)

Le major-général,  
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

## SECTION XVI.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 17 Avril, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL, — Le général Reynaud, commandant supérieur à Rodrigo, ainsi que le général Marchand, qui est avec sa division autour de cette place, me rendent compte que 2 divisions Portugaises avec une division Anglaise ont pris position aux environs d'Almeyda. Quoique cette place ait encore des vivres pour une 20<sup>me</sup> de jours, et que les Anglais et les Portugais meurent de faim dans leurs positions, il faut faire des dispositions pour les chasser au delà de la Coa, et pour ravitailler cette place. Je vous propose en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, de mettre à ma disposition 12 à 1500 chevaux, ceux de l'armée de Portugal n'étant en état de rendre aucun service; je vous demande de plus une division d'infanterie pour placer en réserve. Vers le 24 ou le 29, ces forces se joindront aux 6 divisions que je compte réunir de l'armée de Portugal pour attaquer l'ennemi, s'il nous attend

dans ses positions et le chasser au delà de la Coa. Il est impossible de faire faire le moindre mouvement à toutes ces troupes, du moins à celles de l'armée de Portugal pour attaquer l'ennemi; si on ne peut leur faire distribuer pour 10 jours de biscuit et avoir de l'eau de vie à la suite de l'armée. Je vous demande encore 15 à 18 pièces d'artillerie bien attelées, celles à mes ordres étant hors d'état de marcher. Avec ces moyens, nul doute que l'ennemi ne soit déposé et chassé hors des frontières de l'Espagne et au delà de la Coa. Mon cher maréchal, je vis ici au jour de jour; je suis sans le sol, vous pouvez tout; il faut donc nous envoyer du biscuit, de l'eau de vie, du pain et de l'orge. Ce sera avec ces moyens que nous pourrons manœuvrer. Il ne faut pas perdre un instant. Il est très urgent de marcher au secours d'Almeyda. C'est à vous à donner vos ordres; et vous me trouverez porté de la meilleure volonté à faire tout ce qui sera convenable aux intérêts de S. M.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

## SECTION XVII.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 22 Avril, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL,—J'ai reçu votre dépêche. Toutes vos promesses de vous réunir à moi s'évanouissent donc dans le moment où j'en ai besoin; ravitailler Almeida et Rodrigo est la 1<sup>re</sup> opération et la seule qui peut nous donner la faculté de rendre l'armée de Portugal disponible, lorsqu'on n'aura plus rien à craindre sur le sort des places. En y jettant pour 3 à 4 mois de vivres, on peut ensuite établir plusieurs colonnes mobiles; on peut envoyer des troupes à Avila et Ségovie; on peut au besoin appuyer le mouvement de l'armée d'Andalousie. Mais ne serait-il pas honteux de laisser rendre une place faute de vivres, en présence de deux maréchaux de l'Empire? Je vous ai déjà prévenu de la nullité de ma cavalerie, de l'impossibilité où se trouvent les chevaux d'artillerie de rendre aucun service. Vous savez aussi que je dois envoyer le 9<sup>me</sup> corps en Andalousie; je voulais aussi le faire concourir avant son départ au ravitaillement des places. Pouvez-vous, mon cher maréchal, balancer un seul instant à m'envoyer de la cavalerie, et des attelages d'artillerie, si vous voulez garder votre matériel? Ne vous ai-je pas prévenu que je commencerais mon mouvement le 26? et vous paraissez attendre le (22) une seconde demande de ma part. Vous le savez aussi bien que moi, perdre un ou deux jours à la guerre est beaucoup; et ce délai peut avoir des suites fâcheuses qu'on ne répare plus.

Quand je vous ai dit que je ne réunirais que 6 divisions, c'était pour ne pas tout dégarnir des points importants occupés par les corps d'armée; mais de la cavalerie et de l'artillerie sont un secours dont je ne puis me passer. Je vous prie en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, de me faire arriver de la cavalerie et des attelages d'artillerie à marches forcées. Réfléchissez qu'une fois les places réapprovisionnées, je pourrai disposer des  $\frac{3}{4}$  de l'armée, et que cette opération passe avant tout.

En m'offrant de nous envoyer les attelages pour 16 pièces, vous aurez bien entendu, sans doute, mon cher maréchal y comprendre ceux nécessaires pour les caissons des pièces.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

## SECTION XVIII.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Salamanque, le 24 Avril, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL, — Je me rends demain à Ciudad Rodrigo, où toute l'armée sera réunie le 26. Le ravitaillement de la place d'Almeida est du plus haut intérêt pour les armes de S.M.; et il eut été bien à désirer que les secours que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous demander nous eussent été envoyés. L'ennemi paraît avoir de 20 à 29 mille hommes autour de cette place. Vous dire que je n'aurai en cavalerie que 15 à 1800 hommes, et seulement 20 pièces de canon pour toute l'armée, c'est vous faire sentir, mon cher maréchal, combien votre secours m'eut été nécessaire au moins sous deux rapports, pour votre armée même et pour la tranquillité du nord de l'Espagne. Je n'ai pas ménagé mes instances auprès de vous. Si mes efforts n'étaient pas heureux, votre dévouement pour le service de l'empereur, vous ferait certainement regretter de ne pas les avoir secondés avec les moyens que vous m'aviez fait espérer, avant que j'en eusse besoin.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

## SECTION XIX.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc d'Istrie, Rodrigo, le 29 Avril, 1800.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL, — Vos lettres sont inconcevables. Dans celle du 20, vous me dites que vous ne pouvez me donner aucun secours. Par celle du 22 vous me dites que le 25 ou le 26 vous me joindrez partout où je serai, et que la tête de votre colonne arrivera à Salamanque le 26. Par celle que je reçois à l'instant, vous me dites, que votre cavalerie et votre artillerie se trouvent encore le 27 à une journée en arrière de Salamanque; et vous concluez que mon mouvement doit être fini; et vous me témoignez vos regrets de n'avoir pu y coopérer. Convenez, mon cher maréchal, que si l'armée de Portugal recevait un échec, vous auriez bien des reproches à vous faire. Je vous ai demandé de l'artillerie et des attelages et encore plus positivement de la cavalerie; vous avez sous différens prétextes éludé ma demande. Toutes les troupes qui sont en Espagne, sont de la même famille. Vous êtes, jusques à ce qu'il y ait de nouveaux ordres, chargé de la défense et de l'approvisionnement des places d'Almeida et de Rodrigo. Je n'aurais pas mieux demandé que d'employer l'armée de Portugal sous mes ordres à défendre ces places, à marcher au secours de l'armée du midi; mais comment puis-je le faire sans vivres?

Je compte faire mon mouvement demain matin. J'ignore

quelle pourra être l'issue de ce mouvement; si ma lettre vous arrive dans la journée de demain, votre cavalerie et votre artillerie pourraient toujours se mettre en mouvement dans la nuit pour arriver après demain 1<sup>er</sup> Mai à Cabrillas. Je vous prie de faire filer sans s'arrêter le biscuit, la farine, le grain que vous n'aurez pas manqué de réunir à la suite de vos troupes. Il est instant que ces ressources comme beaucoup d'autres arrivent à Rodrigo; cette place n'aura pas pour 15 jours de vivres. A mon départ d'ici, il faudra que des convois considérables y soient envoyés.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

### SECTION XX.

*A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Raguse, Paris, le 20 Avril, 1811.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE RAGUSE,—Vous trouverez ci-joint l'ordre de l'empereur qui vous donne le commandement de l'armée du Portugal. Je donne l'ordre au maréchal prince d'Essling de vous remettre le commandement de cette armée. Saisissez les rênes d'une main ferme; faites dans l'armée les changemens qui deviendraient nécessaires. L'intention de l'empereur est que le duc d'Abrantes et le général Reynier restent sous vos ordres. S. M. compte assez sur le dévouement que lui portent ses généraux, pour être persuadé qu'ils vous seconderont de tous leurs moyens.

L'empereur ordonne, Monsieur le duc de Raguse, que le prince d'Essling en quittant l'armée n'emène avec lui que son fils et un de ses aides-de-camp. Mais son chef d'état-major, le général Fririon, le colonel Pelet, ses autres aides-de-camp, tous les officiers de son état-major doivent rester avec vous.

Toutefois, Monsieur le duc, je vous le répète S. M. met en vous une confiance entière.

Le Major-général, &c.  
(Signé)

ALEXANDRE.

### No. III.

*Les Officiers Français, prisonniers de Guerre, détenus à la Maison Rue S. Jean, à Monsieur le général Trant, Gouverneur de la Ville et Province d'Oporto.*

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,—Chacun des officiers Français, prisonniers de guerre, détenus à la maison rue S. Jean, pénétré des obligations qu'il vous a, désirerait vous offrir individuellement l'expression de sa reconnaissance. C'est nous que ces messieurs ont choisi pour être auprès de vous leur organes, et nous sommes d'autant plus flattés de cette commission agréable qu'il n'y en a pas un parmi nous qui dans son particulier n'ait reçu de vous des services importants. Nous osons nous flatter que vous agréerez favorablement ce faible témoignage de notre gratitude et les sin-

cères remerciements que nous venons vous présenter pour toutes les bontés que vous avez eues pour nous. Ce n'est pas sans un vif regret que nous envisageons le moment de votre départ, mais ce que déjà vous avez fait pour nous, nous fait espérer que votre sollicitude s'étendra au delà de votre séjour et que pendant votre absence nous continuerons à en éprouver les effets.

Ce n'est pas, monsieur le général, d'après l'étendue de notre lettre qu'il faudra mesurer celle de notre reconnaissance; nous sommes mieux en état de sentir que d'exprimer ce que nous vous devons et lorsque des circonstances plus heureuses nous ramèneront vers notre patrie, nous nous ferons un devoir et une satisfaction de faire connaître la manière dont nous avons été traités et les peines que vous vous êtes données pour adoucir notre sort. Nous nous recommandons à la continuation de votre bienveillance, et nous vous prions d'agréer l'assurance de gratitude et de haute considération avec lesquelles nous avons l'honneur d'être, monsieur le général, vos très humbles et très obeissants serviteurs,

Au nom des officiers Français, prisonniers de guerre,

FALLOT,

Docteur médecin des armées Françaises attaché au  
grand quartier général de l'armée de Portugal.

Le colonel sous inspecteur aux revues des troupes Françaises,

CATELOT.

H. DELAHAYE,

C<sup>um.</sup> de la Marine.

## NO. IV.

### SECTION I.

*Letter from lieut.-general Graham to the right honourable Henry Wellesley, Isla de Leon, 14th March, 1811.*

SIR,—You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy which you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was exposed to by the reports circulated at Cadix, relative to the issue of the late expedition.

But a copy of a printed statement of general La Peña having been shown to me, which, by implication at least, leaves the blame of the failure of the most brilliant prospects on me, it becomes indispensably necessary that I should take up my pen in self-defence.

Having already sent you a copy of my despatch to the earl of Liverpool, with a report of the action, I will not trouble you with a detail of the first movements of the army, nor with any other observation relative to them, than that the troops suffered much unnecessary fatigue by marching in the night, and without good guides.

Considering the nature of the service we were engaged in, I

was most anxious that the army should not come into contest with the enemy in an exhausted state, nor be exposed to the attack of the enemy but when it was well collected; and, in consequence of representations to this effect, I understood that the march of the afternoon of the 4th was to be a short one, to take up for the night a position near Conil; to prepare which, staff-officers, of both nations, were sent forward with a proper escort.

The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, with those frequent and harassing halts which the necessity of groping for the way occasioned.

When the British division began its march from the position of Barrosa to that of Bermeja, *I left the general on the Barrosa height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it*; and, when I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so to support the troops left for its defence, and believing the general to be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack, which was made so near the spot where the general was supposed to be, and, though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army. The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions (Walloon guards and Ciudad Real,) which had been detached from my division, brought them alone back from the wood; but, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, they could only come at the close of the action.

Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse-artillery, been rapidly sent by the sea-beach to form in the plain, and to envelop the enemy's left; had the greatest part of the infantry been marched through the pine-wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what success might have been expected from such decisive movements? The enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered, his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion; a general dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close pursuit; our wearied men would have found spirits to go on, and would have done so trusting to finding refreshments and repose at Chiclana. This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour's ride of the scene of action, the general remained ignorant of what was passing, *and nothing was done!* Let not, then, this action of Barrosa form any part of the general result of the transactions of the day; it was an accidental feature; it was the result of no combination, it was equally unseen and unheeded by the Spanish staff; the British division, left alone, suffered the loss of more than one-fourth of its number, and became unfit for future exertion. Need I say more to justify

my determination of declining any further co-operation in the field towards the prosecution of the object of the expedition? I am, however, free to confess that, having thus placed myself and the British division under the direction of the Spanish commander-in-chief in the field, (contrary to my instructions,) I should not have thought myself justified to my king and country to risk the absolute destruction of this division in a second trial. But I have a right to claim credit for what would have been my conduct from what it was; and I will ask if it can be doubted, after my zealous co-operation throughout, and the ready assistance afforded to the troops left on Barrosa height, that the same anxiety for the success of the cause would not have secured to the Spanish army the utmost efforts of the British division during the whole of the enterprise, *had we been supported as we had a right to expect?*

There is not a man in the division who would not gladly have relinquished his claim to glory, acquired by the action of Barrosa, to have shared, with the Spaniards, the ultimate success that was within our grasp as it were.

The people of Spain, the brave and persevering people, are universally esteemed, respected, and admired by all who value liberty and independence; the hearts and hands of British soldiers will ever be with them; the cause of Spain is felt by all to be a common one.

I conclude with mentioning that the only request expressed to me at head-quarters, on the morning of the 6th. on knowing of my intention to send the British troops across the river St. Petri, was *that the opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops, during the night, was lost*; and on my observing that, after such a defeat, there was no risk of attack from an enemy, a very contrary opinion was maintained.

In point of fact, no enemy ever appeared during several days employed in bringing off the wounded and burying the dead. It may be proper to remark on the report published relative to the enemy's number at St. Petri, (1500 men of Villatte's division,) that, by the concurrent testimony of all the French officers here, general Villatte's division had charge of the whole line,—what, then, must be the strength of that division to have afforded 1500 men to St. Petri alone? In order to establish, by authentic documents, facts which may have been disputed, and to elucidate others, I enclose, by way of appendix, the reports of various officers of this division.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed)

THOS. GRATHAM,  
Lt.-general.

P.S. I must add this postscript distinctly to deny my having spoken, at head-quarters, in the evening of the 5th, of sending for more troops, or for provisions from the Isla. My visit was a very short one, of mere ceremony. I may have asked if the Spanish troops expected were arrived. This error must have arisen from the difficulty of conversing in a foreign language.



With this I send you a sketch of the ground, &c., of the action of Barrosa; by which it will be seen how impossible, according to my judgment, it would be for an enemy to expose his left flank, by making a direct attack through the wood on the Bermeja position, while that of Barrosa was occupied in force by the allied army.

## SECTION II.

*Adjutant-general's state of the troops assembled at Tarifu, under the command of lieutenant-general Graham, 25th Feb. 1810.*

Designations.	Number of Bayonets.	Commanders.
Two squadrons of 2nd German hussars .....	...	Major Busche.
Detachment of artillery ...	...	Major Duncan. 10 guns.
Detachment of engineers...	47	Captain Birch.
Brigade of guards re-inforced by a detachment of the 2nd battalion 95th rifles.....	1221	Brigadier gen. Dilkes.
1st battalion 28th foot: 2nd battalion 67th; 2nd battalion 87th; re-inforced with 2 companies of the 20th Portuguese.	1764	Colonel Wheatley.
Flank battalion composed of detachments of the 3rd battalion 95th rifles and two companies of the 47th foot. ....	594	Lt.-col. A. Barnard, 95th regt.
Two companies of 2nd battalion 9th regt.; two companies of 1st battalion 28th regt.; two companies of 2nd battalion 82nd regt. ....	475	Lt.-col. Brown, 23th regt.
One company of the royal staff corps.....	33	Lieutenant Read.
Total number of bayonets	4134	
The hussars were about...	180	
Total of sabres and bayonets	4294,	with 10 guns.

## SECTION III.—BATTLE OF BAROSA.

*Extract from a letter of general Frederick Ponsonby.*

‘I proceeded rapidly towards the entrance of the wood, found the Germans, and conducted them along the right flank of our little army. We came in contact with the French dragoons, whom we found nearly abreast of our front line and about three hundred yards apart from it on our right flank; our line had just halted and the firing was gradually decreasing at the time we charged. I do not imagine the French dragoons much exceeded us in number; they behaved well, but if we had had half a dozen stout squadrons the mass of beaten infantry would not have returned to their camp.’

## SECTION IV.—BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

*Extract of a letter from colonel Light, serving in the 4th dragoons, at the battle of Albuera.*

‘After our brigade of infantry, first engaged, were repulsed, I was desired by general d’Urban to tell the count de Penne Villamur to charge the lancers, and we all started, as I thought, to do the thing well; but when within a few paces of the enemy the whole pulled up, and there was no getting them farther; and in a few moments after I was left alone to run the gauntlet as well as I could.’

## SECTION V.—STATE OF THE FIRST CORPS.

[illegible]

Total...

*Note by the Editor.*—Deduct affair of the 4th about Santa Petri ..... 45

	.....	49
" " at Puerto Santa Maria .....	81	

55	at 2 UGATA CANONIA MEDICAL	81
56	at Medina	64

**THE**

## Remains loss at Barosa...

2361

190

2554

**Certified copy by Count GAZAN.**

2361

## SECTION VI.

*Intercepted papers of colonel Le Jeune.*

## ORDRE.

Il est ordonné à Monsieur le colonel baron Le Jeune, mon A.D.C., de partir sur le champ en poste pour porter les ordres ci-joints et parcourir l'Andalousie et l'Estremadure.

Monsieur le colonel Le Jeune se rendra d'abord à Grenade auprès de Monsieur le général Sebastiani, commandant du 4<sup>me</sup> corps d'armée, et il lui remettra les ordres qui le concernent.

De Grenade, Monsieur le Jeune se rendra par Séville devant Cadix, et verra par lui-même la situation des choses, afin de pouvoir à son retour en rendre un compte détaillé à l'empereur. Monsieur Le Jeune remettra à Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, les dépêches qui lui sont destinées, soit à Séville, soit à Cadix, soit partout où il sera. Il se rendra ensuite au 5<sup>me</sup> corps d'armée commandé par Monsieur le maréchal duc de Trévise en Estremadure; le corps doit être à Badajos, ou même sur le Tage.

Monsieur Le Jeune prendra une connaissance exacte de sa position, et de celle des troupes de l'armée du centre commandée par le général ——— qui sont réunies sur le Tage. Il verra si ces corps sont en communication avec l'armée de Portugal, et recueillera les nouvelles que l'on pourrait avoir de cette armée de ce côté.

Monsieur Le Jeune prendra tous les renseignemens nécessaires pour pouvoir répondre à toutes les questions de l'empereur, sur la situation des choses en Andalousie, devant Cadix, et en Estremadure, d'où il viendra me rendre compte de sa mission.

LE PRINCE DE WAGRAM ET DE NEUFCHÂTEL,  
Major-général.

*Paris, le 14 Février, 1811.*

## SECTION VII.

*Extracts from Le Jeune's reports.*

## CADIZ.

'Montagnes de Ronda foyer d'insurrection entre le 4<sup>me</sup> corps et le premier.'

'Les obusiers à la villantroy portent à 2560 toises: l'obus doit peser 75 livres, et contient 11 à 12 onces de poudre: on charge l'obusier à poudre d'un  $\frac{1}{3}$  du poids de l'obus pour obtenir cette distance. Il n'y en a que le 4 en batterie: à la redoute Napoléon on en a 12 en fondus: mais il manque de projectiles et de la poudre en suffisante quantité. Toutes les obus n'éclatent pas en ville.'

'Le pont de St. Petri a été traversé le jour de l'affaire par un sergent du 24<sup>me</sup> qui est revenu avec les Espagnols que l'on a pris. Le moment eut été favorable pour s'emparer de l'Isle.'

'Le duc de Bellune bien ennuyé, désire beaucoup retourner: bon général, mais voyant les choses trop en noir.'

## SECTION VIII.

*Puerto Real, 20 Mars, 1811.*

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,—Enfin après 15 jours des plus cruelles souffrances je me trouve en état de reprendre la plume et de continuer le récit que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser dans ma lettre du 6 au 7 de ce mois.

L'une des choses qui mérite d'abord de fixer votre attention, est la composition de cette armée combinée dont nous avons été tout-à-coup assaillis. J'ai déjà dit que le 26 Février une flotte de 180 voiles était sortie de Cadix portant 1500 hommes de débarquement, et que de ce nombre étaient environ 4000 Anglais et 1000 Portugais. Cette flotte se dirigea vers Tarifa où le débarquement se fit le lendemain sans aucun accident. Il paraît que les Anglais en réunissant les garnisons d'Algeciras et de Gibraltar à quelques restes de troupes venues récemment de Sicile, avaient déjà formé à Tarifa un petit corps de 1000 Anglais et de 2000 Portugais commandé par le général Stuart, et qui forma avec 2 ou 300 hommes de cavalerie, l'avant garde de l'expédition dirigée contre nous. Cette armée ainsi composée de 10 à 12,000 Espagnols bien ou mal équipés, de 4 à 5000 Anglais et de 3000 Portugais se mit enfin en campagne, et vint nous attaquer le 5. Il paraît que Monsieur le maréchal Victor ne fut instruit que tard de la vraie direction prise par l'armée ennemie. Il arriva à Chiclana le 5 entre 8 et 9 heures du matin, suivi des bataillons de la 1<sup>re</sup> et 2<sup>de</sup> division: le plan d'opérations auquel il s'arrêta fut d'envoyer sur le champ la division Villatte avec un régiment de cavalerie aux lignes de St. Petri, avec ordre de laisser arriver l'ennemi, de lui résister faiblement pour l'engager à suivre notre mouvement de retraite et de l'attirer ainsi sous la position St. Anne, où il ne pouvait manquer de se trouver dans une situation extrêmement désavantageuse. Pendant cette manœuvre Monsieur le maréchal Victor s'était lui-même porté avec la 1<sup>re</sup> et 2<sup>de</sup> division entre Conil et St. Petri, à peu près à la hauteur de la Torre Barrossa avec l'intention de couper à l'ennemi la retraite des montagnes. Là, rencontrant la queue de l'armée, qui finissait de se filer, il la fit attaquer vigoureusement, culbuta tout ce qui se rencontra devant lui et accula les Espagnols à la mer, mais les Anglais que cette manœuvre hardie mettaient entre deux feux, et dans l'impossibilité de regagner Conil, revinrent sur leurs pas, et attaquant avec la rage du désespoir, ils forcèrent à la retraite nos deux divisions, qui ne formaient pas ensemble 5000 hommes.

Cependant Monsieur le maréchal Victor se croyait si sur de la victoire qu'avant d'attaquer il envoya ordre aux troupes qui étaient à Médina, de se porter entre Veger et Conil, pour ramasser le reste des trainards; les bagages, et les trains de munitions qu'ils pouvaient rencontrer.

Le projet d'attirer l'ennemi sur le feu de St. Anne n'avait pas mieux réussi du côté de la division Villatte; car si cette division fut d'abord assaillie par presque toute l'armée combinée, les généraux Anglais et Espagnols, avertis de bonne heure que Monsieur

le maréchal les tournaient avec un corps de troupes, arrêterent leurs colonnes sur la rive gauche du ruisseau qui touche au Moulin d'Almanza, et là, naturellement retranchés derrière ce marais, ils n'eurent à garder que le pont et le Moulin, les seuls endroits par lesquels on pouvait les attaquer. Quelque chose de plus malheureux, fut, que dès le commencement de l'action, nos lignes de St. Petri n'étant pas défendues, il sortit par le pont de Radeaux 5000 hommes de troupes fraîches de la Isla, lesquels se plaçant en bataille devant la division Villatte, et couverts par la ruisseau du Moulin d'Almanza, laissèrent au reste de l'armée combinée la liberté de se retourner tout entière contre l'attaque de Monsieur le maréchal Victor. Ainsi se termina la bataille du 5, l'ennemi coucha sur son champ de bataille, sans poursuivre les divisions Laval et Rufin dans leur retraite. Je vous ai déjà fait part de notre perte. Le général Rufin que nous croyons tué par une balle, qui lui a traversé la tête, a été porté par les Anglais à la Isla, ou après deux jours de léthargie, il a donné signes de vie; on dit qu'il va mieux.

La perte de l'ennemi a été à peu près de 3000 Anglais ou Portugais, et de 5 à 600 Espagnols, tués ou blessés; les Anglais ont eu beaucoup des officiers mis hors de combat, on croit les généraux *Grám* et *Stuart* ainsi que le général *Pêna* blessés. Le 6 à la pointe du jour nous nous attendions bien à une attaque générale qui pouvait nous-être très funeste; mais l'ennemi se contenta d'occuper avec 2000 hommes le forte de Médina, que nous avions un peu imprudemment abandonnés: la flotille ennemie fit aussi des démonstrations d'attaque sur le Trocadero, mais sans effet. Elle débarqua 6 à 700 hommes entre le Port de St. Marie, et le fort St. Cataline, qui fût sommé de se rendre; on répondit à coups de canons. Un officier Anglais vint chez le gouverneur de St. Marie le prévenir qu'il allait prendre possession de la ville, mais il avait laissé ses troupes à la porte. Elles courent faire une action d'éclat en brulant et réduisant la petite redoute St. Antoine, qui n'était point gardée; enchantés de ce succès ils se rembarquèrent. M. le maréchal s'attendait bien à être attaqué le 6 à Chiclana, il avait donné des ordres en conséquence, ces ordres furent mal interprétés, et on endommagea mal-à-propos dans la nuit quelques uns de nos ouvrages, mais ils furent sur le champ réparés. Lui-même était venu à Puerto Real avec la division Laval, et avait envoyé la 1<sup>re</sup> division à St. Marie pour reprendre la ligne de Blocus comme avant la bataille du 5. Le 5<sup>me</sup> régiment de chasseurs fut envoyé entre Puerto Real et Médina à la ferme de Geurra en reconnaissance; il y rencontra une poste de cavalerie ennemie, et la tailla en pièces. Le 6 au soir, on essaya de reprendre le forte de Médina, mais sans succès. Le 7 il fallut y envoyer plus de monde, et les Espagnols l'évacuèrent sans opposer de résistance.

Dans la nuit du 5 les Espagnols avaient rasés nos lignes de St. Petri, ils employèrent pendant plusieurs jours et plusieurs nuits 6000 hommes, à transporter à la Isla du bois, dont ils manquaient, quelques jours après, nous avons fait cesser ces

approvisionnement, en reprenant la position de St. Petri, où on ne trouva personne; les Espagnols craignant une répétition de l'affaire du 2 Mars, ont détruits eux-même de forte bonne grace leur tête de pont, et replié leur pont de radeaux, dès ce moment chacun resta chez soi, comme avant les hostilités.

*Du 21 Mars, 1811.*

Il est surprenant que l'armée combinée ne nous ait pas poursuivis le 5, bien plus surprenant encore qu'elle ne nous ait point attaqués le 6 au matin; on en conçoit plusieurs raisons. On conjecture d'abord que la principale perte de la bataille étant tombée sur les Anglais, qui ont eu un grand nombre d'officiers et même leurs généraux, mis hors de combat, les Espagnols n'ont pas osé venir seuls nous attaquer. Le général *Grám* voulait cependant les y contraindre le lendemain, mais sur leur refus formel, il les a traité de lâches, de gens indignes d'être secourus. Ils ont répondu qu'ils feraient une sortie de la Isla si l'on voulait mettre le tiers d'Anglais ou Portugais avec les deux tiers d'Espagnols, le général Anglais a répondu qu'il n'exposerait plus un seul de ses soldats avec des troupes de cette espèce, et sur le champ il a donné ordre aux Anglais et Portugais de se retirer à Cadiz ou dans le ville de la Isla. Il paraît même que le lendemain les Anglais se sont embarqués pour se rendre à Gibraltar ou peut-être à Lisbonne. Les gens du pays donnent pour certain que le général *Grám*, en envoyant ces jours derniers à Londres trente-trois officiers des moins blessés, n'a pas dissimulé qu'il les chargeait d'exposer à son gouvernement quelle folie il y avait de sacrifier de braves gens pour soutenir en Espagne un parti sans moyens, sans bravoure et sans moralité. Si ce qui précède n'est pas vrai, au moins sommes nous certains qu'une grande mésintelligence règne entre les Espagnols et leurs alliés. Le 20, les Espagnols ont encore essayé une sortie de la Carraca, mais sans succès; ils s'y prennent un peu tard. Nous sommes à présent très à mesure pour les recevoir. Ils font semblant d'embarquer continuellement de troupes qui n'agissent pas et qui ne peuvent plus nous nuire. Il est arrivé à Medina quelques bataillons du 4<sup>me</sup> corps, deux bataillons du soixante-trois sont aussi venus de Séville. Nous apprenons avec la prise de Badajos, que M. le maréchal Soult est à Séville. La blessure de M. le commandant Bomparr et les miennes vont un peu mieux.

LEGENTIL.

Excusez les imperfections de cette longue lettre, j'écris de mon lit, dans une posture gênante.

*Monsieur le général de division Lery, à Séville.*

#### SECTION IX.

*Extracts from the intercepted report of general Garbé, commanding the French engineers at the blockade of Cadiz.*

*' 25 Mars, 1811.*

*' On avait aperçu le 26 de Février au matin un grand convoi*

partant de la haye de Cadiz, pour se diriger sur Tarifa. Ce convoi portait à peu près 6 ou 7000 hommes des troupes de débarquement, qui allait joindre celles qui étaient déjà réunies sur la Barbato et dans les environs de l'Alcala de los Gazules. Le 2 Mars à la pointe du jour, l'ennemi commença son opération sur Caza Vieja, qui fut évacué et en même temps, il effectua vers l'embouchure de St. Petri, un passage pour faciliter l'établissement d'un pont de radeaux et d'une tête de pont. Il fit aussi débarquer des troupes dans l'Isletta del Coto, et s'occupa d'y établir deux batteries. Le 3, on fit marcher la division du général Rufin, qui prit position à moitié chemin de Puerto Real à Médina Sidonia. Celle du général Laval, s'établit en avant de Puerto Real, et le général Villatte garda ses positions auprès de Chiclana. Ce jour on n'aperçut aucun mouvement de l'ennemi. Tous les ouvrages de la ligne étaient gardés par les garnisons qu'on avait désignées auparavant. Santa Marie fut évacué et le pont replié sur la rive gauche.

'Puerto Real était défendu par une compagnie de sapeurs, deux du 45<sup>m</sup> régime, et par tous les réfugiés Français qu'on avait armés.

'Le 4 Monsieur le maréchal fit attaquer à la pointe du jour l'ennemi dans sa tête de pont de Santi Petri. Cette attaque se fit par 4 compagnies du 95<sup>m</sup> régiment qui s'emparèrent de l'ouvrage, firent prisonniers 500 hommes, et enlevèrent un drapeau. Il est certain que si on eut employé dans cette opération 2 ou 3000 hommes on enlevait le pont et l'Isle de Léon. L'ennemi fut si disconcerté qu'il avait abandonné ses batteries et ses ouvrages fermés. Un pareil résultat paraissait être d'un très bon augure pour les grandes opérations. On fit partir le même jour de Médina une reconnaissance sur Casa Vieja. On reçut avis dans la nuit que cette reconnaissance n'avait rencontré personne, et que les colonnes ennemies se dirigeant sur Conil, le mouvement ne pouvait avoir pour but que d'opérer la jonction de ce corps d'armée avec celui qui était resté dans l'île. Le 5, avant le jour, on se mit en marche de la position qu'on occupait à moitié chemin de Médina pour se porter sur Chiclana. Arrivé dans cet endroit, Monsieur le maréchal donna l'ordre au général Villatte de rassembler toute sa division vers les flèches de St. Petri, pour y maintenir l'ennemi qui y paraissait en force, pendant qu'il dirigeait sur la route de Conil, les divisions de Laval and Rufin, et le peu de cavalerie qu'il avait avec lui. Il se porta de ce côté, et ne tarda pas à rencontrer une forte colonne, qui marchait le long de la mer entre St. Petri et Conil, et se dirigeait sur le premier de ses endroits. Les troupes arrivées à portée de canon se formèrent. Le général Rufin prit la gauche pour aller occuper un mamelon où l'ennemi paraissait s'établir. Quand les deux divisions furent formées, elle se trouvèrent en présence d'une armée, beaucoup plus nombreuse qu'on ne l'avait cru d'abord. L'artillerie n'était pas encore arrivée, et celle de l'ennemi commençait à jouer de toute parts. Le général Villatte n'avait pu garder les flèches de St. Petri, qui étaient au moment



d'être prises, n'étant alors défendues que par un seul bataillon du 27<sup>me</sup> d'infanterie légère.

Cette division fut obligée de se replier et de repasser le ravin dans lequel roulent les eaux du Moulin d'Almanza. Ce mouvement empêcha le général Villatte de se réunir aux deux autres divisions, qui n'ayant en tout que dix bataillons, essuyaient un feu terrible de la part de l'ennemi. Nos pertes devenaient d'autant plus sensible que le nombre des combattans n'était que le tiers de celui de l'ennemi. Des corps entiers se trouvaient accablés avant qu'on eut pu entamer la ligne des Anglais. Il n'y avait point de réserve. Les deux mille hommes de Médina Sidonia étaient en marche pour Conil. Il fallut penser à la retraite qui se fit en bon ordre, jusque sur les hauteurs en avant de Chiclana, où l'on fit camper une division pendant la nuit. Les Anglais firent leur jonction avec les troupes de l'île de Léon, et les Espagnols continuèrent d'occuper notre position du Moulin d'Almanza et de St. Petri. Si l'ennemi voulant continuer ses opérations offensives dans la journée du 6, se fut présenté de bonne heure, il est probable que dans la situation où nous nous trouvions après la journée du 5 nous étions obligés d'évacuer le terrain jusqu'à Puerto Real, où on aurait pris la position dont j'ai parlé plus haut, pour y livrer une seconde bataille, mais les opérations ont manqué d'ensemble. Il s'est contenté de rentrer dans l'île et pendant ce temps un très petit corps de troupes Anglaises opérèrent un débarquement entre St. Marie, et la pointe de St. Catherine, qui n'eut d'autre résultat que d'enlever une batterie défendue par quinze hommes et de se promener une ou deux heures dans les rues de St. Marie. Monsieur le maréchal ne voyait aucun mouvement offensif, ordonna de rétablir les grandes communications par St. Marie, chacun rentra dans ses portes et cette mesure produisit beaucoup plus d'effet, sur l'armée et les habitants du pays, que les dispositions qu'on auraient pu prendre.'

## No. V.

### EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CAPTAIN SQUIRE, OF THE ENGINEERS.

#### SECTION I.

*'March 1, 1811.*

'I have been employed in constructing batteries, opposite the mouth of the Zezere, for twenty-five guns! though we have only one brigade of nine-pounders to arm them.

'Thank God, for my own credit, I protested against these batteries from the first, in my reports which were sent to lord Wellington, and now I verily believe the marshal himself is ashamed of their construction. Punhete, you know, is situated precisely at the confluence of the Zezere with the Tagus, tho

enemy's bridge is about half a mile from the mouth of the river, and one mile, by measurement, from the nearest of our heights, which we have crowned with an eight-gun battery.'

## SECTION II.

'I was truly sorry to hear that the Spaniards were so thoroughly routed near Badajos, but Mendizabel was an idiot. On the 18th February, the enemy threw a bridge over the Guadiana, above Badajos. Don Carlos España, an active officer, whom I know very well, reconnoitred the bridge, and made his report to Mendizabel, who was playing at cards. Very well, said the chief, we'll go and look at it to-morrow! At day-break the Spanish army was surprised.'

## SECTION III.

'May 17, 1811.—I reconnoitred the ground in front of Christoval, and was pressed, by colonel Fletcher, who was on the other side of the Guadiana, to commence our operations that evening. The soil was hard and rocky, and our tools infamous. I made, however, no difficulties, and we began our battery on the night of the 8th, the moon being at the full: our work was barely four hundred yards from Christoval. In spite, however, of a most destructive fire of musketry, and shot, and shells, from various parts of the body of the place, we succeeded in completing our battery on the night of the 10th; and, on the morning of the 11th, at four a.m. its fire was opened. The enemy's fire was, however, very superior to our own, and, before sunset, the three guns and one howitzer were disabled, for against our little attack was the whole attention of the enemy directed. On the other side of the river the intended attack had not yet been begun, and we sustained the almost undivided fire of Badajos! I told the marshal, when I saw him on the 11th, that to continue to fight our battery was a positive sacrifice; he did not, however, order us to desist till our guns were silenced. If doubt and indecision had not governed all our operations, and had we begun even on the night of the 9th, I am satisfied that our plan of attack was excellent, and that we should have entered the place on the 15th. It is true that two distant batteries were erected, on the left bank of the river, against the place, but they scarcely excited the enemy's attention, our little corps bore the brunt of the enemy's exertions, which were great and spirited. Including those who fell in the sortie, our loss has been from six to seven hundred men. Both officers and men were exhausted, mind and body; they felt and saw that they were absurdly sacrificed.'

## SECTION IV.

*Elvas, May 20, 1811.*

'Had our operations been conducted with common activity and common judgment, Badajos would have been in our hands

before the 15th of May. But what has been the fact? Our little corps on the Christoval side was absolutely sacrificed. The whole fire and attention of Badajos was directed against our unsupported attack, and our loss in consequence was severe.'—  
 'Our operation before Christoval was absurdly pressed forward *without any co-operation on the left bank of the river*. The marshal hesitated—delayed, and at last withdrew his troops at such a moment that he was scarcely time enough to meet the enemy in the field!'

## No. VI.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL CAMPBELL  
TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

*'Gibraltar, October 23, 1810.*

'The troops at Malaga, with the exception of three hundred men, moved upon Fuengirola, of which lord Blayney was apprised; but, in place of his lordship taking advantage of this fortunate event, he wasted two days in a fruitless attack on the fort of Fuengirola, cannonading it from twelve-pounders, although he perceived that no impression had been made on it by the fire of the shipping and gun-boats, the artillery of which were double the calibre. In this situation he was surprised by an inferior force, and, whilst he was on board of a gun-boat, his guns taken and the whole thrown into confusion; at this moment he was informed of the disaster, and, so far to his credit, he retook his guns, but, immediately after, conceiving a body of French cavalry to be Spaniards, he ordered the firing to cease, when he was surrounded and made prisoner; his men, losing confidence, gave way, and, hurrying to the beach, relinquished their honour and the field.'

## No. VII

JUSTIFICATORY PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE STATE OF  
SPAIN AT DIFFERENT PERIODS.

## SECTION I.—NORTHERN PROVINCES.

*Captain Irby to Mr. Croft.*

*'H. M. S. Amelia, Coruña, May 6, 1810.*

'I have been cruising for these two months past between Bayonne and Santona.

'In addition to the troops I have observed under arms, there has been a great proportion of armed peasantry at Baquio, a small place to the westward of Rachidaes; as our boats were

returning from destroying some batteries, they were attacked by armed peasantry alone, who were dispersed by shot from the ship, and also since they have assisted the French troops, when we captured a vessel laden with military stores from St. Andero.'

*Mr. Stuart to general Walker.*

*'Lisbon, February 20, 1811.*

'I own that from the various appointments which have lately taken place in their armies, I forebode little advantage in the course of the ensuing campaign; it is perhaps needful to tell you that my fears are grounded on the nomination of the duke of Albuquerque to Galicia, Castaños to Estremadura, Mahi to Murcia, Coupigny to Valencia, and the brother of O'Donnel to Catalonia.'

*Sir Howard Douglas to lord Wellington.*

*'Villafranca, January 4, 1812.*

'Each chief is allowed three servants, a captain two, a subaltern one; the number of soldiers employed in this way is certainly not *under* the regulation, and all officers resident in the interior likewise have this excessive indulgence. The officers' servants never do duty, or attend any drill or review. The cooks are in general changed weekly, and are never present at drill or review; one cook is allowed besides to every three serjeants. These two items certainly take 5000 choice men from the ranks of this army.

'Some very violent recriminations have been brought on by the imprudent reply of the military press, to some observations published in a Coruña paper extolling the guerillas, and at the same time intended to convey a censure on the conduct of the army. I have had frequent conversations with general Abadia on the spirit of disunion which these two papers are sowing. He has at length prohibited the military press from publishing anything but professional papers. I was present when he gave the order—he engaged me in the conversation, and I could not avoid observing, that what was lost could only be regained by the sword, not the pen. In this I alluded to the Asturias, where certainly reputation and public confidence were sacrificed.

'The truth is, the army is oppressive and expensive, as well as inefficient, from its disorganized state, particularly in the departments of supply; and it is a very unpleasant circumstance to hear it generally admitted, that a Spanish corps is much more destructive to the country than an equal French army. There are also violent dissensions between the juntas of Leon and Galicia: inclosure No. 6 will show this state of feeling.'

*Sir Howard Douglas to sir H. Wellesley.*

*'Coruña, March 1, 1812.*

'On the 20th ultimo I had the honour to despatch to your excellency a copy of my letter of that date to lord Wellington, in

which I acquainted his lordship that three battalions of the army of Galicia are preparing for embarkation for America, and that I had positively declined making, and would not permit the delivery of any British arms or stores for that service. I have now discovered, that in addition to these troops it is intended to send a division of horse artillery, to equip which, orders have been given to transfer appointments from the cavalry of the army, and a demand is made for funds to prepare the ordnance, and even to adapt to colonial service more of the field-artillery which I lately delivered for the use of the sixth Gallician army. This measure has never been openly avowed by the government of Cadiz, it has never been communicated to the junta of this province by the regency. It has, I imagine, been concealed from your excellency, and it has only come to my knowledge, by the arrangements no longer to be hidden, which general Abadia is making to carry it into effect.'

## SECTION II.—CATALONIA.

### *Extract of a Letter from Don Antonio Rocca.*

[Translated.]

'Reus, January 20, 1811.

'While we have venal men, ignorant men, and perfidious men in our government, no good can befall us. He must be mad who can expect our condition to ameliorate. The venal are those who, without being called, seemingly abandon their own affairs, and introduce themselves in the different branches of administration with no other view than to enrich themselves at the public expense. The ignorant are those who think themselves wise, and who either obtain by intrigue or accept without reluctance employments the duties of which they are not capable of discharging. The perfidious are all those who are indifferent spectators of this bloody struggle, and who care not for the issue, as they will equally submit to any master. Place no confidence, my friend, in these sort of persons, nothing can be expected from them, and yet by an inconceivable fatality which is attached to us, to the ruin of all parties, it would appear that the provinces employ none but these very people. Those who commend us are either venal, or ignorant, or indifferent; at least, the more we search for the remedy the more our evil increases.'

*Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton.*

'April 24, 1811.

... 'With respect to the proposed plan of admitting supplies of grain in neutral vessels from the ports of the enemy, &c., I have no hesitation in saying I do not see sufficient reason to justify it in the present circumstances of this part of the Peninsula, as I have always found bread for sale at the different places on the coast, at the rate of about *two pounds and three quarters for the quarter of a dollar*, at which price I yes-

terday bought it at Escala. And as there has been of late more corn at Taragona than money to purchase, I presume the latter has been the greater desideratum of the two.'

'The difficulty of allowing a free passage of provisions from one part of the coast to the other would be lessened by being limited to vessels above the size of common fishing-boats, in which I have reason to believe considerable quantities have been carried to Barcelona: and captain Bullen, I understand, found even a mortar in a boat of this description.'

• *General C. Doyle to Captain Bullen.*

'Ripol, April, 1811.

'Can you believe that in this town, *the only fabric of arms, six months* have passed without a firelock being made!! They begin\* to-morrow, and give me two hundred and fifty every week, &c.'

[Note. The italics and notes of admiration are in the original.]

*Admiral Fremantle to captain Codrington.*

'Mahon, May 19, 1811.

'The uncertainty of everything connected with Spanish affairs is such, that I am tired of writing and explaining all that arises from their inconsistency and want of energy.

'Until eight o'clock I had understood that the intendant had procured one thousand quintals of biscuit for the army at Taragona, which number I find on inquiry has dwindled to fifty-seven bags. I have therefore been under the necessity of sending five hundred bags, which we can very ill spare, from our own stores, with a proportion of rice. I cannot tell you how much I have been worried and annoyed the last three days, particularly as I feel the very great importance Taragona is to the Spaniards, and how much this island is connected with the event of the fall of that fortress. The intendant here has wrote that he has sent two hundred and thirty-two bags of bread. You will have the goodness to explain that only fifty-seven were procured by him, which I have engaged to pay for, and that all the rest comes immediately from our own stores, and are consequently at the disposal of the British authorities at Taragona.'

*Extract of a letter from sir Edward Pellow to captain Codrington.*

'H. M. ship *Caledonia*, July 22, 1811.

'The indecision, inactivity, and apparent disunion amongst the Spanish leaders have been the great cause of failure throughout the whole of this arduous contest, and is especially observable in the late events in Catalonia; nor until the patriots are directed by pure military councils and more energy and decision, can I permit myself to think that any effectual stand can be made against the invaders.'

*Sir Edward Pellew to captain Codrington.*

*'August 2, 1811.*

'I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, &c. The information therein conveyed affords me a very melancholy view of the affairs of the patriots, and gives me little reason to hope better things from their future exertions.'—'A despatch which reached me by the same opportunity from the superior junta of Catalonia contains a proposal for occupying a position on the coast as a naval depôt, and the selection of Palamos is presented to my choice. It does not appear to me that the junta possesses at present resources for defending any such position, and from the measures being submitted to my determination, it seems to be expected that I should provide means of defending them while employed in securing themselves in their new station.'—'Yet whilst the noble spirit of this ill-fated people remains unsubdued, it would not be just to expect a total failure, although the loss of all confidence between them and the privileged orders, and the want of leaders among themselves who possess either skill or competency to guide them, afford but a very precarious prospect of their doing anything effectual to stop the invaders.'

*Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew.*

*'November 1, 1811.*

'By a letter from captain Strong it seems the people of Cadagues in the early part of October openly refused assistance to the governor of the Medas islands, declaring that they only acknowledged the strongest party, and therefore paid their subscriptions to the French; and that upon the Bustard's going with a party of Spanish troops to enforce obedience, they rang the alarm-bell as the signal for the approach of an enemy, and sent to Rosas for assistance.'

*Extract of a letter from captain Codrington to  
E. H. Locker, Esq.*

*'February 7, 1812.*

'Whilst the French pay the poor, who serve their purpose, at the expense of the rich, the Spaniards deal out severity to the lower classes, and oblige them to serve without pay and without clothes; and the debauched and profligate of higher life are in many instances rewarded, for imbecility, ignorance, and indifference to the fate of their country never yet exceeded, without one single example being made of the many traitors which have been discovered in the persons of priests, officers of rank, or what are termed gentlemen.'

*Captain Codrington to general Lacy.*

*'February 18, 1812.*

'Being an eye-witness of the discontent of the people, which has arisen from their being partially disarmed, and knowing

how fatal have been the consequences which have followed these practices on former occasions, I must own I cannot offer to the admiral my conviction of all that benefit arising from his good intentions, in which I should otherwise have confided. The officers and men of the French army are walking about this part of the coast unarmed, because *the juntas and justices have concealed the muskets they had at their disposal*, and refused the people permission to attack the enemy. In the meantime, the poor people, whose hearts are burning with patriotism, are starving for want of bread, and the richer citizens of this devoted country are supplying the enemy with corn and other species of provisions.'

*Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew.*

•  
' *Villa Nueva, February 22, 1812.*

'I fear things are going on very ill in this principality from the sudden change in the system of general Lacy, and the consequent destruction of that confidence on the part of the people which was certainly the cause of his former successes. Nor can there be any doubt of the sound reason which guides the conduct of the Catalans on this occasion; for the mode in which general Lacy effected the dishonourable breach of faith of which they complain, bespeaks a mind practised in deception. He ordered the patriotic companies to be sent to particular points in subdivisions, at which points general Sarsfield was to take forcible possession of them, and attach them to different corps of the regular army. And the discovery of this treachery was made by the letter to general Sarsfield falling, by mistake, into the hands of the officer who commanded the whole division of patriotic companies. In the meantime the discontent of the people gains ground with their sufferings, and instead of the Spanish army being increased by the late arbitrary mandate according to its avowed object, and not less probably in consequence of the late extraordinary conduct of general Sarsfield, many of the Catalan soldiers have actually passed over to the enemy.'

'The letter of the baron de Eroles in the gazette No. 10, shows that he was again deceived in the promised support of general Sarsfield on the 24th, and I am told he says publicly it was part of a settled plan to sacrifice him and his whole division.'

*Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew.*

' *Ville Nueva de Sitjes, February 22, 1812.*

'Nothing but a total change can produce permanent good; for the villanies of the intendant and commissary departments are so thoroughly organized, that not one link of the chain can be left with safety. I have good reason to think that even the money furnished by England is so employed in the traffic of corn, by the individuals through whose hands it passes, as to be the direct means of supplying the enemy.'



*Captain Codrington to Mr. H. Wellesley.*

*' March 1, 1812.*

'The change of the regency will, I trust, produce a radical change of that diabolical system by which plunder has been openly licensed, and despotism and injustice towards the people, and even treachery itself, in those of a higher class, have hitherto passed with impunity.'

### SECTION III.—VALENCIA AND MURCIA. \*

*The councillor of state, Mariano Orquijo, to king Joseph.*

*' Madrid, Decembre 4. 1810.*

'Je viens de voir le proviseur et vicaire général qui fut arrêté à Logrogne par les insurgés. Son opinion prononcée en faveur de V. M. lui a attiré toutes sortes de mauvais traitemens et de disgrâces, mais enfin il est parvenu à se sauver de Valence. Il m'a rapporté que l'esprit public de cette capitale a beaucoup changé depuis que le général Caro (frère de Romana) s'est livré aux vexations et aux dilapidations de toute espèce, et que son opinion est qu'on n'y éprouvera aucune résistance. L'archevêque de Valence, qui jouit à présent d'une grande influence, lui a souvent parlé en secret d'une manière favorable de V. M. et de ses ministres. C'est à l'archevêque qu'il est redevable de son evasion. Ce prélat m'ayant connu ainsi que à M. de Montarco dans d'autres tems le chargea de nous voir. Le général Bassecourt n'était nullement considéré. Le proviseur ajoute, qu'à Alicant d'où il est parti le 14 Novembre, tout était rempli de réfugiés de Cadix. D'après tout ce qu'il m'a dit, je conte qu'aussitôt la prise de Tortoze, Valence se rendra sans coup férir. J'ai renvoyé ce proviseur à Monsieur de Santa Fé qui l'a protégé en sa qualité de ministre des affaires ecclésiastiques et qui fut très sensible au malheur qui lui arriva à Logrogne.'

*General Doyle to Mr. Stuart.*

*' March 8, 1811.*

'There is a strong French party in Valencia. It is a sad thing that we cannot *sacar Partido* of that kingdom, in which are more resources than in all the other provinces of Spain. With my head I answer for it that in one month two thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, independent of the existing army, which is one thousand five hundred effective cavalry and eleven thousand infantry, could be raised, and there is money enough within the city to pay them for six months, and without looking elsewhere for assistance to clothe them. There is abundance of cloth, and provisions in abundance, yet Valencia is doing nothing! and this time so precious! while Massena draining all the rest of the Peninsula gives us time to organize. We want a Robespierre in the government, and another in every province!!'

*Colonel Roche to Mr. Stuart.**' Carthage, June, 20, 1811.*

' After three years leaving them to themselves, this army (the Murcian) is everywhere in a worse state absolutely than it was in the commencement of the revolution.'

' The fact is that the Spaniards have no confidence in their general, nor he in them, and thus Freire apprehends if he fights his people will disperse. Valencia, with an immense population and great resources, is doing little. Bassecour retired to Cuenca. The same indolence, lassitude, and egotism prevails through the country, and I see little stimulus produced by the establishment of the Cortes; that feeling of enthusiasm which existed is fast dying away. The thing in the world most agreeable to the Spaniards at this moment would be to be allowed to be neuter, that England and France should fight the battle and pay all the expenses.'

*Captain Codrington to the honourable H. Wellesley.**' September 8, 1811.*

' After ascertaining that much art was employed to disgust the army with general Blake, and at the same time to prejudice the people against their officers, I relied upon the purity of my motives, and opened the subject to the general with the candour and freedom it required. I had great satisfaction in finding him well aware of all that was passing, and upon his guard as to the consequences. Upon my mentioning that certain hand-bills were posted up, he produced and gave me the enclosed copies. He told me that upon obtaining them he went to the marquis of Palacios, who, necessarily agreeing in their evil tendency, consented to accompany the general to the palace of the archbishop, where I trust measures were adopted to prevent a repetition of the misconduct of the Padre Igual and his numerous bigoted coadjutors. I submitted to the general's attention the fatal effects of his quitting this part of the Peninsula, while the minds of the people were in such a state of fermentation, and allowing the supreme authority to revert to the marquis of Palacios. He assured me that he clearly saw the danger which would arise from it; he had determined on no account to do so until the marquis was removed by the government from his present situation.'

## SECTION IV.—ANDALUSIA.

*General Graham to Mr. Stuart.**' May 9, 1810.*

' Nothing new here; the regency and the junta are as usual more asleep than awake, and I can augur nothing good from the government remaining in such hands—let their intentions be ever so good. Nothing but the assembly of the Cortes, and from

thence springing up a revolutionary system, overturning abuses and interesting the people in their own cause by solid and permanent, instead of contingent and prospective reforms, calling forth talents if to be found for the chief situations, and enforcing vigour and rousing enthusiasm. Nothing but some great change (such as we might in the beginning have assisted in bringing about) can carry on this war to any good result. The people are obstinate in their hatred of the French, and from that alone spring the fits of patriotism and loyalty which keep alive the flame in some place or another; that it is so one cannot doubt from the effects, but it is never to be met with where one is; at least I have never seen enthusiasm though I have heard of it. Hence the bulk of the people seem to be completely indifferent to what is going on, and all seem most unwilling to submit to the deprivation of any comfort, and to the sacrifices which a state of siege requires. They would be very well pleased to have anything done for them and to see the enemy driven away, that they might go to eat strawberries at Chiclana, and they are much disposed to blame our inactivity, especially that of the navy, in permitting the enemy to have advanced so near on the point of Trocadero. The destruction of these two forts at first was certainly a great error in admiral Purvis; had they been kept up and well garrisoned, as they support one another, it would have been a very tedious operation to have reduced them. Meanwhile you will hear that the improvidence of the junta, and their denial of any such risk to Mr. Wellesley, placed the bread provision of the town in much too precarious a situation; in short, they completely deceived him by their assurances of the most ample means of subsistence, and both flour and wheat have been sent away since he came.'

*Mr. Wellesley to Mr. Stuart.*

*'Isla de Leon, February 5, 1811.*

'Blake is becoming very unpopular, and I think his reign will be short. He is supposed to be by no means partial to the English. I know not whether you will approve of the appointments to Estremadura and Galicia, but I am sure you will be surprised to hear that general Mahi is appointed to command the army of the centre. I communicated confidentially to general Blake the copy of the letter which you forwarded to me from general Walker, taking care to conceal general Walker's name, so that Blake was fully apprised of our opinion of general Mahi previously to his appointment of him to the command in Murcia.'

*Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart.*

*'Cadiz, February 27, 1811.*

'It grieves me to see from day to day how little is done by the Spaniards, and how little is likely to be done. The Cortes have not given a new impulse to the war as was expected. They

look to their regency for plans of reform for their armies, and their regency is worse than any former government. Blake, of whom I know that you as well as the world in general have a good opinion, does nothing. He refuses to reform abuses that are pointed out to him, passes his days in deliberation upon questions of no moment, and is in my opinion decidedly adverse to the English. Whittingham's plan, (disciplining a separate corps,) which was approved of before his arrival, he has endeavoured by every kind of trick to reject or render useless.'

'The Cortes is full of priests, who, united with the Catalans, are for preserving the old routine of business, and adverse to everything that can give energy and vigour to the operations of government. Fanaticism and personal interest direct their opinions; Arguolles and his party are anxious that something should be done to remedy the disgraceful state of their armies. I have no doubt but that they would remove the present government though the friends of Blake, if there was any chance of the Catalan party permitting them to elect a better.'

'Be assured, my dear Stuart, that the Cortes is, as at present constituted, anything but revolutionary or jacobinical. They love their monarchy, and are anxious to maintain the inquisition in all its forms, the only branch of government to which they seem disposed to communicate any energy. If there is not soon some new spirit infused into the Cortes, it will become an overgrown junta, meddling with every paltry detail of police, and neglecting the safety of their country—and the regency will be content to reign (very badly) over Cadiz and the Isla.'

*Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart.*

*'Cadiz, August 5, 1811.*

'The temper of the public mind at Cadiz is very bad, the press has lately teemed with publications filled with reproaches of the English.'

'The regency and Cortes have lost all influence everywhere, and the distress for money added to the general depression here after the campaign in Estremadura may possibly throw us into a state of anarchy.'

'I am somewhat alarmed by the state of the Serrano de Ronda; the Spanish generals have been quarrelling, and the peasants declare they are tired of the abuses committed there, and that it is reported they mean to capitulate with the French.'

*General Graham to Mr. Stuart.*

*'Isla de Leon, April 24, 1811.*

'The Spanish government has published an official narrative of the expedition (Barosa) full of misrepresentations and blinking the question of the cause of failure entirely—this has obliged me to add something to what I wrote before to Mr. Wellesley.

There are some instances of impudence supporting falsehood beyond example. The *proud Spaniard* is no less *vain*, I think.'

*General Graham to Mr. Stuart.*

'*Isla, May 6, 1811.*

'The government here supported by the Cortes seemed to be determined to adhere with blind obstinacy and pride to a system that has nearly brought the cause to ruin, and notwithstanding lord Wellington's great efforts they are playing Buonaparte's game so positively that I despair of any great good.'

*Colonel Austin to Mr. Stuart.*

'*Faro, March 24, 1811.*

Whether Ballesteros is authorized by his government to pursue the steps he has taken, I know not, but I certainly cannot but consider them as just and necessary. The junta de Seville is a mere farce supported at an immense expense, without the least utility or benefit, and preserving in its train a number of idle characters who ought to be employed in the defence of the nation, but who now only add to its burthens. I have had many negotiations with the junta, and though I have always kept up appearances through policy, yet I have found, in the room of the honour and candour which ought to characterize it, nothing but chicanery and dissimulation.'

*General Carrol to Mr. Stuart.*

'*Olivenza, April 29, 1811.*

'Would to Heaven that the Spanish armies, or, more properly speaking, the skeletons of the Spanish armies, were under his lordship's (Wellington's) command; we might in that case do great things, but alas! our pride seems to increase with our misfortunes, and is only equalled by our ignorance!'

*Mr. Stuart to lord Wellesley.*

'*July 13, 1811.*

'I have endeavoured to throw together the numbers, &c. of the different guerillas, &c., which clearly demonstrate the false exaggerations circulated respecting that description of force; though their appearance in different parts has most unreasonably increased the alarm of the enemy and proportionable confidence of the Spaniards, they cannot be calculated to exceed in the aggregate twenty-five or thirty thousand men at the utmost.'

*Note.*—Here follows a list of the partidas, with their numbers and stations, too long to insert.

*Mr. Wellesley to Mr. Stuart.*

'*Cadiz, July 31, 1811.*

'Nothing can be more wretched than the state of affairs here; the regents are held in universal contempt, and such is the want

of talent, I can hardly hope that a change will make any improvement: the treasury is empty, and no probability of the arrival of any money from America, so that affairs are really in a worse state than they have been at any time since the commencement of the war.'

*Extract from the manifesto of the Spanish regency.*

*'January 23, 1812.*

'There have reached the government the cries of the armies which defend us, depicting their painful privations; the groans of the inhabitants of districts, ready to fall under the yoke of the barbarous invaders; the complaints of the provinces already occupied, always loyal though oppressed and laid waste.

'Cease now, and henceforward, all personal pretensions; the ill-understood feelings of interest dictated by provincial spirit; exemptions unjustly demanded at this period of desolation, writings which, while they ought to create the most ardent patriotism, to unite and enlighten the nation, appear inspired by the enemy for the purpose of enslaving it.'

#### SECTION V.—PRIVATEERS.

*Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew.*

*'Arcs de Mar, August 23, 1811.*

'I have numberless complaints of the Spanish privateers that come upon the coast, and I am sure it would be a benefit to the country if they were all deprived of their commission. They do nothing but plunder the inhabitants of those places which are occasionally overrun by the French armies, and who embrace the opportunity of their absence to carry on a little trade with other parts of the Peninsula.'

*Ditto to sir H. Wellesley.*

*'Valencia, September 8, 1811.*

'I trust some decisive measures will be taken to abolish altogether a system of privateering nothing short of piracy; and in which the vessels from Gibraltar seem to take the lead. I have great reason to believe that they plunder the unfortunate vessels of all countries by hoisting whatever colours may answer their purposes of assumed national hostility; and as we never hear of their attacking each other, I have no doubt that the British and French flags are often united in furtherance of this predatory warfare. The numberless complaints which I receive from all parts of the coast, and the difficulty of trading betwixt Catalonia and Valencia, on account of the privateers which swarm in these seas, drive many into an intercourse with Barcelona and other places in the occupation of the enemy, in order to get a livelihood.

*Captain Codrington to admiral Penrose, Valencia.*

‘The depredations of the Gibraltar privateers have been carried on to such an extent, in all parts of the Mediterranean, as to bring serious reflections upon the British flag.’

#### SECTION VI.—FRENCH PRISONERS AT CABRERA.

*Captain Codrington to E. Locker, Esq.*

‘September 18, 1811.

‘I cannot at all events think it a wise measure to receive into colonel Whittingham’s corps the prisoners at Cabrera, who have long ago withstood the offers of general Roche, *when naked as they were born, and fighting for each other’s miserable rations to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched*, in hopes of rejoining the French.’

*Sir H. Wellesley to captain Codrington.*

‘October 10, 1811.

‘With regard to the French prisoners at Cabrera, I procured from the Spanish government long since an order to the governor of the Balearic Islands to suspend all negotiations with the French on that subject, and not on any account to consent to exchange them.’

### No. VIII.

#### SECTION I.

#### SIEGE OF TARAGONA.

*Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton.*

‘Taragona, May 15, 1811.

‘During the panic which seems to have prevailed upon the unexpected arrival of the French army, the greatest exertions and the most extensive sacrifices appear to have been readily submitted to. But from the present apathy and indifference in those who should set an example of activity, and from the general deficiency of ordnance stores, I by no means consider the place in that state of security which the strength of its works and position would otherwise lead me to expect.’

‘A well planned sortie was made yesterday, but failed through the backwardness of some of the officers employed in it.’—‘I had the satisfaction of being assured by an officer, who conspicuously did his duty on this occasion, and who was outflanked by the enemy, from the backwardness of the column directed to support him, that he attributes the salvation of his troops entirely to the fire from the shipping.’

*Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton.*

*'Blake, off Villa Nueva, June 15, 1811.*

'Leaving Taragona on the 16th (May), we reached Peniscola in the forenoon of the 17th.'—'From thence general Doyle wrote to general O'Donnel an account of the situation of Taragona and of my detaining captain Adam at Peniscola, in readiness to receive any reinforcement which he might be pleased to send to that garrison. Upon our arrival off Murviedro, we found general O'Donnel had already ordered the embarkation of two thousand three hundred infantry and two hundred and eleven artillerymen.'—'Delivering to general O'Donnel two thousand stand of arms, accoutrements, and clothing to enable him to bring into the field as many recruits already trained as would supply the place of the regular soldiers thus detached from his army, we proceeded to Valencia and landed the remainder of our cargo, by which means the troops of general Villa Campa, then dispersed as peasantry for want of arms, were enabled again to take the field, and the corps of Mina and the Empecinado completed in all the requisites of active warfare.'

'At Alicant we proceeded to take in as many necessary materials for Taragona as the ship would actually stow, besides eighty artillerymen and a considerable quantity of powder, ball-cartridge, &c., sent in the Paloma Spanish corvette from Carthagena in company with a Spanish transport from Cadiz deeply laden with similar supplies.'

'After returning to Valencia, where we landed the additional arms, &c., for the Aragonese army, we moved on to Murviedro, where the conde de Bispal proceeded from Valencia to join us in a consultation with his brother, although on account of his wound he was very unfit for such a journey. The result of this conference was a determination on the part of general O'Donnel to commit to my protection, for the succour of Taragona, another division of his best troops under general Miranda, consisting of four thousand men, whilst he himself would move forward with the remainder of his army to the banks of the Ebro.'

'The frequent disappointments which the brave Catalanian army had heretofore met with from Valencian promises, made the sight of so extensive and disinterested a reinforcement the more truly welcome, because the least expected, and the admiration which was thus created in the besieged appeared to produce proportionate anxiety on the part of the enemy.'

'I shall direct the whole of my attention to the neighbourhood of Taragona, in readiness for harassing the retreat of the French, if general Suchet should fortunately be obliged to raise the siege, and for re-embarking and restoring to general O'Donnel whatever may remain of the Valencian troops, according to the solemn pledge he exacted from me before he would consent thus to part with the flower and strength of his army. He even went so far as to declare, in the presence of general Miranda, the principal



officer of his staff, general Doyle, captain Adam, captain White, and myself, that he considered me as entirely answerable for the safety of the kingdom of Valencia, and that if I failed in redeeming my pledge he would resign his command for that particular account.'

'It is but justice to myself, however, that I should tell you that I did most distinctly warn general O'Donnel, that I would in no case answer for his army if placed under the immediate command of Campo Verde, for any distant inland operation, more particularly as I knew that, in addition to his own deficiency in ability, he was surrounded by people whose advice and whose conduct were in no case to be relied on.'

*Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton.*

*'Blake, Turagona, June 22, 1811.*

'I found upon my last return here an arrangement made, that in case of the enemy gaining the Puerto, general Sarsfield should retire to the Mole with part of his division, from whence I had only to assist, but was much astonished to find, by a message, through colonel Green, from general Contreras, that although he had heard of such a disposition being made by general Sarsfield, and assented to by the English squadron, it had not his official knowledge or approbation.'—'I understand that an order had arrived in the morning from the marquis of Campo Verde for general Velasco to take the command of Puerto, and for general Sarsfield to join his army, that the latter had given up his command to some colonel at about three o'clock, who was, by his own confession, totally unfit for it, and that general Velasco only arrived in time to see the Spanish troops flying in confusion from the want of being properly commanded and the French assaulting the place.'

*Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew.*

*'Mattaro, November 1, 1811.*

'Having stated in a letter to sir Charles Cotton, on the 22nd June last, that I understand general Sarsfield had quitted the Puerto and embarked without the knowledge of general Contreras, (which indeed was the substance of a message sent me by general Contreras himself,) I owe it to an officer of general Sarsfield's high military character to declare my conviction that the statement there made by general Contreras is absolutely false and unfounded, and I beg leave to enclose in justification of my present opinion; 1st. A passport sent by general Contreras to general Sarsfield in consequence, as he alleged, of an order from the marquis of Campo Verde. 2nd. An extract from the manifesto of the marquis, in which he disavows having any knowledge of the passports. 3rd. A letter from general Contreras to general Sarsfield in answer to one written by the latter requesting to see the order by which he was directed to quit the Puerto at such

a critical moment, in which he says, 'that he cannot send him a copy of that letter, because it is confidential, but that his presence is necessary at the head-quarters to assist in the operations about to take place for the relief of the garrison, and that he has not a moment to lose.' 4th. The copy of another letter written on the same day by general Contreras to the superior junta, in which he says that general Sarsfield quitted the Puerto without his knowledge!!!

*General Doyle to colonel Roche.*

'June 23, 1811.

'Is it possible to conceive anything so absurd, and I could almost say *wicked*, as the conduct of the junta or captain-general of Carthagena in taking away the firelocks from the regiments *they sent with such parade of their patriotism to relieve Taragona*. Two thousand men are already in this city without firelocks, such is the daily destruction of arms by the enemy's fire and the getting out of repair from constant use.'

*Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton.*

'Off Taragona, June 23, 1811.

'Another regiment arrived from Carthagena yesterday under convoy of the Cossack, but, as on a former occasion, their arms were taken from them by colonel Roche, upon their going to embark, and therefore, as being of no use to the garrison, I have by desire of the general sent them to Villa Nueva, and as there are already 2000 men in the place without arms, I have sent the Termagant to Carthagena, to endeavour to procure those which have been thus inconsiderately taken from the troops belonging to that place.'

*Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton.*

[Extract.]

'June 29, 1811.

'The *Regulus* with five transports including a victualler arrived with colonel Skerrett and his detachments on the 26th. The surf was so great on that day that we had no other communication in the forenoon than by a man swimming on shore with a letter, and upon colonel Skerrett putting questions to general Doyle and myself upon the conduct he should pursue according to his orders, we agreed in our opinion that although the arrival of the troops before the Puerto (lower town) was taken would probably have saved the garrison, it was now too late, and that their being landed, if practicable, would only serve to prolong the fate of the place for a very short time at the certain sacrifice of the whole eventually. This opinion was grounded on a number of different circumstances, and was in perfect coincidence with that of captains Adam and White. In the evening the surf abated sufficiently for general Doyle, colonel Skerrett, and

some of his officers, as well as the captains of the squadron and myself, to wait upon general Contreras, who repeated his determination to cut his way out and join the marquis of Campo Verde *the instant the enemy's breaching battery should open*, and which he expected would take place the following morning, and who agreed the English ought not to land with any view of defending the town, although he wished them to join in his meditated sortie.'

*Extracts from general Contreras' report.*

[Translated]

'I saw myself reduced to my own garrison.'—'I considered if my force was capable of this effort (defending the breach), one of the most heroic that war furnishes, and to which few men can bring themselves. I recollected, however, that *I had still eight thousand of the best and most experienced troops in Spain*.—'All conspired against this poor garrison. Campo Verde in quitting the place promised to come back quickly to its succour, but he did not, although he daily renewed his promises. The kingdom of Valencia sent Miranda with a division which disembarked, and the day following re-embarked and went to join Campo Verde.'

'An English division came on the 26th, colonel Skerrett, who commanded them, came in the evening to confer with me and to demand what I wished him to do. *I replied that if he would disembark and enter the place, he should be received with joy and treated as he merited; that he had only to choose the point that he wished to defend and I would give it to him, but that all was at his choice, since I would neither command nor counsel him*. The 27th the English commandants of artillery and engineers came to examine the front attacked, and being convinced that the place was not in a state to resist, returned to their vessels, and then all went away from the place they came to succour.

'*This abandonment on the part of those who came to save was the worst of all; it made such an impression on the soldiers, that they began to see that they were lost, became low-spirited and only resisted from my continual exhortations, and because they saw my coolness and the confidence I had, that if they executed my orders the French would fail. But this only lasted a few hours. the notion of being abandoned again seized them and overcame all other ideas.*

*Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton.*

'July 12, 1811.

'The vacillating conduct of general Contreras regarding the defence of Taragona is a principal feature in the loss of that important fortress.'

*Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellow.*

' July 12, 1811.

' The marquis blames generals Caro and Miranda, whilst the latter retort the accusation; and I am inclined to think that in giving full credit to what each says of the other, neither will suffer ignominy beyond that to which his conduct has entitled him.'

*Ditto to Mr. Wellesley.*

[Extract.]

' July 20, 1811.

' The disasters which have befallen the principality will produce material accusations against the generals who lately commanded in it, without, I fear, any of them meeting the punishment which is their due. Some of the enclosed papers may help you to form a just opinion of their conduct and that of the Spanish marine; and those respecting the arms for which I sent to Carthagena will show how far colonel Roche is entitled to the merit which he so largely assumes on that occasion.'

' To enable you to form a correct opinion of general Contreras I must refer you to general Doyle, as from his ignorance of our service, the various requests and proposals which arose from the vacillations in what he called his determinations, were signified to me through him. It does not appear to me that he ever visited the works himself, or it would not have fallen to the lot of captain Adam and myself to remove two boats, two large stages, sixteen gun-carriages, and a mortar from the mole, long after the French were advanced beyond the Francoli battery, and two nights previous to their gaining the Puerto; an accidental visit to the mole one night, just after placing the gun-boats and launches, discovered to me this mortar with no less than twelve guns in readiness for forming a battery; and upon general Doyle, by my request, representing this to the general of artillery, he talked of *inquiring into it to-morrow*.'

' It would be a waste of words to describe further the conduct of the general of artillery, or I might find sufficient subject in the events of every passing day from the first investment of the place.—' I shall be very ready to come forward personally in aid of that justice which is due to the numberless brave men who fell a sacrifice to the criminality of the persons alluded to who have so grossly misconducted themselves.'

## SECTION II.

*Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellow.*

' July 29, 1811.

' Had colonel Green, the military agent appointed to succeed general Doyle, adopted the plan of his predecessors of continuing at the head-quarters of the army and in personal communication with the captain-general, instead of retiring to Peniscola with

the money and arms remaining, we should not be left as we are to the precarious source of mere accidental communications for receiving intelligence.'

*Captain Codrington to Don F. Savartes, vocal of the Junta.*

' July 28, 1811. '

' ——— Colonel Green, the British military agent, being at Peniscola, I have opened the letter from the junta to him.'—  
' Had I not in this instance opened the letters to the admiral and the military agent, the junta would have received no answer to them until it would have been too late to execute their object.'

*Captain Thomas to captain Codrington.*

[Extract.]

' *H. M. S. Undaunted, off Arens, Oct. 7, 1811.*

' Having observed, in the Catalonia Gazette of the 24th of September, the copy of a letter said to be written by colonel Green to his excellency general Lacy, relative to our operations on the Medas islands, from the surrender of the castle to the period of our quitting them, I beg leave to state to you my surprise and astonishment at seeing facts so grossly misrepresented, and request you will be pleased to contradict in the most positive manner the assertions there made use of. To prove how inconsistent this letter is with real facts, it may be necessary for me only to say that colonel Green, in the presence and hearing of all the English officers, on my asking him a question relative to the practicability of keeping the island, did declare that he had nothing to do with the expedition; that my instructions pointed him out as a volunteer only. But immediately after, in the hearing of all, did declare it to be his opinion that the island was not tenable.

' As I understood it was intended to form an establishment on the larger island, I judged it proper to retire from it for a short time and destroy the remains of the castle, which might induce the enemy to withdraw from the works he had thrown up, and thereby afford our ally an opportunity whenever he chose to occupy them again, to fortify himself without molestation; and this supposition it has appeared was well grounded. But while the ruins of the castle stood, it was an object of jealousy to the French; nor would they in my opinion have quitted the ground they occupied, nor the Spaniards have been enabled to settle themselves, had this measure not been adopted. I therefore gave orders for embarking the guns and stores.

' If necessary, I could say much more on the subject of this most extraordinary letter; the few remarks I have made will, I think, be sufficient. As an act of courtesy to colonel Green, on landing the marines, I directed the marine officers to receive their orders from him; but military aid was not necessary, for you may recollect before the expedition sailed, on your informing me that general Lacy had offered some Spanish troops, and asking

how many I thought would be necessary, my answer was, 'about forty;' and I have no hesitation in declaring that without the assistance of even a single soldier the castle would have fallen into our hands as speedily as it did on this occasion.

## SECTION III.

*Captain Codrington's orders to captain Adam of the Invincible.*

' July 1, 1811.

' You are hereby directed, in consequence of a representation made to me by general Doyle, to proceed towards Majorca in search of the Spanish frigates Prueba, Diana, and Astrea, which the general reports to be going to that island (contrary to orders) with the treasure, archives of the province, and the vessels laden with stores and ammunition destined for the inland fortresses of Catalonia, together with the officers and soldiers which were saved from Taragona, and which are required to join the army immediately. Upon meeting them you are to deliver the accompanying order for them to return here, and you are, if necessary, to enforce obedience.'

*Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton.*

' Villa Nueva, July 3, 1811.

' I should feel the more hurt by being driven to adopt such a measure had not the whole conduct of the Prueba and Diana made their captains a disgrace to the situation they hold. These two frigates remained quiet spectators of the British squadron engaging the batteries of the enemy on the 22nd of last month, and never attempted to give any assistance to the garrison, except by now and then sending a gun-boat to join those manned by the English. They did not assist in the embarkation of the numberless women, children, and wounded soldiers, until goaded into it by the orders of general Contreras, after I had already sent above two thousand to this place; and even when I had no longer any transports for their reception, the captain of the Prueba refused to receive some wounded officers.'

*Ditto to ditto.*

' July 18, 1811.

' I cannot describe to you the difficulties which I have been put to by the misconduct of all the Spanish ships and vessels of war which I have had to communicate with upon the coast, with exception of the Astrea frigate and the Paloma corvette. In the others I have seen neither courage to oppose the enemy nor humanity to alleviate the distresses of their countrymen.—'I have heard also that the Algeiras, which lately arrived at Arenas, has landed the stores and ammunition, with which she was charged, at the risk of their falling into the hands of the enemy, and has quitted the station!'

## SECTION IV.

*Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew.**' July 12, 1811.*

' General Milans is collecting a mixture of troops, consisting of those who have escaped the enemy.'

' He speaks loudly of his indifference to a command, while he boasts that if he were captain-general he would raise forty thousand men and clear the country of the enemy! But in the midst of this disgusting rodomontade it is not difficult to see that self-interest is the main-spring of all his actions, and that instead of raising an army he is more likely, by the system he has adopted, to shake the stability of that which is still left for the defence of the principality.'

*Captain Codrington to sir H. Wellesley.**' September 1, 1811.*

' The affair of general Milans' (namely, the sending of corn to Barcelona under his passport) 'which I mentioned to you in my last private letter, is still involved in mystery, which I hope however to penetrate upon my return to Arens de Mar. The Mataro papers reported that two soldiers were shot and a serjeant flogged at Arena for suffering corn to pass their guard at Mongat on its way to Barcelona. The *fact* of the punishment is I believe truly stated, but the *cause* no less falsely, entirely as I suspect with the view of terminating my investigation into this nefarious traffic. General Lacy, instead of answering my letter, refers me by word of mouth to the junta, and the deputation from the junta, who went to Mataro (as they assured me) purposely to investigate the business, now tell me that it is an affair purely military, and refer me to general Milans himself.'

## SECTION V.

*Extract from a minute made by captain Codrington.**' Mattaro, July 6, 1811.*

' Colonel O'Ronan, aid-du-camp to the marquis of Campo Verde, arrived, and informed me that he came from the marquis, who was on his march to this town or Arens, for the purpose of embarking all the infantry not Catalans, and the whole of the remaining cavalry, leaving the horses on the beach. Colonel O'Ronan said this determination was the result of a junta, composed of the marquis, general St. Juan, general Caro, general Miranda, the general of artillery, brigadier Santa Cruz, Volasco, and Sarsfield; that after the thing had been proposed and discussed a long time, Sarsfield was the first to give his vote, that he rose from his seat and said, 'any officer who could give such an opinion must be a traitor to his country, and that he and his division would stand or fall with the principality.' Every other officer was of a contrary opinion, except the marquis (it afterwards appeared that Santa Cruz also supported Sarsfield), who

thought with Sarsfield, and yet it seems he allowed himself to be led on by the other generals. *In short, it appears he was resolved to abandon the principality.*

'I told him, without hesitation, that to embark the Valencians I felt a duty to general O'Donnel, to the kingdom of Valencia, and to the whole nation, but that I felt it equally my duty upon no account to embark the army of Catalonia, and thus become a party concerned in the abandonment of a province I had been sent to protect.'—'The colonel, who could not venture on shore again lest he should be murdered by the inhabitants of Mattaro, for having been the bearer of a commission to arrest brigadier Milans about a month ago, sent to the marquis my answer.'

*Extract from a minute of information given by the baron d'Eroles.*

*'July 9, 1811.*

'The baron d'Eroles was appointed captain-general of Catalonia by the junta of general officers, of which the marquis of Campo Verde was president, and by the voice of the people. His reply was, that so long as the army continued in the principality, and that there was a senior general officer, he would not admit it, but that the moment the army passed the frontier (it was then at Agramunt, in full march to Aragon), he would accept the command, unmindful of the dreadful situation in which he should place himself, but he would do so in order to continue the struggle, and to prevent anarchy and confusion. In this state things were when general Lacy arrived. The baron instantly sought him, could not find, but met one of his aid-du-camps, by whom he wrote to him to say what had occurred, but that he was resolved to support general Lacy in his command, not only with all his local influence, but by his personal exertions, and that he would immediately join him to put this resolution in practice.'

*Extract from general Doyle's letter after seeing the above.*

'The Valencian division, that is to say, two thousand four hundred of the four thousand three hundred soldiers who disembarked in this province, are now on board to return to Valencia. General Miranda says the desertion took place in consequence of the marquis's determination to proceed to Aragon, which made them believe they would not be embarked. In short, most disgraceful has been the conduct of this division, and the marquis, as you will see by this letter to me, attaches to it no small portion of blame.'

*Captain Codrington to the marquis of Campo Verde.*

*'Blake, July 5, 1811.*

'I have to remind you that by ordering the Valencian division out of Taragona, in breach of the terms by which I bound myself when I brought them, you yourself broke the pledge given by me, and dissolved the contract.'



*Extracted from captain Codrington's papers.*

'Minute of a conference betwixt generals Caro and Miranda with general Doyle and myself this day.

*July 9, 1811.*

'About eight o'clock generals Caro and Miranda came on board the *Blake*. After being seated in the cabin with general Doyle and myself, general Caro begged general Doyle would explain to me, that they were come in consequence of my promise, to request I would embark the division of Valencian troops which I had brought from Peniscola. I desired to know what promise general Caro understood me to have made? He answered, that I would take the above troops back to Valencia. I denied positively that I had made any promise to re-embark them if they should ever join the marquis of Campo Verde, although I had deeply pledged myself to restore them to general O'Donnel if they joined in a sortie from the garrison, which I was very confident would be decisive of its success. I then referred general Miranda to a similar explanation, which I gave to him, through general Doyle, on the day after our quitting Peniscola, when he had said he was ordered, both by his written instructions and by verbal explanation from general O'Donnel, not to land within the garrison. General Miranda instantly repeated that so he was; upon which general Doyle, to whom he had shown those instructions jointly with myself, after leaving Taragona for Villa Nueva, when under a difficulty as to how he should proceed, referred him to them again, when it appearing that he was therein positively ordered '*desembarcar en la plaza de Taragona*,' general Doyle stopped.

'General Miranda. 'Ah! but read on.'

'General Doyle. 'No, sir, there is the positive proof of your receiving such an order.'

'General Miranda. 'Well, but read on.'

'General Doyle. 'No, sir. This (*pointing to the paper*) is the positive proof of your receiving such an order, which we wanted to establish, because you positively denied it.'

'Upon this general Caro, shrugging up his shoulders, said, 'He was not aware of there being any such order.' And general Miranda again requested general Doyle would read on.

'General Doyle. 'For what purpose?'

'General Miranda. 'To prove that I was not to shut myself up with the division in the plaza de Taragona.'

'General Doyle. 'There is no occasion, sir, for any proof of that, for it was a part of the very stipulation made by captain Codrington when he strongly pledged himself to general O'Donnel.'

'General Doyle continued,—'And now, general Caro, that we have proved to you that general Miranda *had* orders to land in Taragona, and that captain Codrington is bound by no such promise as you had imagined, I must inform you that he has been

eight days upon the coast with all the ships of war and transports which are wanted for other services, for the sole purpose of embarking these troops; and he desires me to add that in consideration of what is due to the liberal and exemplary assistance afforded by general O'Donnell and Valencia in aid of Taragona, but not at all on account of any pledge he has been said to have given, that he will use the same exertion in re-embarking and restoring the troops which he would have done if so bound by his word of honour."

• *Mr. Wellesley to lord Wellesley.*

*July 28, 1811.*

'The morning of the 30th of June, a few hours after the arrival of the British squadron and Spanish vessels in the roadstead of Villa Nueva, five thousand French infantry and five hundred cavalry surprised the place by a night march, and seized all the property of Taragona, which had been sent there before the siege. Twenty-five thousand dollars for each of the next three months was demanded, but no violence or plunder allowed. Eroles narrowly escaped. Lacy, appointed to command in Catalonia, arrived 1st July at Villa Nueva, the 6th went to Ingalada to join Campo Verde.'

'Desertion in the army at Mattaro has been carried to a most alarming extent since the fall of Taragona; the first night fifteen hundred men disappeared, nearly three hundred cavalry had likewise set off towards Aragon; and these desertions are to be attributed to the gross neglect and want of activity on the part of the officers.'—'The only division that keeps together in any tolerable order is that of general Sarsfield, of about two thousand men.'—'He had however disputes with Eroles, and the people called for the latter to lead them.'

## NO. IX.

### SECTION I.

#### POLITICAL STATE OF KING JOSEPH.

##### SPANISH MINISTER'S COMPLAINTS OF THE FRENCH GENERAL

*From the councillor of state, Mariano Luis Orquijo, to king Joseph.*

*Madrid, 22 Juillet, 1810.*

'SIRE.—Le commissaire royal de Cordoue me mande, que le duc de Dalmatie lui a fait écrire officiellement de ne remettre aucune somme d'argent à la capitale lors même que le ministre des finances le demanderait, jusqu'à ce que les dépenses de l'armée des regimens qu'on lève et des employés de la province, &c., furent pleinement couverts, et que le duc prendrait les mesures convenables, dans le cas que cette détermination ne fut pas suivie.'

*' Madrid, 3 Agosto de 1810.*

'Le général Sebastiani a fait voir au commissaire royal à Grenade, un ordre du duc de Dalmatie, qui lui enjoint de la manière la plus expresse, de le mettre en état d'arrestation si pour le 1<sup>er</sup> Août lui et le préfet de Malaga ne mettent au pouvoir de Sebastiani quatre millions de réaux. L'exorbitance de cette somme, pour une province qui a déjà payé son contingent, et le court terme de huit jours désigné pour le payement, donnent à croire que cette somme une fois livrée on en demandera une plus forte. Selon toutes les apparences et d'après les conversations particulières, il s'agit de profiter de l'absence du roi pour mettre les Andalouses sur le même pied que les provinces de Biscaye, Burgos, &c. Il se peut néanmoins qu'on ait voulu inspirer ces craintes dans des idées tout-à-fait différentes. Quoiqu'il en soit il serait scandaleux de voir un commissaire qui représente la personne du roi arrêté dans une de ses provinces.'

*From Mariano Luis Orquijo to king Joseph.*

*' Madrid, 7 Août, 1810.*

'Monsieur d'Aranza m'écrit en date du 22 Août dans une lettre particulière les paroles suivantes, en les soulignant pour mieux fixer l'attention: *' Le maréchal Soult est très content, mais il ne fera usage de son autorité que pour le bien: il aime le roi et la nation: ce pays lui plait beaucoup.'*

*Ditto to ditto.*

*' Madrid, 13 Août, 1810.*

'Parmi les lettres que m'a porté le courrier d'Andalousie arrivé hier, j'en remarque une de Monsieur Aranza écrite dans un style étudié et que je soupçonne rédigée d'accord avec le duc de Dalmatie. C'est un panégyrique à la louange de ce maréchal dans lequel monsieur d'Aranza porte aux nues l'intelligence et le zèle du duc de Dalmatie dans la partie administrative; la considération qu'il donne aux autorités Espagnoles; son extrême adresse à manier les esprits, et l'habileté de ses dispositions militaires, dans un pays couvert d'insurgés. M. d'Aranza termine en formant le vœu que le maréchal ne soit aucunement troublé dans l'exécution de ses plans, et que le sort de l'Andalousie soit mis entièrement à sa discrétion.'

*Ditto to ditto.*

*' Madrid, le 23 Août, 1810.*

'Par ma correspondance avec l'Andalousie j'ai appris; de Cordone: que M. Angulo a reçu les lettres qui l'appellent à Madrid, et qu'il se dispose à suivre le grand convoi sorti de Seville le 11 du courant. De Seville: qu'un corsaire Français s'étant emparé d'un paquebot qui allait de Cadix à Alicante, on y avait trouvé entr'autres dépêches une lettre de Campmany, grand partisan des Anglais, et un des Coryphées de la révolution. Il avouait à son ami, don Anselmo Rodriguez de Ribas, intendant de l'armée du centre, qui s'était plaint à lui des excès que com-

mettaient certaines juntas, que Cadiz n'offrait pas un spectacle moins digne de pitié: que les Anglais qu'il avait appris à connaître s'arrogaient peu à peu toute l'autorité: que le commerce libre accordé aux ports d'Amerique excitait à Cadiz un mécontentement général, et que Venegas allait au Mexique en qualité de viceroy: il parle en outre de l'arrestation de plusieurs personnes connues, et de la deconsidération dans laquelle est tombée la regence.'

*From Mariano Luis Orquijo to king Joseph.*

*'Madrid, 27 Septembre, 1810.*

'Le maréchal Victor permet le passage à beaucoup de femmes qui veulent se réunir à leurs maris, les femmes en contant les choses telles qu'elles sont, détruisent bien des erreurs dans lesquelles on a généralement été entraîné par le gouvernement actuel.\* L'ennemi permit ces jours derniers l'entrée dans l'île à plusieurs femmes qui voulaient passer par Chiclanes pour se réunir à leurs parents, mais dernièrement elles furent contenues à coups de canon, et un boulet emporta la tête de celui qui les accompagnait. Le gouvernement Anglais preside à toutes les opérations, et craint cette espèce de communications.'

*'Valladolid, le 11 Août, 1810.*

'SIRE,—Je suis arrivé à Valladolid, où je n'ai pas trouvé le général Kellermann. Il paraît que les Espagnols ont cerné un détachement de Français qui se trouve à la Puebla de Senabria, et que ce général y est allé pour le débloquer. Les guerrilles ont été hier aux portes de Valladolid, et il y a cinq à six jours que soixante-dix Français ont été détruits à Villalon; la terreur s'est emparée de tous les esprits, et l'on croit que trois cents hommes ne suffisent pas pour faire passer un courrier: malgré cela, je partirai demain, escorté par deux cents hommes avec un convoi de prisonniers de Ciudad Rodrigo, donc le nombre n'est pas considérable, parcequ'ici on leur accorde la liberté moyennant une somme qu'on règle avec le général Kellermann pour les frais de la guerre.

'Toutes les autorités du pays sont venues me visiter, et me consulter sur la conduite qu'elles doivent tenir depuis les derniers ordres du général Kellermann pour qu'elles n'obéissent ni ne correspondent avec d'autre autorité que la sienne. C'est la chancellerie qui se trouve plus embarrassée que toute autre, parcequ'elle ne peut concilier l'administration de la justice au nom de votre majesté avec l'impossibilité de correspondre avec son ministre.

'Je n'ai pas reçu le moindre égard du général Dufrene qui est à la place du général Kellermann. Il ne m'a pas visité, ni même accordé un factionnaire; tout le monde s'en est aperçu, et cette conduite a confirmé l'opinion que l'on a conçue que votre majesté ne règne point dans ce pays. J'ai tâché de détruire une idée qui décourage les véritables sujets de votre majesté, et soutient les espérances de ses ennemis. Les généraux ne s'apper-

çoivent pas du mal qu'ils produisent en faisant croire que le service de l'empereur, et ses intérêts peuvent être en contradiction avec ceux de votre majesté.

'Si le général Dufrene s'était borné à ne rien faire pour faciliter mon voyage, j'aurais moins de motifs de plainte contre lui, mais il a retenu l'escorte de cavalerie que le général Tilly m'avait donnée. De toutes les manières, sire, je ferai tout ce qui sera en mon pouvoir pour accélérer mon voyage, et répondre à la confiance avec laquelle votre majesté a daigné me distinguer.

'LE MARQUIS ALMENABA.'

*Orquijo to Joseph, relating his conference with the French ambassador.*

[Extract.]

'Madrid, Août 22, 1810.

'Je lui dis de s'adresser sur ces deux points au ministre des relations extérieures, il me répondit qu'un désagrément qu'on éprouvait avec lui était l'obligation de lui donner à tout bout de champ des notes écrites, qu'à Vittoria il l'avait compromis en présentant à votre majesté ces notes comme officielles, que le bon vieux duc (ce sont ses propres expressions) étourdissait dans l'instant, qu'il n'entendait point, ou ne voulait point entendre ce qu'on lui disait, et qu'il demandait qu'on lui donnât par écrit ce qui n'était pas nécessaire d'écrire. Je lui répétais toujours qu'il devait s'adresser au duc puisque c'était le seul canal par lequel il devait diriger ses demandes, que je ne me mêlais point de ces affaires, et que je n'en entretiendrais votre majesté à moins que votre majesté ne m'en parlat la première, mais comme simple particulier je l'assurai de l'inviolabilité des promesses de votre majesté et de ses idées libérales. L'ambassadeur ajouta que dans la matinée du jour de St. Napoleon, et les jours suivants, le général Belliard, Borelli, et leurs alentours avaient parlé fort mal des expressions de votre majesté sur ses premiers devoirs, et qu'il ne doutait pas qu'ils n'en eussent écrit à Paris; qu'il n'avait pas pu se dispenser de transmettre à sa cour ces paroles; mais qu'il les avait présentées comme une conséquence du premier discours tenu par votre majesté et une nuance nécessaire pour adoucir le mauvais effet qu'avait produit ici l'article du Moniteur sur les mots de l'empereur au duc de Berg. Je le lui avais présenté de cette manière en sortant de l'appartement de votre majesté, et je lui montrai en même temps un rapport venu de la Navarre dans lequel on dépeignait le fâcheux état de ce royaume en proie aux excès des bandes de brigands et aux dilapidations des gouvernemens militaires. Si l'ambassadeur a écrit dans ces termes comme il me l'a dit, autant par honneur que par attachement à votre majesté, à son pays et au notre, il a bien rempli ses devoirs. Quoiqu'il en soit, je me suis cru obligé de donner connaissance à votre majesté de ces faits ainsi que de la surprise que, selon l'ambassadeur, a causé à l'empereur et au

ministère Français le silence du duc de Santa Fé qui ne s'explique sur rien. L'ambassadeur se plaint d'avoir été compromis par lui, car à sa demande et en conséquence des conversations fréquentes qu'il eut avec lui pendant les trois jours qu'il passa à Madrid, il écrivit à sa cour que le duc de Santa Fé était chargé de négocier sur la situation de votre majesté et celle de notre pays, que l'ambassadeur lui-même disait ne pouvoir pas durer. C'est à la lettre ce que c'est dit entre l'ambassadeur et moi, &c. &c.

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*Orquijo to Joseph.*

*' Madrid, le 13 Novembre, 1810.*

' Monsieur Percyra a reçu du maréchal Soult une réponse extrêmement aigre. Ce commissaire royal persiste dans son opinion que les mesures indignées par le duc de Dalmatie pour l'approvisionnement de l'armée ne rempliront pas le but qu'il se propose; mais le maréchal veut être obéi. D'un autre côté le général Sebastiani l'a contraint à lui donner onze cent mille réaux. Placé entre ces deux écueils, Monsieur Percyra a perdu courage et demande à votre majesté de le rappeler à Madrid. Le général Dufour a pris le commandement de Grenade.

*' MARIANO LUIS DE ORQUIJO.'*

*Ditto to ditto.*

*' Madrid, 19 de Decembre, 1810.*

' Monsieur le comte de Montarco était le 11 courant à Manzanares, il m'écrivit que les habitans de la Manche se plaignent de ce que les troupes qui retrouvent dans la province ne les protègent pas autant que leur nombre le leur permet, que les brigands viennent leur enlever leurs grains pour les transporter dans les royaumes de Valence et de Murcie, ou dans l'Estremadoure. Ils craignent une disette et désirent ardemment qu'il se forme de grands dépôts de grains dans des places à l'abri des incursions des partis d'insurgés. Les commandants des troupes Françaises sont d'une exigence et d'une hauteur insupportables, et les rapports faits au comte de Montarco par toutes les autorités légales du pays confirment complètement ceux que l'intendant de la Manche ne cesse de faire aux divers ministères depuis plusieurs mois.'

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*' Madrid, le 15 Février, 1811.*

' SIRE.—Le préfet de Santander me remèt, en dâto du 16 Janvier, copie des offices qu'il a reçus pour la réunion de cette province au gouvernement militaire de Biscaye. J'ai l'honneur de les mettre sous les yeux de votre majesté en lui observant que cette mesure a été pris sur la proposition du général Caffarelli.

' On a demandé au préfet de Santander un état des employés civils et militaires, des moines, du clergé, et des appointemens dont ils jouissent. Il croit en conséquence que des attributions ainsi que celles des employés seront nulles dès que la province sera gouvernée à l'instar de celle de Biscaye. Il ajoute que lui

et les chefs principaux de l'administration sont décidés à ne travailler que sous les ordres de votre majesté et demandent avec instance que votre majesté ne les abandonne pas.

‘Le sous-préfet de Logrogne me dit en date du 22 Janvier que l'opinion publique s'est améliorée depuis qu'on y a appris les nouvelles du Portugal, et qu'on y connaît le peu de moyens de défense qu'offre Valence dans le désordre extrême qui y règne. La Rioja ne renferme plus de bandes complètes d'insurgés, mais on y trouve encore quelques brigands épars et des voleurs de grands chemins.

‘MARIANO LUIS DE ORQUIJO.’

## SECTION II.

### (RELATING TO JOSEPH'S ABDICATION.)

#### *Vindication of the king.*

*Le ministre secrétaire d'état à monsieur le duc de Santa Fé, et en son absence à monsieur le marquis d'Almenara.*

*Palais de Madrid, le 12 Septembre, 1810, Pars.*

EXCELLENCE,—Le courrier de cabinet, Don Martin Estenoz, qui partit de Paris le 22 Juillet, a remis les lettres écrites par V. E. le même jour et les copies de celles que vous envoyâtes le 19 Juin par le courrier Alvarez, qui furent interceptées. Le roi les a lues avec la plus grande attention, et après s'être bien pénétré des communications faites à V. E. au nom de l'empereur, par monsieur le duc de Cadore, et les observations particulières de ce ministre, S. M. desirant détruire d'un seul trait, les craintes et la défiance que des personnes, tout au moins mal instruites, se sont efforcées d'inspirer, m'a ordonné d'entrer en explication sur tous les points dont elles traitent. Mais je dois avant tout faire connaître à V. E. que le roi s'est montré satisfait de la juste interprétation donnée à ses idées, et à ses sentimens dans la réponse que V. E. a faite au duc de Cadore, relativement à la protection dont S. M. I. désire que le commerce Français jouisse dans les réglemens des douanes, en offrant d'assurer une faveur réciproque dans ses états aux productions d'Espagne. L'empereur ne peut ignorer les vues liberales de son auguste frère, et si S. M. I. a été exactement informée sur ce point, elle saura que, dès son avènement au trône, le roi a écarté bien des obstacles opposés à l'industrie Française qu'il s'agit de favoriser encore par de nouvelles dispositions.

Il est bien douloureux pour le roi d'avoir à se justifier de plusieurs imputations auxquelles on a dû croire puisqu'on les a communiquées à V. E. L'une d'elles est que le roi a rendu à leurs propriétaires, ou disposé à son gré, d'une partie des biens confisqués par l'empereur. Cela supposerait de la part de S. M. un oubli de la parole donnée à l'empereur de ne se mêler en aucune manière de ces confiscations: mais c'est un infame imposture, et son auteur mérite un chatiment exemplaire. Qu'on cite une propriété un pouce de terrain confisqué par l'empereur, et

dont on ait disposé: on ne le pourra point si dans une pure question de fait on en impose ainsi à l'empereur, que sera ce lorsqu'on ne parle que par conjectures et présomption? Le roi porte à un si haut degré son respect pour les décrets de confiscations de S. M. I. qu'ayant besoin d'un des édifices qui y sont compris pour y placer des établissemens publics, il n'a même pas voulu s'en servir provisoirement. S. M. n'a-t-elle pas, en conséquence, le droit de réclamer, pour son honneur, la punition de ses detracteurs? S. M. I. s'est expliquée sur la direction donnée à la guerre, et la manière dont elle a été faite.

L'empereur écrivit au roi pour lui représenter la lenteur des opérations, et l'inaction des armées. Aussitôt S. M. entreprit la conquête de l'Andalousie. Le duc de Cadore a dit à V. E. que la soumission de cette province était illusoire, puisqu'elle se trouve inondée de partis d'insurgés et de bandes de brigands. Qu'on considère la vaste étendue de l'Andalousie: le petit nombre de troupes Françaises que l'obstination de Cadix permet d'y repandre: les pièges de toute espèce que tendent les Anglais et leurs continuelles attaques: qu'on parcoure l'histoire de toutes les guerres contre l'Angleterre et l'on verra qu'indépendamment des vingt mille Espagnols constamment stationnés à St. Rocq. il était encore nécessaire d'entretenir sur cette côté un nombre considérable de troupes pour les opposer aux entreprises partielles de l'ennemi. Si ces précautions étaient indispensables dans un tems de calme et de tranquillité, qu'elles doivent être les espérances et les moyens de l'Angleterre dans l'agitation actuelle de l'Espagne et la nature de la guerre dont elle est le théâtre? Le roi peut dire avec vérité, que la conquête militaire et morale de l'Andalousie est son ouvrage, et que ses paroles, sa conduite, et les sages mesures qu'il a prises, ont préparé la tranquillité dont elle jouit. S. M. y a organisé des gardes civiques chargées de défendre leurs foyers, et malgré le voisinage de cette province avec l'Estremadure et les instigations continuelles de la junte de Cadix et des Anglais, l'Andalousie renferme beaucoup moins de partis ou de bandes d'insurgés que la Castille, la Biscaye, et la Navarre, qui ont été placés sous le régime militaire. Enfin l'on trouve en Andalousie une organisation complète de compagnies de miguelettes qui veillent à la tranquillité des villes et à la sûreté des chemins. Leurs services sont tellement utiles que le maréchal duc de Dalmatie a donné le plus de développement possible à cette institution.

Si l'Andalousie n'est pas entièrement pacifiée, si la junte de Cadix existe encore, et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale influence, on doit l'attribuer en grande partie aux machinations et aux trahisons ourdies par la junte et l'Angleterre au moment où parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Février qui établit des gouvernemens militaires dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l'Arragon, et la Catalogne. Quelques gouverneurs Français ayant traité ces provinces comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie, les membres de la junte de Cadix et les Anglais en profitèrent pour souffler de nouveau le feu de la discorde et



refuter les expressions du roi qui répétait sans cesse, 'Que la nation conserverait son intégrité et son indépendance: que ses institutions s'amélioreraient sous la protection d'un trône soutenu par les relations intimes du roi avec l'empereur; qu'elle n'aurait à combattre que l'ennemi qui voulait s'arroger l'empire exclusif des mers.' Voilà le sens qu'on a toujours donné en Espagne aux mots indépendance et intégrité. Ce langage est celui dont s'est servi S. M. I. non seulement avec les Espagnols, mais à la face de l'univers: il ne peut donc être odieux ni criminel dans la bouche du roi. Mais combien n'est-il pas démenti par la conduite de certains gouverneurs qui paraissent s'obstiner à prolonger l'insurrection d'Espagne, à l'annihiler ou la détruire plutôt qu'à la soumettre! car dans plusieurs endroits on ne se contente pas d'exclure toute idée de l'autorité du roi en faisant administrer la justice au nom de l'empereur, mais ce qui est pire, on a exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Valencia prêtassent serment de fidélité et d'obéissance à S. M. I. comme si la nation Espagnole n'avait pas de roi.

Monsieur le duc de Cadore se plaint de l'indulgence dont on en a usé en Andalousie; S. M. a montré contre ses ennemis, dans les champs de Talavera et Ocaña, toute la fermeté de son caractère; mais serait-il juste, conviendrait-il à ses intérêts et aux vues de l'empereur, que S. M. deployât de la rigueur contre des vaincus, des prisonniers qui doivent être ses sujets? Si le maréchal Ney eut suivi ce généreux exemple dans les villes de Galice où il fut reçu à bras ouverts, et n'eut pas au contraire opprimé et saccagé cette province, elle serait heureuse et soumise, et non livrée aux maux de l'insurrection comme tant d'autres à qui l'on a fait éprouver le même sort. Cette conduite de S. M. dans des pays soumis est vraisemblablement ce que le duc Cadore appelle des grâces accordées aux insurgés de préférence aux personnes attachées à la cause du roi. Les insurgés n'ont obtenu d'autres grâces que celles qui leur furent offertes dans les proclamations pour dissiper l'erreur dans laquelle les Anglais les avaient induits. Si le sequestre mis sur les biens invenus de quelques habitans ou réfugiés, a été levé postérieurement, cet exemple d'indulgence a eu d'heureux résultats, puisqu'il a attiré un grand nombre de personnes à l'obéissance du roi: et qu'on ne croie pas que ces individus n'aient point subi le châtiment qui leur était dû pour le retard qu'ils ont mis à se soumettre, car s'ils possédaient des billets royaux, il les ont perdues pour ne les avoir pas présentés à tems au timbre sec; et s'ils sont porteurs d'autres titres de créances sur l'état, ils doivent, pour les valider, solliciter un décret particulier.

Les avantages de la formation des corps Espagnols sont à la portée de tout le monde: leur présence a influé plus qu'on ne pense sur l'heureuse issue de la bataille d'Ocaña et de l'expédition d'Andalousie. En y admettant un grand nombre d'officiers, on est parvenu à éloigner de l'insurrection des hommes inquiets qui seraient devenus chefs de brigands, et tout en avouant que la désertion a eu lieu parmi les soldats, et qu'il en est résulté quel-

ques maux, on peut hardiment affirmer que la somme des biens est infiniment plus grande, et qu'il n'y a pas de moyens qu'on ne doive employer pour faire revenir de son égarement une nation de douze millions d'âmes qu'il n'est pas facile d'assujettir par la force des bayonnettes, et dont on veut d'ailleurs faire une amie et une alliée.

On a parlé du mauvais emploi des ressources de l'Espagne, et du dénuement dans lequel ont été laissées les troupes Françaises. Les soldats ont eu en Espagne des vivres en abondance : les hôpitaux Français ont été les mieux pourvus, il a fallu pour cela exiger des contributions extraordinaires et des emprunts forcés, et vaincre le grand obstacle de l'interception des communications de province à province, et souvent de ville à ville. L'Espagne se trouve divisé en gouvernemens militaires de sorte que S. M. est à peine maître de la capitale et de sa banlieue : n'est ce donc point par une espèce de miracle qu'elle y fait subsister des troupes, et qu'elle y soutient des hôpitaux. Les gouverneurs Français imposent, il est vrai, des contributions extraordinaires sur leurs provinces, mais ils les vexent et les ruinent, et certes ce n'est pas là le moyen de les maintenir dans l'obéissance, ni un exemple bien attrayant pour les provinces soulevées : cette ressource est d'ailleurs précaire et insuffisante comme le prouvera bientôt l'expérience. S. M. se flatte de ce que les intentions de l'empereur en faveur de la nation seraient mieux remplies et ses troupes mieux dirigées, si toutes celles qui sont en Espagne étaient sous ses ordres, et si les propositions qu'il a faites à son auguste frère étaient acceptées. Le duc de Cadore a évalué à plusieurs millions les confiscations des marchandises Anglaises, et l'enlèvement de l'argenterie des églises et des couvents qu'on aurait dû faire en Andalousie. Les confiscations eurent lieu par ordre des généraux Français à leur entrée dans chaque ville, et si leur valeur fut exagérée, dans le principe, pour donner plus d'éclat aux entreprises militaires, on reconnut dès qu'on en vint à l'examen l'erreur dans laquelle on était tombé ; et dans le fait comment ne pas appercevoir qu'après la bataille d'Ocaña l'invasion d'Andalousie devant être prévue, chacun avait grand soin de faire refluer les marchandises confiscables sur les points les plus capables de resistance, afin de les mettre hors de la portée du vainqueur. L'argenterie d'église a beaucoup d'apparence et fort peu de valeur. On a pris dans les couvents, où il en restait très peu, ainsi que dans les églises toute celle qui n'a pas été jugée nécessaire pour la decence du culte, et comme le roi ne voulait ni ravager ni détruire, mais bien pacifier et conserver, il a dû régler sa conduite sur ce principe.

Monsieur le duc de Cadore parle de dépenses, c'est vraiment une fatalité qu'il soit si mal informé de faits généralement connus. Le trésor public est ouvert à quiconque voudra s'assurer de la vérité. On y verra que S. M. a reçu à peine chaque mois le cinquième de l'assignation de la liste civile : qu'il a dû se réduire à la plus strict économie, et que non seulement il s'est vu forcé de pouvoir donner aux acteurs une légère avance, dans l'obliga-

tion de supprimer le théâtre Italien qui était son unique délassement, mais encore de vendre sa vaisselle platte, et de se défaire des choses les plus nécessaires à l'ornement de sa cour. Aussi dans le repas que S. M. donna, à l'occasion de la fête de l'empereur, à ses ministres, aux grands officiers de la couronne, et à l'ambassadeur de France, la table fut elle servie en fayence semblable à celle qu'avait S. M. au camp de Boulogne. Certainement l'embarras et la confusion que cette excessive simplicité causait au roi n'aura pas échappé à l'ambassadeur. Au milieu de tant de privations, et dans une situation aussi contraire à sa dignité S. M. a la douleur de voir que ses ministres, le conseil d'état, les tribunaux de la capitale, et les employés civils, qui sont en petit nombre, ne perçoivent pas leur traitement depuis plus de sept mois. Ce sont là les faveurs que S. M. a dispensés avec tant de prodigalité. Le roi a donné, il est vrai, quelques cédules aux officiers de sa maison, et à quelques individus attachés à sa personne, pour les aider à acheter des biens nationaux: on donne à ces bienfaits le nom de prodigalité, et d'un autre côté l'on se plaint de l'abandon dans lequel S. M. laisse d'autres individus, ce qui serait incompatible avec la façon de penser du roi et la connaissances de ses devoirs comme homme et comme monarque. C'est l'unique chose dont le roi puisse disposer dans la situation où il se trouve et outre le but politique de ces donations, S. M. a cru que c'était le seul moyen d'assurer à ces individus une médiocre existence, et encore sa prévoyance à cet égard a-t-elle été trompée, car les revenus des terres et des biens qui se trouvent dans les personnes soumises au gouvernement militaire dont les limites s'étendent jusqu'aux portes de Madrid, où ne se payent pas, tant est grande la misère des fermiers, où les biens ne s'afferment pas de crainte d'extorsions de la part des gouverneurs, où, enfin, les revenus se trouvent absorbés par les contributions extraordinaires. Les faits sont évidens, ils parlent d'eux-mêmes, et toute personne impartiale peut en faire l'examen.

Mais il faut qu'elle soit de meilleure foi que celle qui a voulu imputer à S. M. l'aliénation des biens confisqués par l'empereur, et les griefs auxquels on vient de répondre. S. M. pourrait, à bien plus juste titre, se plaindre de la conduite des gouverneurs Français: de celle du général Dufour, par exemple, qui a exigé des dix membres dont il composa à sa manière ce conseil de Navarre qu'on s'est vu bientôt obligé de dissoudre, qu'ils rédigeassent une adresse à l'empereur dans laquelle ils demandaient à S. M. I. un code des lois, et se mettaient à sa discrétion. Trois de ces membres refusèrent de signer, les autres cédèrent à la violence. S. M. pourrait citer encore une foule d'actes qui ont exaspéré les esprits, fourni des armes à l'insurrection, et donné aux Anglais des prétextes pour supposer des projets qui n'existent pas, et rendre la guerre interminable. Qu'on compte le nombre des bandes de brigands et d'insurgés en Espagne, et l'on verra combien il s'est accru depuis l'institution des gouvernemens militaires. S. M. ne peut elle se plaindre avec autant de

justice de la situation équivoque dans laquelle elle se trouve? qu'on en juge par le fait suivant. Le nouveau ministre de finances venait d'entrer en fonction, et il s'agissait déjà de réunir les plus forts capitalistes de la place pour les engager à avancer une bonne somme d'argent, lorsque le payeur de l'armée, Monsieur Crouchart, et l'intendant-général, Monsieur Denniers, assurèrent au ministre que des employés venaient de Paris avec des lettres cachetées qu'ils avaient l'ordre de n'ouvrir qu'à Madrid. On prétendit aussitôt qu'ils devaient se charger de l'administration civile, que les rentrées seraient invariablement affectées à l'entretien et à la solde de l'armée, et le surplus seulement, à la liste civile. C'était annoncer la dissolution de l'état. Des bruits de cette nature répandus dans toute la ville par les employés Français parvenus à la connaissance de l'ambassadeur de S. M. I. et appuyés par des malveillans qui abondent toujours dans les capitales surtout à la suite des guerres d'opinions, ne pouvait produire que de malheureux effets. La confiance de ce petit nombre d'hommes qui aurait pu faire des avances s'éteignit à l'instant, et toutes les portes furent fermées. S. M. ignorait l'arrivée des nouveaux employés du trésor de France, et il n'a connu comme le dernier de ses sujets, le contenu des lettres dont ils étaient porteurs qu'à leurs ouvertures.

Dans cet état de choses il est facile de se faire l'idée de la confiance que peut inspirer le roi, et lorsque S. M. se trouve hors d'état de faire le bonheur du pays qu'il doit gouverner et de concourir à la réalisation des vœux de son auguste frère : qu'il voit enfin sa dignité avilée, doit-on s'étonner qu'il ait manifesté l'impossibilité de vivre plus long temps dans une situation aussi précaire? Monsieur le duc de Cadore tout en reconnaissant les hautes qualités du roi, a prétendu, que les personnes qui approchent S. M. lui ont conseillé et lui conseillent sans cesse de se maintenir dans l'indépendance de la France, et que ce principe se suivait avec trop de rigueur. Monsieur le duc de Cadore sait que S. M. dans aucune époque de sa longue et glorieuse carrière n'a eu besoin de conseils et ne s'est soumis à aucune influence, surtout s'il s'est agi de détruire son système inaltérable d'amitié sincère et éternelle avec son auguste frère l'empereur; d'alliance et de bienveillance affectueuse envers la nation Espagnole à la tête de laquelle il est placé, et dont il s'efforcera de conserver la splendeur et le bien-être, avec l'indépendance et l'intégrité de territoire. Les vœux les plus constants de son cœur sont que les deux nations unies entr'elles par les mêmes liens que leur monarques concourent d'une manière uniforme à la félicité commune en forçant leur ennemie à abandonner le sceptre des mers.

Le prince don Fernando, ajoute le duc de Cadore, se prêterait à céder les provinces qui conviennent à l'empereur et à toutes les conditions qu'il voudrait lui imposer. Le roi ne veut entrer en comparaison avec personne; mais il observera que ce ne fut pas dans ces sentimens ni dans cette croyance qu'il accepta la couronne d'Espagne en déposant celle de Naples: que l'empereur ni la France ne devraient avoir confiance en des offres que la nation

repousserait, et qui ne pourrait avoir d'ailleurs qu'une exécution passagère; car comme le sait très bien Monsieur le duc de Cadore, les nations humiliées dissimulent leur haine en attendant le moment favorable de venger leurs outrages. Une semblable conduite serait incompatible avec le façon de penser du roi, avec son noble caractère et celui de la nation que S. M. gouverne. Elle est diamétralement en opposition avec les assurances données par S. M. I. à la nation Espagnole 'qu'il était nécessaire pour son bonheur qu'elle se régénérât sous sa dynastie et sous le prince qu'elle lui donnait égal en tout à son auguste personne.' A cette occasion le duc de Cadore parle du peu d'avantages que rapporte à la France la guerre d'Espagne en proportion des sacrifices immenses qu'elle a faits. Certes le roi ne les ignore pas, et sa reconnaissance éclatera quand S. M. se trouvera en état de les récompenser. Dans ce moment cela lui est impossible; mais S. M. I. pourrait mettre le comble à ses bons offices en s'offrant pour garant de l'emprunt ouvert en Hollande sous les mêmes conditions que celui de Prusse, ou du moins en lui donnant son assentiment comme à celui d'Autriche. S. M. I. se convaincra facilement que les liens du sang, les relations les plus intimes et les plus sûres d'une étroite amitié entre les deux nations, et enfin la position même de ces armées seront les meilleurs garants de l'exactitude des remboursements quelques sacrifices qu'ils exigent.

Quant aux avantages futurs que promettent les sacrifices actuels de la France, ce serait faire injure aux lumières du duc de Cadore que de la fatiguer en les lui développant. Lorsque S. M. I. crut nécessaire l'établissement en Espagne de sa dynastie, l'expérience lui avait démontré que survenant des troubles dans le nord, il ne pouvait jamais compter sans ce changement, sur la sûreté d'une de plus importantes frontières de son empire. Un siècle d'amitié presque non interrompue depuis le règne en Espagne et en France de la maison de Bourbon, le pacte de famille et la tournure différente que prirent les relations entre les deux pays après l'exclusion de la maison d'Autriche, sont les témoignages les plus authentiques de l'utilité des efforts et des sacrifices de la France pendant six ans, au commencement du siècle dernier. La résistance opiniâtre de presque toute l'Europe et surtout celle de l'Angleterre, qu'elle renouvelle dans cette guerre avec un plus grand développement de moyens démontrent l'importance de cet événement pour la France. Ses meilleurs écrivains politiques ont indiqué avec la plus grande clarté les avantages qui en ont résulté pour le commerce Français et les richesses qu'il a procurées à la nation. Que ne doit elle pas attendre aujourd'hui de la réunion des deux couronnes dans la même famille, de l'analogie de leurs codes politiques et de leurs institutions, des qualités d'un roi sage et éclairé qui aime tendrement son auguste frère et la France, et qui est pénétré de la nécessité d'abattre l'orgueil de l'Angleterre! n'est ce pas le plus grand fruit qu'elle puisse retirer de cette résolution et de tels résultats ne valent ils pas les sacrifices momentanés qu'elle s'impose?

Il a été bien sensible pour S. M. que les rapports mensongers de personnes peu intéressées à l'union et à l'amitié des deux frères et des deux pays, ayant pu inspirer à S. M. I. un seul instant de doutes. Quoique le roi a déjà écrit à l'empereur son auguste frère, S. M. veut que V. E. ou en votre absence le marquis d'Almenara, remette une copie de cette lettre à Monsieur le duc de Cadore, dans l'espérance que V. E. développera à S. M. I. avec sa sagacité ordinaire les causes qui ont influé sur la conduite du roi dans les affaires d'Espagne, que S. E. lui depeindra l'état véritable de la nation, et qu'elle contribuera de cette manière à l'exécution des intentions des deux monarques qui n'ont été, et qui ne peuvent être que les mêmes.

Le ministre secrétaire d'état,  
(Signé) MARIANO LUIS D'ORQUIJO.

*Letters from king Joseph to his ministers.*

10 Février, 1811.

Je suis peiné que l'empereur ait cru nécessaire d'employer des formes diplomatiques avec moi et même avec la reine. Qu'il me fasse clairement connoître sa volonté et je n'aurai rien de plus agréable que de m'y conformer puisqu'elle ne peut être ni compatible avec mon honneur qui me paroît inséparable du sien, comme mon intérêt. Le fait est que je désire complaire, à la fois, à l'empereur et à mon frère; il m'a fait reconnoître roi de Naples, roi d'Espagne, et a garanti mon existence politique sans que je l'aie demandé. Je n'ai pas sollicité le trône; j'y suis monté parcequ'il l'a voulu; aujourd'hui l'empereur désire-t-il que je rentrais dans la retraite? Je suis d'autant plus prêt à le faire que les événemens de trois années ont levé bien des scrupules et empêcher venir bien des regrets.

J'ai dû croire que l'empereur vouloit que je quittasse l'Espagne dès que j'ai vu graduellement mon existence y devenir humiliant, impossible, et qu'il doit savoir que je ne puis pas supporter longtemps de me voir dégradé: dans ce cas je désire partir pour France. L'ordre public sera assuré ici, je m'entendrai avec mon frère, ou pour mieux dire je lui porterai moi-même mon blanc-seing.

Je m'abandonne entièrement à sa justice et à ses sentimens paternels pour ma famille, aussi point de négociations particulières; je retourne dès ce moment à l'empereur tous les droits qu'il m'a transmis sur l'Espagne si son ambassadeur juge que je puisse partir demain pour Morfontaine, et s'il eu autorise à croire que l'empereur verra ce parti sans déplaisir.

L'empereur veut-il réellement que je reste au trône d'Espagne? Je reste quelques que soient les désagrémens indépendant de la volonté qui m'y attendent. Mais il faut que je n'éprouve que ceux qu'il ne peut m'éviter; je le répète, jamais les intérêts politiques ne me diviseront avec lui, qu'il me fasse connoître sa volonté. Si l'empereur vient ici, tout s'arrangera entre nous; s'il ne vient pas en Espagne, qu'il me laisse aller le voir à Paris. S'il juge ce voyage inopportun, qu'il rende mon existence

tolerable pendant la guerre: il sait mieux que personne ce qu'il doit faire pour cela.

Il faut un changement marqué dans tout, avancer ou reculer, vous connoissez l'état actuel; j'ignore comment je pourrai gagner le mois nécessaire pour connoître la détermination de l'empereur.

(The following abdication, by Joseph, was drawn up but never made public.)

L'expérience de trois années nous ayant convaincu que l'ordre social ne peut être recomposé en Espagne qu'en cédant dans les mêmes mains les droits de souveraineté dont nous sommes investés, et les moyens de force et de puissance militaire dont dispose notre auguste frère l'empereur des Français, de qui nous tenons les droits que nous exerçons aujourd'hui sur la monarchie Espagnole, nous avons résolu de notre pleine et libre volonté de rétrocéder à notre frère l'empereur des Français les droits qu'il nous a remis et en vertu des quels nous sommes entré dans ce royaume en 1808 à la suite de la constitution que nous avons signée à Bayonne dans la même année.

C'est pourquoi par les présents signées de notre main nous déclarons céder, transporter, et remettre à notre dit frère l'empereur des Français, tous les droits qu'il nous transmis en 1808 sur la monarchie d'Espagne et des Indes dans tout leur intégrité et tels qu'il les reçut lui-même du roi Charles Quatre.

Nous entendons que la présente rétrocession n'ait de force et valeur que l'époque où nous aurons pleine et entière connoissance de l'acceptation de la présente rétrocession de la part de notre frère l'empereur des Français: et comme nous ne sommes portés à cet acte par aucune considération particulière, mais par l'unique considération que nous avons exprimée plus haut, et qu'en quittant le trône d'Espagne nous n'avons en vue que le plus grand bien du peuple Espagnol que nous ne pourrions pas rendre aussi heureux que nous voudrions, et que nous n'avons d'autre ambition que celle de rentrer dans la vie privée et dans la retraite la plus absolue. Nous nous abandonnons entièrement à la justice de notre frère l'empereur des Français pour le sort des personnes qui nous sont attachées au sentiment de la gloire qui garantit ses efforts pour le bonheur de l'Espagne et à ses sentimens paternels pour nos enfans, pour la reine, notre épouse, et pour nous.

Nous nous engagerons à faire revêtir de toutes les formes qui pourroient paroître plus authentiques le présent acte écrit, rédigé, et signé de notre propre main. Ayant jugé que le plus grand secret était indispensable jusqu'à ce que nous ayons connoissance de l'acceptation de S. M. l'empereur des Français, roi d'Italie.

Fait à Madrid, etc. etc.

*Paris, 1811.*

Depuis la conversation que j'ai eu avec vous sur ma position, elle ne s'est pas améliorée; elle est telle aujourd'hui que je me vois forcé d'embrasser le seul pratique qui me reste à prendre,

celui de la rétraite la plus absolue en France. Je serois déjà parti si je ne venois d'être instruit que S. M. l'empereur qui a su que j'avois donné ordre d'acheter ou de louer une terre a cent lieues de Paris, avoit disapprouvé cette démarche, et qu'il trouvoit plus convenable, si je persistois dans ma résolution, que je me rendisse à ma terre de Morfontaine après vous avoir prévenu de ma détermination, et avoir assuré ici l'ordre public après mon départ. Je dirai en partant que je vais m'entendre avec l'empereur pour les affaires d'Espagne, et je ferois les mêmes dispositions par rapport aux provinces qui entourent Madrid que je fit lorsqu'il y a un an je partis pour l'expédition d'Andalousie; cet état dura six mois sans nul désordre, et je ne doute pas que les choses n'aillent de la même manière et ne donnent le tems à l'empereur de prendre les dispositions définitives.

Je suis prêt à rendre l'empereur les droits qu'il me rémit à Bayonne sur la monarchie d'Espagne et des Indes si ma position ici ne change pas; parceque je dois croire que c'est le désir de l'empereur puisqu'il est impossible qu'il veuille que je reste roi d'Espagne, et qu'il m'ôte tous les moyens d'existence. Il en peut être malheureux que l'empereur ait voulu me reconnoître roi de Naples, il y a six ans lorsqu'à la tête de ses troupes je fis la conquête de ce royaume; ce fut malgré moi, et mes instances pour rester au commandement de son armée avec la simple qualité de son lieutenant furent le sujet d'une lettre dont je me rappelle très-bien.

Lorsqu'en 1808 je fus proclamé roi d'Espagne, je l'ignorois encore; cependant arrivé à Bayonne je fis tout ce que voulut l'empereur, je signerais une constitution, je le signai appuyée par sa garantie. Les événemens n'ayant pas répondu à nos espérances est ce ma faute? Est celui qui en est le plus victim qui doit en porter la peine? Cependant tant que la guerre dure je me suis soumis à tout ce que l'on a voulu, mais je ne puis pas l'impossible; je ne puis pas rester ici plus longtems si l'empereur ne vient à mon secours. En ordonnant qu'il soit versé dans mon trésor à Madrid un million de francs par mois, les autres provinces doivent contribuer aux besoins de la capitale. Les troupes Françaises qui sont dans les provinces du centre (elles sont peu nombreuses) doivent être soldées par le trésor de France.

A la pacification générale l'empereur exigera des indemnités; s'entendre alors il possède de fait presque toutes les provinces aujourd'hui, il sera bien le maître de ne les évacuer qu'à mesure qu'il croira que l'Espagne aura satisfait aux obligations qu'il lui aura imposées. En résumé je suis prêt à faire la volonté de l'empereur pourvu que je la connoisse.

1<sup>o</sup>. Veut-il que je reste roi d'Espagne, je reste dès qu'il m'en donne la possibilité, et je supporte tous les gouvernemens militaires qu'il a établis puisqu'il les croit indispensables pendant la guerre.

2<sup>o</sup>. Préféreroit-il que je rentrasse dans la sein de ma famille à Morfontaine d'abord et l'hiver dans le midi. Je suis prêt à partir



dès que je connoîtrai sa volonté. J'ajoute de plus que le parti de la retraite me conviendra beaucoup plus que l'autre dès que je saurai qu'il lui convient. Je suis sur alors qu'il aura quelques bontés pour les Français qui se sont attachés à mon sort, et que je ne serai pas à même de rendre aussi heureux qu'ils le méritent. Quant à moi, à la reine, et à mes enfans, l'empereur me faisant payer mon traitement de prince Français, nous en aurons assez, mon intention étant de vivre dans la retraite en m'occupant de l'éducation des mes enfans, laissant à l'empereur le soin de leur établissemens; car je ne doute pas si ce projet se vérifie que je ne retrouve le cœur de mon frère, et que dans les intervalles où il se rappellera qu'il est homme, il ne trouve encore quelque consolation en retrouvant mon cœur pour lui aussi jeune qu'il y a trente ans. Enfin j'aime mieux vivre sujet de l'empereur en France que de rester en Espagne roi nominal, parceque je serai bon sujet en France, et mauvais roi en Espagne, et que je veux rester digne de l'empereur, de la France, et de moi-même.

Note.—The bad French is in the original MSS.

*Marquis of Almenara to the minister secretary of state.*

*Translated from a deciphered Spanish letter.*

*'Fontainebleau, November 4, 1810.*

'This government is very uneasy about the military operations in Portugal, from whence they receive no accounts except through England, described therefore factitiously and with the strongest hopes of resisting the French forces that oppose their army. This problem will probably be already solved and its conclusion will decide what is interesting to Spain. It is therefore very important that our government should write all it knows, and what will prove that it takes part in what belongs to both countries; because here I am often asked what is said in Madrid on this subject, and people are surprised that we limit ourselves entirely to the urgent points of our negotiation. This explains the proofs of affection which the prince royal of Sweden desired that the king should give to the emperor, being convinced that the letters of his majesty, written in his own familiar style when he explains his sentiments, produce a great sensation with the emperor.'

### SECTION III.

*Letters from the prince de Neufchatel to king Joseph.*

*Paris, 28 Janvier, 1811.*

SIRE,—J'ai l'honneur de prévenir votre majesté que l'empereur par sa décision du 21 Janvier a fixé les traitemens extraordinaires qui pourront être payés en Espagne à date du 1<sup>er</sup> de l'année 1811, dans l'arrondissement des armées du midi, du

nord, de l'Arragon, &c. Ces traitemens sont déterminés ainsi qu'il suit—

*Savoir :*

Fr. par mois.

Les généraux gouverneurs dans les quatre gouvernemens	fr. par mois.
• comprises dans l'arrondissement de l'armée du nord . . .	4000
Le général chef de l'état major général de l'armée . . .	3000
Généraux de division . . .	1800
Généraux de brigade, inspecteurs aux revues et commis-	
saires ordonnateurs . . .	1200
Adjudans commandans, colonels, et sous-inspecteurs aux	
revues . . .	750
Officiers de santé principaux . . .	500
Chefs de bataillons, d'escadrons, commissaires de guerre,	
et chefs d'administration des différens services . . .	400
Commandans de place occupant dans } capitaines . . .	400
l'armée un grade inférieur à ceux } lieutenans et } .	300
ci-dessus désignées, savoir . . .	sous-lieuts. }

Au moyen de ces indemnités il ne sera rien alloué au-dessus des sommes fixés ni pour dépenses de bureaux ou de table, ni pour frais extraordinaires, quelque nature qu'ils soient et sous quelque prétexte que ce puisse être, et cette décision n'a aucun effet rétroactif. J'écris à MM. les maréchaux et généraux commandant en Espagne, pour leur faire connoître que, d'après les intentions de l'empereur, tout militaire Français qui à l'avenir aurait exigé ou reçu des traitemens extraordinaires plus forts que ceux fixés par la décision du 21 Janvier, et qui s'en serait fait payer sans une ordonnance régulière des intendans généraux ou commissaires ordonnateurs, sera suspendu de ses fonctions et qu'il en sera rendu compte dans le vingt-quatre heures pour prendre les ordres de l'empereur. Votre majesté jugera sans doute convenable de donner ses ordres au général Belliard pour que cette disposition soit suivie dans l'arrondissement de l'armée du centre. Je prie votre majesté d'agréer l'hommage de mon respect.

*Paris, 14 Fevrier, 1811.*

SIRE.—L'empereur ne m'a encore donné aucun ordre relatif à l'objet de la lettre apportée par votre aide-de-camp le colonel Clermont Tonnerre. On pense que Valence ne se soumettra que par l'approche d'une armée, et après la prise de Tarragone le corps du général Suchet sera disponible.—Les affaires paroissent s'améliorer en Portugal, le duc d'Istrie va établir l'ordre dans le nord de l'Espagne. J'envoie mon aide-de-camp le colonel le Jeune voir l'état des choses à Grénade, Malaga, Cadix et Badajoz. Je prie votre majesté d'avoir des bontés pour lui. L'empereur est en bonne santé, l'imperatrice est bientôt à terme, et nous espérons un roi des Romains. L'empereur affermit de plus en plus le grand empire. Votre majesté le seconde, mais nous apprécions ses peines et ses privations. Une nouvelle armée de deux-cent-milles hommes se forme dans le nord de la France, et l'empereur est en position d'en imposer à qui tenteroit de contrarier ses grandes conceptions; tout est bien et va bien en France.

*Paris, le 11 Avril, 1811.*

SIRE, — J'ai eu l'honneur de mander votre majesté, que l'empereur avoit donné des ordres pour qu'il lui fut envoyé chaque mois cent mille francs, et je lui ai fait connoître combien il étoit important que les troupes destinées pour l'Andalusie y arrivassent sans retard.

L'empereur pense qu'il seroit utile de chercher à tirer parti de bons Espagnols pour réunir de vrais cortez qui pourroient avoir de l'influence sur les esprits: l'intégrité de l'Espagne peut encore être maintenue si les cortez opéroient une réaction dans l'opinion: le Perou et le Mexique se sont déjà déclarés independant, et toutes les autres colonies vont échapper à l'Espagne: les vrais Espagnols doivent savoir combien les Anglais les maltraitent. On voit par les gazettes Anglaises que les cortez rassemblés dans l'île de Leon ne furent qu'une miserable canaille et des gens obscurs, qui n'ont autre projet que d'aller végéter dans les tavernes de Londres; il ne peut y avoir rien à faire avec de pareils hommes. Sa majesté trouve qu'il y auroit un grand avantage à former des cortez tirés de toutes les provinces de l'Espagne occupées par les armées Françaises. Une discussion éclairée qui s'établirait auroit beaucoup d'influence sur les esprits. L'empereur est obligé d'abandonner le projet qu'il avoit de s'entendre avec les cortez de l'île de Leon, puisque ce n'est qu'un composé de gens sans aveu: ce ne seroit donc qu'avec des cortez formés d'hommes tirés de toutes les parties de l'Espagne qu'on pourroit éclairer l'opinion des Espagnols qui aiment leur pays.

L'ambassadeur de l'empereur a transmis des plaintes sur votre major-général. Votre majesté commande l'armée du centre. Par conséquent la hiérarchie militaire ne peut pas permettre qu'il s'écarte de ses devoirs. Si je correspond souvent avec le général Belliard, c'est que votre majesté est un général roi, et que je dois lui éviter des détails qu'un major-général lui soumet.

Aucun village d'Espagne n'a été réuni à la France, et l'empereur tient à ce que votre majesté ait en Espagne toute la considération qui lui est due. Tout dépend encore du parti qu'on peut tirer de la nation. Ce qu'il y a de certain, c'est que les Anglais n'ont qu'un but; celui de ruiner la peninsule, de la détruire, parcequ'ils sentent bien qu'elle doit finir par appartenir à la France, ou à un prince de la maison de l'empereur, et qu'ils trouvent un grand avantage à diviser un pays qu'il savent ne pouvoir garder.

Je présente à votre majesté l'hommage avec mon respect,

Le prince Neufchatel, major-général,

ALEXANDRE.

*Paris, ce 6 Mai, 1811.*

SIRE, — J'ai montré à l'empereur la lettre de votre majesté, en date du 21 Avril par laquelle elle fait connoître qu'elle se met en route pour Paris: l'empereur ne s'attendoit pas à cette résolution; votre majesté lui ayant promis de ne pas quitter l'Espagne sans être convenu à l'avance des mesures à prendre et qu'exige une

pareille détermination. L'empereur trouve que dans ces circonstances le départ de votre majesté devoit être précédé de l'évacuation de l'Andalousie afin de concentrer les armées. Car dans la position des choses, le départ de votre majesté va donner une secousse défavorable à la situation des armées de l'empereur. Si votre majesté avoit quitté l'Espagne au mois de Janvier, où les armées étoient en position sans agir, cela auroit eu moins d'inconvénient. Dans ce moment votre arrivée met l'empereur dans de grandes inquiétudes, en vous considérant comme roi d'Espagne, et comme général-en-chef, l'empereur voit que votre retour sera interprété selon l'esprit et la tournure que les Anglais voudront y donner, et fera un mauvais effet; qu'il est pénible que votre majesté se soit portée à cette démarche dont il ne peut résulter aucun avantage, et qui peut avoir beaucoup d'inconvénients, car dans ce moment d'agitation l'Espagne va se trouver sans chef. Votre majesté ne voulant pas rester à Madrid, l'empereur trouve qu'il auroit été très utile qu'elle allât passer la revue de l'armée de Portugal où de l'armée d'Andalousie: l'influence de votre majesté auroit surtout été bien utile pour procurer à l'armée de Portugal tout ce qui lui est nécessaire. L'empereur, sire, est dans une grande anxiété de savoir à qui vous avez donné le commandement de l'armée du centre; si vous avez prévenu le duc de Dalmatie de votre départ, et qui étant aux mains avec l'ennemi trouvera ses embarras augmentés, n'ayant aucune direction sur ses derrières. S'il étoit possible que votre majesté reçut cette lettre encore en Espagne, l'empereur m'ordonne d'engager votre majesté à sentir les inconvénients de son retour si contraire aux circonstances. L'empereur n'a aucune nouvelle ni de l'armée d'Andalousie ni de l'armée du centre. J'épédie à votre majesté un de mes aides-de-camp. Etc. etc.

ALEXANDRE.

*Paris, le 1 Juin, 1811.*

SIRE,--L'empereur a examiné attentivement les observations que votre majesté lui a adressées, et me prescrit de me rendre auprès d'elle pour avoir l'honneur de lui donner connoissance de ce qu'il juge le plus convenable sur les divers points qui en sont l'objet. L'empereur pense, sire, que votre majesté peut partir de Paris quand elle le jugera à-propos, et même sans attendre son retour, si cela entrerait dans les intentions de votre majesté. L'armée du centre en Espagne est pleinement, entièrement sous les ordres de votre majesté, le général Belliard ne doit point prendre le titre de major général, mais celui que lui ont toujours attribué les ordres émanés de l'empereur, *de chef d'état major de l'armée du centre*. Si votre majesté n'est pas content de ce général, je vous engage, sire, à en proposer un autre qui ait votre confiance. C'est à votre majesté, sire, qu'il appartient de suspendre, de renvoyer, de traduire même à des commissions militaires quand il y a lieu, les généraux et officiers de l'armée du centre; d'administrer les provinces comprises dans l'arrondissement de cette armée comme votre majesté le jugera le plus

convenable au bien du service. A l'armée du nord de l'Espagne, l'empereur a besoin d'un maréchal qui soit chargé du commandement des troupes stationnées dans les provinces formant l'arrondissement de cette armée. Le maréchal duc d'Istrie exerce maintenant ce commandement; dans le cas, sire, où ce maréchal ne conviendrait pas à V. M. l'empereur ne serait pas éloigné de le remplacer par le maréchal Jourdan, si cette disposition étoit agréable à votre majesté et à ce maréchal. Mais l'empereur ne juge pas qu'on puisse rien changer à l'organisation de l'armée du nord; il est essentiel que cette organisation reste telle qu'elle est, si ce n'est de mettre cette armée sous les ordres d'un maréchal Français qui possède d'avantage la confiance de votre majesté. Dans les gouvernemens qui forment l'arrondissement de cette armée, c'est au nom de votre majesté, sire, que la justice doit se rendre; le commandant doit envoyer des rapports journaliers à V. M., l'intendant général M. Dudon doit envoyer à V. M. l'état de la perception des contributions et de leur emploi. L'empereur pense que V. M. doit avoir auprès du général-en-chef de l'armée du nord un commissaire Espagnol pour veiller à ce que le quart du revenu des provinces de l'arrondissement de cette armée, soit versé à Madrid pour le service de votre majesté, et pour secourir l'armée du centre. L'empereur consent à ce que toutes les fois que les provinces auraient les moyens nécessaires pour se garder et se garantir des incursions des guerillas, elles puissent rentrer entièrement sous l'administration Espagnole en ne fournissant que ce qui sera convenu. Quant à l'armée du midi de l'Espagne, l'empereur approuve qu'ainsi qu'à l'armée du nord, le maréchal qui commande envoie des rapports à V. M. et l'instruire de tout ce qui se passe; les budgets en recettes et en dépenses des différentes provinces de l'armée du midi, doivent aussi être envoyés à votre majesté, qui y tiendra un commissaire pour percevoir le quart des revenus.

La même méthode sera pareillement appliquée à l'armée d'Arragon. L'empereur, sire, satisfait aussi aux désirs exprimés par V. M. Quant à ce qui concerne le commandement général de ses armées en Espagne, sa majesté ne croit pas pouvoir donner un tel commandement qui doit être simple et un; votre M. sentira qu'il est dans la nature des choses qu'un maréchal résident à Madrid et dirigeant les opérations voudrait en avoir la gloire avec la responsabilité, et que dans ce cas, les commandans des armées du midi et de Portugal se croyant moins réellement sous les ordres de votre M. que sous de son chef d'état major, pourraient ne pas obéir, ou exécuter ce qui leur serait prescrit. Mais indépendamment du commandement de l'armée du centre, V. M. sire, aurait le commandement des troupes qui entreraient dans l'arrondissement de cette armée. Si l'armée du midi se repliait sur l'armée du centre, elle serait dès-lors sous les ordres de V. M. et il en serait de même pour l'armée du centre.

Dans celles des armées où V. M. se rendrait, elle aurait les honneurs du commandement; mais, sire, l'empereur juge très important de ne rien changer au commandement militaire ni à

l'armée du nord, ni à l'armée d'Arragon, ni aux armées du midi et de Portugal, excepté ce qu'il est nécessaire d'établir pour que V. M. ait des rapports de tout ce qui se passe, connaisse tout et puisse se servir de ces relations, dans sa position centrale, pour instruire les autres généraux: sa majesté pense que cette communication de renseignemens, d'observations, de conseils, peut même avoir lieu par le canal du ministre de la guerre de V. M. L'empereur désire, sire, que V. M. veuille bien correspondre directement avec moi par des lettres signés de sa main; j'aurai l'honneur d'adresser directement les miennes à V. M. L'empereur désire également qu'elle s'en réserve l'ouverture et fasse connaître ensuite à son chef d'état-major ce qu'elle jugera convenable. Je prie votre M. de vouloir bien donner ses ordres pour que tous les comptes rendus en états de situation me soient adressés, que les rapports soient très exacts et que je sois instruit de tout ce qui peut intéresser le service de l'empereur comme cela est d'usage dans une armée. D'après les ordres de l'empereur une somme de cinq cents mille francs par mois sera envoyée à V. M. jusqu'au 1<sup>er</sup> Juillet, et à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> Juillet, cet envoi sera d'un million par mois pendant le reste de l'année.

L'empereur, sire, me prescrit d'avoir l'honneur de concerter avec votre majesté les mesures qu'elle jugera convenables à l'organisation de l'armée du centre, ainsi que pour en retirer les généraux qui ne conviendraient pas à votre majesté, faire des exemples de ceux qui auroient commis des dilapidations, leur faire restituer les sommes qu'ils auraient dilapidées; enfin, sire, l'empereur se repose essentiellement sur votre majesté du soin de maintenir les officiers de son armée dans la discipline convenable et de faire des exemples, et il désire que V. M. envoie journellement des rapports détaillés sur tout ce qui est important. Votre majesté, sire, reconnaîtra dans ces dispositions que le désir de l'empereur est de faire tout ce qui peut donner un nouvel éclat à l'entrée de V. M. en Espagne, en maintenant d'ailleurs dans leur intégrité, ainsi que sa majesté le gage indispensable, l'organisation de l'armée d'Andalousie et des autres armées d'Espagne, &c.

*Observations faites par le roi d'Espagne sur la lettre du major général, du 1<sup>er</sup> Juin, 1811.*

Le roi demande:

1<sup>o</sup>. Que Messrs. les maréchaux commandant-en-chef les armées de l'empereur, à l'armée du nord, du Portugal, de midi, et de l'Arragon, ne puissent augmenter les impôts existant à ce jour, ni lever aucune contribution extraordinaire sans l'autorisation du roi, ou de l'empereur.

2<sup>o</sup>. Le roi désire que le maréchal Jourdan remplace le maréchal duc d'Istrie dans le commandement de l'armée du nord.

3<sup>o</sup>. Que les maréchaux commandant les armées de l'empereur et les intendans général ne puissent vendre aucune bien national ou communal sans l'autorisation du roi; qu'il en soit de même pour les plombs et vif argent appartenant à l'état.

4°. Que les administrations Espagnoles dans l'arrondissement des armées du nord, du midi, de l'Arragon, resteront, telles qu'elles sont, et que si des changemens paroissent utiles, ils seront demandés au roi.

5°. Qu'il soit spécifié que le quart des revenus des provinces occupées par les armées de l'empereur, en Espagne, sera versé net dans le trésor du roi à Madrid, et que les trois autres quartes seront employés aux besoins de l'armée dans les dites provinces, et en payement des traitemens des administrations Espagnoles.

6°. Le roi se trouvant avoir l'honneur du commandement près des armées où il se trouve, pense qu'il est dans les intentions de votre majesté qu'il puisse voir et réunir les autorités Espagnoles comme bon lui semblera pour leur parler dans l'intérêt des affaires d'Espagne: ce que le roi trouve utile de faire dans les lieux où il l'arrêtera pour se rendre à Madrid.

7°. Il paroît entendu que le maréchal commandant l'armée de Portugal rendra compte au roi des toutes les opérations, aussi que doivent le faire les autres maréchaux.

8°. Le roi trouve utile pour les intérêts des affaires d'Espagne de pouvoir s'attacher des officiers Espagnols ou autres qui se trouveroient parmi les prisonniers, et qui par des motifs particuliers il jugeroit convenable d'employer.

9°. Le roi de Westphalie qui ne peut pas recruter les régimens qu'il a en Espagne est disposé à mettre le petit nombre d'hommes qui restent aux drapeaux à la disposition du roi d'Espagne pour être à la solde et à son service; le roi d'Espagne les placeroit utilement dans la garde.

10°. Le roi désire que le général Maurice Mathieu remplace le général Lorge.

11°. Qu'il ne reste à Madrid que l'administration nécessaire pour l'armée du centre, et que cette grande quantité d'administrateurs appartenant à l'administration générale qui n'existe plus à Madrid soit envoyée à Burgos ou en France.

12°. Que la solde des troupes Françaises faisant partie de l'armée du centre continue à être payée par le trésor de France.

13°. Sa majesté conservera le général Belliard comme chef de son état major.

14°. Le roi désire pouvoir prendre toutes les mesures politiques qu'il jugera convenable, et faire toutes autres dispositions à l'égard de cortez, en se conformant aux vues contenues dans la lettre que j'ai écrite d'après l'ordre de V. M. pour cet objet.

15°. Sur les 500,000 francs que V. M. met à la disposition du roi à Madrid on en retient 100,000 francs pour l'arrière. Le roi demande que cette somme soit pour le service courant.

*Paris, le 17 Juin, 1811.*

SIRE, — L'empereur m'ordonne de vous envoyer la copie de la lettre que j'adresse au duc d'Istrie: j'écris à-peu-près dans les mêmes termes aux autres commandants. Je n'ai pas encore vu le maréchal Jourdan; je le verrai demain et immédiatement après

il partira pour Madrid, où l'empereur apprendra avec plaisir qu'il est employé comme gouverneur.

Le duc de Raguse mande qu'il est en marche sur le Tage. L'empereur désire que V. M. donne ses ordres pour qu'on lui procure tous les secours dont il peut avoir besoin : il a avec lui vingt-huit mille bayonnettes, trois mille hommes de cavalerie, et trent-six pièces de canon. L'empereur désire que V. M. puisse l'appuyer avec dixhuit cent chevaux, quinze à dixhuit pièces de canon, et deux à trois mille hommes d'infanterie : ce corps pourroit être placé à proximité afin de pouvoir rejoindre et aider le duc de Raguse, s'il devoit donner bataille aux Anglais. L'empereur verroit avec plaisir, sire, qu'après votre arrivé à Madrid vous vous rendissiez à l'armée de Portugal, pour la passer en revue, l'animer, et prendre dans votre revue l'état des emplois vacans.

J'écris au duc de Raguse que si l'on pouvoit retrancher Alcantara et faire une tête de pont sur la rive droite, ce seroit une bonne opération. Si l'armée de Portugal arrivoit à tems pour secourir l'armée du midi devant Badajoz, le petit corps de reserve dont je viens de parler ci-dessus à votre majesté ne pourroit être que de la plus grande utilité.

Le siège de Tarragone a déjà attiré une partie des bandes qui étoient dans l'arrondissement de l'armée du centre. Deux divisions de l'armée de reserve que forme l'empereur arriveront l'une à Pampelune, l'autre à Vittoria vers le 14 Juillet : cela mettra à même d'envoyer encore aux armées du midi et de Portugal environ douze milles hommes qui sont en Navarre, et qui passeront par Madrid.

L'empereur ne peut qu'engager votre majesté à envoyer à l'armée du midi tout ce qui lui appartient, car c'est là que se portent les grands coups et qu'ont lieu les opérations les plus importantes.

&c. &c.

ALEXANDRE.

*To the duke of Istria.*

*Paris, Juin, 1811.*

J'ai prévenu, Monsieur le maréchal, le général Monthion, les généraux Caffarelli et Dorsenne directement des dispositions dont je vais vous entretenir, et qui ont rapport aux intentions de l'empereur relativement au retour du roi d'Espagne dans ses états.

Le roi commande en chef l'armée du centre, mais l'intention de l'empereur est que vous correspondiez avec S. M. C. en lui faisant le rapport de ce qui se passe afin de la mettre à même de connoître l'ensemble des événemens en Espagne comme les autres généraux en chef ont l'ordre d'en agir de même, le roi sera dans le cas de pouvoir comme point central vous faire faire des communications qui contribueront au succès des armes de l'empereur.

S. M. I. m'ordonne aussi de vous faire connaître, M. le duc, que son intention est que pendant le voyage du roi dans son



retour à Madrid, tous les honneurs lui soient rendus dans les gouvernemens et dans l'arrondissement de l'armée du nord comme si S. M. commandait cette armée. Le roi donnera l'ordre et recevra les honneurs du commandement. Les gouverneurs l'accompagneront dans leur gouvernement et lui feront fournir toutes les escortes qui lui seront nécessaires. Il est à présumer que le roi séjournera quelque tems à Vittoria et à Burgos, et qu'il profitera de son séjour pour rassembler les notables du pays, les éclairer sur la situation des affaires, et améliorer l'esprit public. Vous seconderez, Mons. le maréchal, les mesures que le roi pourra prendre pour rendre les villes et les villages responsables des abus qui se commettent sur leur territoire. Vous agirez de même si le roi accorde le pardon à quelques bandes de guerillas qui se rendraient. Vous devez aider de tous vos moyens les mesures que S. M. prendra pour le rétablissement de l'ordre et de la tranquillité publique. Du reste les troupes composant l'armée du nord doivent rester sous le commandement respectif de leurs chefs et vos ordres doivent continuer à être exécutés sans qu'aucun ordre de qui que ce soit puisse les changer. Quant à l'administration du pays, elle doit continuer à marcher dans la direction donnée par les instructions et les ordres de l'empereur ; les fonds doivent être destinés aux besoins de l'armée, à l'entretien des hôpitaux, et vous devez défendre et empêcher toute espèce d'abus. Le roi ayant plus particulièrement encore que vous, les moyens de connaître les abus qu'ont lieu, l'empereur ordonne que vous profitiez des lumières que le roi pourra vous donner à cet égard pour les réprimer. Il est nécessaire, Monsieur le duc, que vous me fassiez connaître le budget des ressources et des dépenses, afin de savoir la partie des revenus qui pourront être versés à Madrid dans la caisse du gouvernement pour le service du roi et pour l'armée du centre.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous répéter que la justice doit se rendre au nom du roi ; cela a toujours dû avoir lieu ; le droit de faire grâce ne vous appartient pas pour les individus condamnés par les tribunaux ; vous n'êtes autorisé qu'à suspendre l'exécution dans les cas que vous jugerez gracieux. Le droit de faire grâce n'appartient qu'au roi. Vous n'avez pas non plus le droit de nommer à aucune place du clergé ; le roi y nomme dans toutes les parties de son royaume.

Si le roi juge à-propos de tenir près de vous et des gouverneurs un commissaire Espagnol pour connaître les recettes et les dépenses, vous devez donner à ce commissaire les renseignemens dont il aura besoin pour remplir sa mission. Vous aurez soin, Monsieur le maréchal, de me rendre compte journallement de ce qui se sera fait pendant le séjour du roi afin que j'en informe l'empereur.

&c. &c.

*Paris, le 24 Août, 1811.*

SIRE, — J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre majesté que d'après les ordres de l'empereur, je viens de faire connaître à M. le maréchal duc de Raguse, que l'armée de Portugal doit prendre désormais sa ligne de communication sur Madrid ; je lui mando

que c'est là que doit être son centre de dépôt, et que toute opération que l'ennemi ferait sur la Coa ne peut déranger cette ligne; que si l'ennemi veut prendre l'offensive il ne peut la prendre que dans l'Andalousie parceque de ce côté il a un objet à remplir, qui est de faire lever le siège de Cadix, tandis que ses efforts dans le nord s'avancèrent-ils même jusqu'à Valladolid n'aboutiraient à rien, puisque les troupes que nous avons dans ces provinces en se repliant lui opposeraient une armée considérable, et qu'alors l'armée de Portugal devrait faire pour l'armée du nord ce qu'elle ferait pour l'armée du midi. Je le prévien que l'objet important est que sa ligne d'opérations soit sur Talavera et Madrid, parceque son armée est spécialement destinée à protéger celle du midi. Je lui fais observer que l'armée de Portugal étant attaquée de front son mouvement de retraite est encore sur Madrid, parceque dans tous les cas possibles ce doit être sa ligne d'opérations; qu'il faut donc que tous les dépôts quelconques appartenant à l'armée de Portugal soient dirigés sur Talavera et Madrid. Je donne l'ordre impératif au général Dorsenne de faire partir dans les 24 heures tous les dépôts et détachemens qu'il a appartenant à l'armée de Portugal; tout ce qui est en état de servir sera dirigé en gros détachemens par Avila sur Placentia; et quant aux hommes qui ne sont pas pour le moment en état de servir, le général Dorsenne les fera diriger sur Madrid, et aura soin d'en informer à l'avance votre majesté; de manière qu'il ne lui restera plus un seul homme appartenant à l'armée de Portugal, sauf la garnison de Ciudad Rodrigo qu'il fera relever et rejoindre aussitôt après l'arrivée des renforts qui vont se rendre à l'armée du nord.

&c. &c.

*Boulogne, le 20 Sept., 1811.*

SIRE, — L'empereur m'a demandé si j'avois réponse à la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser à V. M. en lui rendant compte de la reddition de Figueras. L'empereur m'ordonne d'annoncer à V. M. que son intention est d'étendre à toute la rive gauche de l'Ebre la mesure qu'elle a jugé devoir adopter pour la Catalogne. L'empereur pense que V. M. témoin de la résistance qui éprouvent les armées et des sacrifices des toutes espèces que la France est obligé de faire, est trop juste pour ne point apprecier les motifs de la conduite de l'empereur, et je suis aubrisé à assurer V. M. des sentimens d'intérêt et d'amitié qui continuent à animer l'empereur pour V. M., mais il ne peuvent pas faire negliger à S. M. I. et R. ce qu'elle doit à la sureté de son empire et à la gloire de son règne.

&c. &c.

## No. X.

## OPERATION PROJECTED FOR THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.

ADDRESSED TO MARSHAL MARMONT BY PRINCE BERTHIER, DATED COMPEIGNÉ,  
18TH SEPTEMBER, 1811.

[Extracted from Belmas's 'Peninsula Sieges.']

MARSHAL,—When you shall have eighty pieces of artillery well furnished; when general Vandermacsen and all your depôts left in the north shall have joined you; and when you have received all equipments and clothing destined for your army, the emperor counts on your having forty-one thousand seven hundred men, and we shall then be near the first of October. When you are sure that Ciudad Rodrigo has been re-victualled for three months, the emperor leaves you free to march on Badajos, invest Elvas, and inundate the Alemtejo. In that case S. M. directs that the fifth corps shall be under your orders, with three thousand cavalry which the duke of Dalmatia will furnish. You will thus have fifty-seven thousand three hundred men based on Estremadura and the fortress of Badajos, and you can besiege Elvas, take the town and one of the forts, which will not be difficult, disturb the English towards Abrantes and Lisbon, and in a good position watch to see if they will give battle to relieve Elvas. If they let you besiege that place, you will have gained a real advantage, you will have relieved the north, and by that single stroke have thrown the enemy into Lisbon. Elvas might be taken before the 15th of November with the exception of one fort which is of little importance: this will forward affairs so, that before the month of February the campaign will be active in the interior of Portugal.

If the enemy should then take the offensive and move on Salamanca and Valladolid, he will find Salamanca fortified and provisioned for two months; and general Dorsenne will have to fall back upon Valladolid, or even on Burgos, where he will find himself at the head of fifty thousand men, exclusive of a division in the Asturias and of the troops in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th governments. But this movement of the English is not at all probable; they will more likely hasten to the defence of Lisbon, and will be pursued by twenty-five thousand men detached from the army of the north. So that two divisions will hold them in check. The operation which I have explained to you, marshal, is the only one which can do honour to our arms, draw us out of the defensive state we are in, make the English tremble, and advance us towards great events. The twenty-five thousand men who shall be on the Coa, will follow the English army; and if the latter concentrates entirely on the Tagus, the army of the north will detach fifteen thousand men to join you, which will give you a force of seventy-two thousand three hundred men.

The taking of a fortress under the eyes of the English army;

the conquest of a part of Portugal which will cover the army of the south; and the junction with your force of twenty-five thousand men from that army of the south, will be for you motives of glory, and of success. On another side marshal Suchet will march upon Valencia, and everything tends to a belief that Valencia will be taken by the time you have reduced Elvas, and that you can be thus reinforced with another good division.

You have, marshal, well observed that to execute the operation proposed, *we must be sure that the enemy has not got any battering-train to attack Ciudad Rodrigo*; because if the siege of that place is commenced, it will be necessary at first to march and disengage the fortress, seeing the army of the north is not strong enough alone to do so, and its business is to fall back if the English, which is not likely, attempted to fall upon that army when you march on the south. But if you are prepared, and that Ciudad Rodrigo is not besieged, you can, with the aid of the fifth corps, attack and overthrow all the positions of the line of English placed on the left bank of the Tagus. That will cause such alarm and will so disquiet lord Wellington, that he will probably return by long marches to Lisbon.

In case of your junction with the army of the north to march for the succour of Ciudad Rodrigo, if the enemy besiege it, you will by his majesty's orders have the command of both armies. You will find joined to this letter a duplicate order placing the fifth corps under your command when you shall have resolved to march on Elvas; also a duplicate order to general Dorsenne if you march on Ciudad Rodrigo.

(Signed)

ALEXANDER.

END OF VOL. III.







